The State of Asian Pacific America

TRANSFORMING RACE RELATIONS

A Public Policy Report

Paul M. Ong
Editor

LEAP
Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute
and
UCLA Asian American Studies Center

2000 | Volume IV
Table of Contents

PREFACE

7  Don T. Nakanishi
       J.D. Hokoyama

INTRODUCTION

13  Paul M. Ong
       The Asian Pacific American Challenge to Race Relations

PART I. RACIAL IDENTITIES

Yen Le Espiritu and Michael Omi
43  "Who Are You Calling Asian?": Shifting Identity Claims, Racial
       Classifications, and the Census

Taeku Lee
103  Racial Attitudes and the Color Line(s) at the Close of the
       Twentieth Century

Robert Lee
159  Fu Manchu Lives! Asian Pacific Americans as Permanent Aliens in
       American Culture

PART II. RACIAL INTERACTIONS

Tarry Hum and Michela Zonta
191  Residential Patterns of Asian Pacific Americans

Karen Umemoto
243  From Vincent Chin to Joseph Ileto: Asian Pacific Americans
       and Hate Crime Policy

Pauline Agbayani-Siewert
279  Asian Pacific Americans and Human Rights/Relations Commissions
**PART III. NATIONAL RACE POLICIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>313</td>
<td>Paul M. Ong</td>
<td>The Affirmative Action Divide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>363</td>
<td>Shamit Saggar</td>
<td>Asians and Race Relations in Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>395</td>
<td>Christine Inglis</td>
<td>Asians and Race Relations in Australia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PART IV. NEW POSSIBILITIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>435</td>
<td>Leland T. Saito and Edward J.W. Park</td>
<td>Multiracial Collaborations and Coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>475</td>
<td>Angela Oh, Member, Advisory Board to the President’s Initiative on Race</td>
<td>Reaching Toward our Higher Aspirations: The President’s Initiative on Race</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>495</td>
<td>Contributors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"The State of Asian Pacific America: Transforming Race Relations" is the fourth major public policy research report produced by our two institutions – Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics (LEAP) and the UCLA Asian American Studies Center. We hope this policy study, like others we have already released and those we will publish in the future, will serve to inform public discussions and shape public policy deliberations about the most important and compelling policy issue-areas facing the nation's rapidly growing and diverse Asian Pacific American population.

At the beginning of a new century, it is obvious that race relations remains as one of America’s most significant, ongoing national dilemmas. Race continues to influence, in both subtle and overt ways, our access to and mobility within public institutions and private enterprises; what we see and do not see on television or movie theater screens; and what we talk about, debate, and act upon in our great legislative halls, on radio talk shows, and in ballot booths. Although the dynamics and scope of racial inequities, racial prejudice, and racial intolerance and violence changed in quite significant ways during the course of the past century, they continue to stain the American fabric.

Asian Pacific Americans have a major stake in the future of race relations in American society. No longer a small, regionally-based population, the over 11 million Asian Pacific Americans now reside in all fifty states, with large and highly visible communities from New York to Los Angeles, from Houston to Chicago, and from Honolulu to Boston. By 2020, they are projected to reach 20 million, and represent 1 in 20 Americans. Along with their rapid population growth, especially during the closing decades of the 20th century, has been their ever-increasing presence and significance in virtually all aspects of American race relations from public policy discussions over affirmative action to the alleviation of inter-group conflicts in multiracial urban centers.
This policy report is intended to respond to the continuing significance of race in American society by providing the most comprehensive, multidisciplinary empirical analysis of the diverse ways in which Asian Pacific Americans are redefining and indeed transforming contemporary American race relations. By doing so, we are interested in infusing the policy decision-making process with fresh and accurate information, as well as rigorous analysis and creative policy perspectives and recommendations. A team of renowned social scientists, historians, and public advocates from institutions across the nation, along with a scholar from England and another from Australia, was assembled to undertake this path-breaking endeavor with state-of-the-art quantitative and qualitative research techniques, and oftentimes original data. We are hopeful that the report will provide an abundance of meaningful, insightful and hopefully provocative views on how we should respond to the continuing and new challenges of our racial situation.

Like our other joint policy research activities and publications, this report reflects the special strengths and goals of our two institutions. The UCLA Asian American Studies Center, established in 1969, is one of four ethnic studies centers at UCLA, and the largest and most comprehensive program of its kind in the nation. Through its research, teaching, publishing, video productions, library and archival acquisitions, and community-university collaborations in fields ranging from literature to urban planning, the faculty, staff, and students of the Center have sought to advance scholarly and policy understanding of Asian Pacific Americans.

Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. (LEAP) is a national, nonprofit, nonpartisan, community-based organization based in Los Angeles, California. Founded in 1982, LEAP’s mission is to achieve full participation and equality for Asian Pacific Americans through leadership, empowerment and policy. With a wealth of information on Asian Pacific Americans and a national reputation as a leading Asian Pacific American organization, LEAP continues to raise the visibility and leadership effectiveness of Asian Pacific Americans.

We would like to pay special tribute to Professor Paul Ong of the Department of Urban Planning and the Asian American Studies Center at UCLA for serving as the principal investigator of this major policy report, as well
as the research director of the joint public policy research activities involving LEAP and the UCLA Asian American Studies Center. Professor Ong is the nation's foremost scholar addressing the most significant public policy issues facing the Asian Pacific American population, and we are tremendously grateful for the leadership, commitment, and vision which he has provided for this and other research endeavors.

We also would like to thank the extraordinary team of researchers who participated in this project, as well as the individuals who worked on producing this publication. Finally, we would like to express our gratitude to the Board of Directors of LEAP and the Faculty Advisory Committee of the UCLA Asian American Studies Center for their continued support of our joint policy research activities.

Don T. Nakanishi, Ph.D.
Director and Professor
UCLA Asian American Studies Center

J.D. Hokoyama
President and Executive Director
Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. (LEAP)
We wish to thank the following individuals and institutions who have provided their generous support to the Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute and have made this study possible:

The Charles Stewart Mott Foundation provided major funding for this research study. The Levi Strauss Foundation, Fannie Mae Foundation, ARCO Foundation, and Farmers Group, Inc. also contributed significant funds for the project. We wish to thank The Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Ford Foundation, State Farm Companies Foundation, Procter & Gamble Fund, and the GTE Foundation for their continued support of LEAP and the Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute, and for making this project possible. We also wish to thank American Express and IBM, whose partnership and support of LEAP have contributed to our organization's success.

Many people contributed to the successful completion of this project. We are grateful to the UCLA Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies for providing space and office support for the project, and to Don Nakanishi and the UCLA Asian American Studies Center for their constant support. We would also like to thank the members of the Center's Faculty Advisory Committee who, along with LEAP Board members and staff, served on the joint executive steering committee: Professors James Lubben, Jerry Kang, Geraldine Padilla, Pauline Agbayani, and David Takeuchi. The editorial assistance of Glenn Omatsu was invaluable for his expertise and professional insight, and Christine Wang provided exemplary guidance on financial matters. Levin Sy was indispensable in offering his technical assistance and project coordination skills. Kylee Williams and Thuong Mong Ha assisted in preparing the manuscript. We are also grateful to Jennifer Woo for the layout and cover design. Finally, each of the authors were supported by research assistants who are acknowledged in their respective chapters.

Finally, the individuals at LEAP deserve special recognition for their dedication to the project at every stage of its development. We wish to thank J.D. Hokoyama and John Y. Tateishi for their continued support of the project. We also wish to thank Melissa Reyes and Melissa Szeto, Program Coordinators, for their technical assistance and administrative support throughout the project. And, finally, we are indebted to Gena Lew, Director of Development, for her skillful management in working with the writers and the project team, and for her perseverance in seeing the final product through to its completion.
The Asian Pacific American Challenge to Race Relations

Paul M. Ong

Introduction

The "race problem" has followed us into a new millennium. W.E.B. DuBois' argument that the "color line" was society's problem of the Twentieth Century is applicable to the Twenty-first Century. At the same time, much has changed. Blatant and state-sanctioned racism has disappeared, yet racial inequality persists. We still face the enormous challenge of achieving racial justice, but the nature of the issues and cast of actors have been transformed. Further progress requires us to formulate strategies and policies that address current realities, including those linked to Asian Pacific Americans (APAs).

This volume examines how Asian Pacific Americans are redefining racial concepts, race relations and race-related policies. Over the last three decades, the APA population doubled every ten years. According to the Bureau of the Census, there were approximately 10.5 million in 1998, and we project that there will be at least 20 million by the year 2020. With this dramatic growth, APA issues should no longer be ignored in policy debates. APAs have taken the initiative to push these concerns onto the national stage. One question is how should this group be included. Unfortunately, responses are often polemical, based on narrow group interests, with some APA organizations and leaders insisting on participation on the same terms as other minority groups and some non-APA organizations and leaders taking the opposite position. The policy question is frequently postulated as whether APAs constitute a disadvantaged minority or a part of the advantaged segment of society. This is, however, not a productive way to frame the discussion.
Difficulties in resolving inconsistencies suggest that the prevailing black-white paradigm of the "race problem" has seriously flaws. The limitations are mostly felt by APAs struggling with group identity and politics, but the problem is more pervasive. New concerns are confounding the national debate. Beneath the polemics is a conundrum because APAs do not fit widely held assumptions about race relations. One major challenge is whether the core of the black-white framework can be preserved by absorbing new ideas such as multiculturalism and diversity. The alternative is a radical transformation, a new approach to race relations. Regardless of how this question is resolved, it must be done without diminishing the moral obligation to remedy racial inequalities.

An informed discussion requires an understanding of the material conditions of APAs, and an assessment of the political debates and processes in disparate policy arenas. The findings from the original research reported in this book uncover common elements of a new framework encompassing all racial groups and their concerns. The book also includes policy essays identifying effective practices and institutional arrangements that enable APAs and non-APAs to work together productively. The ultimate goal of the participants is to redefining the principles that form a collective vision of what this nation ought to be with respect to race. Their contributions are based on reconceptualizing notions of social groupings and relationships, and reformulating public policies.

The Existing Framework

The current framework is predicated on a widely accepted concept of race and the forces generating inequalities, and is modeled after the black experience vis-à-vis whites. Racial grouping is a societal, economic and political construction with enormous ramifications at the individual and collective levels. Racial membership is ascriptive, where group assignment imposes liabilities and confers privileges. This
grouping takes on a collective self-consciousness when racial solidarity becomes instrumental in protecting and enhancing group status, or in fighting oppression. A racial hierarchy is created and maintained by stereotypes and prejudices that overtly and subtly shape individual behavior, by institutionalized racism that systemically limits opportunities, and by a historical legacy of discrimination that disadvantages subsequent generations. The outcomes are both glaring and deplorable—a disproportionate number of minorities are economically marginalized, politically disenfranchised, residentially segregated, and under-served by basic institutions like public schools.

During the latter half of Twentieth Century, public policy has evolved progressively to encompass strategies to eliminate discriminatory practices within the government, to fight overt employment and housing discrimination in the private sector, to correct de jure and de facto biased institutional practices, and to establish affirmative action programs to remedy past injustices. These efforts have been accompanied by others to improve race relations, with much of the activities occurring at the local level through human rights/relations agencies and grass-root efforts. In implementing policies, membership in a racial minority has become a pragmatic and convenient operating principle. Over time, this nation has developed classes of protected populations that are entitled to participate in government sponsored programs. The use of a simplistic racial criterion for government action, however, creates a potential conflict with some deeply held values, such as individualism and equal protection. This inherent tension in race-based policies has been exploited by its opponents to attack affirmative action.

The present policy framework faces another difficulty because it does not easily encompass all nonwhites. Obviously, African Americans fully fit the paradigm. This match is based on the fact that African Americans have dominated the Civil Rights Movement, the political force behind race-oriented policies. The black-white experience has
defined the popular image of what constitute prejudicial attitudes, discriminatory behavior, biased institutional practices, and racial inequalities. This black-based framework has been stretched to encompass other minorities. This same paradigm fits American Indians, who in many ways are more disadvantaged than African Americans. While Hispanics are not a racial group in a narrow sense of the term, they too have been considered a disadvantaged population covered by race-oriented policies. APAs are more problematic, a group that is disadvantaged in some arenas but not in others. The elasticity of the black-based framework, however, is finite. American Indians, Hispanics and APAs raise issues outside the existing paradigm: sovereignty rights, immigration and nativism, and ethnic rather than racial concerns.

THE CALL FOR A NEW DIRECTION

One indication of the growing complexity of race relations is found in President Clinton’s speech that was delivered on June 14, 1997, at commencement at the University of California at San Diego:

To be sure, there is old, unfinished business between black and white Americans, but the classic American dilemma has now become many dilemmas of race and ethnicity. We see it in the tension between black and Hispanic customers and their Korean or Arab grocers, in a resurgent anti-Semitism even on some college campuses, in a hostility toward new immigrants from Asia to the Middle East to the former communist countries to Latin America and the Caribbean—even those whose hard work and strong families have brought them success in the American way.

Of course, race relations in America have always been more diverse than black-white relations, but the President’s remarks correctly identified a pressing need to move beyond the bipolar framework.
The increasing complexity of race relations comes at a time when current strategies have come under political and judicial scrutiny. For example, recent Supreme Court rulings have restricted the use of remedial programs, requiring the government to demonstrate compelling reasons for public action and to develop programs narrowly tailored to remedy specific problems. The passage of California's Proposition 209 (the "California Civil Rights Initiative" to end affirmative action in admissions to public colleges and universities, in public-sector employment, and in public-sector contracting) represents a growing public concern and uneasiness with race-based policies. At the same time, there is unfinished business. Racial inequality and injustice are still too prevalent, and racial tensions and conflicts are on the rise.

While affirmative action has received much attention, the debate is broader. In a search for a new direction, the President has called for a "great and unprecedented conversation about race." The message is that we should not retreat from a commitment to fighting racial injustices. The task, as framed by the President in the area of affirmative action, is to "mend not end," and this task applies equally to other aspects of race relations. The desire for a new perspective is not just one person's opinion. Polls taken prior to the vote on Proposition 209 show that a majority believe that racial discrimination remains a major problem that must be addressed. The debate was, and continues to be, over how far government should go to ensure fairness, to fight discrimination, and to improve inter-group relations. This question cannot be answered by just repeating the justifications from the 1950s and 1960s. A meaningful national dialogue requires incorporating new and emerging race realities.

**The Asian Pacific American Challenge**

APAs present a major challenge to the existing framework on multiple fronts. Their experience raises questions about the nexus between being a minority group and being disadvantaged. Although a
disproportionate number of APAs live in poverty and some subgroups experience extremely high welfare usage, these phenomena are not rooted in the failure of domestic American institutions. Instead, the problems are linked to the educational limits and political upheavals of the home country of immigrants and in the failures of America's foreign policy. Moreover, this population as a whole is not economically disadvantaged as indicated by median income and earnings, and there is a disproportionately high number of APAs in prestigious and higher paying jobs. While APAs are underrepresented among voters and elected officials, political disenfranchisement is linked to a lack of citizenship, which is being gradually rectified through acculturation and naturalization. While many are under-served by basic institutions like public schools, this problem is due to a lack of appropriate cultural and linguistic facilities than to traditional racism. And while many APAs live in enclaves, residential segregation is lower than for other minorities. For many, the decision to live in a segregated community is driven by a voluntary desire to associate with others of the same ethnicity.

There are also differences regarding how race is played out. APAs are subjected to stereotypes but not just negative ones. In fact, there is a widely held view of this group as a model minority. We can agree that stereotypes, regardless of nature, are undesirable because they reduce all members to a simple caricature, but it is also important to acknowledge that the prejudices against APAs are more benign than those for other minority groups. APAs do suffer from institutionalized practices that limit employment opportunities, but the most widely discussed restriction is a "glass ceiling" to top management position. This is dramatically different than the gross underrepresentation in all desirable jobs experienced by other non-whites. APAs enroll in record numbers at elite universities but are subjected to biased admissions decisions aimed at capping their share. Finally, APAs have suffered from past discrimination—for example, immigration exclusion, restrictions on
naturalization and political participation, and mass incarceration—but the historical legacy is not a personal one for most. Only a minority can directly link their family history to these past wrongs; nonetheless, APA history serves as a powerful reminder of the potential for a nation to do evil with respect to race.

APA realities are changing the nature of race politics by interjecting ethnicity. Community activists and advocates have promoted pan-Asianism, but this identity is fragile. Subgroups have insisted on maintaining their national identities. This can be seen in the incorporation of ethnic groups (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Vietnamese, etc.) into the racial categories for the decennial census. APAs are also altering the notion of race as a dichotomous hierarchy. This is most apparent in the uncomfortable role of Korean merchants in the inner-city, in which they are depicted as both exploited and exploiters. In these situations, inter-group conflicts entail interactions between members of minority populations. The notion of race is also being contested by individuals of mixed parentage. Persons who are part-APA comprise a disproportionate share of the multiracial category because APAs have a high rate of out-marriages, and many of these multiracial individuals have been adamant in expressing their combined racial heritage, thus challenging the notion of mutually exclusive racial categories.

The incongruencies discussed above point to severe weaknesses in the current race framework. We are left with plausible claims for including APAs in race-oriented policies and programs and contradictory reasons to doubt these claims. One could argue that APAs constitute an exception to the rule or that their problems should be recast as immigrant issues. Neither, however, is acceptable politically or intellectually. One cannot ignore that many elements of the APA experience are tied to their status as a racial minority, and APAs themselves are not likely to abandon their claim to a place at the table in the debate over race and race-related policies. So far, the contradictory claims have been worked out piece-
meal, with ad hoc solutions based on situation-specific compromises. These tenuous solutions represent an uncomfortable truce that can only temporarily allay an escalating frustration with the prevailing framework.

The Project

To assess the APA impact on race relations, this project assembled a multi-disciplinary team of nationally renowned researchers and scholars to examine various issues and topics. Because of a paucity of information in several areas, the project sponsored original research by Pauline Agbayani-Siewert (University of California, Los Angeles), Yen Le Espiritu (University of California, San Diego), Tarry Hum (Queens College and New York University), Taeku Lee (Harvard University), Michael Omi (University of California, Berkeley), Paul M. Ong (University of California, Los Angeles), Edward J.W. Park (University of Southern California and Loyola Marymount University), Leland T. Saito (University of California, San Diego), and Michela Zonta (University of California, Los Angeles). The research has produced empirical studies covering six areas:

- Attitudes on race and race-oriented policies.
- The political construction of racial categories.
- Affirmative action.
- Residential segregation and integration.
- Multiracial collaborations and coalitions.
- APAs and human rights/relations programs.

Each study tackles an important question and offers policy recommendations.

The project also invited five experts to write policy essays. An essay does not require new research, and the contributors used their previous work, experience and knowledge to address major policy questions. The writers were encouraged to take normative stances, arguing what ought to be. Three of the essays examine issues in the
United States, and the other two examine issues in the United Kingdom and Australia. The essayists include Christine Inglis (University of Sydney), Robert Lee (Brown University), Angela Oh (Advisory Board to the President's Initiative on Race), Shamit Saggar (University of London), and Karen Umemoto (University of Hawai'i at Manoa).

The book is organized into four parts, mixing both case studies and essays when appropriate. Part one examines the way race is constructed within institutions and perceived by individuals. Part two focuses on racial interactions, including the degree of residential contact, race-bias crimes, and the response by human relations agencies. Part three includes chapters analyzing race-related policies in the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. The final part explores "new possibilities" to guide how APAs should constructively transform race relations in this nation.

Summary of Analytical Studies and Policy Essays

PART I: RACIAL IDENTITIES

This part of the book looks at the concepts of race, focusing on the ways racial classifications, concepts and attitudes are defined, negotiated, debated and constructed. The first chapter is by Yen Espiritu and Michael Omi, "Who Are You Calling Asian?: Shifting Identity Claims and Racial Classification, and the Census," which explores racial terms used in the official count of the population. In 1980 and 1990, Asian American legislators, community leaders, and advocacy groups successfully maintained ethnic breakdowns within the Asian/Pacific Islander "racial" categories. Over the years, other political claims have arisen. Some groups have increasingly questioned the appropriateness of their group being counted as part of the APA category, and multiracial APAs have challenged the notion of mutually exclusive racial categories and demanded new ways to categorize racially mixed people. Espiritu and Omi examine the following questions:
• What types of political claims have APA groups made for inclusion (or exclusion)?
• How do different groups want to be defined and represented?
• What is the slippage between individual conceptions of identity, group collectivities, and state definitions?
• What is the significance of a multiracial category or the allowance of multiple racial check-offs?
• What is the impact of "moving" certain groups (e.g., Native Hawaiians) out of the APA category?
• What are the differences between federal and state/local classifications of APAs, and what are the policy implications that result from these differences?

To answer the above questions, the authors draw on a range of data sources, including recent census studies and surveys on race and ethnicity questions, selective state and local documents on race/ethnic classifications, and interviews with key APA constituencies (e.g., multiracial Asians, Native Hawaiians, Asian Indians). The analysis starts with a review of how APAs have been an object for racial classification for over a century, with categories changing to accommodate the racism of each decade.

The rest of the chapter takes up four case studies. The first case study is on Asian Indians. The convoluted history of how this group has been classified illustrates how the concept of race is subject to constant revision—driven by shifting demographic trends, changing concepts of race, and claims for political/legal recognition. The second case study focuses on the largely unsuccessful efforts by Filipinos to separate from the APA grouping. A major incentive for requesting the reclassification was possible economic gain derived from affirmative action programs, along with a desire to emphasize the group's unique cultural and racial identity. The third case study examines the successful reclassification of
Native Hawaiians for the upcoming 2000 Census. The creation of a new category was spurred by the claims of Native Hawaiians that the Asian and Pacific Islander category failed to recognize their status as an indigenous population. The final case study documents how multiracial Asians challenged the practice by the Bureau of the Census to assign individuals to a single racial category. The United States has always been a nation of blended racial and ethnic groups, and those of a mixed heritage have demanded the right to be counted as such. As a group with a high rate of interracial marriages, multiracial APAs played a role in changing federal policy to allow individuals to declare more than one race on census forms.

Espiritu and Omi’s analysis offers a detailed and nuanced account of current debates regarding the racial/ethnic classification of APAs. The study provides an important window to examine how this group is situated in the broader politics of race in the United States. The ability of APAs to interject ethnicity into the classification scheme disrupts the black/white framing of racial issues. Clearly, racial identity can be reconstructed and negotiated. The authors, however, caution that achieving ethnic recognition is not sufficient. APAs often disappear with respect to official reporting of racial and ethnic statistics, and remain unacknowledged with respect to major policy decisions.

The conceptualization of race and its meaning is not just shaped by official classifications but also by the knowledge, beliefs, and experiences of ordinary individuals. Taeku Lee’s chapter, “Racial Attitudes and the Color Line(s) at the Close of the Twentieth Century,” examines public attitudes about race relations and APAs within a multiracial context. Because race relations are shaped by notions and values held by individuals, analyzing popular opinion and political preferences is critical to understanding how APAs are situated in American society. The chapter focuses on answering the following questions:

- How commonly do APAs and others experience racial
discrimination?

- What beliefs do different groups hold about discrimination, racial inequality, economic conflict, and the opportunity structure in the United States?
- Do APAs' views on these matters align with whites, do they exhibit a multiracial consciousness, or do APAs occupy a distinct "third space" on racial matters?
- Do negative stereotypes and sentiments about APAs exist?
- Are white, black, and Latino views on public policies affecting APAs determined by antagonistic attitudes?

To answer these questions, Lee analyzes several recent media polls that include significant numbers of APA respondents, including those conducted by the Washington Post (with the Kaiser Foundation and Harvard University), Los Angeles Times, Asian Week, and San Francisco Chronicle/KRON/KQED. Additional information comes from several academic surveys: the Los Angeles County Social Survey, the Los Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality, and a University of Massachusetts poll.

The analyses offer three major findings. First, there is a clear but complex hierarchy to racial attitudes. Black and white opinions are at the two ends of the racial order with the relative position of APA opinions (along with Latino opinions) shifting with issues. At times, APAs are closer to whites, and at other times they are closer to other minorities. Second, APAs are distinguished by a high level of personal experience with discrimination and a diversity of attitudes varying by ethnicity, region, and length of residence in the United States. Third, opinions by non-APAs are influenced by knowledge of and interactions with APAs. These opinions in turn influence attitudes over government policies that impact the Asian Pacific American community.

Robert Lee provides a historical and contemporary view of how racial identity is externally imposed. In the essay chapter, "Fu Manchu
Lives! The Asian American as Permanent Alien," he argues that APAs have been made into a race of foreigners, the Orientals. This unique racialization is deeply imbedded in American culture, but like other "irrational" constructs, the images are frequently contradictory and subject to change, depending on particular historical circumstances. Despite being sometimes mutable, this ascriptive identity has stubbornly resisted eradication. At one level, APA racialization is based on "color." This is exemplified by the use of the infamous "Yellowface" in the March 1997 cover of National Review. That illustration used racist Asian features (buck-toothed, squinty-eyed, stereotyped clothing, etc.) as caricatures of the Clintons and Vice President Al Gore to depict the political corruption associated with illegal campaign contributions. The singling out of Asians through the characterization is in itself telling, but the cover also reveals that the racist image of APAs is tied to both physical and "exotic" cultural features.

For Lee, the designation of yellow as the "color" of the Oriental is a prime example of the social construction of a racial identity. As a group, APAs occupied a particular position within the economy and society. They were feared as unwanted cheap labor, unassimilable heathens, sexual deviants, and more generally, the "Yellow Peril." Equally important, the racial identity is intertwined with the notion that the Oriental is indelibly alien. Besides being based on exotic cultural misconceptions, APAs as aliens is also a political and legal status. Historically, this group had been denied full membership in American society. They were barred from citizenship, from interracial marriage, from owning land, and from bearing witness in trials. The tragic consequences of being permanent aliens reached an apex when 110,000 Japanese Americans, two-thirds of whom were citizens by birth, were incarcerated because they were considered potentially dangerous foreigners. Overt bigotry and anti-Asian hostility have waned since World War II, but the racialization of APAs still continues. In recent
decades, two competing and contradictory images prevailed, the "model minority" and the "gook." The emergence of a positive stereotype, nevertheless, does not negate the fact that APAs have not escaped from the imposition of an externally defined identity, one that continues to be predicated on the notion of a race of permanent aliens.

