Out of the Melting Pot and Into the Fire:

Race Relations Policy

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In 1947, then New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey declared that "New York City is not a melting pot, it's a boiling pot." Thirty-five years later, it is an apt description of Los Angeles and other major American cities. Patterns of residential segregation, the inequitable distribution of public goods and services, and capital flight from core urban areas all provide the backdrop for increasing incidents of racial conflict and violence. And what is increasingly evident is that such racial tensions are no longer intelligible, if indeed they ever were, within the framework of a "black/white" paradigm of race relations.

Despite this quite obvious observation, the prevailing race relations literature continues to retain an exclusive black/white focus. A look at recent popular books by Andrew Hacker, the Edsalls, and Studs Terkel[1] suggests that when scholars and journalists talk about race relations, they mean relations between African Americans and Whites. Such biracial theorizing misses the complex nature of race relations in the post-civil rights era and is unable to grasp the patterns of conflict and accommodation among several increasingly large racial/ethnic groups. In most major cities, for example, Whites have fled to surrounding suburban rings, leaving the inner city the site of turf battles between different racial minorities.

Confronting this reality, political analysts have had to reexamine the utility of various models of race relations, or, as is more often the case, attempt to make the facts fit within the existing black/white paradigm.

While the latter option is a meaningless exercise, a contemporary response to Marvin Gaye's troubling question "What's going on?" is not easy to frame.

The recent riots in Los Angeles may serve to broaden our racial outlook. Journalist Tim Rutten described the devastation in the immediate wake of the Rodney King decision as "the nation's first multi-ethnic urban riot, one that involved not simply the traditional antagonism of one race toward another, but the mutual hostility, indifference, and willingness to loot of several different racial and ethnic groups."[2] Indeed, if only for a fleeting moment, the Los Angeles riots served to focus media attention on generally neglected racial/ethnic subjects—Korean, Guatemalan, Salvadoran, Chicano—who were both victims and victimizers. Given the contemporary and projected patterns of immigration, it is precisely these groups which will shape the patterns of race relations in a state such as California.

What impact will the tremendous projected growth and increasing visibility of Asian Americans over the next several decades have on racial/ethnic relations in the United States? I believe that it will challenge existing paradigms of race relations, reveal new patterns of "racialization" with respect to individual/collective identity and political organization, and fuel disturbing trends in racial politics.

The Limits of Existing Race Relations Theory

For most of the 20th century, the dominant conception of American race relations has been that of assimilation.[3] It has been a popularly accepted understanding that different racial/ethnic groups over time would lose their cultural distinctiveness and become what mainstream social scientists have called "Anglo-conformists." From the vantage point of this perspective, structural boundaries would recede and groups would neither be segregated nor marginalized in residential life, the labor market, and politics.

The assimilationist framework has been the dominant paradigm in interpreting the historical experiences of Asian Americans. At the turn of the century, it was used as a justification for Asian exclusion, the rationale being that Asians were unassimilable and a significant racial threat to the white population on the West Coast.[4] In the 1950s, it was used as a gauge by which to measure the degree of "separateness" of

Chinese Americans and as a plea for the shedding of "difference."[5] In the late 1960s, in the midst of ghetto rebellions and the emergence of Asian American consciousness, it was used to illustrate the successful integration of Japanese Americans into the mainstream of American life.[6] Currently, however, the paradigm's continued usefulness in explaining patterns of social/cultural/political consciousness and organization among Asian Americans is questionable.

The assimilationist perspective has assumed a zero-sum relationship between assimilation and the retention of ethnicity. To become more "Americanized," therefore, meant that one was less "Asian." By contrast, recent scholarship on Japanese Americans has suggested that they have been able to maintain high levels of ethnic consciousness and ethnic community involvement, while simultaneously becoming structurally assimilated into the dominant society.[7]

Another challenge to the assimilationist framework is the fact that the new wave of post-1965 Asian immigrants have had an unprecedented opportunity to develop "private cultures" within the broader American culture. In sharp contrast to the pre-1965 immigrants, they have been able to maintain more comprehensive links with their respective homelands. Some of these connections have been shaped by the video revolution and the global dissemination of popular culture. The proliferation of video stores in Asian American communities allow new Asian immigrants to view the latest tapes from Manila, Seoul, or Hong Kong—"soap operas," dramas, musicals, and soft-core pornography. In addition, independent television stations in selected markets regularly broadcast ethnic programming, keeping their audiences "current" in news and popular culture.

