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on behalf of

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

In 1940 there were 127,000 individuals of Japanese descent in the contiguous United States. They comprised less than one-tenth of 1% of the total population. Approximately 90% lived in California, Oregon, and Washington with nearly 75% living in California. In the area of highest population concentration - Los Angeles - they represented an insignificant minority. Only 16 of every 1,000 residents (.16%) of the people in Los Angeles were of Japanese ancestry.

Two-thirds of the individuals of Japanese ancestry were born in the United States and were, therefore, American citizens. The remaining third were aliens who were ineligible for naturalization until 1952. Of the 113,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry residing in the three West Coast states, 72,000 were Japanese Americans (tenBroek, Barnhart, and Matson, 1954) some of whom were Sansei (the American born children of American born parents). The preponderance of foreign born males were over 50 years of age while their female counterparts were over 40 (Broom and Kitsuse, 1973). The data for the American born are more difficult to interpret since they include both the Nisei and their children, the Sansei. Thus, while there have been arguments that both aliens and citizens had to be evacuated because the Nisei were minors, the contention is based upon a misinterpretation of the data which combined both the Nisei and the Sansei. Since approximately one-third of the Japanese Americans in 1980 are Sansei (they

were 10 years old or younger in 1942), it is evident that a significant number of evacuee families were likely to have been nuclear families in which both children and parents were American born.

I will not document the history of anti-Asian feeling on the West Coast of the United States. Suffice it to indicate that any cursory perusal of social histories dealing with the experiences of immigrants from China and Japan before World War II amply demonstrates the prejudice and discrimination borne by individuals of Chinese and Japanese ancestry on the West Coast.

Approximately two months after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, a number of individuals began to publicly advocate the evacuation of all individuals of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast. Despite statements from Mr. J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066. A flavor of the spurious arguments is contained in statements by Walter Lippmann and Earl Warren.

Lippman (1942) indicated:

... since the outbreak of the Japanese War there has been no important sabotage on the Pacific Coast. From what we know about the Fifth Column in Europe, this is not, as some have liked to think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a sign that the blow is well organized, and that it is held back until it can be struck with maximum effect.

Grodzins (1949) quotes Warren as having stated:

It seems to me that it is quite significant that in this great state of ours we have had no Fifth Column activities and no sabotage reported. It looks very much to me as though it is a studied effort not to have any until the zero hour arrives. (p. 94)

Despite the fact that many politicians, patriots, individuals, and social groups questioned the loyalty of Japanese Americans, the Army Intelligence Service began to recruit Nisei for training in Japanese language to

assign them for service in the Pacific theater in 1942. Bosworth (1942)

indicated that "it was ironical that most of those who could qualify were Kibei who had had a long or short period of education in Japan and who were considered by Commander Ringle and other experts to be generally the most disaffected element within the Japanese American population. By the end of 1942 the army intelligence authorities had already made a good start. They had recruited 167 American citizens for the language school." (p. 145). Ultimately, more than 6,000 Nisei were trained to serve with Allied forces in the Pacific during World War II (Hosokawa, 1969).

While the exploits of the Japanese Americans who served in Europe have been amply chronicled, little attention has been paid to the Japanese Americans who served in the Pacific theater. Bosworth (1967) has indicated that the Japanese Americans:

...did intelligence work, served as interpreters, and constantly ran the risk of being shot at by their own troops because they looked like the enemy. General Charles Willoughby, Chief of Staff for Intelligence to General Douglas MacArthur, expressed the belief that the use of these Japanese Americans shortened the Pacific war by at least two years and saved hundreds of thousands of American casualties.

No matter where these Americans were fighting, the fact remains that their parents, wives, and younger brothers and sisters were, for practical purposes prisoners behind barbed wire. (p. 18)

In substantiation of Bosworth's statement, Myer (1971) indicates:

Col. Sidney F. Mashbir, who commanded the Asiatic Theatre Intelligence Service, had this to say of the Japanese American contribution to victory in the Pacific. Had it not been for the loyalty, fidelity, patriotism, and ability of these American Nisei, that part of the war in the Pacific which was dependent upon intelligence gleaned from captured documents and prisoners of war would have been a far more hazardous, long drawn out affair.