PART II: RACIAL INTERACTIONS

The second part of the book focuses on the ways racial groups interact with each other in several arenas, and explores ways people and institutions address interracial issues. Collectively, these studies capture the diversity and intricacies of inter-group relations.

Tarry Hum and Michela Zonta's chapter, "Residential Patterns of Asian Pacific Americans," examines one of the most visible aspects of racial interaction, the neighborhoods where APAs live. The dramatic growth of the APA population over the last three decades has transformed many urban and suburban neighborhoods throughout this nation, and this transformation has added to the complexity of the relationship between residential choice and race. Race and ethnicity influence housing patterns but certainly not to the extent that prevailed in the past. After a century of housing discrimination sanctioned by state and local governments, the period following WWII provided opportunities for APAs to choose their residential locations. What emerged was a high degree of residential assimilation that mirrored the acculturation of the predominately U.S.-born Asians of this period. Although ethnic communities such as Chinatown continued to exist, APAs in general were no longer an isolated racial group by the late 1960s. During the 1970s, the majority of APAs lived in predominantly non-Asian neighborhoods where they constituted a small minority. The movement toward integration, however, slowed in subsequent years as immigration played a key role in attenuating residential integration. In the 1990s, APA
settlement patterns were highly complex and varied with both the reemergence of historic enclaves in the central city and new communities in the suburbs, including "satellite" Chinatowns and "ethnoburbs."

Their study addresses the following questions:

- What is the level of APA residential segregation relative to other minority groups, and how does segregation vary by demographic factors?
- How do factors such as the racial composition of neighborhoods affect residential choice?
- What are the trends and characteristics of old and new ethnic enclaves?

To study the patterns of residential settlement among Asian Pacific Americans, the authors examine the level of housing segregation and integration for the top 30 metropolitan areas with the largest APA populations using 1970, 1980 and 1990 census tract level data. They use the dissimilarity index to measure the spatial distribution of different groups and the degree of contact or interaction between minority and majority group members. They examine how demographic factors across metropolitan areas and over time influence neighborhood-level outcomes. The study uses micro level data (the 1993-1994 Multi-City Survey on Urban Inequality) to provide information on neighborhood preferences, i.e., the reasons why people select their residential locations. The findings provide important insights on APA attitudes and preferences that contribute to locational decisions and patterns of residential integration and segregation. To examine ethnic enclaves, Hum and Zonta examine neighborhoods within the four key metropolitan areas: New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Oakland. This analysis uses both the 1990 Census data and more recent data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to elaborate on APA immigrant settlement.
Karen Umemoto’s chapter, “From Vincent Chin to Joseph Ileto: Asian Pacific Americans and Hate Crime Policy,” examines one of the most unfortunate aspects of interracial interactions: racially motivated violence. Her chapter provides an overview of hate-crime policy, presents data describing the nature and magnitude of the problem for APAs, discusses the challenges that hate crimes and related policy discourse pose for race relations and, finally, discusses recommendations for research, policy and organizing. Her analysis relies on both published and unpublished data.

Hate crimes are extreme manifestations of personal antagonism toward a group of people, including vandalism, threats, assaults and murder. While the victims are individuals, hate crimes are also considered acts against groups and society. The federal government and several states have recognized the uniqueness of these actions as special crimes. When it is demonstrated that a crime is motivated by racial bigotry, the law allows for enhanced penalties. Despite the importance in dealing with hate crime, there are several problems, including the lack of local laws in several states, under-reporting, and inconsistent enforcement. Consequently, the recorded crimes, especially the most visible and heinous ones covered by the media, are only the tip of a larger problem.

Like other minority groups, APAs have long been victims of hate crimes. The beating death of Vincent Chin is the most well-known case of a hate crime against an Asian, but there are hundreds of cases. The number of nationally reported crimes averages close to 500 per year, but this is a severe undercount because many, particularly immigrants, are reluctant to report such crimes. A review of the evidence shows that anti-APA violence is caused by several factors: perceived or real economic competition, prejudice and bigotry, and scapegoating APAs for social ills. Umemoto examines 1994-97 data from Los Angeles, California, one of the most diverse places in the world, to gain additional insights into the
nature of hate crimes involving APAs, both as victims and as perpetrators. They were victimized equally by Latinos and whites and less frequently by African Americans. In contrast, the racial group most often victimized by APAs was African American. These findings, however, should be placed in a larger context and complex picture. Members of all races are victims as well as perpetrators, and hate crimes against people of color are perpetrated by whites and people of color. Hate crime is a multiracial phenomenon.

Umemoto concludes with several recommendations: improve reporting, strengthen hate crime legislation, develop law enforcement protocols that are culturally sensitive, support APA and other community organizations addressing hate crimes, build multiracial coalitions and a human relations infrastructure, and conduct research to better understand and address underlying sources of conflict.

How society responds to new racial tensions and conflicts is determined in part by the ability of its institutions to adapt. Pauline Agbayani-Siewert’s chapter, “Asian Pacific Americans and Human Rights/Relations Commissions,” examines how these agencies respond to the growing presence of APAs. While many of these agencies were initially concerned with systemic problems in housing, schooling and employment, over time, the human rights/relations organizations have taken on a narrowly defined set of activities, including conflict resolution, cultural sensitivity training, leadership training, and providing forums for inter-group discussion. In recent years, HRCs have faced new changes due to declining resources, new developments and understanding of race relations, and new forms of inter-group (especially between minority groups) tension and conflict, many of which involve Asian Pacific Americans. The chapter analyzes the nature and extent of group tensions and conflicts, the responses of human rights/relations organizations, and the effectiveness of conflict-resolution through negotiation and mediation.
The study relies on an organizational analysis of agencies in large and moderate-size urban areas (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Seattle, Chicago, Austin and New York) and a detailed review of conflicts involving APAs. Published materials and news accounts are utilized to determine each agency's structure (e.g., public institution, private institution, public-private collaboration), staff size and composition, membership on its governing body, history and stated mission, mechanisms utilized to carry out its mandates, and sources and funding. Most of the detailed insights come from interviews with key individuals involved with the agencies.

One of the positive findings is that most human relations agencies and APA community members shared a common vision of going beyond ethnic/minorities as separate groups with separate issues and concerns. Achieving this vision will require meaningful APA participation in both the agencies and city government.

**PART III: NATIONAL RACE POLICIES**

Nowhere is the national debate over race-based policies more heated than over affirmative action. Paul M. Ong's chapter, "The Affirmative-Action Divide," examines the APA position in this divisive ideological battle. Over time, affirmative action has emerged as the contested boundary defining how aggressive government ought to be in correcting racial inequality. The battle has been waged within governmental agencies, in the courts, and more recently on ballots. APAs are materially and ideologically on both sides of the political divide, with some adamantly supporting and others vehemently opposing the policy. To understand how APAs are aligned, the chapter focuses on the following questions:

- What is the status of APAs relative to whites and other minorities in education, employment, and business?
- How does socioeconomic standing affect APA participation in
affirmative action programs?

- What is the political position of APAs on affirmative action in particular, and race-based policies in general?

The analysis relies on Current Population Survey data, EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) data and reports, and annual reports on minority-business programs. The chapter also relies on opinion polls, secondary material, and unpublished sources.

The statistical evidence reveals a mixed picture of high achievement in education, partial parity in employment, and sub-performance in business. The diversity in outcomes points to a multifaceted racial structure rather than a simple dichotomous racial hierarchy. Variations in socioeconomic status translate into differences in APA participation in affirmative action programs. They bear some of the cost of affirmative action in education, make some selective gains through employment programs for targeted occupations, and are fully incorporated into contract set-aside programs for minorities. Because of this spread, APAs have taken competing political positions in pursuit of both self-interest and broader principles. Some have argued that “preferential treatment” for other minorities hurt APAs, but others have defended the policy as necessary for increasing APA presence in public-sector employment and contracting. Despite this heterogeneity, a majority of APAs believe that some type of race-oriented policy is needed to address racial inequality.

The next two chapters offer different views on how Asians have influenced national discussions on policies related to race in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Australia. The term Asians is used because the two nations do not have an official term equivalent to the Asian/Pacific Islander (A/PI) category used in the United States. This is not surprising since the A/PI category is a socially constructed concept anchored to circumstances in the United States. Interestingly, all three nations have a large white majority, a dominant culture with a common
English root, and an APA/Asian population that constitutes an estimated
4 to 5 percent of total population. Despite these similarities, there are
significant differences, such as in the size of the black population, the
ethnic composition of the Asian population, and the way race is discussed
within the policy arena.

Shamit Saggar provides a British perspective. His chapter
“Asians and Race Relations in Britain,” starts with a review of the historic
context of post-war immigration and recent statistics on the components
of multiracial Britain. The next section focuses on Asian participation in
employment, education and mainstream politics. The final section
explores the Asian public policy agenda. The study relies on both
published census data, voting information, and opinion surveys.

Saggar notes that immigration has been the driving force behind
the emergence of a multiracial and multicultural society. The inflow
started during the 1950s with the recruitment of migrants to fill labor
shortages, followed by chain migration through family reunification
starting in the 1970s, and finally by the in-migration of politically
displaced refugees. Most immigrants came from the former British
colonial empire, that is, from areas with nonwhite populations. Asians
comprise the single largest racial group among all immigrants, with
South Asians being the majority of Asian immigrants. As a consequence
of this movement, the relative number of nonwhites has increased
dramatically. By the early 1990s, Asians and blacks comprised 5 percent
of the total population. Asians account for approximately two-thirds of
the nonwhites, making them the largest racial group. The initial growth
of the minority population interjected race into policy discussions. The
first wave of immigrants led to a racialization of the “immigration
question,” but that divisive debate eventually waned. During the 1960s,
Britain pursued an integration policy to address discrimination and
promote cross-cultural awareness. This approach appears to have had
some success because compared with the situation in other European
countries, ethnic minorities in the U.K. are better integrated. This is not to say that race has disappeared from the policy arena, but race does not have the same potency as in the United States. One indicator of the difference is the fact that there are few supporters of race-based policies in the U.K., even among its minority population.

It would be too simplistic to attribute the current moderate view on race-based policy to the effectiveness of the integration policy. After all, the United States pursued a similar policy during the 1960s but without the same results. The difference may be due to a lack of a domestic legacy of slavery and an absence of a black dominance of minority politics in Britain. Instead, Asians have a substantial influence on race relations, and that influence is shaped by the group’s material status. This group is overrepresented at the bottom end of the occupational distribution, but is also roughly at parity with whites at the top end of the spectrum. There are, however, ethnic differences in this class structure, with Indians faring considerably better than other South Asians. Despite this ethnic difference, youths from all Asian groups have high access to education, with enrollment rates well above that for whites (and blacks). A common thread among Asians, then, is a heavy reliance on education for inter-generational mobility. Asians also have an impressively high level of participation in electoral politics (above that for other groups), and while the number of elected Asians is below parity, there is an upward trajectory. Within politics, there is another common thread among Asians, a strong preference for the Labour Party, which tends to have a progressive policy agenda.

Despite the commonalities, Saggar concludes that there is an “absence of convincing evidence to demonstrate high and enduring levels of ethnic-based political consciousness among this group.” Their high level of economic, social and political incorporation mitigates against the formation of a reactive racial identity based on opposition against being marginalized. Moreover, internal ethnic and class divisions are barriers
against pan-ethnic politics. The consequence is a moderation of the use of race by Asians. At the same time, there is still a unique "Asian dimension" to a number of policy questions, which is shifting away from immigrant concerns as the number of British-born Asians increases.

Christine Inglis provides another perspective from halfway around the world in the chapter "Asians and Race Relations in Australia." The chapter starts with a review of the history of Asian immigration, which parallels the history in this country. Inglis then turns her attention to the impacts of the most recent wave of immigration, which commenced in the 1970s. She uses census and other data to examine both the composition of immigrant population and its implications. Finally, she explores the policies and politics affecting Asians.

Asian immigration to Australia dates back to the 1850s when Chinese migrated in search of economic opportunities in Victoria’s gold fields. They were soon met by racially-motivated hostility and violence, and by anti-Asian laws. The antipathy took on moral overtones with the popular press depicting the Chinese as opium-smoking degenerates and destroyers of white women. Anti-Asian racism slowed but did not entirely stop immigration from Asia. The Chinese were later joined by smaller numbers of other Asians, particularly from India and Japan. By the end of century, even that small flow came under attack. The campaign to erect the "Great White Walls" culminated in the Immigration Restriction Act at the beginning of the 20th century, which put into place the White Australia Policy. Despite some limited exemptions for Asian immigration, the policy led to a gradual decline of the Asian population. A reversal started in the post-World War II period, when the country gradually relaxed its restrictions. The major break with the White Australia Policy came in 1973, when Australia enacted a non-discriminatory immigration policy.

The renewal of substantial Asian immigration has had a major demographic impact. Asians comprised less than one percent of the total
population after World War II but over two percent of the population by 1986. A decade later, Asians (immigrants and their children) made up over 5 percent of the Australian population. The Asian population is ethnically diverse, with South East Asians comprising over a half of all Asians, Far East Asians comprising another third, and South Asians comprising the final sixth. The economic character of the Asian population has been shaped by the 1973 immigration policy. Although many entered through family reunions and as refugees, a substantial number took advantage of the openings for highly skilled professionals and wealthy business entrepreneurs. Asians with advanced degrees from Australia and other English-speaking countries have been incorporated into the middle-class. On the other hand, those with an education from non-English-speaking countries have had difficulties translating their credentials into comparable employment. There is also a significant number of marginalized refugees with very limited education and marketable skills.

Australia does not have an explicit race-based policy, at least not in the same way as in the United States. Instead, Australia has pursued a policy of multiculturalism, which was institutionalized in the late 1970s. Since the late 1980s, the policy has emphasized the promotion of diversity and the reduction of social disadvantage. According to Inglis, this strategy “has been remarkably successful in ensuring the incorporation of diverse groups into a previously very homogenous society in an equitable and surprisingly non-contentious manner.” All is not perfect, however. Many Asians still experience discrimination, a sizable minority of whites has negative feeling about Asians, and racist politics erupts periodically. However, as Inglis points out, the current hostility is not a replay of the anti-Asian movement of the 19th century. Considerable gains and rights have been won, and additional progress can come by strengthening multiculturalism.

The comparison of the three countries reveals that the role of race
in national politics and policy is contingent on historical and contemporary factors. All three nations have a history of racism and anti-Asian hostilities, and have attempted to eliminate institutional forms of racism in the post-World War II era. Each nation, however, has taken a different path. Race remains central to politics and policy in the United States but not in the United Kingdom and Australia. A part of this is due to the size and composition of the minority population. In the United States, where African Americans constitute the largest minority group, black activism and white resistance have shaped race relations. The growing presence of APAs (and Latinos) is transforming this situation, but the transformation has been difficult and so far incomplete. In the United Kingdom, Asians have emerged as the majority among nonwhites, which effectively precludes a simple black-white framework to race. Asian concerns have moved the political discourse away from a purely race-oriented one, although race cannot be totally ignored. Australia appears to have gone the furthest in dismantling the centrality of race, replacing it with a policy of multiculturalism. Australia is also the country where Asians are the overwhelming majority of the nonwhite population.

The APA/Asian experience in all three countries points to two common phenomena. First, class plays a key role structuring the APA/Asian influence. A significant proportion of the APA/Asian population is comprised of the highly-educated who are incorporated into the middle-class. Their class interests moderate minority politics. Second, the APA/Asian experience reveal the importance of immigration and foreign affairs. In the new global order, even domestic race-related politics has become intertwined with international politics. Again, how that nexus is played out varies from one country to another. The diversity, however, can be a blessing. The United Kingdom and Australia can offer alternative models of what is possible.
PART IV: NEW POSSIBILITIES

The chapters in the previous sections of this book examine the issues and problems associated with the APA impact on race relations. This final section examines what ought to be done to improve race relations. Responding to new racial realities requires not only transforming existing institutions such as human relations agencies, but it also requires developing new ones. Leland Saito and Edward Park’s chapter, “Multiracial Collaborations and Coalitions,” examines multiracial coalitions in cities across the United States. The efforts are part and parcel of the “New Urban Race Relations,” which is embedded in a globalization of the economy and a demographic transition created by an influx of Asian and Latino immigrants. As Saito and Parks note, recent immigrants bring new multiracial complexities that are not easily absorbed into the existing political process and structure. This eventually moves racial politics gradually from “the simplicity of white over black discrimination to the more nuanced and complex dynamics of ‘post-Civil Rights’ politics.”

To understand the new urban politics, Saito and Park focus on grassroots efforts that provide “lessons” on what may or may not facilitate cooperation among diverse racial groups. The analysis includes four case studies of multiracial relations: the mayoral campaign of African-American Lee Brown in Houston; redistricting in New York City involving Chinatown; high school violence in the San Gabriel Valley of Los Angeles County; and the campaign to support union jobs in Los Angeles. These case studies cover a range of ethnic and racial groups, class positions, and issues, situated in different regional and political contexts. The major research questions are:

- How, and under what circumstances, do such formations emerge?
- Can the participants successfully articulate a common agenda, and if so, how?
• How do they address potentially divisive questions?
• What are the limitations of such efforts?

The study utilizes in-depth interviews, which provide information about the history, issues, goals, participants, methods of collaboration, and community context. The interviews are supplemented by archival research and other historical data.

Their analysis produces four major findings. First, racial coalitions emerge when groups are able to set aside short-term objectives to address more fundamental issues such as making public institutions more accountable and fighting for a living wage. Second, successful coalition building resists narrow race-based politics, while clearly recognizing the importance of race in society. APAs must be willing to transcend their own interests when addressing the broader problem of racial inequality, and other groups must be willing to make room for APAs. Third, building alliances requires establishing and sustaining relations among individuals and organizations. A track record of working together, constructing networks, and engendering trust lays the foundation as new concerns emerge. Fourth, ethnic-specific organizations are not necessarily a source of divisiveness but are potential vehicles for community mobilization, leadership training, and resource building. They can promote communication and negotiation among various community groups.

To respond effectively to the new race relations, grassroots strategies must be complemented by national strategies. Angela Oh, who served on President Clinton’s Advisory Board to the President’s Initiative on Race, offers some constructive suggestions in the book’s concluding chapter, “Reaching Toward Our Highest Aspirations: The President’s Initiative on Race.” The Initiative, launched in June 1997, was designed to rekindle America’s desire to solve this nation’s race problem. The process started with an effort to promote a constructive dialogue on race relations, and the Advisory Committee, along with a professional staff for
the President's Initiative on Race (PIR), played a key role in conducting town-hall meetings throughout the country. One of the most difficult tasks was moving beyond a black-white discourse. Some argued that the spotlight should remain on African Americans because slavery and its legacy have determined so much of this nation's history and continue to shape inter-group relations. This resistance to change, however, varies by regions, with the West and Southwest being much more open to including APA and Latino experiences. This inclusion adds an ethnic flavor to the dialogue and interjects immigrant issues into the discussions. Acknowledging the new racial complexity, however, is not tantamount to ignoring the uniqueness or importance of the black experience. Despite the reluctance by some to expand the race-relations framework, many of the activities of the PIR proved to be inclusive.

One would be naive to assume that the Initiative can solve the race problem, and it is more realistic to see the effort as a start. Angela Oh argues that the dialogue and related activities should be integral to "the inter-generational work that requires all of us to take a step into the future." This will require courageous leadership that supports open and frank discussions, and an educational system that teaches the next generation to fully understand and appreciate America's racial history, the current problems of racial injustice, and the potential for a better society. Progressive social change to promote racial justice will require a "politics of possibility," and constructive innovations to solve racial conflicts are most likely to emerge in areas undergoing the most rapid change in race relations. APAs can and must play a major role in generating new possibilities.
Part I

Racial Identities
"Who Are You Calling Asian?":
Shifting Identity Claims, Racial Classification, and the Census

Yen Le Espiritu
and Michael Omi

Introduction

Tiger Woods may be popularly regarded as a "black" golfer, but Woods himself writes that he is "Asian" on forms requesting racial and ethnic data. "Actually," Woods says, "I am 90 percent Oriental, more Thai than anything." How Woods classifies himself reveals the inherent slipperiness of racial identity, and the gap between popular understandings of racial belonging and state definitions of race and ethnicity. Nowhere are these issues as evident as in the contested framing of racial categories for the U.S. Census.

This chapter describes how Asian Pacific Americans (APAs) have been affected by, and in turn have shaped, census classification. Through an examination of specific cases, we illustrate how racial categories have been significantly transformed by the advancement of APA political claims. A shifting consciousness regarding group "sameness" or "distinctiveness" has mobilized APAs to lobby for the creation of new categories, for the expansion of existing ones, or for the relocation of groups from one category to another. The cases illustrate how specific forms of classification are the result of dynamic and complex negotiations between state interests, panethnic demands, and ethnic-specific challenges. As such, APA census categories both reflect and help create group identities, influence the formation of public policy, and shape the popular discourse about race in the U.S.

Racial Classification and the Census

The census is regarded by much of the population as a bureau-
ocratic routine—a form of national accounting that provides a collective portrait of who we are as a people. Part of that picture involves dividing and clustering the population into meaningful and significant groups. Among others, the census establishes categories based on nativity, citizenship status, age, household income, and marital status. None of these categories, however, has been subject to such intense scrutiny, vigorous debate, and political controversy as that of race and ethnicity. The census has increasingly become the site where competing political claims for group recognition by race and ethnicity are advanced, and where classifications are established in response to statistical needs, administrative record keeping practices, and legal requirements. At stake is not only the “appropriate” classification of groups, but also the political and policy implications that flow from these definitions.

Sociologist William Petersen notes that, “Over the history of the American census, enumerations have helped create groups, moved persons from one group to another by revised definition, and through new procedures changed the size of groups” (Peterson 1983, 188). Contemporary national censuses have had to confront the demise of biological notions of race and its attendant impact on state classifications. For most of the modern period, race was considered something objective and fixed, much like one’s age or nativity status. The concept of race is now widely regarded as a social construct, and census categories are seen as an important force in the generation and reproduction of collective identities (Omi 1997, Goldberg 1997).

In the wake of the civil rights movement, new record keeping practices needed to be developed to monitor discriminatory trends and enforce equal opportunity laws. In 1977, the Office of Management and Budget issued Directive 15, which defines the federal standards for racial and ethnic classification:
This Directive provides standard classifications for record keeping, collection, and presentation of data on race and ethnicity in Federal program administrative reporting and statistical activities. These classifications should not be interpreted as being scientific or anthropological in nature, nor should they be viewed as determinants of eligibility for participation in any Federal program. (OMB Directive 15)

Originally conceived to provide consistent categories for use by federal agencies, OMB Directive 15 has inordinately shaped the very discourse of race in the United States. Its categories have become the de facto standard for state and local agencies, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the research community. Social scientists and policy analysts use Directive 15 categories since data is organized under these rubrics.

Given the importance of racial data for monitoring and redressing the nation's racial inequalities, some demographers and statisticians hope that we can have racial and ethnic categories that are conceptually valid, exclusive and exhaustive, measurable, and reliable over time. However, as this chapter will illustrate, racial/ethnic categories have proven to be fundamentally unstable. Official racial categories have changed nine times in the past ten U.S. censuses. In the planning of the 2000 Census, the Census Bureau once again faced increasing public demand for revising or expanding the racial categories. This demand is driven in part by demographic shifts—the entrance of “new” immigrant groups since 1965 and increasing ethnic heterogeneity among pre-existing categories. It is also fueled by the “increasing recognition of the fluidity and accompanying ambiguity of racial and ethnic identities for many people” (Edmonston and Schultze 1995, 141). There is, for example, frequently a gap between state definitions and individual/group self-identities. Immigrant groups who come from societies organized around different concepts of race and ethnicity often have difficulty
navigating and situating themselves within U.S. categories (Omi 1997). Another concern is the temporal effect of evolving racial and ethnic labels. New labels come into vogue, old groups dissolve through assimilation, and new groups emerge as a result of changes in civil status or patterns of immigration.³

Our discussion of APA census classification takes place at a time when the very use of racial categories is being challenged from a number of political positions. For over a year, the American Anthropology Association debated the appropriateness of any form of racial classification (American Anthropology Association 1997a, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d). The Association concluded that there was no scientific basis for the concept of “race” and urged that the term not be used in scholarly practice. Political conservatives, in arguing for “color-blind” social policies, have also denounced the use of racial categories. Such race thinking, they argue, runs counter to the move to “get beyond race” and to judge individuals by “the content of their characters.”⁴ Liberal voices have also expressed their dissatisfaction with racial categories, contending that to classify groups along racial line is to reify race. Sociologist Orlando Patterson, for example, questions why the Census Bureau needs an “Asian” category, arguing that such an umbrella category would only reinforce “the notion of race as a separate, meaningful entity” (Patterson 1997). The on going challenge to the practice of racial classification and record keeping has important social policy implications, for it can potentially affect the government’s ability to monitor trends and discern forms of racial inequality.

In this chapter, we address the complexity of classifying APAs—a diverse and changing population. When and under what conditions should APAs be classified as an aggregate? When do we need to disaggregate the category? And when do we need to advocate for new categories? In so doing, we hope to address the larger question of the relationship between racial classification, individual identity, and the
efforts by the state and various populations to address racial inequalities. We first turn to a consideration of how APAs have been historically classified by census definitions and practices.

Historical Continuities and Contradictions

The U.S. federal government has been collecting racial data since the eighteenth century. From the very beginning of census taking in this country, a basic differentiation was established between nonwhites and whites. As Peterson (1983, 190) notes:

Those of European origin have been specified as the "foreign stock" if they or one or both of their parents were born abroad, but from the third generation on, whites of any nationality disappear statistically into the native population. For nonwhites, however, a separate category has been maintained, irrespective of how many generations lived in this country.