New Asian American immigrants maintain their connection to the homeland not merely through electronic means, but through trans-Pacific travel as well. Quick and relatively affordable, air travel has made the borders and boundaries which separate Asia and the mainland United States more fluid. This has allowed new Asian American immigrants to shuttle back-and-forth to meet family obligations, vacation, or to allow their children a periodic immersion into their respective language and culture. Such a situation contrasts sharply with the pre-1965 Asian immigrants who were more divorced from their homelands and faced forced assimilation in the immediate postwar period.

New Asian communities are emerging, on an unprecedented scale.

They are not small, dingy, urban enclaves like the Chinatowns and Japantowns of recent memory, nor are they a product of restrictive covenants or other mechanisms of ghettoization. They are a product of the demand for ethnic goods and services, and, in many instances, are testimony to the infusion of Asian capital here in the U.S. A "Little Saigon" has arisen in Westminster in Orange County, California, featuring dozens of mini-malls and a large-scale shopping center with huge, gleaming white Buddhist figures gracing the entrance. And when one is in Monterey Park, California, whose population is well over 50 percent Asian, it is not clear *who* is assimilating into *what*.

In suggesting that the new immigrant communities do not face a stark choice between assimilation and the maintenance of ethnic identity and organization, I do not wish to imply that no transformation exists. Clearly what is interesting to examine is the manner in which a *new* distinct identity and culture is shaped, contested, and continually reformed. Tran Van Ngoc, 45, a former helicopter pilot in Vietnam who now works as a computer technician in Southern California, articulates the seemingly unconscious nature of this process, and the confusion it engenders:

> We are Vietnamese but we are not Vietnamese. Living in a new country, we change and we don't even know it. Our thoughts are different and we don't even know it. Sometimes I try to deny that I am Americanized, but I have changed.[8]

The growth and persistence of private cultures poses a challenge to the smooth trajectory of incorporation into the dominant culture predicted by the assimilationist paradigm. In many respects, the limits of the assimilationist model are rooted in its emergence as an analysis of the historical incorporation of succeeding waves of white European immigrants. By contrast, an alternative perspective would have to account for distinct trajectories of incorporation, exclusion, and social/cultural autonomy, and not take assimilation as an inevitable outcome or desirable goal. Such an alternative view of race relations, I would argue, first needs to confront and challenge the prevailing concepts of race.

Racial Formation and the Concept of Racialization

For the most part, contemporary social science has explicitly rejected biologistic notions of race in favor of approaches which stress the *social* construction of race. But while it has elevated the idea of race as a socio-historical concept, much of contemporary social science nonetheless slips into a kind of objectivism about racial identity and racial meaning. In many empirical studies, race is simply treated as an independent variable requiring little or no elaboration. Such studies can intriguingly correlate race and poverty, race and heart disease, or race and residential patterns, but in so doing render unproblematic the concept of race itself.

In contrast to this approach, *racial formation* theory[9] treats race as a fluid, unstable, and "decentered" complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political conflict. Relations between "races," therefore, fundamentally transform what races are about. Central to the discussion at hand is the construction of racial identity and meaning which Howard Winant and I call *racialization*.

The concept of racialization signifies the extension of racial meaning to a previously racially unclassified relationship, social practice, or group. A historical example would be the consolidation of the racial category of *black* in the United States from Africans whose specific identity was Ibo, Yoruba, or Bakaongo among others. Parallel to this was, as historian Winthrop Jordan observes, the emergence of *white* as a term of self-identity evolving from earlier conceptions of *Christian, English,* and *free*.[10]

Asian Americans are undergoing unique and specific patterns of racialization which will deepen and intensify in the decades to come. In the post-civil rights era, they have been consolidated into a new racial category, have experienced the increasing significance of class divisions, and have been directly implicated in the overall politicization of race. This has, and will continue to have, profound effects on relations between Asian American ethnic groups, and between Asian Americans and other racial/ethnic groups.