At a highly conservative estimate, thousands of American lives were preserved and millions of dollars in material were saved as a result of their contribution to the war effort. (p. 152)

It is apparent, then, that despite the public rhetoric of the times,

the Japanese Americans were considered to be loyal Americans and served with distinction in the armed forces of the United States in both the European Theater where they won the distinction of being christened the "Christmas Tree Battalion" and perhaps more significantly in the Pacific Theater where they were entrusted with the vital work of serving as scouts, interpreters, and intelligence personnel. While the men were serving with distinction, their parents, siblings, relatives, and friends were incarcerated behind barbed wire in the 10 relocation centers established for that purpose.

Much has been made of the fact that there were no proven cases of espionage and sabotage involving Japanese Americans during World War II. Logic would dictate that the Japanese government would recruit individuals who were not readily identifiable for such activities. That is, if one is obviously different from the majority in a country, no government in its right mind would recruit its agents from among the physically identifiable group. Rather, a government would recruit individuals who do not stand out in a crowd.

Despite the fact that the Japanese immigrants were not allowed to become citizens of the United States, many of the aliens had already determined that their futures and that of their children lay in their adopted country. A substantial proportion of the Issei population had already entered the "family rearing" phase (Miyamoto, 1938). While in the relocation centers, all individuals 17 years of age or older were required to fill out a questionnaire. While there were differences between the forms filled out by male citizens and all other adults, the substance of Question 28 remained the same. Question 28 asked individuals to respond affirmatively or negatively to the statement, "Will you swear unqualified alle-

giance to the United States of America and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?"

Despite the fact that an affirmative response could mean that the Issei would be forswearing allegiance to the only country which recognized their citizenship, only 9% of the Issei responded negatively to the question. In contrast, among the Nisei (and, possibly, a handful of Sansei), 28% responded negatively. The percentages, incidentally, varied from camp to camp.

The summary data I've presented thus far and other data which I have not gone into demonstrate that individuals of Japanese descent were loyal Americans. Americans who were willing to leave detention centers and serve in the armed forces of the United States. Americans whose loyalty was not questioned by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Naval Intelligence. (Those about whom the FBI and Naval Intelligence had doubts had already been arrested and detained.) Americans, albeit alien Americans, who were willing to forswear allegiance to the only country that recognized them as citizens. Americans who sold or lost most of their worldly possessions to enter the assembly centers and the relocations centers.

More recently, Daniels (1975) and Weglyn (1976) having reviewed previously classified documents concluded that the decision to relocate individuals of Japanese descent was predicated upon political and economic considerations - not on the basis of military necessity. The evacuation must, then, be viewed on the basis of the long history of anti-Asian feeling on the West Coast. Hawaii, which was more central to the war effort in the Pacific was not evacuated primarily because of the opposition to evacuation by political and social groups in Hawaii. It should also be noted that individuals of Japanese descent and Aleut descent were evacuated

in Alaska. In addition, individuals of Japanese descent were evacuated in Canada, Mexico, and several other nations in the Western Hemisphere. The Commission, for example, is already cognizant of the evacuation of Japanese Peruvians.

What impact did the evacuation have upon the Japanese Americans? There has been much speculation and the personal anguish suffered has already been well documented during these hearings. It may be informative to the Commission for me to discuss some unpublished studies many of which I've conducted myself.

In 1980, I reviewed tax and real estate records in the State of Washington. I then checked public records for demographic data, e.g., age. Using these data, I matched Issei (and some Nisei) with Caucasians of roughly the same age, residing in the same general area, who were comparable in terms of "net worth." I then compared the status of the Japanese Americans with their white counterparts in 1980. The data indicate that the Issei were, on the average, worth \$150,000.00 less than their white counterparts. If one examines the median, the discrepancy increases to \$196,000.00. These data would indicate that the Issei did not recover fully from the impact of the evacuation. The property they lost was never wholly regained and the income which was deferred because of the incarceration was really income lost. Before overgeneralizing from these data, however, I must hasten to add that the study was based on one hundred individuals who resided in Seattle, Vashon Island, Bainbridge Island, Bellevue, Kent, Fife, Auburn, and Tacoma, Washington. Data from other states and areas within the State of Washington were not sought. Despite this caveat, I believe that comparable results would be obtained if the study were expanded in scope. I also believe that comparable results would