Extending this point, we would argue that such a distinction was explicitly linked to the political dynamic of racist inclusion and exclusion. Until the passage of civil rights legislation in the 1960s, census categories were utilized to politically disenfranchise and discriminate against groups defined as nonwhite. From prohibitions on naturalization rights to the setting of quotas for the 1924 National Origins Immigration Act, census categories were evoked and strategically employed to circumscribe the political, economic, and social rights of particular groups (Anderson 1988).

As nonwhites, Asians in the United States have always been counted separately in the "Race" or "Color" question. As indicated in Table 1, Asians first appeared in the census schedules in 1870 when "Chinese" was included in the "Color" question. After the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, Japanese were recruited as substitute
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other Asian or Pacific Islander</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Filipino, Hindu, Korean</td>
<td>Other + write in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Filipino, Hindu, Korean</td>
<td>Other + write in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Filipino, Hindu, Korean, Other</td>
<td>Other race, spell out in full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Filipino, Hindu, Korean, Other</td>
<td>Other race, spell out in full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>Other race, spell out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Filipino, Hawaiian, part Hawaiian, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean</td>
<td>Other (print race)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean, Vietnamese, Asian Indian, Samoan, Guamanian</td>
<td>Other (specify)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean, Vietnamese, Asian Indian, Samoan, Guamanian, Other Asian or Pacific Islander</td>
<td>Other race</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

workers. The Japanese category thus appeared for the first time in the 1890 Census. In the Twentieth Century, the “race” question continued to be a combination of color, tribal status, and Asian national origin. Reflecting increased immigration from different Asian countries, the 1930 and 1940 Censuses added Filipinos, Koreans, and Hindu to the “Color or Race” question. However, presumably because of their small numbers, Koreans were dropped from the “Color or Race” question in the 1950 and 1960 Censuses. As we will discuss below, the classification of Asian Indians in the United States has been most fluid, beginning with “Hindu” in 1930 then changing to “white” after World War II and then to “Asian Indian” in 1980. Pacific Islanders were added to the census schedules in 1960 with the introduction of the categories “Hawaiian” and “Part Hawaiian.”

Civil rights legislation beginning in 1964 has stimulated vested interest in the racial and ethnic classification and enumeration of the Census. At the time of the 1960 Census, the race question had become discredited and would have been excluded in 1970 had it not been for the passage of civil rights and equal opportunities laws, which made it necessary for the census to continue to compile racial statistics (Kaplan 1979, 4). Civil rights legislation requires federal authorities to look for patterns of discrimination as evidenced by the under-representation of disadvantaged minorities; and where such under-representation is found, affirmative action by the responsible party must be undertaken to correct it. Disadvantaged minorities are defined as those who have been historically subject to racial discrimination and economic oppression in the United States. Congress also used census population statistics to ensure equal access to the electoral process. Until census data began to provide comprehensive data on an underlying population including its disadvantaged minorities in a specific geographic area, it was very difficult to demonstrate patterns of discrimination practiced by businesses, schools and political institutions against disadvantaged minorities. Thus, census
statistics became absolutely critical for the enforcement of every civil rights law passed since the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Not surprisingly, because the census tabulations of racial and ethnic groups had the potential to form the benchmark for many legal tests of minority underrepresentation, the accuracy, adequacy, and precision of census statistics became an explosive political controversy, as well as an important site for the political activity of racial and ethnic political interest groups. The passage of civil rights legislation thus marked an important shift in the use of racial and ethnic data—from a tool to identify populations who were excluded from citizenship to one that is used to ensure the inclusion of groups (Lott 1998, 31).

Responding to political pressure from racial and ethnic interest groups seeking to acquire not just substantive but legally authoritative data on their populations, the U.S. government undertook the standardization of the collection and presentation of data on race and ethnicity. In 1977, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Statistical Directive 15 required all federal agencies to use five standard categories in program administrative reporting and statistical activities: American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black, White, and Hispanic. Directive 15 defines an Asian or Pacific Islander in relation to geographical origin and ancestry as “a person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Indian subcontinent, or the Pacific Islands.” From a civil rights perspective, this directive is significant because it formalized and institutionalized the collection and representation of presumably compatible, nonduplicated, exchangeable ethnic and racial data by all federal agencies. This policy has resulted in a wealth of data previously unobtainable on the disparities between white and nonwhite populations, especially in the areas of voting rights, public accommodations and services, education, employment and housing (Lott 1998). The directive has also shaped the very discourse of race in the United States, becoming the de facto standard for state and local
agencies, the private and nonprofit sectors, and the research community. Directive 15 has also influenced group identity and community-formation patterns. For example, new organizations have emerged representing the interests of "Asian and Pacific Islanders" or "Hispanics" in a variety of forms from service providers to professional caucuses.

Although Directive 15 allowed the collection of additional detailed race and ethnicity categories, it required that such groups be reaggregated into the five basic racial/ethnic categories. To satisfy the new federal guidelines on the collection of racial statistics, the Census Bureau proposed to do away with the individual Asian Pacific racial codes in favor of one summary category "Asian or Pacific Islander" in the 1980 Census and again in the 1990 Census. According to the Bureau, this single classification would provide a 100 percent count of the total APA population, as required by the OMB. Both times, APA legislators, community leaders, and advocacy groups united to fight the Census Bureau’s proposal to lump all APAs together and recommended instead separate categories for the various APA populations. Citing the huge influx of recent immigrants from Asia and the Pacific Rim, APA community representatives argued successfully that new immigrants, particularly limited or non-English speakers, would not relate to the racial category "Asian or Pacific Islander" and that these newcomers have unique health, education, and welfare concerns that need to be separately identified (Espiritu 1992, 118-130). Mounting pressures from APA constituencies and unfavorable pre-census test results, which demonstrated a great deal of confusion about the summary category of "Asian or Pacific Islander," ultimately forced the Census Bureau to not only retain the separate categories for APA groups from the 1970 Census, but to add Asian Indian, Vietnamese, Samoan, and Guamanian. In the 1990 Census, an "Other API" category was added.
Although APAs have been most effective in lobbying for representation on the census forms, it is important to note the limitations of these successes (Lott 1998, 91). Most importantly, despite these victories, data on APAs continue to be difficult to obtain. Many federal agencies do not solicit, record, or report data on APAs separately, claiming that it is difficult and costly to obtain data on such small populations. For instance, in the Census Bureau’s survey of minority-owned businesses, data on APAs is combined and reported with data on American Indians and Alaskan Natives (House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight: Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology Hearings 1997, 670-671). Even when APAs are included in the collection of data, they often fail to appear in the actual reporting of data.

In recent years, the continuing utility of Directive 15—and of racial and ethnic categories—has been questioned. When Directive 15 was implemented in the 1970s, racial and ethnic minorities were a stable and small proportion of the American population. Moreover, African Americans were the only sizable minority group in the United States, comprising approximately 90 percent of the nonwhite U.S. population (Payson 1996, 1257). Since then, the United States has witnessed a substantial influx of immigrants from Asia, Africa, and Latin America and the emergence of a new generation of multiracial families and children. As the United States becomes more heterogeneous, public pressure has increased for revising and expanding race and ethnicity classifications in the census as well as for increasing recognition of the fluidity and multiplicity of individuals’ self-identification (Edmonston and Schultze 1995, 141). In the following section, we will discuss how APAs have negotiated, contested, and made use of these official racial and ethnic categories.
Negotiating and Contesting Racial/Ethnic Categories

APAs are a diverse and changing population—a multicultural, multilingual, and multiethnic people who have different socioeconomic profiles, immigration histories, and political outlooks. Despite these differences, APAs have at times come together as a panethnic group to lobby for recognition, to assert political claims, and to argue for increased resources (Espiritu 1992). Because the APA category is a social and political construct, it is inherently unstable. Within the broad and imprecise pan-Asian boundary, subgroup identifications remain important, leaving room for shifting levels of solidarity and mobilization, backsliding, or dropping out of the pan-Asian framework altogether. In recent years, APA groups have lobbied for both inclusion into and exclusion from the APA category. In this section, we examine how the issues of racial classification have been negotiated and resolved among APAs, between APAs and other minorities, and between APAs and the federal and state governments.

Asian Indians

Racial terms used in census enumeration schedules are subject to constant revision—driven by shifting demographic trends, changing concepts of race, and claims for political/legal recognition. The convoluted history of how Asian Indians have been classified in the census provides a compelling illustration of some of these factors. In 1930, Asian Indians first appeared in the census schedules when "Hindu" was added to the "Color" question. The term "Hindu" or "Hindoo" in the popular parlance of the era was constructed as a racial classification, and not as an indicator of religious affiliation. Ironically, only a small portion of the initial wave of Asian Indian immigrants was Hindu. In fact, a third of the Asian Indian population was Muslim, and the clear majority was Sikh (Takaki 1989, 295). "Hindu" was omitted as a category in the
1950 Census. Despite the abolition of the Hindu category, enumerators were instructed in 1950 and 1960 to write in “Hindu” for the race of persons they regarded as Asian Indians (Colker 1996, 236).

The question of how to racially “situate” Asian Indians has historically been the focus of intense legal battles, primarily centered on securing naturalization rights. Between 1909 and 1923, court decisions on whether Asian Indians were “white by law” were contradictory and relied on different principles to arrive at their judgments (Haney López 1996). The courts found Asian Indians to be “white persons” in 1910, 1913, 1919, and 1920, but not in 1909, 1917, or after 1923 (Haney López 1996, 67). The deliberations of these legal cases are interesting because they reveal the tensions and contradictions between science, popular consciousness, and the law. At the turn of the century, leading anthropologists considered dark-skinned people from western and southern Asia, such as Syrians and Asian Indians, as “Caucasians.” At times, the courts agreed with this classification and its meaning for the extension of legal and political rights. At other times, the court decisions reflected the acknowledgment of a disjuncture, from a legal standpoint, between “scientific” evidence and “common knowledge” as rooted in popular conceptions of race.

This disjuncture is clearly revealed in the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Thind (1923). Bhagat Singh Thind, born in India and a graduate of Punjab University, had immigrated to the United States in 1913. He was petitioning to become a naturalized citizen based on his racial classification as “Caucasian.” The Court found that although Thind was “Caucasian,” he was not “white” by commonly understood notions of “whiteness,” and therefore ruled that Thind was ineligible for naturalization. “It may be true,” the court declared, “that the blond Scandinavian and the brown Hindu have a common ancestor in the dim reaches of antiquity, but the average man knows perfectly well that there are unmistakable and profound differences between them today” (Thind 1923, 209).
The *Thind* decision had an enormous impact on immigration and naturalization policies and practices. In the immediate wake of the decision, the federal government attempted to deprive naturalized Asian Indians of their citizenship. The result was the denaturalization of at least 65 people between 1923 and 1927, including one man, Vaisho Das Bgai, who committed suicide after being divested of his citizenship (Haney López 1996, 91). Within weeks after the decision, California's Attorney General began proceedings to revoke Asian Indian land purchases under the restrictive terms of the state's Alien Land Law (Takaki 1989, 300). Finally, Asian Indian status as "aliens ineligible for citizenship" made them subject to the 1924 Immigration Act that denied admissions quotas for such persons. In 1946, Asian Indian immigrants, along with Filipinos, were finally granted naturalization rights.

In 1950, the "Hindu" category was removed from the census "Race" question; Asian Indians were then relegated to the category "Other" and subsequently classified as "white/Caucasian." Because Asian Indians defy the logic of U.S. established racial categories, it has continued to be difficult to situate or identify them by their "race" or "color." In 1978, a National Opinion Research Center (NORC) survey asked, "Would you classify most people from India as being white, black, or something else?" Twenty-three percent of respondents described Asian Indians as "brown," 15 percent as "black," and 11 percent as "white." What is striking is that 38 percent of respondents classified them as "other," while 13 percent said they could not classify them at all (cited in Xenos et. al. 1989, 3). This ambiguity and confusion extends to Asian Indians themselves. In the 1980 Census, many people who identified themselves as Asian Indian by ancestry also considered themselves to be white by race (Xenos et. al. 1989, 1).

In the mid-1970s, to challenge the "invisibility" of Asian Indians, leaders affiliated with the Association of Indians in America (AIA) lobbied for an Asian Indian category under the larger APA category.

"Who's an 'Non-Citizen' or Shifting Identity: Chinese Racial Classification and the Community..."
The desire to obtain an accurate count provided the initial impetus for petitioning for a new category. Dr. Manornjan Dutta, an economist at Rutgers and former president of the AIA was the first to serve on the Census Advisory Committee and the principal actor behind the call for an Asian Indian category. He explained that it was important for Asian Indians to be “counted”:

I have said this in many meetings from San Francisco to Boston: “When you left India, you promised your mom and dad that you would be counted. You will not remain uncounted.” The first place to be counted is in the census of the country where you pay taxes. (Dutta interview 1999).

Dr. Jilen Shah, a physician and former president of the AIA who served on the 1990 Census Advisory Committee, underscored the need to clarify the racial status of Asian Indians:

Prior to the 1980 Census, nobody knew how many Indians there were in the country. When the questionnaire came, we didn’t know how to fill out the form. A lot of people were filling it out that we were black. Some were saying we were Hispanic. We just did not know (Shah interview 1999).

Dr. Narendra Kukkar, an endocrinologist and AIA member who actively petitioned for the category, notes the slippage that existed between census categories, popular conceptions of race, and individual/group self-identity:

We were listed on the official reports as Caucasians and we knew that we didn’t look like Caucasians...We didn’t act like Caucasians. We didn’t speak like Caucasians. Our names were not like Caucasians...Anthropologically they felt that we were Caucasian...our plea to [the Census Bureau] was that we didn’t fit into the category (Kukkar interview 1999).
The move for a separate category provoked debates within the broader Asian Indian community regarding its policy implications. Was the category meant to insure a more accurate count or to make claims to "minority status"? The debates primarily circulated in professional circles. The issue became framed, as it has in other instances, as one of individual merit and socioeconomic mobility versus group demands for recognition and collective empowerment. Many Asian Indians, subscribing to the former perspective, opposed the idea of a separate category:

There were many Indians that resented the idea that one should become a minority and claim a minority status...They would say, "What do you mean? You are undermining my own ability and my own education. You are trying to tell that I have to be a minority to get this? I'm getting this because I am capable of this" (Kukkar interview 1999).

On the other hand, the proponents of the Asian Indian category felt that the category would assist the next generation who may face some difficult obstacles with respect to access to higher education because of "the name factor, the color factor, and the pronunciation factor" (Kukkar interview 1999).

In the end, however, the group that would substantially benefit from the creation of the category was small businesspeople:

The fortunate part, which at that point none of us had realized, was that when the new wave of immigrants started arriving many of them were small businessmen and contractors. Minority businessmen have received most of the benefits of this minority status. They were eligible to get loans at a preferred rate from the federal government and from the state governments...That was totally unforeseen. In terms of benefits to kids who wanted to get into Harvard or Yale or UCLA...that did not even materialize. (Kukkar interview 1999)
In 1977, the OMB agreed to reclassify immigrants from India and their descendants from “white/Caucasian” to “Asian Indian.” They were officially listed on the 1980 Census as “Asian Indian” and were one of the subgroups under the “Asian or Pacific Islander” category under Directive 15. The term “Asian Indian” itself apparently emerged in response to comments from the American Indians who wanted to avoid confusion between the two groups. As Dutta recalls, “[American Indians] suggested that Indians should take a prefix or suffix otherwise Columbus’ mistake would persist. I said I preferred Asian Indian” (Dutta interview 1999).

The inclusion of Asian Indians under the APA classification has been contested by both Asian Indians and other APAs. Contending that they are racially different from other Asians, some Asian Indians have questioned the potential alliance with other APAs and argued that Indians run the risk of being ignored and marginalized in pan-Asian organizations (Misir 1996; Shankar and Srikanth 1998). On the other hand, some APAs have challenged the validity of Asian Indian claims to minority status as an APA group. For example, in San Francisco, Chinese American architects and engineers protested the inclusion of Asian Indians under the city’s minority business enterprise law (Chung 1991). Citing a Supreme Court ruling which requires cities to narrowly define which groups had suffered discrimination to justify specific affirmative action programs, Chinese Americans argued before the Board of Supervisors that Asian Indians should not be considered “Asian.” Obviously, at stake were economic benefits accruing to designated “minority” businesses.

The 1980 Census data—which indicated that the Asian Indian population was one of the most highly educated and had one of the highest incomes in the country—also challenged Asian Indian claim to minority status. As Kukkar stated, “They say, ‘You guys do so well. You’re so highly educated. What do you mean you want minority status?’” (Kukkar interview 1999). Asian Indian leaders have had to counter the claims of
being another "model minority" by demonstrating the existence of class cleavages and significant differences in life chances within the population. They have also emphasized discrepancies between educational attainment and income when compared to whites, and the phenomenon of the "glass ceiling" with respect to job mobility among professionals.

The case of Asian Indians illustrates the inherent fluidity of racial categories and how they are shaped by political interpretation and contestation. Labeled "Hindu" when the majority were Sikh, declared "Caucasian" but not "white" by the Supreme Court in 1923, and recognized as "Asian Indian" and "Asian American" in 1977, the category still remains open to further interrogation and change. As the number of South Asians has increased in recent years, questions regarding the relationship between Asian Indians and other South Asian groups have surfaced. In many academic and community-based settings, the term "Asian Indian" is being replaced with the term "South Asian" in an effort to decenter India and encompass groups from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, among others. "South Asian" was entertained as a possible term in the mid-1970s, but it was argued at the time that the majority of South Asians were Indian, so the term should reflect that. In addition, Dutta notes that, "[Indian] immigrants from several Caribbean and Latin American countries whose forebears immigrated from India also contacted me and preferred the term Asian Indian" (Dutta interview 1999). How other South Asian groups negotiate their location within the "Asian Indian" category is still an open question.

**Filipinos**

As indicated by the Asian Indian case study, the state's effort to classify racial and ethnic groups is imprecise at best, thus leaving room for ethnic groups discontented with their classification to challenge the validity of racial/ethnic categories. Whereas some Asian Indian leaders have lobbied to be reclassified from the "white/Caucasian" category to a
subgroup under the APA category, Filipinos have at times fought to be removed from the APA grouping. However, in both cases, a major incentive for requesting the reclassification was possible economic gain derived from civil rights affirmative action programs. Other motives included a desire to emphasize the group's unique cultural and racial identity and to assert their significance in U.S. racial schema.

Large-scale immigration of Filipino agricultural workers to the U.S. mainland coincided with their influx to Hawaii. The 1920s was a decade of dramatic increase in their numbers, with some forty-five thousand Filipinos migrating to the Pacific Coast. The 1921 and 1924 Immigration Acts which barred Asian immigration and restricted European immigration, prompted West Coast farmers and canneries to turn to Filipinos to fill the labor shortage created by the exclusion of the Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and South Asians. Filipinos were the favored source of labor at that time due to their unusual legal status, for until the passage of the Tydings-McDuffie Act in 1934, Filipinos could migrate freely to the United States, protected by their colonial status as U.S. nationals. Due to the influx of Filipinos during the 1920s, Filipinos first appeared in the census schedules in 1930. The 1930 Census indicates that Filipinos were scattered across the nation; however, the majority concentrated in California (Espiritu 1995).

The precise racial classification of Filipinos was contested almost from the beginning. In 1905, California's lawmakers passed a bill to prohibit marriages between whites and "Mongolians." Because it was unclear whether Filipinos were Mongolians or not, some county clerks issued marriage licenses to Filipino-white couples, while others did not. In 1931, a Los Angeles county superior court judge decided that Filipino-white marriages did not violate the state antimiscegenation law because, in his view, Filipinos were not Mongolians. In 1933, the majority opinion handed down by the appellate court, based on an exhaustive reading of the works of nineteenth-century ethnologists,
declared that Filipinos were Malays, and not Mongolians, and therefore could marry whites. Undaunted by their failure in the courts, anti-Filipino forces, portraying the largely single Filipino men as sexual threats to white women, successfully lobbied the state legislature to expand the existing antimiscegenation laws to unambiguously include Filipino-white marriages (Chan 1991, 60-61).

The racial status of Filipinos vis-à-vis other APAs came up again during the Asian American movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the summer of 1968, more than one hundred students of diverse Asian backgrounds attended an “Are You Yellow?” conference at UCLA to discuss issues of Yellow Power, identity, and the war in Vietnam (Ling 1989, 53). In 1970, a new pan-Asian organization in northern California called itself the “Yellow Seed” because “Yellow [is] the common bond between Asian-Americans and Seed symbolize[s] growth as an individual and as an alliance” (Masada 1970). However, Filipino Americans rejected the “yellow” references, claiming that they were brown, not yellow (Rabaya 1971, 110; Ignacio 1976, 84). At the first Asian American national conference in San Francisco in 1972, Filipino Americans made it clear to the conferees that they were “Brown” Asians by separating themselves from the larger Asian American body and organizing their own “Brown” Asian caucus (Ignacio 1976, 139-141). Calling attention to their “braiding of cultures”—of Asian, Spanish, American, African, and Pacific Island cultures—Filipinos have also differentiated themselves culturally from other Asians. Maria Root (1997, ix) described Filipino cultural heritage in the following way: “Not dominated by Confucian philosophy, oral in tradition, coming from societies that have matriarchal structures and bilateral kinship systems, intersected and invaded by seafarers, traders, military, missionaries, and colonizers, Filipinos in America are seldom accurately situated in history or culture and are therefore often misinterpreted.”
In addition to the perceived cultural and racial gap, Filipino Americans also claimed that they had a different socioeconomic profile from other APA groups and thus should be separated from the APA rubric. As indicated above, Directive 15 collapsed all Asian Pacific groups into the one summary category of Asian or Pacific Islander. As a result, federal agencies collect civil rights compliance data using the inclusive Asian or Pacific Islander category. However, aggregate data can be misleading, masking the economic diversity of the APA groups and ignoring the needs of high-risk groups. In the early 1980s, Filipinos in California began to clamor to be separated from the APA category, claiming that their socioeconomic status was lower than that of other APAs, namely the Chinese and Japanese. For example, in 1979, college-educated Japanese Americans on the average earned $23,000 and Chinese Americans $21,000. The same year, similarly educated Filipinos averaged just over $16,000. Moreover, compared to Chinese and Japanese Americans, Filipino Americans “appear to be more of a working-class ethnic group, with greater occupational concentrations in semi-skilled jobs” (Nee and Sanders 1985, 82-85; Cabezas, Shinagawa, and Kawaguchi 1986-87). Because of their relatively disadvantaged position in the labor market, Filipino Americans have a potentially strong claim for inclusion in affirmative action programs. However, they feared that, when lumped together with other APA groups who are stereotyped as the “model minority,” their claim on the state could be diluted due to the relatively high economic level of the APA aggregate.

Filipino Americans also fare less well in secondary and higher education than other APAs: Filipinos have a significantly higher high school dropout and non-completion rate than other APA groups; fewer Filipinos graduate from colleges; and fewer still enroll in graduate school (Okamura and Agbayani 1997). Although Filipino educational profiles differ from those of other APA groups, only seven percent of all public schools, mainly in the West, used “Filipino” as a
separate racial/ethnic category in addition to the five federal categories of Directive 15 (U.S. Department of Education 1996). Classified as APA, Filipinos have been presumed not to be an underrepresented minority and in higher education, in 1986, were removed from affirmative action recruitment and admissions programs in the University of California system (Almirol 1988, 6). In subsequent years, Filipino American admissions and enrollment at UC Berkeley and UCLA declined. For example, in fall 1996, at UCLA, only 26 percent of Filipino applicants were admitted—the lowest admission percentage of any ethnic/racial group. Similarly, UC Berkeley records indicated that the acceptance rate of Filipinos (16 percent) for fall 1996 was 16 percent—the lowest in recent years and also the lowest of all ethnic/racial groups and well below the overall admission rate of 25 to 30 percent. In contrast, during this same period, APA representation in the UC system and in higher education in general showed unprecedented gains (Okamura and Agbayani 1997). Because Filipino American experiences and status in higher education have not been comparable to those of other APA groups, lumping them together with the latter could only mask their specific academic needs and concerns. The post-1965 influx of immigrants from the Philippines has substantially increased the number of Filipinos in the United States. According to the 1990 Census, Filipinos now total more than 1.4 million, comprising the second largest immigrant group as well as the second largest APA group in the United States, and the largest APA group in California. Their increasing numerical strength has fortified their contention that they no longer need to coalesce with other APA groups. Some Filipino American community advocates have claimed that the pan-Asian grouping allows the more established groups to dominate the resources meant for all APAs; newer and less powerful groups are simply used as window displays. As a Filipino American aide explained:

"We Are Not Asian: Shifting Identity Claims, Racial Classifications, and the Census"
There is a sense of feeling that Japanese and Chinese have gotten a piece of the pie and that Filipinos are not getting enough of the pie. The issues being addressed have always been Japanese and Chinese issues. Filipinos believe in coalition building with other Asian Americans. They understand its strength. At the same time, they don't feel that the coalition is benefiting them (Tony Ricasa interview, 1989).

A 1988 editorial in the Sacramento-based *Philippine News* argued that Filipino Americans should be separated from the Asian Pacific classification because “the Japanese and Chinese...dominate every outreach funding meant for Asian and Pacific Islanders combined” and that “[they] are only using the numerical strength of the Filipinos to attract larger funding for the Asian and Pacific Islanders” (Jacaban 1988a).

