

officer of the WCCA. You will thus have full power and authority to act." He then called in his sergeant (clerk) who operated the stenotype and dictated his order:

I hereby delegate to you all and in full my powers and authority under Executive Order 9066, which in turn have been delegated by The President to the Secretary of War, by the Secretary of War to the Chief of Staff, and by the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army. All rules and regulations of the Fourth Army over which I have any control or authority, you have authority to suspend, as in your judgment may be necessary. You will take this action forthrightly, you will establish a separate headquarters, you will have full authority to call upon all Federal civilian agencies as provided in the Executive Order and to call for assistance and cooperation of the State authorities as The President has in turn asked the Governors of the states concerned to provide. You will do this with a minimum disruption of the logistics of military training, operations and preparedness, and with a minimum of military personnel, and with due regard for the protection, education, health and welfare of all of the Japanese persons concerned. You will, to the maximum, take measures to induce them to relocate voluntarily under your authority, in areas east of the Cascades, Sierra Nevadas, and north of the southern half of Arizona and New Mexico, so that the burden upon them will be at a minimum. You will make known that the Army has no wish to retain them at any time for more than temporary custody. It would be contrary to the philosophy and desires of the Army to do otherwise. These measures are for the protection of the nation in a cruel and bitter war, and for the protection of the Japanese people themselves. You will use all measures to protect the personal property of Japanese, including crops.

There were 24 temporary assembly centers which were selected, established and equipped along the West Coast. I later selected the sites for the ten relocation centers to which those Japanese persons who had not already relocated in the interior could be moved pending their relocation and absorption into the economies of the interior states.

The procedure followed was to designate evacuation zone control areas. I called upon all of the Federal Agencies for assistance, including the Federal Reserve and the banks in the Federal Reserve system. I used agencies of the Departments of Agriculture and Interior. Such authority had been delegated by President Roosevelt in Executive Order 9066, as above stated.

General DeWitt's order to me directed in very specific words that "You will protect their crops, and harvest them and see that they are paid for their produce." We harvested all crops, we sold them, we deposited the money to their respective accounts. We kept families together.

As indicated, we established 24 interim family assembly centers. The families were not separated. We made special arrangements aboard the trains for their protection and for their reasonable comfort and health. Step by step, we evacuated people from designated evacuation zones into the assembly centers which had been prepared to house them.

Under my direction the relocation centers were built and furnished with residential equipment, bedding, beds, dressers, tables, chairs, schoolrooms and teaching equipment, infirmaries, dormitories, bathing and sanitary facilities, as well as kitchens and dining halls, fully equipped.

When all those who had not resettled themselves had been moved to relocation centers and all arrangements had been made for training of personnel for full staffing of these centers, the Army by Presidential order then turned over the centers to the War Relocation Authority. It was headed by a man named Dillon Meyer.

The following is a summary:

First, about their assets, their lands (Nisei could own land), their possessions, their bank accounts and other assets, their household goods, their growing crops--nothing was confiscated. Their accounts were left intact. Their household goods were inventoried and stored. Warehouse receipts were issued to the owners. Much of it was later shipped to them at government expense, particularly in the cases of those families who relocated themselves in the interior, accepted employment and established new homes.

Lands were farmed, crops harvested, accounts kept of sales at market and proceeds deposited to the respective accounts of the owners.

Second, it was never intended by Executive Order 9066 and certainly not by the Army that the Japanese themselves be held in relocation centers. The sole objective was to bring about relocation away from the Sea Frontier. Japanese were urged to relocate voluntarily on their own recognizance and extensive steps were taken to this end. The desire was to relocate them so that they could usefully and gainfully continue raising their families and educate their children while heads of families and young adults became gainfully employed. They were to be free to lease land, raise and harvest crops, go into businesses. They were not to be restricted so long as they did not seek to remain or seek to return to the war "frontier" of the West Coast.

In furtherance, from the very beginning I initiated diligent measures to urge the Japanese families to leave with the help and funding (whenever needed) of the WCCA (Wartime Civil Control Administration) on their own recognizance and resettle east of the mountains. To this end, I conferred with the governors of the seven contiguous states east of the mountains. I called a Governors' Conference at Salt Lake City. I invited them to urge attendance by members of their cabinets, by members of their legislatures and by the mayors of their communities. It was a large and successful conference. I advised them in full, sought their full cooperation, asked them to inform their citizens and to welcome and help the evacuees to feel welcome without restrictions, to become members of their inland communities and schools and to help them find employment and housing. I told them that these people would become a most constructive segment of their respective populations. Those who resettled certainly did. Where needed, I told them that the WCCA would provide financial support for a limited period.

Further to this end, I conferred with the elders of each major Japanese community along the Pacific Coast, wherever they were. I carefully explained all this to them. I expressed deep regret that this unfortunate situation had arisen. I urged them to persuade their fellow Japanese to leave before the evacuation to assembly centers began and while it was proceeding. I assured them that the WCCA would provide escort, if requested, for those who felt insecure. We organized convoys and shipped to those

who had resettled their stored possessions. I urged their cooperation. To their eternal credit, it was given.

This phase of resettlement from the temporary assembly centers came to a regrettable and necessary halt. Hostility toward the Japanese in the interior, at first minimal, developed quite suddenly and intensively in the western states of the interior as word of the brutalities committed against U.S. military and civilian forces by the Japanese became generally known.

The protection of the evacuees mandated that such a measure be instituted. I visited each assembly center and discussed the reasons for this with leaders among the evacuees. They fully understood. Assurances were given that unremitting efforts would be taken with state and city officials and with community leaders to deal with and to defuse these attitudes. Further assurances were given that resettlement from the ten relocation centers would resume in due course. Fortunately, within four to five months these hostile feelings moderated due to the good offices of officials, community leaders and the press of these interior states. The process of relocation from the assembly centers to the relocation centers resumed. The WCCA resumed its actions to foster relocation or more properly "resettlement" directly from the relocation centers.