In a second study, this one conducted in 1960, I found that there were significant differences between Issei, Nisei, Kibei, and Sansei on the basis of several psychological tests. For the sake of illustration, let me focus upon results from the F-Scale. I found that Issei, Kibei, and Nisei had significantly higher scores on the F-Scale than a sample of Caucasians. There were no significant differences between the Sansei and Caucasians. I also found that the variance (statistical jargon relating to the distribution of the scores) for the Nisei was significantly higher than that for Issei, Kibei, and Sansei. The significant difference in the variance led me to a subsidiary analysis. I wondered why the variance for the Nisei should be so much larger than for other Japanese American groups. I had expected that if there was to be a significantly different variance it would appear for the Sansei. What I discovered was that if we split the Nisei on the basis of whether or not they had completed high school before the war, the variance decreased significantly. What I also found was that the Nisei who finished high school after the evacuation had significantly lower F-Scale scores than their older siblings. I won't bother the Commission with the statistical details other than to indicate that age was not the factor, i.e., Sansei and Nisei of equivalent age were significantly different. My ultimate interpretation rests upon some anecdotal evidence. Apparently, many Nisei made a conscious decision to be less "Japanesee" and to be more "American." That decision led them to emulate Caucasian Americans and to denigrate their Japanese heritage. The evacuation also forced into a Japanese American enclave individuals who had had little exposure to other Japanese Americans. For example, some of the Japanese Americans evacuated from Alaska had had no contact with other Japanese Americans since birth. Those individuals had to learn how to interact with

their new neighbors and make friends with their fellow inmates. In order to do so, these individuals had to learn new behaviors, new norms, new mores and in that process became more "Japanesee." In her doctoral dissertation, Leonetti found that many Japanese Americans deferred having children after the World War II in order to provide a more stable financial basis for rearing a family. In many Japanese American families, both parents worked in order to provide incomes that would enable the families to recover financially from the losses suffered as a result of the evacuation. As indicated by Newell in her testimony in Seattle, children were deferred until much later in life than would normally have been the case and some retired Nisei are just now becoming grandparents. The implication of deferred child bearing, beside the fact that many Nisei died before they saw their grandchildren was the loss of an entire generation of Japanese American children. Morishima (1973) also reported that the camp environment led to some major changes in child rearing practices. The lack of privacy caused some mothers to spoil their children even more than they normally would have. For example, a crying child was likely to keep an entire barracks awake at night. Consequently, the mother went out of her way to attempt to placate the crying youngster. We have no way of gauging the impact of those behaviors on the subsequent personalities of the child. Another major change in child rearing practices was reported by Morishima (1976). One of the primary means of discipline had been the threat of love withdrawal. The technique was practiced by some 90% of the Issei as a principal means of discipline (as contrasted to the 5% reported for other Americans by Sears, Maccoby, and Levin). After the war, 75% of the pre-World War II Nisei (those who had graduated from high school before the

War), 75% of the Kibei, and 45% of the post-World War II Nisei practiced the technique. Today, approximately 15% of the Japanese American families practice the threat of love withdrawal as a primary means of discipline. The change in child rearing practices should have an impact upon the later personality of the child. Threat of love withdrawal should lead to the formation of individuals who look to external stimuli for behavioral cues. That is, individuals who worry about what others will think about particular behaviors.

The research on the effects of the evacuation upon Japanese Americans is largely speculative in nature. While social scientists have speculated about the effects and interpreted what data they do have in light of the evacuation experiences, little has been done in a scientifically designed study. What is known is that the economic implications of the evacuation upon adults who had to begin life over again are enormous. Houston and Houston (1973), for example, point out that Jeanne Houston's father could not really begin life over again. He had lost heart and because of his relatively advanced years he simply could not begin again from scratch. As indicated earlier, Leonetti found that substantial numbers of younger Japanese Americans practiced deferred child bearing while both spouses worked in order to regain a sufficient financial footing. Morishima discovered that the monetary losses were likely to have been quite substantial in his comparisons of Japanese Americans and their Caucasian American counterparts.

The effects upon the personalities of Japanese Americans are also likely to have been substantial. Ignoring for the moment the lack of understanding on the part of many younger Sansei and Yonsei about the "ovine" action of their parents and grandparents, it is difficult to imagine that a stress-filled event could leave an individual unscarred. I

believe that the Commission has already been exposed to the therapeutic value of these hearings. The hearings have allowed many Japanese Americans to release their repressed feelings in public (and even more so in private). The hearings have already led to increased understanding of the actions of the Federal Government in response to an imagined crisis. The hearings have already led to an understanding of the influence public opinion can play on the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Unfortunately, the hearings have also indicated a continued lack of acceptance of Japanese Americans as being American.

It is the hope of the American Psychological Association that the hearings will result in justice for the Japanese Americans. They have been exemplary citizens and have amply demonstrated that they are American in both attitude and behavior.