Identity, Collective Consciousness, and Political Organization

The post-civil rights period has witnessed the rise of *panethnicity* as a phenomenon of racialization. Groups which were previously self-defined

in terms of specific ethnic background, and which were marginalized by the seemingly more central dynamic of "black/white" relations, began to confront their own racial identity and status in a political environment of heightened racial consciousness and mobilization. Sociologists David Lopez and Yen Espiritu argue that such panethnic formation has become a crucial feature of contemporary ethnic change, "supplanting both assimilation and ethnic particularism as the direction of change for racial/ethnic minorities."[11]

Prior to the late-1960s, there were no "Asian Americans." In the wake of the civil rights movement, distinct Asian ethnic groups, primarily Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and Korean Americans, began to frame and assert their common identity as Asian Americans. This political label reflected a similar historical experience of being subjected to exclusionary immigration laws, restrictive naturalization laws, labor market segregation, and patterns of ghettoization by a polity and culture which treated all Asians as alike.

The *racialization* of Asian Americans involved muting the profound cultural and linguistic differences, and minimizing the significant historical antagonisms, which had existed among the distinct nationalities and ethnic groups of Asian origin. In spite of enormous diversity, Asian American activists found this new political label a crucial rallying point for raising political consciousness about the problems of Asian ethnic communities and for asserting demands on state institutions. From a racialization perspective, Asian American panethnicity is driven by a dynamic relationship between the specific group being racialized and the state. The elites representing such groups find it advantageous to make political demands by using the numbers and resources which panethnic formations can mobilize. The state, in turn, can more easily manage claims by recognizing and responding to large blocs as opposed to dealing with the specific claims of a plethora of ethnically defined interest groups. In this context, conflicts occur over the precise definition and boundaries of various racially defined groups, and their adequate representation in census counts, reapportionment debates, and minority aid.

Panethnic consciousness and organization are, to a large extent, contextually and strategically determined. Different Asian American ethnic groups have found that there are times when it is advantageous to be in a panethnic "Asian Americans" bloc, and times when it is desirable to mobilize along particular ethnic lines.

The situational nature of this dynamic is illustrated by two examples. In an attempt to boost their political clout and benefits from land trust arrangements, native Hawaiians voted four-to-one in January 1990 to expand the definition of their people to anyone with a drop of Hawaiian "blood." Previously only those with at least 50 percent Hawaiian "blood" were eligible for certain benefits. By contrast, in June 1991 in San Francisco, Chinese American architects and engineers protested the inclusion of Asian Indians under the city's minority business enterprise law. Citing a Supreme Court ruling which requires cities to narrowly define which groups had suffered discrimination to justify specific affirmative action programs, Chinese Americans contended that Asian Indians should not be considered "Asian." At stake were obvious economic benefits accruing to designated "minority" businesses.

Such inclusionary/exclusionary debates make the very utility of the concept "Asian Americans" unclear. The irony is that the term came into vogue at precisely the historical moment when new Asian groups were entering the U.S. who would render the term problematic. The new post-1965 Asian immigrants, encompassing a diverse range of class origins, ethnic identities, and political orientations make it increasingly difficult to speak of a "shared" experience.

Such diversity between and within Asian American groups makes for interesting politics. Few can claim to speak for Asian Americans as a whole. Older organizations such as the Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association cannot represent and articulate the needs of the increasingly diverse ethnic Chinese population in America. The second and third generation Asian Americans who founded many community-based organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s are now in the demographic minority. Every group except Japanese Americans now has more foreign-born than native-born members. The estimated growth in the immigrant population suggests an emerging leadership gap between Asians on the basis of nativity status.

Differences also manifest themselves between Asian American ethnic groups as the result of distinct political agendas. Filipino "homeland" politics and the Japanese American movement for redress/reparations, for example, are issues which elicit little excitement or the potential for political mobilization outside of the ethnically specific community. In the wake of the L.A. riots, some Korean American leaders felt that other Asian American groups did not take a firm stand against the violence

and property damage directed at Korean American small businesses. Bong Hwan Kim, executive director of the Korean Youth Center, said, "You can't deny the fact that among some [Chinese and Japanese Americans] there was an 'I-am-not-Korean mentality,' and then running for the hills."[12]

This, if anything, illustrates the situational nature of panethnic identity and organization, and the circumstances which can lead to its unraveling. Another source of potential difference lies in the increasing class stratification of Asian American communities.