In 1988, Filipino Americans were successful in lobbying for the passage of California Senate Bill 1813, which requires state personnel surveys or statistical tabulations to classify persons of Filipino ancestry as Filipino rather than as Asian or Hispanic. With this bill, Filipino Americans can potentially reap affirmative action benefits independent of the APA grouping because these outreach programs or funds “shall include equitable allocations based on the percentages of Filipinos in local governments in the State of California.” The numerical strength of Filipino Americans was indeed a factor in the passage of California Senate Bill 1813. In a letter to State Assemblyman Peter Chacon, United States Congressman Jim Bates (1988) urged the passage of the bill stating that “there are more Filipinos in California than Japanese or Chinese and they are the fastest growing ethnic group in the state. The Filipinos should be separately categorized and given separate funding for outreach programs to serve their own people.” The sponsor of the bill, Melecio Jacaban, also made use of the politics of numbers. In a memo to
the bill committee, he wrote:

As you are all aware of, the Filipinos are the third largest ethnic group in the state... We estimate that there are about 850,000 Filipinos in California at this writing. And out of that number, there are approximately half a million Filipino American registered voters. This is quite a sizeable number of voters, and they could prove to be the margin of election victory for some of the legislators who have a heavy Filipino population in their district (Jacaban 1988b).

In a telephone interview that took place soon after the bill was passed, Melecio Jacaban argued that since affirmative action laws are based on numbers, Filipino Americans should be receiving a larger share than the Japanese and Chinese Americans:

If numbers count, then why should the Filipinos take a back seat? Because there are more Filipinos than Chinese or Japanese, we are the ones who should be dominating the outreach programs for Asian Pacific groups. We should be getting the directorship and the funding (Jacaban interview 1989).

After the passage of California Senate Bill 1813, California has devised more detailed categories than those specified by OMB’s Directive 15. As the following examples indicate, the Filipino category was separated from the Asian and the Pacific Islander categories:

California State Employee racial/ethnic categories:
White, Black/African American, Hispanic, Asian, Filipino, American Indian, Pacific Islander, and Other

California Department of Education racial/ethnic categories:
American Indian/Alaskan, Asian, Pacific Islander, Filipino, Hispanic, Black, White
These more detailed categories indicate that state government racial/ethnic categories can differ from those specified by the federal government. However, it is important to note that in areas where there is Federal-State partnership and cooperation, the racial/ethnic data would be reaggregated into the five standard racial/ethnic categories before they are transmitted to the Federal government. For instance, the racial statistics of Filipino students in California's public universities are reaggregated into the APA category when they are reported to the National Center on Educational Statistics. In other words, even when Filipinos lobbied successfully at the state level for a "Filipino" category distinct from an "Asian American" or "Pacific Islander" category, the federal mandate meant continued Filipino inclusion in the APA category at the national level.

**Native Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders**

One recent dramatic change to OMB Directive 15 is the disaggregation of the existing "Asian or Pacific Islander" category into the separate categories of "Asian" and "Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander." The creation of the latter category was spurred by the claims of Native Hawaiians that they were ill served by inclusion in the Asian and Pacific Islander category. The "Hawaiian" and "Part Hawaiian" categories first appeared on census schedules in 1960. In 1970, Part Hawaiian was deleted, and in 1980 Guamanian and Samoan were added. Under OMB Directive 15, these subgroups were aggregated into the Asian or Pacific Islander category.

The 1990 Census reported 211,014 Hawaiians, or slightly less than 0.01 percent of the total U.S. population. The population was highly concentrated with almost two-thirds (138,742) residing in the State of Hawaii. The second highest concentration was California with more than one-sixth (34,447) of all Hawaiians. While Native Hawaiians comprised only 2.9 percent of the total Asian and Pacific Islander
population, they constituted about 59 percent of the total Pacific Islander population. Data from the 1990 Census illustrated deepening differences in the demographic profile between Asian and Pacific Islander groups (Lott 1998, 95-96). One trend was the decreasing proportion of the Pacific Islander population. Between 1980 and 1990, Pacific Islanders decreased from 7 percent of the total APA population to 5 percent. There were 365,000 Pacific Islanders in 1990 compared to 6.9 million Asians. Differences in nativity status were dramatic. In 1990, only 13 percent of Pacific Islanders were foreign-born, compared to 66 percent of Asians. Socioeconomic indicators also suggested two distinct groups. With respect to education, only 11 percent of Pacific Islanders 25 years and older had a bachelor's degree compared to about 40 percent for Asians. Median household income was $41,583 for Asians and $33,955 for Pacific Islanders (Federal Register 1997b, 92).

Beginning in the early 1990s, Senator Daniel K. Akaka (D-HI) initiated a discussion and subsequent lobbying effort to move Native Hawaiians out of the Asian and Pacific Islander category. Senator Akaka's office had been receiving phone calls from students and alumni of Kamehameha High School complaining of the difficulty of convincing mainland colleges and universities to consider Native Hawaiian admissions and scholarship decisions separate from those of Asian Americans (Kiaaina interview 1999). Native Hawaiian students cited unique social hurdles and economic difficulties in pursuing higher education. College and university administrators countered that in line with OMB Directive 15, Native Hawaiians would be considered as part of the APA category and not be guaranteed any form of "special" consideration.

In March 1993, Senator Akaka contacted then OMB Director Leon Panetta and proposed to reclassify Native Hawaiians in the same category as American Indians and Alaskan Natives. Akaka did not advocate for the creation of a separate category for Native Hawaiians in the belief that many federal agencies would not support the creation of
any new categories under Directive 15. His move was to argue for a reconstituted indigenous category that would be called “Native Americans.” Akaka believed that Native Hawaiian interests would be best served in this expanded category. He stated: “Like the varying cultures among the hundreds of American Indian tribes and Alaskan Native groups, Native Hawaiians have a unique political and historical relationship with the United States” (House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service: Subcommittee on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel Hearings 1994, 200). The move to classify Native Hawaiians as Native Americans called attention to the indigenous status of the population and to the past wrongs exacted on Hawaii’s native people by the United States.

In 1993 testimony before the Congressional Subcommittee on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel, Senator Akaka contrasted the indigenous status of Hawaiians to the immigrant status of other APA groups and argued against their classification as Asian or Pacific Islander in Federal record keeping practices:

As a result, there is the misperception that Native Hawaiians, who number well over 200,000, somehow “immigrated” to the United States like other Asian or Pacific Island groups. This leads to the erroneous impression that Native Hawaiians, the original inhabitants of the Hawaiian Island, no longer exist. We exist, Mr. Chairman. The fact that I am sitting before you today is proof that we exist. And I want to make it clear that Native Hawaiians are Native Americans. While we are culturally Polynesian, we are descendants of the aboriginal people who occupied and exercised sovereignty in the area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii (House Committee Hearings 1994, 200).

Akaka received strong support for his proposal to expand the
definition of "American Indian or Alaskan Native" to include Native Hawaiians. In an earlier statement before the Subcommittee, Henry Der of the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders pointed out that some federal statutes already recognized and classified Hawaiians as Native Americans. For example, under Title VI, FTA Circular C4702 defines "Native Americans" as a category that "includes persons who are American Indians, Eskimos, Aleuts, or Native Hawaiians" (House Committee Hearings 1994, 99). The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights also supported Akaka's proposal. Then Chairperson Arthur A. Fletcher stated before the Subcommittee that Native Hawaiians are the indigenous, aboriginal people of Hawaii and that they should be included under the category of American Indian or Alaskan native. Fletcher (p. 259) drew out the implications of this reclassification:

The Congress should promptly enact legislation enabling Native Hawaiians to develop a political relationship with the Federal Government comparable to that enjoyed by other native peoples in the Nation. Such legislation would encourage the realization of sovereignty and self-determination for Native Hawaiians, a goal that this Advisory Committee strongly endorses.

The proposal to relocate Native Hawaiians to the American Indian or Alaskan Native category subsequently received support from the entire Hawaii Congressional delegation, then Governor John Waihee, and a range of Native Hawaiian organizations.

On the other hand, groups representing American Indians vigorously opposed the proposed reclassification. Some feared that such reclassification would reduce data consistency over time for American Indians, without improving the data available for Native Hawaiians (Edmonston et. al. 1996, 31). They argued that minor changes in terminology and formatting would yield better data for Hawaiians. The
Results of the 1996 Race and Ethnic Targeted Test by the Bureau of the Census (1997, 1-22) found that use of the term “Native Hawaiian” in place of “Hawaiian,” combined with listing this category immediately as the first of the APA groups, increased reporting of Hawaiians in the Asian and Pacific Islander targeted sample. This conclusion supported the additional, more minor request by Akaka and others to shift the terminology from Hawaiian to Native Hawaiian.

The more contested issue was over the political legal status of Native Hawaiians. Some Native American representatives feared that Native Hawaiians, when reclassified as Native Americans, would be granted special tribal status akin to the government-to-government relationship, which exists between federally recognized Indian tribes and Alaskan Natives and the federal government. Testifying before the House Subcommittee on the federal measures of race and ethnicity and their implications for the 2000 Census, Senator Akaka sought to allay these concerns: “My proposal...does not, and I repeat does not affect...the political status of Native Hawaiians. That is something that we, as Native Hawaiians, will resolve through the legislative process” (House Committee Hearings 1997, 262). Representative Akaka (House Committee Hearings 1997, 270) submitted an analysis done by Roger Walke of the Congressional Research Service as documentation. This analysis noted that the proposed move of Native Hawaiian to the American Indian and Alaskan Native category might not be as significant as it might seem at first glance. This was because the majority of federal spending on Indian programs was not based on a racial classification, but on a government-to-government relationship between the United States and federally recognized tribes. In his analysis, Walke (House Committee Hearings 1997, 272) made a distinction between a racial group and a genealogical one based on a chain of kinship relations: “A federally-recognized Indian tribe, no matter what its apparent racial makeup, is assumed to be a genealogical grouping whose kinship ties, to
whatever degree of consanguinity required by tribal (or federal) laws, can be adequately demonstrated.” Because of this, Walke argued that a shift in racial classification for Native Hawaiians would not imply either “tribal existence” or recognition of a government-to-government relationship. It is interesting to note that while the proposed change was over the 2000 race question, the racial logic of moving Native Hawaiians into the American Indian and Alaskan Native category never surfaced. Instead, debates swirled around the issues of unique federal status, territorial assignment, and the aggregate profile shifts that a change in classification would precipitate. This case study clearly illustrates that the concept of race is not a biological but a social and political construction.

Towards the end of the hearings, Sally Katzen of the OMB reported that the OMB-appointed Interagency Committee had recommended that the term “Hawaiian” be changed to “Native Hawaiian” but that Hawaiians should continue to be classified in the Asian or Pacific Islander category (House Committee Hearings 1997, 600, 131-132). Principle findings in favor of this classification included: geographically, Hawaiians should be classified with other Pacific Islanders; time series and other analyses would not have to account for the change in classification. More importantly, the report asserted that the reclassification of Hawaiians into the same category as American Indians would confuse the question of special legal status. It would also have a major impact on the social and economic profile of the category since Hawaiians would comprise 9.7 percent of the total population of a combined American Indian, Alaska Native, and Hawaiian category (Federal Register 1997b). Again, it is noteworthy that the OMB recommendations on the 2000 race question were not about race per se, but about geography, special legal status, and record keeping needs.

Advocates of the proposed change in classification were “flabbergasted” when it appeared that OMB would decide that Native Hawaiians would remain in the Asian and Pacific Islander category (Kiaaina...
Many felt it was a political decision that was not determined by the actual merits of the case. Advocates organized a grassroots campaign to challenge the maintenance of the existing framework of classification. Over 7,000 cards were sent to OMB requesting the change (Federal Register 1997a, 6). Representatives of major Hawaiian service organizations, including Alu Like, the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, and the Department of Hawaiian Homelands meet with Clyde Tucker (Bureau of Labor Statistics) and Nancy Gordon (Census Bureau liaison to OMB) to exchange information and express their concerns.

In a September 8, 1997 letter to Katherine K. Wallman of OMB, three Congress members strongly opposed the recommendation that Native Hawaiians continue to be classified in the Asian and Pacific Islander category. Among other points, they refuted the “geographical basis” for classification and stressed the indigenous status of Native Hawaiians (Abercrombie et al. 1997, 3):

While Hawaii is geographically a Pacific island, the circumstances of Native Hawaiians...must be differentiated from other Pacific Islanders...Native Hawaiians are a dispossessed people (see P.L. 103-150, legislation offering a U.S. apology to Native Hawaiians for American complicity in the 1893 overthrow of the Kingdom of Hawaii). This accords them a special status compared to other Pacific island groups in their relationship with the United States.

Placing the issue within an international context, the letter quotes Article 8 of the U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, stating that “Indigenous peoples have the collective and individual right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the right to identify themselves as indigenous and to be recognized as such (Abercrombie et al. 1997, 2).” The Congress members urged that the country needed to adhere to this
principle and respond to the concerns of its indigenous peoples.

On September 7, 1997, Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI) wrote to Franklin D. Raines, Director of the OMB in response to the Interagency Committee’s recommendation. Inouye argued that “if it is the pre-existing sovereign status of the native people of the United States which is the underlying rationale for the American Indian/Alaska Native category, that rationale applies with equal force to Native Hawaiians, and thus is not a credible basis upon which to exclude Native Hawaiians” (Inouye 1997, 3). He concluded that the adoption of recommendations for changes in classification and data gathering would constitute “the single most important instrument in our ability as a nation to ensure that Native Hawaiians are afforded the same rights and opportunities as other Americans” (Inouye 1997, 5).

It was speculated that the OMB staff was faced with two political concerns emanating from the White House. First, the White House did not want to upset American Indians in light of then recent Congressional battles regarding contested amendments to the Department of Interior appropriations bill. Second, the White House wanted to allay the concerns of the Hawaiian delegation with respect to the neglect of Native Hawaiian issues (Kiaaina interview 1999). Faced with competing demands, OMB’s Sally Katzen proposed a compromise at a meeting with the Hawaiian delegation that completely surprised Native Hawaiian advocates: Why not put Hawaiians and Pacific Islanders together into a separate category? Her proposal had the political asset of avoiding further conflict with American Indians and satisfying Native Hawaiians, whose statistical numbers had been swamped by other groups in the Asian and Pacific Islander category. The sudden and unexpected prominence in negotiations of a major change in racial and ethnic categories acts as strong evidence supporting the notion of race as a socially and politically constructed concept.
While a version of this proposal was entertained earlier in the Report from the Interagency Committee (Federal Register 1997b, 92-94), the concerns were that it might become difficult to obtain adequate sample data from such a small group. Only a few agencies, such as the Department of Education in its assessment of reading proficiency collect data separately. Substantial costs might be incurred by federal agencies if they had to collect data separately. In addition, it was feared that splitting the Asian and Pacific Islander category would have an impact in those areas (such as Hawaii) where APA populations have significantly intermarried. Individuals with both Asian and Pacific Islander ancestry who would currently respond to a single category, would now have to choose between two categories or declare themselves as “other race” or “multiracial” (Federal Register 1997b, 92-94).

The proposal became official on October 30, 1997. OMB decided to break apart the Asian and Pacific Islander category into two categories:

**Asian.** A person having origins in any of the original peoples of the Far East, Southeast Asia, or the Indian subcontinent including, for example, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam.

**Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander.** A person having origins in any of the original peoples of Hawaii, Guam, Samoa, or other Pacific Islands. 8

In announcing the reclassification, OMB acknowledged the significant efforts waged by Native Hawaiians for changing existing racial categories:

The Native Hawaiians presented compelling arguments that the standards must facilitate the production of data to describe their social and economic situation and to monitor discrimination against Native Hawaiians in housing, education, employment, and other areas... By creating separate categories, the data on Native
Hawaiians and other Pacific Islander groups will no longer be overwhelmed by the aggregate data of the much larger Asian groups (Federal Register 1997a, 9).

In the wake of the OMB decision, concerns still remain. The National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC) wrote to Katherine Wallman on April 14, 1999 to express their concerns regarding the recently released Draft Provisional Guidance on the Implementation of the 1997 Standards for the Collection of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity (1999). The Consortium feared that data on Native Hawaiians and Other Pacific Islanders would be lost due to data quality and confidentiality reasons because they are expected to total less than 0.2 percent of the populations. The Consortium urged that information be provided to the fullest extent possible adding that if significant data is not provided for the Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander groups, then the goal of creating a separate category is thwarted (NAPALC 1999, 7).

Advocates remain fearful that the Census Bureau might resist implementing the changes in the new directive (Kiaaina interview 1999). For example, the Census Bureau did not create a separate committee for the Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander category within the structure of the Census Advisory Committee. In addition, formatting changes to the census forms did not adequately reflect the changes in classification. It is clear that Native Hawaiian and Pacific Islander advocacy groups will have to vigilantly monitor the implementation of the directive and data collecting efforts.

This case study illustrates that for smaller and more economically impoverished groups such as Native Hawaiians, the inclusion in a panethnic category can mask their specific needs and interests. It also illustrates the power of a small group—in this case, Native Hawaiians—to successfully make claims based on its historic grievances against the
FIGURE 1. 2000 CENSUS SHORT AND LONG FORM QUESTIONS ON RACE AND ETHNICITY

Asked of all persons on Short and Long Forms

Is this person Spanish/Hispanic/Latino?
Mark the "No" box if not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.
- □ No, not Spanish/Hispanic/Latino.
- □ Yes, Mexican, Mexican Am., Chicano
- □ Yes, Puerto Rican
- □ Yes, Cuban
- □ Yes, other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino [Print group]

What is this person’s race?
Mark one or more races to indicate what this person considers him/herself to be.
- White
- Black, African Am, or Negro
- American Indian or Alaskan Native [Print name of enrolled or principal tribe]
- □ Asian Indian
- □ Chinese
- □ Filipino
- □ Japanese
- □ Vietnamese
- □ Korean
- □ Other Asian- Print race [Print name of other Asian and/or Pacific Islander race]
- □ Some other race [Print name of other race]

Asked of a sample of persons on Long Form only

What is this person’s ancestry or ethnic origin?
[Print ancestry or ethnic origin]

(For example: Italian, Jamaican, African Am., Cambodian, Cape Verdean, Norwegian, Dominican, French Canadian, Haitian, Korean, Lebanese, Polish, Nigerian, Mexican, Taiwanese, Ukrainian, and so on.)

Source: Census 2000 Questionnaire “Informational Copy” Form D-61B
United States. Native Hawaiian advocates, lobbying to gain more access to college/university admissions and scholarship awards, ended up changing federal classifications: the separation of the Asian and Pacific Islander category and the expansion of the minimum set for data on race from four to five groups. The crucial role played by APA legislators supporting the Native Hawaiian effort also reinforces Espiritu's conclusion on the important role ethnic representation plays in political struggles over the census (Espiritu 1992, 131). Finally, the case called attention to the fact that the fight for "appropriate" racial categories is not only waged between interested groups and the state but also between interested groups themselves—in this case, between Native Hawaiians and Native Americans.

**MULTIRACIALS**

Like the case study of Native Hawaiians, this case study documents how multiracial Asians have challenged the existing racial classification and substantially modified the ways individuals classify themselves on census forms. As a new millennium looms, the United States is set to become more a nation of blended races and ethnic groups than it has ever been. By 2050, demographers calculate that the percentage of the U.S. population that claims multiple ancestries will likely triple, from the current 7 percent to 21 percent (Puente and Kasindorf 1999). APA multiracials will comprise a significant proportion of this increase. In an analysis of multiracial households in the United States, Chew, Eggebeen, and Uhlenberg (1989) report that a significant number of these households comprise a person of some Asian ancestry through marriage, birth, and/or adoption. It is estimated that in the post-civil rights era, approximately half of U.S.-born Chinese and Japanese Americans are married to whites (Jacobs and Labov 1995). A 1990 California survey found that 25 percent of Asian-ancestry children in the state were the product of both Asian and European-descent parents.
(Federal Register 1995). The Japanese American community has the highest rate of interracial marriage and of multiracial children. According to the 1990 Census, there were 39 percent more Japanese/white births than monoracial Japanese American births that year (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992).

The state—as represented by the Census Bureau—has routinely distorted or disregarded the reality of interracial families and multiracial individuals. Through the categories it uses to count and classify ethnic and racial groups, the census has often legitimated the hypodescent rule, bolstered the claim of white racial purity, and imposed an arbitrary monoracial identity on individuals of mixed parentage. As an example, the 1920 Census stipulated that “any mixture of White and some other race was to be reported according to the race of the person who was not White” (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1979, 52). In the post-civil rights period, OMB’s Directive 15 provides that “[t]he category which most closely reflects the individual’s recognition in his community should be used for purposes of reporting on persons who are of mixed racial and/or ethnic origins.” The presumption of monoracial identification is evident from the language of this provision, “which takes as given that a mixed-race person will be identified monoracially by ‘his community’” (Payson 1996, 1257).

In an attempt to assert their multiracial heritage, some multiracial persons have ignored census instructions to “[f]ill ONE circle for the race that the person considers himself/herself to be” by marking two or more boxes. However, since the census scanners are designed to read only one marked box, such a person ended up as monoracial based on whichever box was marked more firmly (Payson 1996, 1261). In the 1990 Census, nearly 10 million persons marked the “Other” race category, making it one of the fastest growing racial categories. Although the bulk of the growth came from a shift in racial identity among Hispanics, the growth can also be explained in part by the increase in the number of multiracials who used the “Other” category to write in
“multiracial,” “biracial,” “mixed-race” or other alternatives to the monoracial categories (McKenney and Cresce 1992). However, the Census Bureau routinely reassigned such persons to one of the OMB’s distinct racial categories based on the first race listed or the race of the nearest neighbor who gave the same response in the Hispanic category (Payson 1996, 1270). As legal theorist Kenneth E. Payson, the child of a Japanese mother and a white father, laments (Payson 1996, 1234):

> While I am able to explain that I am of both Asian and European descent to curious people on the street, I am not able to do so with respect to federal agencies. Were I to describe myself as a mixed-race to a federal agency, my race would be reassigned to one of the distinct racial categories outlined in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Statistical Policy Directive Number 15.

Among several APA groups, the high reporting of “European” as a first ancestry may reflect personal attempts to report on multiracial identities (Edmonston and Schultz 1995, 150).

Since the 1980s, multiracial advocacy groups\(^{16}\) have consistently challenged the notion of mutually exclusive racial categories embodied in the “single-race checkoff” policy. In June 1993, the Association of MultiEthnic Americans (AMEA), the first nationwide group of its kind in the United States, testified before the Census Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives and proposed that the Census Bureau add a multiracial category to the 2000 Census (House Committee Hearings 1994). Under the vigorous leadership of Executive Director Susan Graham, Project RACE (Reclassify All Children Equally) also actively lobbied for the multiracial category. Whereas Project RACE framed the multiracial category as a “self-esteem” issue, APA organizations such as the Asian and Pacific Islander American Health Forum and Hapa Issues Forum viewed it as an opportunity to generate more accurate data on their communities and to educate the larger public about race (Guillermo...
Hapa Issues Forum was more interested in changing people's perceptions about race, generally speaking, and the census was one avenue. We kind of got thrown into the census debate. We were never motivated by a touchy feely good thing, feeling validated by the government. There was something that was clearly wrong and inefficient [about the old census categories], and we were willing to work on it. If anything, we were trying to make society conform to our reality rather than the other way around (Mayeda interview 1999).

The public education sector has been the source of much of the public pressure for a review of the current OMB race and ethnicity classifications, as parents of multiracial children became increasingly concerned about the (mis)classification of their children in public schools. In a survey of U.S. public schools, only about 5 percent of the schools used a general multiracial category; the others employed the standard racial/ethnic categories as specified by OMB's Directive 15 (U.S. Department of Education 1996, iv). From the perspective of the multiracial/ethnic families, forcing a multiracial/ethnic child to favor one parent over the other offends the child's personal dignity and interferes with his/her development of self-esteem. It also constitutes an unwarranted intrusion by the government into the families' fundamental right of privacy. As Graham, executive director of Project RACE, stated:

The reality is that multiracial children who wish to embrace all of their heritage should be allowed to do so. They should not be put in the position of denying one of their parents to satisfy an arbitrary government requirement (House Committee Hearings 1997, 286-87).
Sociologist Reginald Daniel, who has done extensive research on multiracial issues and is himself a multiracial, likened the "single-race checkoff" policy to "psychological oppression," stating that the most consistent grievance expressed by multiracials centers "around not being able to indicate their identity accurately on official forms that request information on race/ethnicity" (p. 395). The growth and activism of the multiracial movement—along with increasing skepticism of the continuing utility of Directive 15—forced the federal government, in its preparation for the 2000 census, to launch a comprehensive review of the race and ethnicity categories.

Among Asian Pacific Americans, the interests of the panethnic APA group and those of multiracial Asians diverged and even collided over how best to classify and count multiracials in the 2000 Census. Denouncing the government's past attempts to wedge mixed-raced Americans into one rigid racial category, multiracial advocacy groups and their supporters favored adding a mixed-race category under which multiracial people could check all the boxes that applied. It is important to note that proponents of the multiracial category did not challenge the continuation of current categories but instead requested an expansion of categories (Lott 1998, 98). However, following the stance of most civil rights groups, many APA organizations lobbied against the inclusion of a multiracial category, arguing that it could substantially change the APA count and thus cause the community to lose hard-won gains in civil rights, education, and electoral arenas (Nash 1997, 23). For example, while multiracial Asians consider the meaning and importance of the racial/ethnic categories to be highly personal matters, NAPALC opposed the multiracial category because:

the issue of whether to add multiracial to the existing racial categories is more than a personal issue. The data is being collected for use as a basis for important research, policy development, and resource allocation.
The data is also extremely important to monitor and fight discrimination, both institutional and otherwise (House Committee Hearings 1997, 414).

The Consortium then concluded that “adding a multiracial category would undermine the effectiveness of civil rights enforcement agencies because of the inconsistent counts and the uncertainties it introduces in being able to analyze trends” (House Committee Hearings 1997, 418). In another opposing statement, the National Coalition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders questioned the appropriateness of including a multiracial category alongside racial minority categories that are protected under civil rights and other federal programs:

Like individuals of single race group, persons of biracial or multiracial backgrounds seek acknowledgment and identification through the race question. Because existing federal civil rights laws and programs are premised largely on exclusive membership in a racial group, it becomes difficult to ascertain the salience of biraciality or multiraciality in relationship to the specific provisions and intended benefits of these Federal laws and programs...What can be stated about common experiences shared by biracial or multiracial persons?...Biracial or multiracial persons have the burden to document what distinct experiences or disadvantages, in contrast to persons of protected single race backgrounds, they have had because of their biraciality or multiraciality before the decision to establish a multiracial or biracial category would be appropriate (Hearings 1994, 96).