Over four thousand took advantage of the opportunity to leave on their own recognizance with WCCA help in the first three to four months following March 1942.



Persons of Japanese ancestry along the Western Sea Frontier were not interned. Internment was never ordered. There was no confiscation. The intention and purpose was to resettle these persons east of the mountain ranges of the Cascades and Sierra Nevadas, away from the Sea Frontier and away from the relatively open boundaries between Mexico and the states of Arizona and New Mexico.

Some readers may find it useful for reference purposes to here describe the coverage of the Official Report dated June 5, 1943. With others I assisted in the preparation of that report.

The letter of transmittal of the Report to the Chief of Staff of the Army consisted of ten paragraphs, in itself a brief summary. It is included in the Official Report.

The Library of Congress card catalogue reference under the letter "U" is officially titled:

United States Army, Western Defense Command and
Fourth Army, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast

The Report is in nine parts consisting of 28 chapters with extensive reference materials and special reports appended. These reference materials included the reports of many Federal civilian agencies which had been placed under General DeWitt's direction by order of The President. In addition, various primary source materials were selected and bound together. Two of these special reports, for example, were from the Farm Security Administration of the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, a part of the Federal Reserve system. The special reports numbered twelve in all.

The Official Report, together with all of its appended and supplemental materials, was filed in the Library of Congress

and remains there. Other sets were filed in the War Department, in the custody of the Adjutant General (now the Department of Army).

General DeWitt recommended that his Report and all of its supplements be declassified and published immediately. His recommendation was adopted. At the same time, he also recommended that the type which had been set for the printing of the Report, special reports and appendixes remain intact for additional printings, so that distribution of the Report and its associated material could be quickly made available to Federal and state agencies, public libraries, colleges and universities. This was done.

Chapter Two of the Report discusses the need for military control and for evacuation. Chapter Three discusses the establishment of wartime civil control under Executive Order 9066. Chapter Four discusses the emergence of controlled evacuation. Chapter Five discusses the separation of jurisdiction over the evacuation on the one hand and relocation on the other.

Subsequent chapters discuss the evacuation methods, the organization and functions of the cooperating Federal agencies.


The Official Report provides in considerable detail the nature, characteristics, etc. of the Japanese communities along the West Coast. It is urged that the Commission study the Official Report and in so doing give due weight to these details, particularly so as to understand the context and setting. It would aid in comprehending the then perspective. To evaluate these past events in the perspectives of today would not be useful.

In the concluding paragraphs of the Report, General DeWitt states that the agencies under his command, military and civilian alike, as well as the efforts of the cooperating Federal agencies which had been placed under his direction "responded to the difficult assignment devolving upon them with unselfish devotion to duty." The paragraph (8) goes on to state: "To the Japanese themselves great credit is due for the manner in which they * * * responded to and complied with the orders of exclusion."

Within the Western Defense Command, resident aliens who were German or Italian were subject to internment. Hearing boards were established. The intelligence agencies such as the FBI and the Naval Intelligence designated those who were regarded as dangerous. Such individuals were given notice, a hearing board was convened, the individual was present, he was entitled to counsel, a reporter produced the entire record. These records were ultimately reviewed in each case by General John L. DeWitt who made the final decision with regard to whether the individual concerned would or would not be interned.

I had officially conveyed to Mr. Dillon Myer, head of the War Relocation Authority (after I had fully briefed him and his staff) full responsibility and accountability for the ten relocation centers in May of 1943.

I was then ordered to report to the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander (Designate) located on St. James Square in Norfolk House, London. This was the Combined U.S./British



Headquarters which had the duty of planning Operation Overlord, the cross-channel invasion of 1944. The Commanding General had not yet been selected or appointed. This did not happen until sometime later, of course. As everyone knows, General Dwight D. Eisenhower became the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces. The headquarters to which I reported carried the abbreviation C.O.S.S.A.C. (Chief of Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander). My permanent station then became Norfolk House, St. James, London.

In conclusion, I would add that it is manifestly unfair to judge in today's perspective the events hereinbefore described which followed the sneak attacks on Pearl Harbor, the Philippines and Singapore, as well as the destruction of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The sweeping condemnations recently made of the responsible officials cannot be condoned on any basis. They were each faced with impelling necessity. The slurs and slanders of men who are above reproach demeans the character of those who cast them. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, then President of the United States, who made the ultimate decision was a man of compassion and integrity. His chief legal advisor, Attorney General Francis Biddle was also a man of compassion, well and highly regarded for his balanced judgment.

The Honorable Henry Stimson, then Secretary of War who had been the Secretary of State, was a man of great breadth and tolerance. His place in history bespeaks his humane qualities.

Who can responsibly characterize these men, as well as Earl Warren, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court as racists, as men of no compassion? When Chief Justice Warren was Governor of California, he reluctantly concluded that there was no alternative to the action taken.

The Honorable John J. McCloy who then was The Assistant Secretary of War and a man of towering stature, tolerance, compassion and discretion came to the same conclusion.

General George C. Marshall, then the Chief of Staff to The Secretary of War is well remembered for the Marshall Plan which generously supported recovery of the war torn nations of Western Europe, including Germany, our enemy. President Truman and General Marshall strongly supported General Douglas MacArthur who devoted himself to the rebuilding of our former enemy, Japan, notwithstanding the fact that members of U.S. forces in their hands as prisoners of war were subjected to torture and brutality.

The circumstances then prevailing bear no remote relationship to these times.

I trust the foregoing will prove helpful to the Commission whose duty it is carefully to consider and make public this authoritative statement.