The Increasing Significance of Class

The relative importance of class with respect to race is currently a central preoccupation in the race relations literature. When sociologist William Julius Wilson argued in 1978 that the contemporary life chances of individual African Americans "have more to do with their economic class position than with their day-to-day encounters with whites,"[13] he created a raging storm of a debate about the relative importance of race versus class in American life. At stake was discerning *the key factor* in determining life chances and the patterns of racial accommodation and conflict.

I would argue that correspondingly little attention has been given to the issue of class and contemporary Asian American communities. Research questions abound. What is the class structure of Asian American communities? How does it mirror, intersect, or diverge from the broader configuration of class stratification in the United States? What is the relationship of the distribution of status and power to economic class location in Asian American communities? What are the class bases for specific political mobilizations?

Suggesting these topics does not imply that no literature exists. Good work has indeed been done on political organization, the ethnic labor market, and the relationship of Asian Americans to the global economy.[14] However, what may be important to future research endeavors and policy initiatives is to understand the effects of race and class on the contemporary Asian American experience in a way which does not assert the primacy of one factor, nor treat each as an objectively distinct category with rigidly defined boundaries.

Korean-African American conflict in Los Angeles and other urban

settings, for example, cannot be neatly framed in either purely class or racial terms. Such tragic conflict is overdetermined by an ensemble of factors involving the ghetto economy, patterns of small entrepreneurship, access to resources, and racial ideology in the United States and South Korea.

The recent U.S. Commission on Civil Rights report[15] on Asian Americans illustrates that racial discrimination is a problem which affects all classes in the Asian American community, although its effects vary widely by class strata. The problems encountered by a rich entrepreneur from Hong Kong and a recently arrived Hmong refugee are obviously distinct. The sites and types of discriminatory acts each is likely to encounter, and the range of *available responses* to them, differ by class location. Distinct class strata in the Asian American community experience a *differential racialization* in which race has been rendered more complex by class.

From a racialization perspective, much of the existing race/class debate suffers from the imposition of rigid categories and analyses which degenerate into dogmatic assertions of the primacy of one category over the other. I see the importance of analyzing racial and class divisions in a single unified framework—one which grasps the increasing significance of class for Asian Americans within a social order still highly structured by race. To do this, one would have abandoned any essentialist notions of race and class, and view them as different, and at times competing, modalities by which social actors see themselves and collective action is mobilized.[16]

In summary, the "increasing significance of class" does not necessarily suggest the "declining significance of race." However, a *differential racialization* has developed between and within different Asian American communities with important consequences for individual identity, collective consciousness, and political organization.

In the coming decades, there will be issues which unite Asian Americans, and issues which divide them. Redistricting and reapportionment debates, Asian American admissions in higher education, and anti-Asian violence are issues which cut across different Asian American ethnic groups and offer the potential for panethnic unity. On the other hand, class, nativity, and generational differences can manifest themselves in distinct political agendas. Many foreign-born Asians desperately need programs, such as English-acquisition and job-training programs which can ease their transition into the mainstream of American life. More

"established" and resource-rich groups are less concerned with basic "survival issues" and instead emphasize mobility ones such as the "glass ceiling" in professional employment. In spite of these significant differences, I believe that panethnic consciousness will be an enduring feature of Asian American organization in the coming decades as political elites attempt to wield a range of disparate interests into a coherent political force. This may prove to be crucial in order to respond to disturbing trends in the prevailing political climate.

The Racialization of Politics

Last year, Megan Higoshi and other members of a mostly Japanese American Girl Scout troop were selling cookies outside of a suburban supermarket in Southern California. A man they approached simply replied, "I only buy from American girls."[17] Over 50 years after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Japanese Americans are again victims of rising tensions between Japan and the United States. This should come as no surprise. The fate of Asian Americans has always been historically shaped by the prevailing state of U.S.-Asia relations.