The arguments in opposition to the multiracial category essentially deny the possibility or the appropriateness of multiple affiliations and pose the interests of multiracials—the right to claim their full heritage—in
opposition to the civil rights needs of APAs—the possible loss of political clout and economic benefits that are tied to numbers. For their part, multiracial Asians have charged that APA community leaders claim multiracial Asians because “it is politically propitious and advantageous” (Houston 1991, 56) but that APA organizations have largely ignored or marginalized multiracial concerns. They point to the fact that even today, few Asian American Studies programs in the country incorporate multiracial issues into their curricula; and few APA organizations have multiracial representatives in their leadership circles. Finally, some APA leaders call attention to the political importance of self-identification. As Tessie Guillermo, director of the Asian and Pacific Islander American Health Forum, stated, “I think the civil rights community has to remember that self-identification is a civil liberty” (Guillermo interview 1999).

Confirming the concerns of APA civil rights organizations, the preliminary survey findings suggest that the provision of multiracial options may well lead to declines in the proportions reporting as Asian and Pacific Islanders. In May 1995, the OMB-established Interagency Committee asked the Bureau of Labor Statistics to design a supplement to its Current Population Survey that would obtain data on the effect of having a multiracial category among the list of races. This survey found that about 1.5 percent of the population reported as multiracial and that the inclusion of a multiracial category decreased the proportion of Asian and Pacific Islanders from 3.83 to 3.25 percent (U.S. Department of Labor 1995). Similarly, the National Content Survey (NCS), conducted by the Census Bureau in 1996, found that when the multiracial category was included, about 1 percent of the respondents reported as multiracial. Of those identifying as multiracial in that sample, 30 percent partially identified themselves as Asian and Pacific Islander (House Committee Hearings 1997, 416). While the study found that the inclusion of a multiracial category had no statistically significant effect on the percentages of larger race groups, it indicated that the proportions reporting as APA
declined, from 4 percent to 2.7 percent—a possible decline of at least 3,250,000 APAs. (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996, 26; House Committee Hearings 1997, 416). Finally, the results of the 1996 Race and Ethnic Targeted Test further confirms that the inclusion of a multiracial category and the provision of instructions to “mark all that apply,” while not statistically significant, nevertheless reduced reporting of Asians and Pacific Islanders in the targeted samples (House Committee Hearings 1997, 416).

In December 1996, citing the NCS results, the Census Advisory Committee on the Asian and Pacific Islander Populations recommended that the “OMB Directive 15 should not be revised to include the multiracial category” (Census Advisory Committee 1996). In May 1997, the Asian and Pacific Islander Census Advisory Committee, along with the Census Advisory Committees on the African American, American Indian, and Alaska Native, and Hispanic populations, jointly recommended that the “Census Bureau does not add a multiracial category in Census 2000 form, and that no separate instructions be added for multiple responses in the race question” (Census Advisory Committees 1997).

After four years of heated debate, the OMB’s Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards rejected the proposal to create a separate multiracial category. Instead, in July 1997, the 30-agency task force recommended that Directive 15 be amended to permit multiracial Americans to “mark one or more” racial category when identifying themselves for the census and other government programs. Critics of the inclusion of a multiracial category were generally supportive of the “check one or more” proposal because they perceived it to be less likely to reduce the total count of their respective groups (Fiore 1997). The Interagency Committee rejected the creation of a new multiracial category because committee members feared that the category would generate yet another population group and add to racial tension and fragmentation. The Association of MultiEthnic Americans disagreed with the Committee’s reasoning:
We disagree that a multiracial/ethnic classification would create a new population group. The population groups to which they refer already exist and are growing rapidly. We also take issue with the opinion that a multiracial/ethnic classifier would add to racial tension and fragment our population. The essence of the multiracial/ethnic population is one of racial/ethnic unity. As we have stated before, our community is specially situated to confront racial and interethnic issues because of the special experiences and understanding we acquire in the intimacy of our families and our personalities. Of all populations, ours has the unique potential to become the stable core around which the ethnic pluralism of the United States can be united (House Committee Hearings 1997, 573-74).

However, the Association of MultiEthnic Americans and allied organizations and individuals regard the Interagency Committee’s recommendations as necessary and even revolutionary. They believe that, if implemented appropriately, the proposed changes to OMB Directive 15 will meet their most fundamental concern: the acknowledgement by the state that multiracial/ethnic people do exist and have a right to be counted as such.

The controversy then shifted to the tabulation of multiple racial responses. The 1997 standards require that at a minimum, the total number of persons identifying with more than one race must be reported. Beside this provision, it is still undecided as to how federal agencies will tabulate the new racial information, particularly what they will do with the overlap. In a 1998 joint report to the Census Bureau, the four Census Advisory Committees on the race and ethnic populations made the following recommendations:

1) That the OMB prepare two sets of data tabulations: one set would be the “full distribution” that preserves all of the multiple responses; and a second set that would collapse the multiple...
combinations back to the OMB standard six racial categories
and would be used for redistricting, affirmative action, voting
rights, distribution of funds for government programs, and other
mandates to reduce racial inequality.

2) That the following approach be used to collapse the combination
responses back to the OMB standard six groups: individuals
who check both a nonwhite majority group and white would be
classified as a member of the specific racial minority.

At the time of their report to the Census Bureau (June 1998), the
four committees had yet to reach a consensus on how individuals who
check off two or more racial minorities would be classified. For its part,
the Asian and Pacific Islander Advisory Committee had recommended
assigning the multiple minority individual to the smallest minority. The
Committee further proposed that whenever the response is a Black and
Asian racial combination, it should be reassigned to Black or Asian
depending upon whether the respondent lives in or near a Black or Asian
community; otherwise, the response should be assigned equally randomly
to Black and Asian. In all, the recommendations of the Census Advisory
Committees represented a compromise, designed to recognize the
concerns of multiracial individuals and organizations as well as to
protect the rights and interests of historically underrepresented groups.
In contrast, the Association of MultiEthnic Americans (AMEA)
vigorously opposes the reassignment of multiracial individuals to
monoracial categories. Ramona Douglass, AMEA president since
1994, argues that such reassignment would defeat the purpose of the
multiple responses and expects that AMEA will pursue litigation if
reassignment of any kind occurs (Douglass interview 1999).

In August 1999, for the purpose of redistricting data, the
Department of Justice selected the “full distribution approach”—or
the “PL 63 Matrix” approach—to tabulate the “more than one race”
census responses. Multiracial advocacy organizations praised this
decision since the full distribution approach reports multiple responses in the most expansive and detailed way possible—with no reassignment of multiple responses to monoracial categories. Under this, people would be placed in a racial category that matches the combination of races they list. In all, the various combinations would give the United States 63 officially recognized races. However, for non-redistricting issues, as of this writing, no decision has been made on how to allocate the multiple check-off responses. It is expected that the decision will be put off until the 2000 Census data comes out and studies are done on it.

Conclusion

The decennial national census has increasingly become the site of demands for political recognition. Until very recently, census categories were created and strategically employed to politically disenfranchise and discriminate against groups of color (Anderson 1988). In the wake of the civil rights movement, by contrast, state definitions of race and ethnicity have been increasingly used to monitor discriminatory trends and for the enforcement of equal opportunity laws. Given this, the census has become the focus of intense debates over the recognition and definition of groups. Groups realize the political value of racial categorization, along with the strategic deployment of “numbers,” in highlighting inequalities, arguing for resources, lobbying for particular forms of redistricting, and other policy debates. Strategic APA political actors, aware that hundreds of millions of dollars—not to mention political fortunes—are dispersed based on data gathered from responses to the racial and ethnic questions, actively seek to influence the content of the race item on the decennial census. Over the past several decades, APAs have been quite successful in challenging and expanding existing racial and ethnic categories to
address specific concerns and interests. Census numbers are also extremely important to APAs because relative to other groups like African Americans, so little data is generated elsewhere on their population. The absence of census data on APAs means that they are generally not sufficiently counted and acknowledged in social science and policy discussions of broad racial trends.

Asian Pacific American campaigns for recognition have not been waged solely to secure state-sponsored benefits but also to advance distinctive forms of identity claims. Some multiracial organizations have argued for the creation of a separate multiracial category as an issue of "self-esteem"—not as an issue of seeking underrepresented status. Other groups, such as Native Hawaiians, may be responding to both historical oppression and contemporary forms of inequality by asserting specific identities that question their current classification. What is interesting is how the census becomes the site of distinctive identity claims, how they are handled through the existing framework of state definitions, and how classification correspondingly shapes particular policies.

While APA accomplishments and gains regarding census classification are impressive given their small political base, the overall impact of these achievements on the quality of APA lives has been limited. Part of the problem is the generation and publication of quality data. In the Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander case, for example, NAPALC fears that data would be lost due to data quality and confidentiality reasons since the category constitutes less than 0.2 percent of the population. The Consortium has urged that data be collected and provided to the fullest extent possible. If significant data cannot be gathered in a timely fashion for Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander groups, then the goal of creating a separate category may fail to address the initial concerns that generated it (NAPALC 1999).
The collection and dissemination of data is an important, but insufficient step towards addressing APA social, economic, and political concerns. Data is always subject to multiple interpretations, and distinct policy options can emerge from a common set of trend lines and observed disparities by race (along with other axes of stratification). One issue centers on the tabulation of results. APA political actors have been concerned with the tabulation procedures for the multiracial count in Census 2000. At issue is not only the different numbers generated by distinct tabulation procedures, but the meaning of these counts for the established relationship of collecting and reporting race data to enforce civil rights laws.

Another important concern is to assess the impact of this data on specific policy initiatives to improve APA life chances. Our sense has been that while APA categories are used for administrative reporting and record keeping, the data generated has neither been widely disseminated nor sufficiently analyzed. Thus the generation of categories and data obtained under these rubrics has not translated into substantive policy outcomes. The Census Bureau has decided that untabulated census data from the 2000 Census will be made available via the internet for public access. How this data will be used in policy discussions will remain unclear for several years after the census.

We recommend and urge that APAs be more attentive to the publication and use of the data collected on APAs. They need to strategically utilize the data on APAs in the advancement of specific policy proposals. APAs also need to actively follow up on what federal agencies do, or fail to do, with APA data. In pursuing these actions, the focus extends beyond the process of simply adding up and demonstrating the "numbers" to make claims, but to deal with the complex social issues that lurk behind them.

One hopeful sign is the recent Executive Order (June 7, 1999) issued by President Bill Clinton to "improve the quality of life of Asian
Americans and Pacific Islanders through increased participation in Federal programs where they may be undeserved (e.g., health, human services, education, housing, labor, transportation, and economic and community development).” Relevant to the issues addressed in our chapter are Section 2a and Section 5a which call for the collection of data related to Asian American and Pacific Islanders, and Section 2c and Section 5c which call for ways to “foster research and data on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, including research and data on public health.” The Executive Order establishes the President’s Advisory Commission on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in the Department of Health and Human Services. It is important that this Commission advise the President with respect to the issues considered here, and underscores the importance of quality data as a policymaking resource.

Racial and ethnic classification is an eminently political process, subject to change under specific historical contexts. One might interpret our selective case studies as a challenge to the appropriateness and utility of the APA category. We caution against such a reading. APAs continue to be “lumped by race” in employment practices, cultural representations, and as victims of anti-Asian violence. Aggregate data is necessary for discerning broad trends and to comply with existing laws and practices. For example, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission collects compliance data using the inclusive APA category. Similarly, the Voting Rights Act and the redistricting process require data on the collective group, not on the individual subgroups. In fact, no federal legislation requires the Census Bureau to provide 100 percent data for the Asian Pacific subgroups, but only for the APAs as a whole (Espiritu 1992, 132).

That said, a delicate balancing act between the needs/interests of the larger category and that of the individual subgroups needs to be maintained. Summary statistics (regarding educational attainment, income, and housing trends) mask the heterogeneity within the category.
Different numbers need to be invoked in different policy contexts. A wide gap in subgroup profiles can lead, as in the case of Native Hawaiians, to a radical reconsideration of the category itself.

So who makes the call with respect to balancing competing demands and making political claims to state institutions? Thomas P. Kim suggests that there are several different “groups” of APA political elites involved in census politicking (Kim correspondence, 1999). There are elected legislators like Senator Akaka, lobbying organizations like NAPALC, insider/appointees like Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division Bill Lann Lee, and the APA members on the Census Advisory Committee. A loose collection of political consultants and elected officials also emerges around census and redistricting debates, reflecting an interest in consolidating particular voting blocs for future electoral campaigns.

On the issue of political empowerment, it may well be that only groups with sufficient political capital can effectively lobby for change. Other groups may be marginalized, and not sufficiently “connected” to present their concerns to appropriate bodies. For example, other Pacific Islander groups did not appear to have been consulted by OMB officials regarding the creation of the Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander category. They were simply relocated as a consequence of balancing competing demands between those groups that had voice in the political process. A question for continual study is who gets to speak and what specific interests do they represent. APAs must be attentive to the organization of political actions in the politics of racial and ethnic classification.

We are at an important juncture with respect to racial and ethnic classification and data. Under the guise of “colorblind” policies and practices, conservatives are urging the abandonment of racial and ethnic classification—specifically their use in record keeping procedures and in establishing eligibility requirements for various programs. For instance, former Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich tied his support
of a multiracial category to efforts to end affirmative action. Scholarly works in anthropology, genetics, and other fields have rejected biologically based notions of race, rendering any form of classification as suspect. While race is no longer seen as a biological “fact,” the reality of race as a social concept persists.

The notion that race is a social concept is amply illustrated by the history of the Census. Classifications utilized since the first census was taken reveal the inherent fluidity of racial categories, and how demographic changes, shifts in collective attitudes, panethnic coalitions, and individual identity formation constantly shape and re-shape the processes of classification. APAs have been subject to specific forms of classification from “above”—by federal, state, and local policies and practices—and have challenged such classification from “below”—through grassroots mobilization, political elites, and organized lobbying groups—to advance their own distinctive political claims for recognition.

APAs have often been rendered “invisible” by the broader emphasis on black/white relations. As a consequence, policy debates regarding health, immigration, labor, housing, and economic and community development, among other areas, have not taken into account nor discerned the impact of different policy initiatives on APA communities. Debates over census classification need to be situated in this context. Demands for specific categories are driven by the issue of appropriate “representation,” and the perception of unique issues and concerns not addressed, or disguised, by a particular group’s current location.

The goal of establishing racial and ethnic categories that are conceptually valid, measurable, exclusive and exhaustive, and reliable over time is an illusory one. That said, we do not argue for abandoning the use of racial and ethnic categories. Without some form of classification, we cannot monitor and track invidious forms of racial inequality and discrimination. The current debate on police profiling
of black motorists illustrates this issue. To get at the “reality” and scope of this problem, one needs to engage in racial record keeping that employs specific categories. However “unscientific” and imprecise these categories may be, some form of racial/ethnic classification is needed to discern trends and discriminatory patterns.

The determination of these categories is a policy issue. Categories are the result of processes of intense negotiation between state institutions and different groups advancing claims for recognition. As we have seen, the OMB has had to weigh different claims, assess their merits, and consider their impact on different federal agencies and their practices.

This process is not exclusively confined to the dealings between the state and a particular group. In the Native Hawaiian case, American Indians voiced their concern and dismay over the proposed relocation of Native Hawaiians to their “racial” category under Directive 15. The point is that different groups often contest the boundaries of state definitions in ways that bring them into conflict with each other. In so doing, the broader dynamics of racialization in the United States are revealed.

Outcomes with respect to census classification are never easy to predict, and no clear, coherent principles exist to guide and frame the decision-making. The process, despite claims to the contrary, is inherently political. Specific forms of classification are the result of dynamic and complex negotiations between state interests, panethnic demands, and ethnic-specific challenges. APA census categories both reflect and help create group identities, influence the formation of public policy, and shape the popular discourse about race in the U.S.
Endnotes

1 Both authors made equal contributions to this chapter, and alphabetical order determined the order of names. We are truly grateful to Paul Ong for his helpful comments, support, and prodding throughout the project. We are also greatly indebted to Thomas Kim for his invaluable assistance in all phases of the research process, and Monali Sheth for her interview work on the section on Asian Indians. We would like to thank our numerous respondents for generously giving of their time and expert insights. Lastly, we want to acknowledge each other’s help and support. In an often competitive and isolating academic environment, it is truly a pleasure to engage in a collective project with a kindred spirit.


3 In the past several years, for example, the Census has studied whether to maintain the term “Guamanian” or use the term “Chamorro.” The 1997 RAETT study observed the following trend: “Recently, ‘Chamorro’ has become more preferable to some, much like ‘African American’ has in the Black population...Younger and more educated respondents preferred ‘Chamorro’ and older respondents preferred ‘Guamanian’ (RAETT 1997, 2-15).” The final compromise was to use both terms in the check-off category.

4 Newt Gingrich, prior to his resignation from Congress, used the issue of a multiracial category to illustrate the indeterminacy of all racial categories, and to advocate for their abolition in government data collection: “America is too big and too diverse to categorize each and every one of us into four rigid racial categories...It is time for the government to stop perpetuating racial divisiveness” (Federal Measures of Race and Ethnicity and the Implications for the 2000 Census 1997, 662). Some have done just that. In 1998, then-California Governor Pete Wilson ordered state agencies to stop tracking data on women and minority-owned businesses in the state’s $4 billion public contracting system.


6 The Interagency Commission for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards was established by the OMB in March 1994. Its members come from more than 30 federal agencies that represent the many and diverse Federal needs for data on race and ethnicity, including statutory requirements for such data (Federal Register July, 9, 1997, 20).

7 Inouye had special credibility on this issue. Not only did he represent Hawaiian constituencies, but he had served on the Senate Committee for Indian Affairs for 19 years, including 8 years as its Chair.
The Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander category includes the following Pacific Islander groups reported in the 1990 Census: Carolinian, Fijian, Cesarean, Melanesian, Micronesia, Northern Mariana Islander, Plain, Papua New Guanine, Ponapean (Pohnpelan), Polynesian, Solomon Islander, Tahitian, Tarawa Islander, Tokelauan, Tongan, Trukese (Chuukese), and Yapese.

Between 1980 and 1990, many Hispanics abandoned the white racial category in favor of the “other” racial category.

Initially, multiracial advocacy groups were organized by parents in interracial unions who advocated on behalf of their mixed-race children. However, the people who are currently challenging the monoracial paradigm and resisting monoracial labels are predominantly the offspring of interracial couples (Payson 1996, 1233, n. 16).

For the sole purpose of the 2000 Census, OMB has granted an exception to the Census Bureau to use a category called “Some Other Race.” Thus, there are 63 mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories of race, including six categories for those who marked only one race and 57 for those who marked more than one race. (See Draft Provisional Guidance on the Implementation of the 1997 Standards For the Collection of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity (1999).
References


“Who Are You Calling Asian?”: Shifting Identity Claims, Racial Classifications, and the Census


Interviews

Douglass, Ramona. (1999, August 5).
Dutta, Dr. Manoranjan. (1999, April 15).
Kukkar, Dr. Narendra. (1999, April 9).
Ricasa, Tony. (1989, October 31).
Shah, Dr. Jiten. (1999, April 6).
If we remember nothing else about W.E.B. DuBois today, we remember his sober proclamation some 100 years ago that “the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color line.” This diagnosis is so well remembered because we sit on the edge of one century—a century Max Lerner dubbed “The American Century”—prepared to embark upon the next, and the problem of that next century most assuredly promises to remain that of the color line. Yet, the boundaries of this color line can no longer be drawn simply in black and white. Rather, the defining boundaries of race relations at the end of the Twentieth Century are multichromatic intersectional, heterogeneous, and constantly shifting.

This chapter examines the contours and cleavages in public attitudes about race relations and Asian Pacific Americans in an explicitly multiracial context of blacks, whites, Latinos, and Asians (APAs). The focus on racial attitudes is vital because race relations are shaped not only by the material conditions of different racial and ethnic groups and the policies that governments enact, but also by the knowledge, beliefs, and experiences of ordinary individuals. As such, an analysis of what unites and divides popular opinion and political preferences on racial matters is critical to understanding how race relations are structured and what kinds of race relations are possible.

The analytic framework is expressly comparative: across racial and ethnic groups, across different constituent Asian Pacific American ethnic groups, and across national and local contexts. The substantive and interpretive focus foregrounds the racial position of APAs in seeking to answer the following questions. How commonly do APAs and others experience racial discrimination? What beliefs do different groups hold about discrimination, racial inequality, economic conflict, and the oppor-
tunity structure in the United States? Do APAs’ views on these matters align with whites, do they exhibit a multiracial consciousness, or do APAs occupy a distinct “third space” on racial matters? Do negative stereotypes and sentiments about APAs exist, and are whites’, blacks’, and Latinas’ views on public policies affecting APAs significantly determined by such antagonistic attitudes?

The analyses show, first, the simultaneous order and discontinuity that characterizes the public’s views on Asian Pacific Americans and race relations. There is a clear hierarchy to racial attitudes. The discontinuity arises in the hybrid forms this hierarchy takes. By some measures the hierarchy divides whites from nonwhites. By other measures, the hierarchy splits blacks from nonblacks. By still others, whites and APAs together are differentiated from blacks and Latinos. And sometimes racial attitudes are lexically ordered from whites to APAs to Latinos to African Americans *seriatim*. The racial order, then (other permutations notwithstanding), locates blacks and whites at the antipodes of public opinion with Latinos and APAs shifting contingently in the interstices.

The other prominent result in the forthcoming pages is the specificity and shifting position of Asian Pacific Americans within this multiracial configuration. APAs themselves are distinguished by the pervasively high level of personal experience with discrimination and a rich diversity of attitudes and experiences that cuts across ethnic groups, geographic region, region length of residence in the United States, among other things. For non-APAs, opinions about APAs are strongly influenced by knowledge of and interactions with APAs, beliefs about APAs’ economic threat and acculturation, and anti-Asian stereotypes and sentiments. These dynamics of racial attitudes specific to APAs, importantly, carry over to preferences over government policies that impact the Asian Pacific American community. As such, public opinion among and about APAs captures the unique, but unstable and vulnerable, position APAs face at the close of the Twentieth Century.
A persistent feature of the study of racial attitudes is the predominance of a black-white paradigm. Until as recently as the 1980s—this paradigm has largely been the study of what white Americans think about African Americans. More recently, survey researchers have increasingly recognized the interdependency of public opinion across different racial and ethnic groups. Accordingly, there has been a significant rise in data and research on racial attitudes in a more inclusive, multiracial context. The last few decades have also seen surveys that attempt to understand the dynamics of public opinion indigenous to specific communities of color. Yet even today, the most prominent contemporary works in the field restrict their analysis to debates over blacks' and whites' opinions. And until recently, few surveys included sufficiently large samples of whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians together, with even fewer polls that examined exclusively the opinions of Asian Pacific Americans.

This chapter takes advantage of several recent media polls that place racial attitudes in an explicitly multiracial, multiethnic context. Specifically, it draws from two surveys of the four largest racial/ethnic groups in the U.S. (a 1995 Washington Post/Kaiser Foundation/Harvard University poll and a 1993 Los Angeles Times poll) and four LA Times ethnic-specific polls of Southern Californians of Chinese, Filipino, Korean, and Vietnamese descent. Where appropriate, the discussion will also draw from several other recent academic surveys and media polls as well: the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey, the 1993-94 Los Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality, a 1996 Asian Week poll, a 1998 San Francisco Chronicle/KRON/KQED poll, and a 1998 University of Massachusetts poll.

Several prefatory, precautionary remarks on these data bear mention. First, although the Post poll offers significant insights into racial attitudes in a national context, five of the six primary data sets used draw
only from residents of Southern California. And while racial attitudes and politics in California often presage those of the nation writ large, the two contexts are clearly distinct. Moreover, although the polls of Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, and Vietnamese reflect a broad diversity of Asian Pacific American ethnicities, by no means do they capture the full diversity of the Asian Pacific American community.9

Along these lines, although the chapter primarily looks at race and ethnicity in terms of the four most commonly aggregated groups—whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asian Pacific Americans—the reality of racial attitudes and racial politics is (to paraphrase Lisa Lowe) heterogeneous, hybrid, and multiple.10 Data from the ethnic-specific LA Times polls, for example, reveal a remarkable diversity and differentiation in the opinions Chinese, Filipino, Korean, and Vietnamese Americans hold and in the company they keep. Thus, while the ensuing pages liberally refer to racial and ethnic groups in global, homogenizing terms, the analyses and interpretation should be read with the complexity of actual experiences and opinions—especially for putatively “pan-ethnic” groups like Asian Pacific Americans and Latinos—firmly in mind.

Too, there are nuances to polling predominantly immigrant communities of color that limit what we can infer from these data. Three specific such caveats are the sampling of respondents, the wording and sequence of questions, and the language in which interviews are conducted. In addition to the chronic worry of “randomly” sampled survey respondents, communities that are disproportionately immigrant, impoverished, or otherwise marginalized like APAs, Latinos, and African Americans are especially difficult to sample without bias. Strategies to circumvent these problems, further, often fall shy of their mark. The LA Times poll’s decision, for example, to select their pool of potential respondents by identifying “Asian”-sounding surnames risks missing many APAs with non-standard surnames and errantly sampling many non-APAs with “Asian”-sounding surnames.
The survey data on APAs are also susceptible to subtleties in the text and language of the interviews. The *LA Times* polls, for instance, contain questions that are worded and ordered in ways that may reinforce stereotypical views of Asian Pacific Americans—e.g., as perpetual foreigners or as a homogeneous, monolithic ethnic bloc. Further, data from surveys such as the *Post* poll that interview Asian Pacific Americans exclusively in English may miss the full diversity of opinion. U.S. Census Bureau data show that 73 percent of APAs speak a language other than English at home, and this figure is even higher for APAs in the Los Angeles region. Consistent with this, between 50 to 90 percent of respondents in the ethnic-specific *LA Times* polls—which gave a choice of languages to be interviewed in—opt for a non-English language of interview. And the evidence from these polls suggests that APAs interviewed in the languages of their countries of origin give substantively different answers than APAs interviewed in English.¹¹

Such caveats warn us against accepting the results of poll data on APAs too enthusiastically or uncritically. That said, survey data on APAs and race relations remain singularly rare and abundantly illuminating. While we know plenty about what political elites have to say on racial matters, the voices of ordinary APAs remain obscure. As APAs rapidly emerge into the political limelight and as that limelight rapidly casts racist and nativist shadows back at Asian Pacific Americans—witnessed by the recent maelstrom of controversy around campaign finance and military espionage—a clearer understanding of how rank-and-file APAs negotiate these treacherous racial currents is increasingly urgent. These data, then, warts and all, offer a unique vantage point into race relations and racial attitudes among and about APAs.¹²
Interracial Interaction

How often and in what settings do APAs interact with each other and with others? Do APAs remain socially insular, do they assimilate and integrate seamlessly with the majority white population of the U.S., or do they forge multiracial, pan-ethnic ties across communities of color? In this section, we take a rough hew at these questions in three contexts: racial intermarriage, close personal friendships, and residential integration.

The results show a rich heterogeneity in the company that Asian Pacific American ethnicities keep. This diversity is evident not only across racial and ethnic groups, but across regions of the United States and types of interracial contact as well. The results also demonstrate the extent to which interracial interaction in the U.S. is strongly shaped by a racial ordering that places whites as the most socially desirable and African Americans as the least socially desirable. Accordingly, by most measures Asian Pacific American ethnics tend to either keep with their own ethnic group or cross-over to interact with whites. Moreover, attitudes toward racial intermarriage and neighborhood composition strongly evince such a hierarchy of racial preferences. At the same time, the levels of friendship ties across multiracial and panethnic boundaries are quite high. And intimate interracial relations (and respondents' tolerance to them) increase with time in the United States.

Evidence of interracial interactions is often accepted with the uncritically positive expectation that direct social contact will give the lie to stereotypes and prejudices and harmonize race relations as a consequence. Indeed, we shall see that direct experience with APAs does diminish racial resentment towards APAs later in this chapter. Yet it is imperative to keep in mind that close contact can sometimes worsen, not improve, race relations. Moreover, actual levels of interracial interactions may differ considerably from desired levels of such contact;
individuals cannot always freely choose the company they keep. There is a long and fully documented history in the United States of socially, economically, and politically segregating racial minorities by law, institutional practices, social custom, and—as we shall see—by the preferences and prejudices of private individuals as well.

Figure 1. Attitudes on Racial Intermarriage

![Bar chart showing attitudes on racial intermarriage for Filipino-Americans, Korean-Americans, and Vietnamese-Americans.](chart)


**Racial Intermarriage**

Chinese-, Filipino-, and Korean-Americans in the ethnic-specific *LA Times* polls are overwhelmingly—from 90 percent of Filipinos to 98 percent of Koreans—wedded to partners within their own ethnic group. At least at first blush, these numbers seem to reinforce popular beliefs that Asians choose to socially isolate themselves. Of course, there are a myriad reasons why particular marital unions occur ranging from legal codes, population growth and immigration flows, and residential and geographical settlement patterns at the macro-level to familial pressure, cultural norms,
social distance, racial prejudice, and simple partner preferences at the individual-level.

Moreover, the intermarriage rates from the LA Times poll data differ quite a bit from more exhaustive demographic studies that use U.S. Census Bureau data. For example, 1990 Census data show that fully 15 percent of married APAs formed ties outside their ethnic group. As with close friendships, length of residence and the rapid influx of Asian immigrants explain much of this difference between Census data and LA Times data. Native-born APAs, for example, are more than twice as likely to marry outside their racial/ethnic group than foreign-born APAs.

When asked to evaluate racial intermarriages normatively, the Asian Pacific American ethnic groups in Figure 1 manifest a markedly greater diversity of opinion. Filipino Americans appear most favorable among the Asian Pacific American ethnicities polled, with about three in four approving interracial unions. By contrast, only about one in two Korean- and Vietnamese-Americans appear tolerant of exogamy. Interestingly, the modal view for Vietnamese is indifference to intermarriage while well over a third of Koreans actively oppose such bonds.

To put these figures in some context, the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey finds comparably high levels of opposition to racial intermarriage among whites, Latinos, and Asian Pacific Americans generally. Notably, the greatest opposition is to intermarriage to African Americans followed by intermarriage to Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans. Opposition to intermarriage to white Americans is minimal. Perhaps ironically, African Americans are the least resistant to exogamy across all possible interracial partners, while whites are the most resistant to every possible interracial partnership. This hierarchical pattern of responses—from whites at one end to blacks at the other—is one we will see again across a broad range of racial attitudes in the coming pages.
PERSONAL FRIENDSHIPS

Another kindred tie across racial and ethnic boundaries is the bond of friendship. The LA Times' ethnic-specific polls asks Chinese-, Filipino-, Korean-, and Vietnamese-Americans who their "close personal friends" are—blacks, whites, Latinos, members of other Asian Pacific American ethnic groups, or of their own ethnic in-group.

Figure 2 shows that Chinese and Filipinos form a large number and a broad heterogeneity of friendships. Although three in four Chinese and Filipinos surveyed report friendship ties within their in-group, about 40 percent or more also report intimate acquaintances with blacks, whites, Latinos, and other APAs. Vietnamese and Koreans, by contrast, appear considerably more socially isolated. Vietnamese respondents almost exclusively build friendships with other Vietnamese. Koreans exhibit a modestly greater frequency of friendship ties across racial lines, most commonly with whites. 18

Clearly many plausible reasons might explain this interethnic variation. One such possibility worth noting is the relatively longer history in the U.S. for Chinese and Filipinos. 19 Among respondents to the Times polls, almost 15 percent of Chinese and 12 percent of Filipinos are U.S. born, while less than 1 percent of Koreans and less than 2 percent of Vietnamese were born in the U.S.. 20 These cross-generational differences in friendship ties and racial intermarriage bear mention because they sustain (albeit indirectly) sociological studies which show that immigrant communities of color become more racialized and politicized with their length of tenure in the United States. 21

Accordingly, U.S.-born Chinese and Filipino respondents are significantly more likely to hold close acquaintances outside their ethnic group than their foreign-born counterparts. Second-generation Chinese-Americans, for instance, are more likely to form close ties with blacks, whites, Latinos, and other APAs as they are with other Chinese Americans. 22 Focusing on pan-ethnic ties, more than half the Chinese-
Figure 2. Close Friendships, by Race/Ethnicity of Acquaintance


Figure 3. Racial/Ethnic Composition of Majority of Neighbors

Americans and fully 40 percent of Filipino-Americans report close friendships with Asian Pacific Americans outside their ethnic in-group.

**Neighborhood composition**

A third aspect of racial interactions that the ethnic-specific *Los Angeles Times* polls speak to are the spatial contexts that either bring diverse groups together or keep them apart. Existing residential settlement patterns show that while Asians are geographically concentrated and tend to live in urban areas, they do not face the kind of "hypersegregation" that typifies black Americans. Some studies even suggest that multiethnic cities like Los Angeles may actually engender relatively stable integrated neighborhoods over the long term. Our data illuminate two dimensions of spatial context for APAs: the degree of segregation in APAs’ residences and the attachment APAs hold to an ethnic center of community life.

Once again there is both commonality and diversity across different Asian Pacific American ethnicities. Filipino, Korean, and Vietnamese respondents are more likely to live either in racially-mixed neighborhoods or in majority-white communities (See Figure 3). That said, Filipinos are much more likely to live in racially integrated communities than any other racial/ethnic composition, Vietnamese are more likely to live in majority-white communities than any other composition, and Koreans were fairly even split between the two. In all respondent groups, a moderate proportion live in a majority ethnic in-group or majority Latino neighborhoods. Very few respondents live in neighborhoods that are either majority African American or majority Asian Pacific American outside their ethnic in-group.

As with interracial partnerships, we cannot assume a direct correspondence between residential settlement patterns and prefer-
ences over where to live and with whom to live. These results are consistent with the perceived social desirability of white neighbors and the perceived social undesirability of African American neighbors in other surveys. The 1992 LA County Social Survey, for example, shows that between one-third and one-half of whites, Asians, and Latinos oppose moving into a majority-black neighborhood. By contrast, fewer than 10 percent of all nonwhites oppose a move to a majority-white neighborhood. Partiality for majority-Asian and majority-Latino neighbors falls between these opposites. More generally, the 1993-94 LA Study of Urban Inequality shows that African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Pacific Americans most prefer racially mixed communities, while Anglos favor either all-white or only marginally integrated neighborhoods. Importantly, these preferences for certain neighbors and not others is conspicuously shaped by ethnocentrism and racial prejudice.

This general in-group bias over residential space is bolstered in the LA Times polls by strong identification with ethnically concentrated sites like Los Angeles’ Chinatown, the San Gabriel Valley, Los Angeles’ Koreatown, or Orange County’s Little Saigon. About 40 percent of Chinese respondents identify Chinatown as a “most” or a “very” important center of business, cultural, and social activity in their daily lives and almost two-thirds identify the San Gabriel Valley similarly. Well over 80 percent of Korean- and Vietnamese-Americans either identified Koreatown or Little Saigon as a “very” or “most” important center of life or in fact lived in these neighborhoods. As with the tendency to forge close friendships, this preference is notably more visible among the newer immigrant groups.
Racial Discrimination

The overview of interracial contact—from marriage partners to next-door neighbors—tells us a fair bit about the diversity and fluidity of social arrangements that characterize everyday life for Asian Pacific Americans. This finding is an important reminder that APAs’ experiences and opinions cannot be tidily summarized into a small number of uniformly applicable, enduring attributes. We have also seen that the type and intensity of interracial intimacy individuals engage in closely parallels their expressed preferences (or perceived constraints) over marital partners, friends, and neighbors. This finding is an important reminder that race relations are not always freely formed, but quite often operate within a field of binding constraints set by personal preferences and prejudices.

In this section, then, we turn more directly to personal experiences of being discriminated against and perceptions about racial discrimination. The results show that a significant proportion of Americans—black, white, Latino, and Asian—report first-hand experience with discrimination. Notably, contrary to popular beliefs of an overachieving, thriving Asian Pacific American “model minority,” the levels of perceived discrimination reported by APAs is quite extensive. In fact, these levels are more comparable to those reported by African Americans and Latinos than they are to whites.

These results capture the hybridity of racial attitudes in a multiracial context. On the one hand, there is a distinct architecture to racial attitudes which situates blacks and whites at the antipodes of social desirability, lived racism, and material well-being, with Latinos and Asians in between. Yet, this racial ordering is neither uniform nor universal. Nor does it map tidily onto statistical realities of the material conditions facing each racial/ethnic group in the United States. In fact, public perceptions about personally experienced discrimination or the
racism that other groups face vary substantially by race, region, historical period, and the particular issue at hand. Conspicuously, very few Americans (APAs themselves included) view Asian Pacific Americans as facing a significant level of discrimination.

This leaves us with a disjuncture—between high levels of discrimination reported by APAs and the general perception that APAs do not face high levels of discrimination—that frames the analysis for the remainder of this chapter. Specifically, this disjuncture suggests a more complex, multi-dimensional basis to racial attitudes than is reflected in simple percentages. Here the existing research on racial attitudes points to four “usual suspects”: beliefs about social stratification and racial inequality, perceptions of tangible conflict and competition between groups, normative judgments about a group’s mores and motivations, and (either explicit or symbolic) racial resentment of out-groups. We consider these in turn. Ultimately, these dimensions yield important insights into how the public thinks about APAs and the public policies affecting the Asian Pacific American community.

PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF DISCRIMINATION

From the Kerner Commission’s infamous indictment of “two societies; one black, one white—separate and unequal” some thirty years ago to the more recent aftermath of the O.J. Simpson trial, we have come to accept a profound divide in the lived realities of racial groups in the United States as a common fact. This divergence is manifest in our survey data on personal experiences with discrimination. Figure 4 compares the national Post poll to the regional LA Times and San Francisco Chronicle polls on this question.

The first finding of note in Figure 4 is the regional specificity of discrimination and perceptions of discrimination. In the national Post poll, experience with racism divides fairly clearly between whites and nonwhites. Only 1 in 6 whites report being discriminated against during
the last ten years, while over a third of Latinos, 40 percent of Asians, and half of African Americans report such an experience. This pattern recurs when the Post poll asks respondents if they are concerned about discrimination in the future. Almost 70 percent of white respondents were either “not very” or “not at all” affected by the prospect of being discriminated against in the future. By contrast over 80 percent of African Americans, and well over 60 percent of Latinos and APAs were either “somewhat” or “very” concerned about facing such experiences in the future.

The landscape of racism in California is quite different. All racial and ethnic groups—in the Bay Area and Southern California—report the same or higher levels of discrimination than their counterparts in the nation writ large. The most precipitous rise occurs, moreover, with whites. In the San Francisco Chronicle poll the proportion of whites who report discrimination increases to 28 percent, although a perceptible division between the experiences of whites and nonwhites lingers. In the Los Angeles Times poll this is no longer true. Fully half the white respondents report personally experiencing discrimination, a rate higher than that of Latinos.

Figure 4 is also conspicuous for the consistently high levels reported by Asian Pacific Americans. In both the Post and the LA Times polls, APAs rank second only to African Americans in experiencing discrimination. In the ethnic-specific LA Times polls, the prevalence of discrimination remains high, although perhaps at rates closer to that in the Washington Post and San Francisco Chronicle polls: 57 percent of Chinese, 46 percent of Filipinos and Koreans, and 41 percent of Vietnamese respondents report such incidents. Even with a 1998 University of Massachusetts poll that asks this question over a very narrow time horizon—restricted to experiences within the last three months of the survey—fully 25 percent of Asian Pacific Americans reported being discriminated against.
Figure 4. Personal Experience being Discriminated Against


Figure 5. Which Group Experiences the Most Discrimination?

GROUP ASSESSMENTS OF DISCRIMINATION

Although Asian Pacific Americans report experiencing widespread discrimination, this pervasive experience is seldom perceived by others. One of the Washington Post poll items asks which racial/ethnic group in the U.S. faces the greatest discrimination. Figure 5 shows that across all respondent groups African Americans are most often identified. Although about 40 percent of Latinos identify themselves as facing the greatest racial animus, Latinos are only a distant second for white, African American, and Asian Pacific American respondents. Notably, although we have seen that somewhere between 40 and 60 percent of Asian Pacific Americans report personally experiencing discrimination, fewer than 15 percent of any respondent group—Asian Pacific Americans included—identify APAs as facing the greatest discrimination.

The LA Times poll’s version of this question, however, shows that at least in Southern California, the relatively linear hierarchy of racial attitudes does not always hold. More than 70 percent of African Americans unambiguously rank blacks as more discriminated against than any other group. Yet, less than a quarter of respondents in any other group identify blacks as the most discriminated group in Southern California. Close to half of Latinos view themselves as the most discriminated group, while whites and Asians split fairly evenly between viewing blacks and Latinos as the most discriminated group. Fewer than 5 percent of whites, blacks, and Latinos see APAs as the most discriminated group.

Of course, the wording of this question forces a choice between racial minorities, all of whom may face significant levels of racism. In particular, the gap between reported discrimination by APAs and perceptions of discrimination may simply reflect reasonable differences in perceptions of the intensity of discrimination faced by different groups. Here the San Francisco Chronicle poll offers a nice comparison (results not shown). It simply asks whether different groups face “a lot” of prejudice.
in the Bay Area. The familiar ordering is replicated regardless of respondent race and ethnicity: every respondent group rates African Americans most often as subjected to significant discrimination, followed in order by Latinos, Asians, and whites. Notably, the percentage of respondents who now identify Asian Pacific Americans as frequent victims of discrimination now ranges from 12 percent (whites) to 27 percent (Latinos), although these rates still fall far below the percentages of APAs who actually report experiencing discrimination.

**GROUP ASSESSMENTS AND RACIAL INEQUALITY**

There remains, then, a significant gap between the levels of discrimination that APAs experience and public perceptions of those experiences. Part of this gap is likely rooted in beliefs about the opportunity structure in the United States and the differential access of blacks, Latinos, whites, and Asians within that structure. When polled about the relative disadvantages facing different racial/ethnic groups—absent any explicit reference to discrimination as the cause of such disadvantages—the American public exhibits a remarkable consensus in opinion. The *Washington Post* poll asks respondents whether or not nonwhites have the same opportunities to lead a middle-class life as whites. Figure 6 shows that all respondent groups perceive blacks and Latinos to be significantly more disadvantaged than APAs vis-à-vis the opportunities and privileges available to whites.33

The *LA Times* poll's variation on this theme asks respondents whether different groups face adversity in their efforts to obtain "adequate housing and education, and job opportunities and social acceptance by whites." Keeping the difference in question wording in mind, here again respondents clearly distinguish the barriers facing blacks and Latinos from those facing whites and Asians.34 More than 40 percent of respondents in all groups identify African Americans and Latinos as facing substantial adversity, while fewer than 20 percent (and
usually less than 10 percent) by contrast identify either whites or APAs.\textsuperscript{35}

Question wording notwithstanding, few respondents—black, white, brown, or yellow—view Asian Pacific Americans as facing significant barriers to a decent life. In the multiracial \textit{LA Times} poll, only about one in ten Asian Pacific Americans themselves see APAs as facing substantial adversity in meeting basic social and material needs. This rather sanguine view about their own upward mobility is true across specific Asian Pacific American ethnic groups as well. In the ethnic-specific \textit{LA Times} polls, between 87 and 96 percent of the Chinese, Filipino, and Vietnamese respondents rated the conditions they face as good or better than good. No more than 2 percent in any respondent group view conditions as “very bad.”\textsuperscript{36}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure6.png}
\caption{Perceived Barriers to Equal Opportunity \hfill (Data: 1995 \textit{Washington Post}, 1993 \textit{Los Angeles Times})}
\end{figure}


This result persists even when potential barriers to equal opportunity are explicitly offered to respondents. When asked to identify the
“primary thing holding Asians back in Southern California,” the most common response among whites and African Americans is that APAs face no barriers at all (See Figure 7). And where barriers are acknowledged, respondents most commonly point the finger back at attributes internal to the Asian Pacific American community itself—namely, cultural differences, voluntary isolation, and language problems. Conspicuously, only between 10 and 15 percent in any respondent group identify racism as an obstacle for APAs, and APAs stand alone in characterizing lack of political power as an obstacle in substantial numbers.

This general tendency to view a group as facing no significant barriers or to place the burden of hardships facing a group on their own attributes is important because it can be pernicious. Previous studies show that “attributional” explanations of racial inequality that “blame the victim” also engender negative views toward the group in question and legitimate policy positions that are unsympathetic to that groups’ plight. By contrast, more “situational” perspectives that recognize the structural, environmental impediments to equal opportunity tend to induce more positive, sympathetic attitudes and policy positions.37

In the Washington Post poll, respondents are offered a series of situational and attributional reasons for the economic and social problems faced by nonwhites in the U.S. today.38 Among attributional explanations, all respondent groups view poor family structure (and, to a lesser extent, lack of motivation) as a significant cause of the economic and social problems facing the African American community. All respondent groups view language as a significant barrier for Latinos and Asians. And while beliefs about the African American family or Latinas’ desire to speak English may not amount to overt racism, they do signify more symbolic, or “laissez-faire” modes of justifying racially antagonistic views.39

In fact, at least in Southern California, Asian Pacific Americans are not only viewed as facing no substantial barriers to opportunity, but
they are also considered as too successful and too enthusiastic in their pursuit of material success. Here the LA Times poll asks whether any group "is getting more economic power than is good for Southern California" and whether any group "is working harder than the others to succeed in Southern California." Perhaps unsurprisingly, given their relative economic well-being vis-à-vis Latinos and African Americans, whites and Asians are most commonly perceived economically powerful (See Figure 8). What may be more surprising is that white, African American, and Latino respondents are more likely to choose APAs than whites on this question. Whites in particular are discernibly shy about citing themselves as wielding too much economic power.

Consistent with prior research on racial attitudes, these perceptions of economic competition and group threat are key to beliefs about discrimination and (as we shall see) preferences over policy matters. Thus, contrary to classic assimilation theory, economic mobility does not foster greater social acceptance. Instead, the view that APAs are too economically powerful is statistically linked to other negative evaluations of APAs such as the belief that APAs are the most prejudiced group in Southern California. This is true even when we control statistically for other plausible alternative explanations like sociodemographic background, political partisanship and ideology, interracial experiences.

When asked if any group works especially hard to succeed, Asian Pacific Americans are singled out by all respondent groups. From prior research, we know that the belief that a particular group lacks the will to succeed acts as a negative stereotype that gives rise to racial resentment and opposition to racially egalitarian policies. One might logically conclude, then, that if APAs are seen to work especially hard to succeed, that belief ought to generate positive, sympathetic attitudes toward APAs and the policies that affect APAs.

This logic turns out to be only partially sound in general and mostly unsound vis-à-vis Asian Pacific Americans. Specifically, the belief
Figure 7. Primary Barriers Holding Back APAs

Source: 1993 Los Angeles Times poll

Figure 8. Who Holds Too Much Economic Power, Works Hardest to Succeed?
(Data: 1993 Los Angeles Times poll)

Source: 1993 Los Angeles Times poll
that a group works harder than others to succeed is positively related to the belief that that group endures extreme discrimination, controlling again for sociodemographic and political factors and one's personal experiences with discrimination. This relationship, interestingly, holds uniformly only when the work ethic of African Americans or Latinos is concerned. When asked about the work ethic of Asians or whites, the relationship holds only within in-groups. That is, only Asian Pacific Americans make the link between their perceived motivation to succeed and the belief that they are widely discrimination against.

Anti-Asian Sentiments and Stereotypes

Thus, while negative stereotypes about blacks' or Latinos' work ethic may vindicate unsympathetic or even hostile attitudes, the converse does not generally hold. We know from prior research that inequality in the United States is consoled ideologically in the public mind vis-à-vis notions of equal opportunity and economic individualism. By this reasoning, racial disparities result from unjust inequalities of opportunity or defects of individual or group character. One implication of these results in this chapter is that such core principles do not apply uniformly to all social groups. In the case of Asian Pacific Americans, few respondents perceive significant barriers to equal opportunity and even fewer perceive an insufficient will to succeed. Yet, Asian Pacific Americans do face significant adversity and injustice—whether measured by the survey-based reports of discriminatory experiences that we have seen or by some other evidentiary basis like statistics on hate crimes, oral histories, government documents, or highly profiled public trials of APAs.

There are at least two explanations for this gap between lived racism for APAs and the public's opinion about APAs. For one thing, the site of anti-Asian discrimination within the U.S. opportunity
structure may differ in important respects from other racial minorities. For another, the substance of anti-Asian discrimination may differ from other racial minorities. On the first point, discrimination often hits APAs in formal, institutional contexts as relatively successful individuals hit the proverbial "glass ceiling." Larry Bobo and Susan Suh find that Asian Pacific Americans most likely to report discrimination in the workplace are the highly educated, the highly paid, and the white-collar employees. Thus, APAs may face real discrimination, but people (including APAs themselves) may not view encumbrances at the upper echelons of professional life (cf. a decent standard of life) as a significant barrier to equal opportunity.

On the second point, the paradox between the apparent absence of negative stereotypes about APAs and the visible presence of discrimination experienced by APAs is intelligible if the substantive form of anti-Asian discrimination is distinct and not adequately captured by existing measures of discrimination. In fact, the substantive forms of discrimination should be distinct if the prevailing constructivist view of race and racism is correct. Racial formations occur around essentialist stereotypes that differentiate one "race" from another. Thus, we should not expect that epigenetic stereotypes about intelligence, motivation, family, criminality—which in the United States have evolved largely from the history of black-white relations—will necessarily apply to APAs. As Michael Omi and Howard Winant put it, racial hegemony at the end of the Twentieth Century is demonstrably "messy."

Plainly put, survey questions designed to measure racial resentment toward one group will be inadequate and invalid as measures of racial resentment toward another group. Even today, opinion polls that assess the prevalence of negative stereotypes towards African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Pacific Americans generally do so with a common set of questions applied unvaryingly to these distinct racial/ethnic groups. In this last section on racial attitudes, then, we consider whether evidence of
negative sentiments and stereotypes unique to APAs can be found using survey data and, if so, how such anti-Asian attitudes are constituted. Here the *Los Angeles Times* poll includes a unique set of questions on popular beliefs and prejudices about Asian Pacific Americans. Specifically, the *Times* polls include four items that measure distinct stereotypes of APAs and three items that measure anti-Asian sentiments.

The first three stereotype measures are specific to historical and contemporary stereotypes of Asian Pacific Americans: (1) that APAs are homogeneous—respondents are asked whether or not APA ethnic groups "tend to have the same mentality"; (2) that APAs are perpetual foreigners—respondents are asked whether "APAs have more in common with Asians who live in Asia or ... more in common with other types of Americans"; (3) that APAs are inscrutable—respondents are asked about the accuracy of portrayals of APAs as "people who are particularly puzzling and mysterious." The remaining measure asks respondents whether or not APAs use a disproportionate amount of government services. This item is not unique to Asian Pacific Americans as it considers the general view that racial minorities and immigrant groups depend on and freely abuse government benefits.