The current state of relations is a rapidly deteriorating one. The "Buy American" craze continues despite the confusion created by multinational ownership, sourcing of parts and materials, and assembly. And the indicators of deteriorating relations are not purely economic, they are cultural as well. Examples like Baseball Commissioner Fay Vincent's objection to selling the Seattle Mariners to Nintendo, Michael Crichton's new thriller *Rising Sun*, and Ray Stevens' country hit, "Working for the Japanese" illustrate the cultural pervasiveness of anti-Japanese sentiments. Such sentiments have created an upsurge in random and organized acts of anti-Asian violence.[18]

More disturbing is the manner in which these sentiments seep into electoral politics. During the Senate campaign in New Hampshire, Democratic Senate candidate John Durkin accused his Republican opponent Bob Smith of accepting support from "Japs":

> The same Japs who planned and carried out a sneak attack on Dec. 7, 1941, are now planning a sneak attack on the voters of New Hampshire on Nov. 6, 1990. Here we have the Japs, they buy Rockefeller Center and are trying to turn the Rockettes into

geishas. That's bad enough. But here they're trying to buy a U.S. Senate seat.[19]

Durkin's analysis highlights a disturbing dimension of contemporary politics—the manner in which political issues are *racialized*. Political issues have been increasingly interpreted through a framework of racial meanings. Jesse Helms' come-from-behind Senate campaign in 1990, the late Lee Atwater's "Willie Horton" ad campaign for President Bush, and David Duke's surprising show of support in various Louisiana bids are all eloquent testimony to the fact that the *race card* can be effectively played and does win elections. "Racially coded" and racially explicit appeals have come to dominate electoral contests, and as such, there has been an increasing *racialization* of politics.

Much of this has taken the form of a concerted backlash to the perceived social impact of an increasingly diverse population. David Duke, during his declaration of candidacy in December 1991, argued that immigration should be a major issue in the presidential election. The time had come, he stated, to severely limit immigration into our society:

> What's happening is, we are unraveling. We're losing our way. This country is overwhelmingly European descent. It's overwhelmingly Christian. And if we lose our underpinning, I think we're going to lose the foundations of America.[20]

During his presidential campaign, Patrick Buchanan drew upon the assimilationist paradigm to weigh the social costs of integrating different groups:

> I think God made all people good. But if we had to take a million immigrants in, say Zulus next year, or Englishmen, and put them up in Virginia, what group would be easier to assimilate and would cause less problems for the people of Virginia?[21]

Other political initiatives are indicative of an overall intolerance towards diversity. U.S. English has recently begun a $1.6 million campaign against congressional representatives who oppose a House bill declaring English the official U.S. language. Norman Shumway, the organization's chairman and former Republican Congressman from California, says, "There are people coming to this country who feel they don't have to learn English, and we think that's a threat."[22] In addition to this, a

growing number of businesses, ranging from hospitals to bottling plants, have implemented work rules which require their employees to speak English on the job. At the heart of these restrictions lurks the issue of race. Ed Chen, a lawyer for the ACLU, observes:

> For a lot of folks, language becomes a proxy for race or for immigrant status. It becomes a legitimate way of expressing concern about being overrun by hordes of Mexicans and Asians coming into the United States.[23]

The overall racialization of politics projects a grim vision of the future in which multiracial and multicultural diversity is openly resisted and legislated against, instead of celebrated.

Trends and Prospects

Some intriguing demographic shifts will occur in the years to come which will influence the nature of race relations between Asian Americans and other groups. The number of Asian Americans, which doubled in the last ten years, is expected, according to projections, to double again in 20 years to over 14 million. Although Asian Americans still tend to cluster in a few states and in urban centers like the Chinatowns of San Francisco and New York, they will increasingly be found in all parts of the country. According to the 1990 Census, some states have seen a dramatic growth in their Asian American population since the last count: Texas, up 165.5 percent (319,459); New Jersey, up 162 percent (272,521); and Rhode Island, up 245 percent (18,325).[24]

The Census also reveals that Asian Americans are increasingly likely to live in the suburbs. An interesting dimension of Asian American residential patterns in the post-civil rights period is that they are quite distinct from the patterns of "hypersegregation" which African Americans experience. An examination of the 16 largest cities in America found that Asian Americans were nearly half as likely to be residentially segregated from Whites as African Americans.[25] The growing "suburbanization" of Asian Americans, however, may bring with it a host of new problems as new Asian immigrants settle in areas and transform the established patterns of housing and consumption. In this regard, the political battles in Monterey Park over English-Only signs, development, and racial recomposition may prefigure the future.