The three measures of anti-Asian sentiments ask respondents: (1) whether they have a negative or positive impression of Japan; (2) whether or not "a substantial increase" of APAs moving into the respondent's neighborhood would upset the respondent; (3) whether or not such an increase in the number of APAs would upset the respondent's neighbors. This last measure is an important check against respondents who might in fact oppose a large influx of Asian Pacific American neighbors, but feel socially constrained to express a more "politically correct," racially tolerant position. In fact, Figure 9 shows that whites, blacks, and Latinos are between two to four times as likely to claim that an influx of Asian Pacific Americans would upset unnamed neighbors than they are to report personal discomfort.

More generally, Figure 9 shows that the belief in distinctly
anti-Asian attitudes is quite high. The distribution of responses in Figure 9 is also impressive for the extent to which all respondent groups either accept or reject particular sentiments and stereotypes altogether. Hence, across all respondent groups there is widespread acceptance of the stereotype of APAs as inscrutable and as perpetual foreigners and feelings of hostility towards Asian neighbors and towards Japan. Similarly, there is only modest support across all respondent groups for the stereotype of Asian Pacific Americans as welfare dependents or as dispositionally homogeneous group. In fact, these seven items can be cumulated into a statistically powerful and meaningful “anti-Asian” attitude scale. In such a global measure, notably, African Americans exhibit the greatest tendency to stereotype APAs, followed by Latinos, whites, and Asian Pacific Americans themselves.

Figure 9 is also revealing for what, at first blush, appears to
be a surprisingly high rate of anti-Asian attitudes among APAs themselves. For example, more than half the APAs polled agree that APAs are “particularly puzzling and mysterious” and almost a third agree that APAs are more Asian than they are American. These high levels may suggest that some items—the stereotype questions in particular—are not really negative stereotypes. After all, beliefs about Asian Pacific American homogeneity or inscrutability may be neutral generalizations. Alternatively, these results might suggest the prevalence of “internal racism”; the stereotype items may indeed be pernicious, but APAs may still accept them as true.

It is important to note in this context that the tendency of racial minorities to adhere to seemingly negative stereotypes of themselves is not exclusive to Asian Pacific Americans. The 1991 National Race Survey shows with respect to black-white opinion that African Americans actually appear to be more prone than white Americans to adopt negative stereotypes of themselves. These negative views clearly do not, however, influence race attitudes and support for racial policies in the same way for blacks as they do for whites. As we shall see quite vividly, then, a third possibility is that stereotypes can operate differently for the in-groups to whom the generalizations refer than they do for out-groups.

This is true of the sentiments and stereotypes in Figure 9. The additive scale of the seven items noted above, for instance, enjoys reasonable statistical properties only for whites, blacks, and Latinos. For Asian Pacific Americans, such a scale is much less coherent. More convincingly, when we turn to multivariate accounts of how anti-Asian attitudes are formed, a meaningful narrative emerges for blacks, whites, and Latinos, but not APAs.
Table 1. Determinants of anti-Asian Stereotypes and Sentiments\textsuperscript{43}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Divisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>older, less educated, urban</td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>no effects</td>
<td>no effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Divisions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conservatives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Sources and</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less knowledgeable, informed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>believe media bias, is pro-Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hear anti-Asian slurs often</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more friendly APA contacts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>View of Acculturation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>multiculturalist view</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perceived negative impact,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1993 Los Angeles Times poll.

Table 1 summarizes results from such a multivariate account of anti-Asian stereotypes and sentiments. Anti-Asian attitudes here are the previously mentioned additive scale from Figure 9. Variations on this anti-Asian scale are theorized to be the result of the following dimensions of racial attitudes: (1) enduring social cleavages (age, education, family income, gender, urbanicity, and nativity); (2) political partisanship and ideology; (3) knowledge and informational sources on APAs; (4) personal contacts with APAs; (5) views on acculturation (assimilationist and multiculturalist); (6) group threat and competition (whether APAs
are the most prejudiced group, whether APAs control too much economic clout, and the positive impact Asians have on Southern California). Each cell shows the influence of the particular variables in that cell on anti-Asian stereotypes and sentiments, controlling for (statistically) the independent effect of all the remaining dimensions above on anti-Asian stereotypes and sentiments.

The first observation is that, statistically speaking, this set of variables sheds no significant light on the conditions in which Asian Pacific Americans themselves affirm such stereotypes and sentiments. There are no meaningful effects on any of the dimensions examined. Cumulatively, the set of dimensions explains just about none of the variation in the anti-Asian attitude scale and the results are excluded from Table 1 as a result.

But these dimensions tell us a great deal about where whites, African Americans, and Latinos stand. To highlight the main points, Table 1 shows the consistent and compelling influence of experience, information, and group evaluations on anti-Asian attitudes. Consistent with our earlier discussion of Figure 8, APAs are significantly more likely to be viewed in stereotypical and antagonistic terms when they are seen as too economically powerful or as having a generally negative impact on life in Southern California. Moreover, whites and Latinos who view APAs as inadequately integrated into “American culture” are more likely to hold anti-Asian attitudes.

These group-based and normatively-based influences on racial resentment ought to be familiar to opinion researchers. Assessments about groups and the cherished values they affirm or violate powerfully shape anti-black attitudes. Moreover, Table 1 shows that (especially for whites) age and education make a difference; older and less educated respondents tend to hold more prejudiced and hostile views of APAs. And Table 1 shows that spatial contexts are a battleground for conflict with APAs: Latinos and African Americans who live in neighborhoods with large numbers of APAs are significantly more likely to hold anti-Asian attitudes.
On the more hopeful side, experience with APAs, knowledge of APAs, and information about APAs create a critical counterbalance. White Americans who get their information about APAs from direct personal experience and who have close social ties with APAs are much likelier to reject negative stereotypes and sentiments about APAs. In addition, whites and Latinos who report hearing anti-Asian slurs often take a more negative view of Asian Pacific Americans themselves. For whites, blacks, and possibly Latinos as well, the more one knows about Asian Pacific American history and current events, the more sympathetic one’s position toward Asian Pacific Americans. The informational basis of blacks’ and whites’ attitudes is strongly influenced by what they think about media coverage on Asian Pacific Americans. Respondents who believe that media coverage belies an anti-Asian bias take a more positive view towards APAs.

These results are equally revealing for which factors turn out not to matter. With only a few exceptions—notably, the tendency for older, less educated, more conservative, and urban whites to be more anti-Asian—demographic, socioeconomic, and political influences appear to have little influence on attitudes about Asian Pacific Americans. These are precisely the factors that usually enjoy the most explanatory power in opinion research, and their relatively tepid effects here manifest the fluid, emergent nature of mass opinion about Asian Pacific Americans.

Let me be clear that about what is claimed in this section. The results here do not imply a claim about the equivalence (or even comparability) of anti-Asian discrimination with discrimination against other racial minorities. To compare anti-Asian stereotypes with anti-black stereotypes, for example, being viewed as inscrutable, exotic, or alike is not the same as being seen as mentally inferior, morally dissolute, or criminally predisposed. The primary claim is that discrimination takes multiple forms, and that those forms are specific to the group in question. Thus the measures of anti-Asian discrimination ought to differ from
those that examine discrimination against blacks, Latinas, Jews, American Indians, Arab Americans, among others. As we shall see in the concluding section of this chapter, however, negative stereotypes and sentiments about minorities are comparable across racial/ethnic groups in question in one key respect: they play a central role in justifying policy positions that are hostile to the political interests of that racial/ethnic group.

Racial Attitudes and Policy Preferences

We have traversed the polymorphic and paradoxical terrain of racial attitudes in a multiracial, multiethnic context. In large measure, whether these dynamics bear on race relations and how they affect the lives of Asian Pacific Americans depends critically on their political significance. In short, much depends on how racial attitudes (and attitudes about APAs in particular) influence citizens' policy preferences and political activism.

In this final section, we explicitly consider how blacks, whites, Latinos, and Asians form their positions on policies affecting the Asian Pacific American community. This focus on policies that directly impact APAs—as opposed to a broader set of racial policies or public policies writ large—is decidedly narrow, to be sure. That said, there is already a substantial literature on broader public policy preferences, political participation, and voting behavior within a multiracial context. Furthermore, the 1993 Los Angeles Times' multiracial survey affords a unique opportunity to examine the diverse policy issues with important consequences for APAs. Lastly, the focus on a narrower and targeted set of policy questions enjoins a more direct test of whether or not the stereotypes and sentiments about APAs in the previous section are, as claimed, negative and antagonistic. Are policy positions on issues affecting predominantly immigrant communities of color guided by the
conventional determinants of political opinion (e.g., partisanship and ideology), do they take on the dimensions of racial politics, or are they shaped by factors specific to the immigrant experience?

An ever-growing number of public policy questions—from hate crimes and domestic violence to affirmative action, immigration, and welfare reform to campaign finance reform and the decennial Census—acutely affect the interests of the Asian Pacific American community. An analysis of how whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians form their preferences on such policy matters will thus be crucial if we are to properly understand the increasingly multiracial dimensions of politics in the U.S. On a more prescriptive note, such an analysis may also shed insights into whether multiracial political coalitions are feasible (or even desirable) and how public support might be mobilized in response to racially-motivated political campaigns or policy debates such as California’s Propositions 187, 209, and 227.

Turning to the analysis, then, the LA Times poll asks its respondents four policy questions that impact upon the Asian Pacific American community: (1) whether the United States should legislate a moratorium on legal immigration; (2) whether Chinese “boat people” seeking asylum should be returned to China without a hearing; (3) whether reparations to Japanese-Americans imprisoned in World War Two internment camps are merited; and (4) whether admissions to the University of California system ought to welcome the disproportionate number of qualified Asian Pacific American applicants or match the demographic composition of the racial/ethnic groups in California.58

Figure 10 shows that the distribution of responses to these questions are highly issue-specific and highly group-specific. While a sizeable proportion of whites, blacks, and (to a lesser degree) Latinos support drastic measures to address both legal and illegal immigration to the U.S., an equally sizeable proportion of Latinos, whites, and (to a lesser degree) blacks support monetary reparations to Japanese-
Americans. Across respondent groups African Americans most consistently appear to adopt policy preferences that are opposed to those of APAs.

While a vast simplification, positions on each issue can loosely be considered sympathetic or antagonistic to Asian Pacific American political interests, where the political interests of APAs are defined by the discernible policy positions taken by a majority of Asian Pacific American respondents.\(^5^9\) As the results show, a majority of Asian Pacific American respondents oppose a moratorium on immigration, oppose returning Chinese seeking asylum without a hearing, support reparations to Japanese Americans interned during World War II, and support a "meritocratic" University of California admissions policy. What's more, APAs take the strongest position on each of these issues across all respondent groups.

In the remaining analysis, this oversimplified view—of "pro-Asian" or "anti-Asian" policy positions—will be used to make some
general claims about how policy preferences on such issues are formed. As with the measures of negative stereotypes and sentiments, responses to the four policy items can be cumulated into a statistically coherent "anti-Asian" policy scale. In this case, restrictive views on immigration, opposition to reparations, and support for a demographically representative admissions policy are taken as "anti-Asian." \(^{66}\)

As Figure 10 implies, African Americans appear to be the most anti-Asian on such a scale of policy preferences, followed by whites, Latinos, and APAs themselves. The multivariate account of variations in this cumulative policy scale is similar to that for anti-Asian attitudes. Positions on these four issues are examined as a function of social divisions, political loyalties, personal experience with APAs and with discrimination, assimilationist or multiculturalist views of immigrant acculturation, realistic group conflicts, and knowledge and information about Asian Pacific Americans. The one new variable is the extent to which direct negative stereotypes and sentiments (the anti-Asian scale) affects policy preferences on issues affecting Asian Pacific Americans.

The results are summarized in Table 2. \(^{61}\) For whites, anti-Asian stereotypes and sentiments are the single strongest influence on anti-Asian policy preferences. Anti-Asian attitudes also strongly shape the policy preferences of Latinos and African Americans, but they no longer predominate over other factors. In particular, the belief that APAs are too economically dominant (among blacks and Latinos) and self-identification as a political conservative (for Latinos) is at least equally decisive in shaping anti-Asian policy positions.

Once again, there are important countervailing forces that incline non-Asians toward more pro-Asian policy positions. Where people get their information from and how knowledgeable they are
about Asian Pacific Americans—controlling for anti-Asian stereotypes and sentiments—are decisive factors. Whites who get their information on APAs through personal experience are significantly less likely to present an anti-Asian policy profile; for African Americans, it is knowledge that matters the most; and for Latinos, it is media information on APAs. Additionally, whites and blacks (and possibly Latinos as well) who affirm an interest in learning Asian Pacific American history and traditions are decidedly more sympathetic.

Interestingly, personal experience appears to matter in distinct ways for each of the groups involved. For whites, as we have seen, it is the information drawn from direct personal experience that engenders more sympathetic policy positions. Latinos take a more sympathetic position if they report close social contact (either as friends or in a professional relationship) with Asian Pacific Americans. And for African Americans, having personally experienced discrimination leads to anti-Asian policy positions.

In addition, enduring social divisions appear to command considerable leverage over policy preferences, although with few regularities across racial/ethnic groups. Consistent with other research, older and less educated respondents often exhibit greater opposition to racially liberal policies. Notably, simply being born in the United States is the second strongest factor in whites' anti-Asian policy positions.62

As with the determinants of anti-Asian sentiments and stereotypes seen in Table 1, the influences on black, Latino, and white opinion on these questions are as telling for what does not appear to matter as they are for what does matter. Ironically, although these are matters of public policy, conventional political factors exhibit a tenuous hold over public opinion. When political determinants do matter, moreover, they appear to be ideological in origin, not partisan. There is a clear implication here
### Table 2. Determinants of Anti-Asian Policy Preferences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Asians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Divisions</strong></td>
<td>older, native born</td>
<td>young, poor, female (possibly less educated)</td>
<td>older, less educated</td>
<td>older, less educated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Divisions</strong></td>
<td>conservatives</td>
<td>conservatives</td>
<td>conservatives</td>
<td>conservatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>no effects</td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information Sources and knowledge of APAs</strong></td>
<td>knowledgeable, informed by personal experience or media</td>
<td>knowledgeable</td>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
<td>no effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
<td>no effects</td>
<td>no effects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Experience</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>experienced discrimination with APAs</td>
<td>close contact with APAs</td>
<td>experienced discrimination with APAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
<td>close contact with APAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>View of Acculturation</strong></td>
<td>multiculturalist</td>
<td>multiculturalist</td>
<td>possibly Multiculturalist</td>
<td>Multiculturalist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
<td>less anti-Asian assimilationist</td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>less anti-Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Group Conflict</strong></td>
<td>APA economic threat</td>
<td>APA economic threat</td>
<td>APA economic threat</td>
<td>APA economic threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
<td>more anti-Asian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anti-Asian sentiments</strong></td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>anti-Asian</td>
<td>anti-Asian</td>
<td>anti-Asian</td>
<td>anti-Asian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

that political parties do not play their usual role in informing and influencing policy positions when the policies are those that primarily affect Asian Pacific Americans. Whether this is the result of a lack of clarity or concern among partisan elites or apathy and ambivalence among its rank-and-file is an open matter beyond the scope of this chapter.

Importantly, Asian Pacific Americans themselves are the singular exception. Partisanship and ideology stand out as the two strongest influences on APAs’ policy positions. Democrats are significantly more “pro-Asian”; conservatives are significantly more “anti-Asian.” Table 2 also shows that APAs who are younger, more educated, have personally experienced discrimination, and have close social contact with other APAs are more likely to adopt policy positions consistent with the political interests of APAs.

Taken together, the dynamics of Asian Pacific American mass opinion over policy matters appears prominently less mystifying and more intelligible than many public commentators on Asian Pacific American politics would have us believe. APAs who are more personally invested—whether vis-à-vis partisan and ideological loyalties or vis-à-vis personal experiences and sociodemographic location—have much more to say about these policy matters than those who do not. This not only fits comfortably with the dynamics of democratic politics in the U.S. as we generally know it, but it also suggests that the political identity of APAs into the Twenty-First Century (be it pan-ethnic, multiracial, or mainstream) will depend ultimately on factors like political socialization, demographic change, immigrant experiences, and pan-ethnic and interracial ties.

Conclusion

In these pages, we have surveyed racial attitudes among and about Asian Pacific Americans. There is a discernible topography whose
centrifugal narrative force remains the enduring and evolving history of black-white relations in the United States. The lived realities of African Americans and white Americans remain worlds apart, as do public perceptions about those realities. Yet, these pages also vividly demonstrate the varied, shifting, and contradictory contours and cleavages of this racial landscape, especially for APAs and Latinos.

In particular, much of the analysis in this chapter has focused on the radical disjuncture between the levels of discrimination that APAs experience and the public's perceptions (Asian Pacific Americans included) of the unfettered opportunities open to APAs. This disjuncture, more pointedly, leaves APAs mired between the reality of racial inequality and the ideology of equal opportunity and economic individualism. To make the point simply, for African Americans the disjuncture between personal experiences and public perceptions is more modest in part because the racial inequalities facing African Americans are usually either seen by liberals to result from systemic injustices in the U.S. opportunity structure or seen by conservatives to stem from moral and motivational inadequacies internal to the African American community.\textsuperscript{66} APAs, by contrast, are seen to face few systemic barriers and seen to manifest the values and initiative of a "model minority" by both sides of the political aisle.

The conjoint set of public beliefs described in this chapter—that a significant proportion of APAs report anti-Asian discrimination but that most of the American public views APAs as facing few barriers to success, controlling too much economic power, working too hard to succeed, and characterizeable by negative stereotypes and sentiments—thus leaves APAs in the ironic, vulnerable position where their successes are exploited for rhetorical leverage against less-advantaged minorities, their hardships go unrecognized, and their position in the U.S. racial hierarchy is open to scapegoating and racial resentment. Indeed, these results affirm critics who decry the stereotyping of Asian Pacific
Americans as a “model minority and describe well what Claire Kim calls the “racial triangulation” of Asian Pacific Americans—“the processes of relative valorization and civic ostracism, linked together by essentialist readings of Asian/Asian Pacific American ‘culture’”(1999, 36). The results call into question whether popular images of the “Asian Pacific American” work ethic, family values, and economic achievements act unambiguously as a positive conception of APAs. Put bluntly, public beliefs about racial and ethnic groups in a multiracial context are necessarily comparative and interdependent. Characteristics generously conferred upon one racial (model) minority are characteristics mean-spiritedly deferred from other racial minorities.

In fact, the structurally contingent and evolving position of APAs in public opinion confounds the already uncertain future of Asian Pacific American politics—among other things, whether an entity such as an “Asian Pacific American politics” can or does exist, and, if so, what form it takes. As we embark into a new century, APAs already comprise about 10 percent of California’s population and are poised to comprise the same tenth of the entire United States population sometime around the year 2050. Yet, as Paul Ong and Don Nakanishi have judiciously noted, “[w]hether Asian Pacific Americans become a major new political force in the American electoral system is nearly impossible to predict with any precision” (1996, 293).

To be sure, there is no consensus among scholars of Asian Pacific American politics. Those who have observed the “third space” between black and white that APAs occupy spin at least three fortunes for the future: (1) that the position of APAs exposes the deep incoherence and ambiguity of the very notion of “Asian Americans”; (2) that the position reveals the disquieting vulnerability of a “middleman minority”; (3) or that the position represents a politically strategic opportunity to be a swing vote (or, by Elaine Kim’s account, to at least celebrate the irony and creatively exploit the “interstitiality” of Asian Pacific American identity).
This author would gladly report that the empirical results herein confirmed a reading of contingency as opportunity rather than contingency as incoherence or vulnerability. No such unequivocally sanguine reading avails. What this chapter does suggest are morsels of understanding and potential pathways to avoid vulnerability and incoherence. More concretely, we now have a better understanding of what anti-Asian racial resentment looks like, how prevalent it is, what some of its underlying roots are, and what consequences such negative attitudes hold for public policies that impact upon the Asian Pacific American community.
Endnotes

1 Many thanks are due to Albert Hahn, Charles Jung, Darlene Martín, and Lisa Sanbonmatsu for their expert research assistance; to participants of the Kennedy School of Government’s Politics Research Group and participants at a meeting of project contributors at UCLA for their sage advice in the project’s formative stages; to John Brehm, Zoltan Hajnal, Claire Kim, Shirley Lee, Doug Suh, and Paul Ong for their insights on early versions of this chapter. Any shortcomings, oversights, and incongruities, however, are mine, all mine.

2 I use both “African Americans” and “blacks” interchangeably, and adopt the term “Latinos” to refer to U.S. residents of Hispanic descent. The terms “whites” and “Anglos” are used to identify non-Hispanic whites. I use “APA” as shorthand for “Asian Pacific American” and the term “APAs” is used interchangeably with “Asians.” No privileged claims are implied for the designations I use over alternatives like “Asian Americans,” “Asian Pacific Islanders” or “Asian Pacific Islander Americans.”

3 This tradition owes much to the influence of Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma (1944), which argued persuasively in its time that racial injustice exists as a result of white racism. Smith (1987) argues that the resulting presumption was that the appropriate solutions to racial injustices lie exclusively in an understanding of whites’ racial attitudes.

4 The 1984 and 1988 National Black Election Study (see Tate, 1993 and Dawson, 1994), the 1993-94 National Black Politics Study (see Dawson, 1999), and the 1989 Latino National Political Survey (see de la Garza et al., 1992) are especially pioneering in this regard.


6 Most of these studies have come from three multiethnic surveys: a 1984 survey from the Institute of Governmental Studies at University of California at Berkeley (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner, 1989; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet, 1989; Lien, 1994); the 1992 Los Angeles County Social Survey (Bobo et al., 1994; Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Bobo and Zubrinsky, 1996); the 1993-94 Los Angeles Survey of Urban Inequality (Bobo and Suh, 1995; Zubrinsky and Bobo, 1996).

7 The two surveys will often hereafter be referred to as the Post poll and the Times poll.

8 The Asian Week poll sampled 807 registered voters with Asian Pacific American surnames from California (n=596) and four “control” states-Massachusetts (n=57), Ohio (n=53), Pennsylvania (n=45), and Washington (n=56). Respondents were drawn from voter registration rolls and the survey was conducted by Meta Information Services. The San Francisco Chronicle/KRON/KQED poll sampled 1,000 Bay Area
residents. The sampling design included at least 100 African Americans, Latinos, and APAs and the survey was conducted by Baldassare Associates. The University of Massachusetts McCormack Institute poll sampled 729 respondents (381 whites, 127 African Americans, 107 Latinos, and 114 APAs) and was designed in collaboration with the Institute for Asian American Studies, the Gaston Institute, and the Trotter Institute all at the University of Massachusetts Boston.

Surveys that focus on the perspectives of Japanese Americans, Indian Americans, and Pacific Islanders are notably missing. A 1996 India Abroad Center for Political Awareness poll does survey the political opinions of Indian Americans, but with only a limited battery of questions (see Chopra, Kuntamukkula, and Reeves, 1996).


On the language segregation of Angelenos, see Lopez (1996); on the effect of survey sampling and question wording on interviews of APAs, see Lee (1998); on “language-of-interview” effects, see Lee (1999).

To be fair as well, the LA Times polls go well beyond most other surveys of Asian Pacific American opinion. In addition to making the costly investment in interviewing respondents in non-English languages, the LA Times polls also consulted with key leaders and academics within each Asian Pacific American community.

In a classic observation on the “contact hypothesis,” Gordon Allport some forty years ago cautions that “It has sometimes been held that merely by assembling people without regard for race, color, religion, or national origin, we can thereby destroy stereotypes and develop friendly attitudes. The case is not so simple” (1954). Studies of racial and ethnic conflict (see Olzak, 1992 and Green, 1998), for example show that rapid changes in a neighborhood racial/ethnic composition—and the corresponding increase in interracial contact—is a critical incitement to race riots, hate crimes, and other forms of racial violence.

These numbers are from Lee and Fernandez (1998); see also Shinagawa and Pang (1996).

They also find that exogamy rates were significantly higher in the previous 1980 Census at 25 percent. One other finding of note in Lee and Fernandez is that of the intermarriages, the proportion of marriages to across different Asian Pacific American ethnicities (“panethnic” unions) nearly doubled from 11 percent to 21 percent between 1980 and 1990.

There is no question on attitudes toward racial intermarriage for Chinese respondents to the Times poll.

See Bobo et al. (1994).
The Los Angeles Times survey of Korean Americans does not ask about friendships with other Korean Americans.


Data from the 1990 Census show well over two-thirds of every Asian Pacific American ethnic group are foreign-born, except Japanese Americans (35 percent) and Pacific Islander Americans (26 percent). The corresponding percent immigrant for Chinese, Filipinos, Koreans, and Vietnamese are 70, 68, 82, and 82, respectively (Jibou, 1996).

See, for example, Cho (1999), Kibria (1997), and Portes and Rumbaut (1996).

This generational, historical explanation of differences also speaks to interethnic differences in forming multiracial acquaintances: more recently immigrated Koreans and Vietnamese also appear to make proportionately fewer social contacts with blacks and Latinos than do Chinese and Filipinos.


This research ranges from Bobo (1983) and Bobo and Hutchings (1996) from the "realistic group conflict" perspective; Sniderman and Piazza (1993) from the "principled objection" perspective; Bobo (1991) and Kluegel and Smith (1986) on social stratification; Kinder and Sears (1981) and Kinder and Sanders (1996) from the "symbolic racism" and "racial resentment" perspectives; and Bobo's (1997) "laissez-faire" racism perspective.

In addition to self-reports of discrimination, the 1993 LA Times poll also asks about two specific kinds of racially discriminatory acts: hate crimes and anti-Asian speech. Across respondent groups, between 12 to 18 percent report being victim to a hate crime; one in three Latinos and one in four APAs report frequently hearing such anti-Asian slurs. Exposure to such an anti-Asian discursive environment is somewhat lower for whites (15 percent of respondents) and African Americans (18 percent of respondents).

When asked if a family member or a close friend had experienced discrimination, the pattern across the four groups remained about the same, with an increased percentage reporting second hand knowledge of discrimination.