In certain areas of the economy, Asian capital investment is growing and will continue to grow in the coming decades. It is estimated, for example, that Asians are starting a quarter to a third of all new electronics companies in California's Silicon Valley.[26] Recent changes in immigration laws may further stimulate investment. Under the Immigration Act of 1990, some 10,000 visas are reserved for wealthy foreign investors willing to invest a minimum of one million dollars and to create at least ten jobs for U.S. citizens. This has numerous states attempting to lure rich Asian immigrants as part of an economic development strategy.[27]

Despite their anticipated influence on economy and society, there has been, up to now, little attention given to Asian Americans and how they are affected by, and how they affect, the broader patterns of racial politics. The absence of a sustained scholarly and policy-oriented appraisal will become more glaring and untenable in the years to come. Currently a host of issues which cut to the heart of racial politics in the United States have been raised by, or centrally involved, Asian Americans:

- The question of bilingual education as articulated in the *Lau* v. *Nichols* decision.
- Immigration reform, particularly as it relates to the emphasis on family reunification, established in 1965.
- Affirmative action in a range of arenas, but particularly with respect to Asian admissions into institutions of higher learning.
- Reapportionment debates, particularly in California and New York in the face of the dramatically changing racial make-up of these states.
- Civil rights legislation as reflected in the disputed *Wards Cove* decision.
- Race and the performing arts as witnessed by the Jonathan Pryce/*Miss Saigon* controversy.
- And perhaps most immediately, interracial tensions in inner city communities of which the tragedy of African American-Korean relations in South Central is but one manifestation.

While analysts of race relations continue to focus almost exclusively on black/white relations, the reality is that Asian Americans have become a crucial barometer of the contemporary racial climate.

Indeed, an analysis of contemporary Asian American images—as a "model minority" and as a racial threat—reveals interesting dimensions of the very nature of racism in the United States. We tend to think of racism as hostility directed against those of a different skin color whom we believe to be "inferior"—in class and status terms, in intellectual ability, or in cultural orientation. This is coupled with structural forms of discrimination—in the job market, in politics, in residential patterns—and negative cultural representations. In the United States, African Americans are subject to this type of racism.

Asian Americans, however, are subject to a different form of racism. They are often the objects of *resentment* by other groups who perceive that they do "too well," that they unfairly secure wealth and other material resources and social advantages. This resentment has historically resulted in political disenfranchisement and exclusionary laws in the late-19th to early-20th century. We are seeing some of that today in the form of "English-Only" initiatives and more stringent curbs on immigration and foreign capital investment.

A political response from Asian Americans has emerged to this climate of increased intolerance, though it remains vague and in formation. Between Asian American ethnic groups, the degree of panethnic unity remains situationally defined. Between Asian Americans and other racial minority groups, there are issues which can potentially unite, and issues which threaten to divide. A common agenda around bilingual education, immigration reform, and employer discrimination against foreign-born or non-English speaking workers can seemingly be forged with Latino groups. These same issues, however, in an era of declining public resources and private opportunities, can be the basis for conflicts with African Americans. On the other hand, a shared concern for civil rights legislation and enforcement, equal opportunity in hiring and promotion decisions, and the economic reconstruction of our major cities can potentially unite Asian Americans with African Americans, as well as other racial minorities.

In an editorial reflecting on the meaning of the L.A. riots, Judy Ching-Chia Wong states:

> The problems and experiences of Asian-Americans, African-Americans, Hispanics, etc., while sometimes similar, are not the same. Unless Asian-Americans learn to think and speak out as a group, we will continue to be caught in the middle, misunderstood and pummeled by both sides.[28]

Her assessment seems quite correct. In the worst case scenario, Asian Americans would increasingly be the victims of racial violence, while simultaneously being extolled and regarded by the media, political leaders, and the general populace as the shining exemplars of the assimilative capabilities of our society. In this context, Asian Americans will add a new and very troubling dimension to the continuing "American dilemma."

Notes

1. Andrew Hacker, *Two Nations: Black and White, Separate, Hostile, Unequal* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992); Thomas Byrne Edsall and Mary D. Edsall, *Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, Rights, and Taxes on American Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991); Studs Terkel, *Race: How Blacks and Whites Think and Feel about the American Obsession* (New York: New Press, 1992).
2. Tim Rutten, "A New Kind of Riot," *New York Review of Books* 39:11 (June 11, 1992), 52.
3. The most comprehensive explication of the assimilationist paradigm is Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
4. Paul Takagi, "The Myth of 'Assimilation in American Life,' " *Amerasia Journal* 2 (1973), 149–158.
5. Rose Hum Lee, *The Chinese in the United States of America* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1960).
6. Harry H. L. Kitano, *Japanese Americans: The Evolution of a Subculture* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
7. Stephen S. Fugita and David J. O'Brien, *Japanese American Ethnicity: The Persistence of Community* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991).
8. Quoted in Seth Mydans, "Vietnamese, With Hearts across the Sea," *New York Times* (August 22, 1991), A16.
9. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, *Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1980s* (New York and London: Routledge, 1986).
10. Winthrop Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (New York: Norton, 1968).

11. David Lopez and Yen Espiritu, "Panethnicity in the United States: A Theoretical Framework," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 13 (1990), 198.
12. Quoted in L. A. Chung, "Asian Americans Frustrated in Trying to Respond to Rioting," *San Francisco Chronicle* (May 6, 1992), A4.
13. William Julius Wilson, *The Declining Significance of Race: Blacks and Changing American Institutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 1.
14. See, for example, Peter Kwong, *Chinatown, N.Y.: Labor and Politics, 1930–1950* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979); Ivan Light and Edna Bonacich, *Immigrant Entrepreneurs: Koreans in Los Angeles, 1965–1982* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
15. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Civil Rights Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s*, Washington, D.C., February 1992.
16. These comments can be extended to a consideration of gender as well. In many respects, racialization is a highly "gendered" process with women and men experiencing community, the labor market, and the "private, domestic" sphere in a distinct fashion. Racial ideology assigns distinct attributes to racialized men and women as endless versions of Madam Butterfly (from *M. Butterfly* to *Miss Saigon*) attest.
17. Quoted in Seth Mydans, "New Unease for Japanese-Americans," *New York Times* (March 4, 1992), A8.
18. See chapter 2, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Civil Rights Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s*.
19. "Opponent Calls Senate Candidate a Japanese Agent," *San Francisco Chronicle* (October 27, 1990), A8.
20. Quoted in Robin Toner, "Duke Takes His Anger into 1992 Race," *New York Times* (December 5, 1991), A14.
21. Buchanan made this comment on the ABC News program *This Week*. Quoted in Maureen Dowd, "Buchanan's Alternative: Not Kind and Gentle," *New York Times* (January 15, 1992), A12.
22. Quoted in Dan Levy, "U.S. English Goes National with Campaign," *San Francisco Chronicle* (July 9, 1992), A7.
23. Quoted in Seth Mydans, "Pressure for English-Only Job Rules Stirring a Sharp Debate Across U.S.," *New York Times* (August 8, 1990), A10.
24. Fox Butterfield, "Asians Spread Across a Land, and Help Change It," *New York Times* (February 24, 1991), A14.
25. Reynolds Farley and Walter R. Allen, *The Color Line and Quality of Life in America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 144–145.
26. Andrew Pollack, "Asian Immigrants New Leaders in Silicon Valley," *New York Times* (January 14, 1992), A1.
27. James Leung, "California Tries to Lure Rich Asian Immigrants," *San Francisco Chronicle* (February 11, 1991), A1.
28. Judy Ching-Chia Wong, "Victims of Both Races," *New York Times* (May 28, 1992), A15.