An important difference between the two surveys, however, is that the Times poll does not identify the discrimination as exclusively racial or ethnic in nature. Thus, whites who perceive or experience discrimination on the basis of age, gender, sexual orientation,
or some other criterion could well respond affirmatively to this question.

Part of this discrepancy between the 1993 Los Angeles Times poll of Asians writ large and their ethnic-specific polls is quite possibly due to the absence of two other sizeable Asian Pacific American ethnic communities in Southern California—namely, Japanese Americans and Asian Indians.

See Watanabe and Hardy-Panta (1998). By comparison 33 percent of African Americans and 31 percent of Latinos report such experiences. Moreover, well over a half of these individuals (60 percent of African Americans, 52 percent of Latinos, and 57 percent of APAs) report that the discrimination occurs “very” or “fairly” often.

Whites are not included as one of the choices in the Post poll.

The LA Times poll also describes the tangible tensions that intersect the interstices of the black-white divide. While whites and Asians identify themselves as less discriminated against than blacks or Latinos, both groups view themselves as subject to greater racism than the other. Conversely put, almost no whites view APAs as most discriminated against, and almost no APAs view whites similarly. In terms of identifying offending parties, nearly 20 percent of African Americans name APAs as the most prejudiced group in Southern California; nearly the same proportion of Latinos name African Americans similarly. And while whites often identify themselves as the most prejudiced group, the greatest number of them consider African Americans to be most prejudiced.

The most notable deviation from this consensus is the relative reluctance of whites to view any group as facing substantially different opportunities than they do.

While the Washington Post poll does not have an identical question, it does ask respondents whether or not nonwhites have the same opportunities to lead a middle or upper class life. To this question, there is a qualitative difference in how all respondent groups perceive the opportunities available to blacks and Latinos from those available to APAs. African Americans are most likely to view both blacks and Latinos as facing less opportunity than whites, followed by Asians and Latinos. Whites are least likely to view any group as facing less opportunity than they do. Respondent perceptions on barriers to a middle class or an upper class life do not differ but for one group: Asians. APAs (by a considerable margin) and blacks and Latinos (by a more modest margin) view Asians as more likely to face barriers to an upper class life than a middle class life.

This rift in the perceived opportunities facing blacks, Latinos, and Asians is not always so sheer, however. In yet another variant, the University of Massachusetts poll asks whether or not different communities of color are “still a long way from having the same chance in life than white people have.” Here blacks and Latinos are still viewed as having greater hardships than APAs, but the gap is significantly narrower (especially for
Latinos and APAs).

36 This question was not asked of Korean-Americans, but one point of comparison might be a question that asks respondents how Korean-Americans are faring relative to blacks and Latinos. Here 68 percent view Koreans as doing better, and only 7 percent view Koreans as doing worse than African Americans or Latinos.


38 Four of these reasons—family dissolution, lack of intelligence, language problems, and lack of motivation—describe “attributional” views that place the blame on the individual or group affected themselves; the remaining reasons—the lack of education, lack of jobs, whites’ resistance to equal opportunity, and discrimination generally—describe more “situational” views that identify root environmental and structural causes of racial inequality.

39 By contrast, African Americans, Latinos, and, to a lesser extent, APAs—each of whom faces greater disadvantages than whites by many objective measures of inequality—also opt for situational explanations more commonly than do whites. There is in fact the familiar, discernible rank order in respondents’ partiality to situational explanations, from African Americans to Latinos, APAs, and last, white Americans. More generally, responses to attributional explanations are roughly formed around perceived characteristics of the target group in question while responses to situational explanations are roughly formed around the conditions facing each respondent group.

40 Whites rank a close second for African American and Latino respondents, and APAs rank whites as too economically powerful. While a sizeable proportion of Asian Pacific American respondents rank Asians as too economically powerful, very few whites rank whites as being too economically strong. Blacks are least likely to be cited for having an excess of economic resources by any group.

41 Regression results are available upon request from the author. This relationship between the perceived economic power of a group and the perceived prejudice of that group holds as well for whites and, to a lesser extent, for Latinos and African Americans.

42 Put conversely, if a group is not viewed as working hard to succeed, that group—actual material hardships or racism notwithstanding—is less likely to be viewed as enduring significant discrimination.


44 Data from the US Commission on Civil Rights (1992) and the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (1997), for example, find record increases in anti-Asian violence into the mid-1990s. Too, the much vaunted economic success of APAs comes into question once economic statistics are disaggregated by Asian Pacific American
ethnic group, by the number of workers per household, by regional variation in household income, by the skills-mismatches in employment, inter alia (see Ong and Hee, 1994; Tuan, 1998). On the history of exclusion and discrimination against APAs, see Chan (1991), Hing (1993), and Takaki (1989). On the more recent controversy involving APAs and campaign contributions in the 1996 presidential campaign, see Lee (1998), Wang (1998), and Wu and Nicholson (1997).

I don't mean to imply that APAs face no discrimination or disadvantages at the lower socioeconomic strata. This is especially true of specific Asian Pacific American ethnic groups. To take the example of foreign-born Vietnamese Americans, more than a third fail to attain a high school equivalency, the median household income is equivalent to that of native-born African Americans (and more than $13,000 per year below that of whites). See Cheng and Yang (1998) and Ong and Hee (1994).

Data from the Post poll sustain this finding: only 26 percent of APAs believe that Asians are given less opportunity than whites to achieve the material trappings of middle class life, but fully 38 percent believe that Asians face greater barriers to an upper class life. While of a lesser order of magnitude, African Americans and Latinos also share this belief that APAs face a glass ceiling. Whites remain remarkably constant, nonetheless, in their assessment of relative parity between APAs and whites to achieve either a middle or upper class life.


Regrettably, no other poll, including the Washington Post, includes comparable measures of anti-Asian attitudes.


The mean scores on this seven point scale are 1.86 for whites, 2.13 for African Americans, 1.97 for Latinos, and 1.62 for APAs. The reliability of the scale is (.44 for whites, (.35 for African Americans, (.37 for Latinos, and (.27 for APAs.

Regression results are available on request from the author. Sample size for whites on this question is 341 whites, 71 African Americans, 78 Latino/as. Because of the limited sample sizes of nonwhites in the survey, parameter estimates are considered statistically significant when there is less than a 10 percent chance that they are the result of random variation. For whites, the criterion remains the more conventionally used 5 percent benchmark. The adjusted R-squared ("fit") statistics for whites, blacks, and Latinos are 0.26, 0.41, and 0.18, respectively. The adjusted R-squared statistic for Asian Pacific American respondents is -0.013.

The significance of whether or not one reports hearing anti-Asian slurs is likely to admit multiple interpretations. Most obviously, it may tell us something about contextual effects—the discursive environment (workplace, community of residence, family) and social networks in which individuals are situated. It may also, however, indirectly measure how commonly the respondent herself uses anti-Asian slurs. Note that this survey item permits the respondent to be ambiguous about whether or not she adheres to or condones such anti-Asian speech.


Pei-te Lien (1997) has also examined some of the policy questions contained in this LA Times poll, albeit subsumed within the question of whether or not political participation makes a difference in policy positions.

The Washington Post poll does not allow us to view policy preferences as intimately as the LA Times poll and are therefore not presented here. In particular, it lacks any items on racial prejudice (whether specific to APAs or more general across racial minorities) and the questions on situational and attributional explanations of inequality were asked of only a small sub-sample of the pool of respondents.

Of course, the "sympathetic" or "antagonistic" nature of particular policy positions can (and perhaps ought to) be justified and defined on more normative, argumentative grounds.

The resulting scale ranges from 0 to 4; the average scores on this scale are 2.44 for African Americans, 2.08 for whites, 1.89 for Latinos, and 1.45 for APAs. The alpha-reliability scores for these scales are 0.48 for whites, 0.38 for African Americans, 0.47 for Latinos, and a meager 0.29 for APAs. Separate results for each policy issue are available from the author on request.

Analyses of the policy items separately are similar to those in the cumulative index, but with important differences. Results on these separate analyses are available from the author upon request.

Regression results are available on request from the author. Of course, nativity per se does not cause one to adopt policy positions antagonistic to APAs. Rather, it is factors associated with nativity that are somehow not captured in the other variables that likely explains its significance.
Sample size for whites on this question is 343 whites, 83 African Americans, 110 Latino/as, and 128 Asian Pacific Americans. Because of the limited sample sizes of nonwhites in the survey, parameter estimates are considered statistically significant when there is less than a 10 percent chance that they are the result of random variation. For whites, the criterion remains the more conventionally used 5 percent benchmark. The adjusted R-squared ("fit") statistics for whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians are 0.24, 0.42, 0.26, and 0.17, respectively.

The prevailing view in contemporary opinion research is that political elites (vis-à-vis the formative influence of political parties and liberal-conservative ideology) play a dominant, defining role shaping the political opinions of ordinary individuals. See, e.g., Zaller (1992) and Carmines and Stimson (1989); c.f., Lee (forthcoming).

Asian Pacific American respondents who agree with "anti-Asian" stereotypes and sentiments are statistically more likely to adopt more anti-Asian policy positions, although when the policies are disaggregated, this relationship seems isolated to policy positions over college admissions.

As we have seen, however, the disjuncture is not always modest for African Americans: in the Los Angeles Times multiracial poll, for example, whites are notably unwilling to view African Americans as the most discriminated group in Southern California, despite the fact that African Americans report the highest levels of discrimination and almost unanimously view themselves as the most discriminated group.


References


against Asian Pacific Americans. Washington, DC: NAPALC.


Asians in America, immigrant and native-born, have been made into a race of aliens, Orientals. The Oriental is a mode of representation which constructs the alien as a racial category. Deeply imbedded in American culture, the images that constitute the Oriental at any given moment are frequently contradictory, sometimes mutable, but always stubbornly resistant to eradication. It is the common, if not universal, experience of all Asian Pacific Americans to be asked by other Americans: “Where do you come from?” The question is never completely innocent; it is always freighted with the assumption “you aren’t from here.” The assumption that Asians are indelibly alien is occasionally revealed in a way that provokes more embarrassament than anger, but all too often, the assumption has devastating consequences.

Recently Dr. Wen Ho Lee, a senior scientist at the Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory was publicly accused of spying for the People’s Republic of China. The accusation was leaked to the press on the eve of the presidential impeachment trial, and not surprisingly the critics of the Clinton administration were quick to howl for blood. Pundits routinely compared Wen Ho Lee to Julius and Ethel Rosenberg who had been electrocuted in 1953 for passing atomic bomb secrets to the Soviet Union and claimed his crimes were no less heinous.

Wen Ho Lee is less a Rosenberg than he is a Dreyfus. Lee was publicly accused of committing a crime for which there is no evidence of having occurred. Although the government surmised that China had knowledge of classified information regarding U.S. missile technology, three years of investigation produced no evidence that any such information had come into Chinese hands through Wen Ho Lee; indeed a subsequent careful reading of the Chinese documents which led to these sus-
pictions in the first instance reveals that whatever classified information that China may possess came from a source other than Los Alamos since it replicates errors introduced after the data left Los Alamos.

Were consequences not so tragic for Wen Ho Lee, and the implications so ominous for Asian Pacific Americans, the present case might easily be fodder for satire. Indeed, both the hysterical rhetoric surrounding the case and the investigation itself bear the tell-tale signs of Dr. Fu Manchu, the pulp fiction villain created by Arthur Sarsfield Ward who, as Sax Rohmer, wrote thirteen novels, four short stories and a novella about the Yellow Peril incarnate. Rohmer’s Fu Manchu was a Western-educated sophisticate, whose brilliance is at the service of an evil Asian empire bent on the conquest of the white world. The novels enjoyed massive popularity in the United States, and Fu Manchu was the first universally recognized Oriental, the archetype of villainy and the first celebrity Asian. In the forty years that spanned Fu Manchu’s career in evil, millions read the books, listened to stories about him on the radio, watched him on film and television and followed his heinous crimes in the comics.¹

The principle reason for suspecting Lee was that he was Asian Pacific American, an Oriental, and therefore predisposed to the role of a brilliant yet treacherous mole. Admitting that FBI targeted Chinese Americans, the Bureau’s “China expert” claimed that Chinese espionage techniques were so sophisticated that Chinese American scientists were being exploited by the Chinese intelligence gatherers without their knowledge. Indeed, Chinese spying was so inscrutable that it could occur without anyone knowing about it. The last time that America had been warned of such Oriental inscrutability was during the Second World War, when General John Dewitt justified the incarceration of 110,000 Americans of Japanese descent by insisting that the fact that no acts of espionage or sabotage on the part of Japanese Americans had occurred proved beyond doubt that such acts were likely to occur. The General
assured Americans that while German and Italian Americans might be vouchsafe as individuals, no such individual scrutiny could certify the loyalty of Japanese Americans who were "of an alien race."

Yellowface—Marking The Oriental

In March 1997 the cover of *National Review* featured President William Jefferson Clinton, First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and Vice President Al Gore, all in Yellowface. The President, portrayed as a Chinese houseboy, buck-toothed, squinty-eyed and pigtailed, wearing a straw coolie hat, serves coffee. The First Lady, similarly bucktoothed and squinty-eyed, outfitted as a Maoist Red Guard, brandishes a "Little Red Book," while the Vice President, robed as Buddhist priest, beatifically proffers a begging bowl already stuffed with money.

By using the Yellowface cartoon to illustrate a story about alleged political corruption, the editors of *National Review* subtly shifted the focus to race and revived a tradition of racial grotesque that had illustrated broadsides, editorials, and diatribes against Asians in America since the mid-nineteenth century. The cover illustrates a story which attempts to summarize allegations that the Clinton administration had solicited campaign donations from Asian contributors in exchange for policy favors. These allegations focused exclusively on Asian and Asian Pacific American contributors and ignored the much larger illegal campaign contributions of non-Asians. Not surprisingly, the *National Review* was silent on the broader questions: the impact of multinational corporations on American politics and the baleful influence of big money on big politics. By focusing only on the Asian and Asian Pacific American campaign contributions, the *National Review* made its view clear that it was not corporate money, or even foreign money generally, but specifically Asian money which polluted the American political process. In the eyes of the *National Review* editors, the nation's First Family (with Al Gore as
potential heir) had been so polluted by Asian money that they had literally turned yellow.

Here and elsewhere, Yellowface marks the Asian body as unmistakably Oriental; it sharply defines the Oriental in a racial opposition to whiteness. Yellowface exaggerates racial features which have been designated Oriental such as slanted eyes, overbite, and mustard yellow skin color. Only the racialized Oriental is yellow; Asians are not. Asia is not a biological fact, but a geographic designation, from Malaysia to Mongolia, and Asians come in the broadest range of skin color and hue. Because the great pretension of race is to claim that common ancestry is its organizing principle, it is concerned with the physical, the biological, and the reproductive. But race is not a category of nature; it is an ideology through which unequal distributions of wealth and power are naturalized, that is to say, justified in the language of biology and genealogy. Biology is salient to race only, insofar, as certain sorts of physical characteristics, such a skin color or hue, eye color or shape, shape of the nose, color or texture of the hair, shape of the overbite, etc. are socially designated as markers of racial difference.

Race is a mode of marking cultural meaning onto the body. The designation of yellow as the color of the Oriental is a prime example of this social construction. In 1922, the US Supreme Court denied Takao Ozawa, an immigrant from Japan, the right to become a naturalized citizen. The Court recognized the fact that some Asians, including Mr. Ozawa, were of a more pale hue than many European immigrants who America had already accepted into the nation as white. Race, the court concluded, was not a matter of the actual color of his skin but, rather of Ozawa’s blood or ancestry. Ozawa, being of Japanese blood, could not claim to be white, no matter how white his skin might be.³

What is the racial meaning of Yellowface? Yellowface marks the Oriental as indelibly alien. As a racialized alien, the Oriental represents a present danger of pollution. An analysis of the Oriental as a racial cat-
egory must begin with the concept of the alien as a polluting body. The cultural anthropologist, Mary Douglas, argues that fears of pollution arise when things are out of place. Soil, she observes, is fertile earth when on the ground with tomatoes growing in it; it is polluting dirt when on the kitchen table. Pollutants are those objects, or persons, which are perceived to be out of place. They create a sense of disorder and anomaly in the symbolic structure of society. Douglas observes that pollution is not a conscious act, mere presence in the wrong place, the inadvertent crossing of a boundary, may constitute pollution. Aliens, outsiders who are inside, disrupt the internal structure of a social formation; their very presence provokes anxiety.

Alieness is both a formal political or legal status, and an informal, but no less powerful, cultural status. The two categories are related but not congruent. Alien legal status and the procedures by which it can be shed often depend on the cultural definitions of difference. In 1923, a year after the Ozawa case, the Supreme Court stripped Bhagat Singh Thind, an Indian immigrant who was already an American through naturalization, of his U.S. citizenship. In Ozawa, the court had ruled that neither skin color nor cultural assimilation counted in the matter of race. In Thind, despite the contemporary scientific evidence presented that Bhagat Thind, a Hindu of high caste was a descendent of Aryans and therefore Caucasian, the Court ruled that nevertheless he was not white and could no longer be a citizen. The court held that race was not a scientific category but a social one. Chief Justice Sutherland cited the existence of a “common understanding” of racial difference which color, culture or science could not surmount. The important thing about race, the Supreme Court held, was not what social or physical scientists at the time may have had to say about it, but rather how it was “popularly” defined; that is to say, race is a product of ideology.

Asian immigrants were finally granted the right to become naturalized citizens in 1952. Even so, well after the legal status of alien has
been shed, no matter what their citizenship, how long they may have resided in the United States or how assimilated they are, the “common understanding” that Asians are an alien presence in America is still the prevailing assumption in American culture. In 1996, the immediate response of the Democratic National Committee to allegations that it had accepted illegal campaign donations from foreigners was to call Asian Pacific Americans with “foreign sounding” surnames who had contributed to the party’s coffers and demand that they verify their citizenship or permanent resident status. The question “Where are you from?” took on an ominous and threatening tone.

One such donor, Dr. Suzanne Ahn, a prominent Houston physician and civic leader, reported to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that DNC auditors threatened to turn her name over to the news media as “uncooperative” if she did not release personal financial information to them. Ahn concluded that she had been investigated by the DNC, the FBI and the news media simply because she had contributed to the DNC and was Asian Pacific American. The assumption that Asian Pacific Americans are really foreigners in disguise is by no means limited to the Democratic Party officials. When Matthew Fong, a fourth generation Californian, ran as a Republican candidate for State Treasurer, he was asked by news reporters whether his loyalties were divided between the U.S. and China.

Orientals

The Supreme Court’s reliance on “common understanding” is, of course, a legal fiction. It gives popular convention. The common sense of “real” Americans is in the power to define race. The “common understanding” of the Oriental as racialized alien therefore originates in the realm of popular culture where struggles over who is or who can become, a “real” American take place and where the categories, repre-
sentations, distinctions, and markers of race are defined.

The creation of the Oriental as a permanent alien in American culture was critical to the construction of an American nationality which identifies itself as white. The Oriental is not simply a distorted reflection of Asian Pacific American realities, but rather is a representation of racial difference produced and deployed in cultural crises in American society. These crises come in the wake of economic change as the social relations of production transform social life and culture. As a part of the process of constructing the national identity, racial images and stereotypes are ideologically active, imbedded in the discourses of race, gender, class and sexuality and thus contradictory and unstable. The Oriental therefore appears in various guises throughout American popular culture and no single image represents the totality of the representation. Instead it is necessary to understand the Oriental as a discursive field within American racial ideology, out of which a wide array of specific images are constructed, reproduced and transmitted through pictures, songs, paraphernalia, books and movies.

Six dominant images, the Pollutant, the Coolie, the Deviant, the Yellow Peril, the Model Minority and the Gook, figure the Oriental as an alien body and a threat to the American national family. Each of these dominant images is paradigmatic and forms a field from which emerge a wide array of specific images. Each of these representations has been constructed in a specific historical moment marked by a shift in class relations accompanied by a set of cultural crises. It is in these crises that American nationality is periodically redefined in terms of class, gender, sexuality and race. It is in this context that the question, "where are you from?" takes its real meaning.

Before Asian Pacific America

The origins of the Oriental predates Asian immigration to the
United States and, indeed, the United States itself. Images of Asia as the source both of immense wealth and of barbarian invasion are deeply imbedded in the European historical imagination from the time of Alexander the Great. It is not necessary to examine here the originary moments of this encounter to examine the role that the images of the Oriental have played in shaping American national identity.

Although scores of Chinese had settled in the United States, mainly on the Eastern seaboard, in the decades before the California Gold Rush, these early settlers, scattered among the waves of European immigrants coming to the United States, were viewed primarily as curiosities embodying the exotic difference of Asia. Before the arrival of Chinese immigrants in substantial numbers in mid-nineteenth century California, the representation of China had enjoyed a long career in American popular culture. In 1784 Peale's Museum in Philadelphia opened a display of Chinese curiosities among its collections of objects from Africa and India.

The opening of Peale's Chinese collection occurred in the same year that the New York clipper Empress of China docked in Canton, opening the fabled China Market to American merchants. By 1805 Peale's, which had been renamed the Philadelphia Museum, had introduced life size figures in "life group" dioramas as a way of displaying its Chinese collections. Chinese artifacts were displayed on life-sized wax models side by side with the models of Native Americans and other "exotic" peoples.

Public interest in such displays inspired Nathan Dunn to open the Chinese Museum in conjunction with Peale's Philadelphia Museum in 1838. Peale, a Quaker, had also been a merchant in Canton for many years. Peale particularly wanted to use his collection of memorabilia to refute negative portrayals of the Chinese as barbaric heathens which were being circulated by frustrated Christian missionaries, and instead promote a positive image of the Chinese as potential trading partners. In the
Chinese Museum, well over a thousand Chinese items were on display, but the central attraction were the eleven dioramas or “life groups.” These groups of life-size clay figures dressed in Chinese costumes represented the hierarchy of Chinese society—high and low ranking mandarins, literati, ladies of rank, actors, teachers of the main Chinese religions, itinerant craftsmen, a man being carried in his sedan chair, visitors to a wealthy residence, and farmers. The Chinese museum was a huge attraction; an estimated one hundred thousand people visited it between its opening in December of 1838 and the summer of 1841, when the collection was moved to London.

While the museum diorama situated China as a distant exotic object (simultaneously desirable and repulsive in its difference) in the geographic imagery of a emerging middle-class eager to expand its commercial horizons, the immigration of “ordinary” Chinese people to the United States had an altogether different significance. The arrival of thousands of Chinese settlers in California undermined the definition of Oriental difference, which relied on distance. This earlier construction of cultural difference as distant and exotic was displaced (but not completely replaced) by a construction of racial difference as present and threatening. Once thousands of Chinese settled in the United States, they could no longer be imagined as simply foreign, made strange by their distance. The Chinese, who made up the largest single immigrant nationality in mid-century California, constituted alien presence which the fantasies of an exotic China could not contain.

In the eyes of white settlers from the East, Chinese settlers from the West disrupted the mythic narrative of Westward expansion. In the popular imagination, California was a Free Soil Eden, a place where small producers, artisans, farmers, and craftsmen, might have a second chance to build a white republic, unstained by chattel slavery or proletarian labor. In this prelapsarian imaginary, the Chinese were identified both with the moral chaos of the Gold Rush and portrayed as the harbingers
of industrial wage slavery. As the national debate over slavery, abolition and statehood came to a boiling point in the late 1860s, the ideal of establishing California as both free and racially pure demanded the removal, or at least exclusion, of both Chinese and African Americans.

"California as It was and Is" was published in 1855 by John A. Stone the prolific writer of such popular songs as "Sweet Betsy From Pike." The song's refrain imagined a golden pastoral era in California

I remember, I remember when the Yuba used to pay,
With nothing but a rocker, five hundred dollars a day.
We used to think 't would always last, and would, with perfect ease,
If only Uncle Sam had stopped the coming of Chinese...

and laid the blame for its passing era squarely on the arrival of immigrants from China. In the pastoral image of "California as It was and Is," the Chinese immigrant represents the entering wedge of disruptive capitalism. After the arrival of the Chinese, independent placer mining on the Yuba collapsed and the song complains, "we're compelled to pay a tax which people say is gambled off... And certain ones are trying to give our mineral lands away, to build a railroad from the States, to San Francisco Bay."

Scores of popular songs published between 1855 and 1882 portrayed the Chinese immigrant as an agent of economic decline and social disorder for free white workingmen and their families. Thousands had flocked to the Sierra Nevada foothills after the Sutter's Mill gold strike. For the many men who lacked experience, skills or capital, prospecting for gold was the more alluring alternative to becoming wage workers in the rapid industrializing Northeast or to farming on the prairie. For such men, prospecting for gold represented a return to the small producer economy. They imagined California as a small producer economy, free of slavery, free of the cash nexus of capitalism, and free of the Chinese, "when the Yuba used to pay, with nothing but a pan and pick, five hun-
dred dollars, in a day."

The representation of the Chinese immigrant as a polluting racial Other relied on a trope of insurmountable cultural difference. Unlike the popular characterization of free blacks as fraudulent citizens because they were supposed to lack culture, the Chinese were seen as having an excess of culture. This excess had led them into a state of degradation and cultural degeneration. Excess and degeneration, of course, carried with them connotations of disease, contagion, and pollution. In a culture dominated by virtuous republicanism, which held self-control in a highest esteem, excess was also closely identified with moral sloth.

Mary Douglas has observed that when external boundaries of the social system are perceived to be threatened, attention is paid to the orifices of the body and the bodily functions of ingestion, digestion, and excretion as symbols of entry and exit into and out of the social system. The construction of Chinese racial difference in mid-nineteenth century cultural productions such as the minstrel show, focused on three such natural symbolic systems, each closely related to such boundary crises: language, food, and hair.¹⁰

In the refrain to “The Heathen Chinee,” sung by the famous minstrel performer Luke Schoolcraft, nonsense words combined with pidgin construct the Yellowface singer of the song as childlike and naturally incomprehensible.

Hi! hi! hi! Ching! ching! ching!
Chow, chow, wellie good, me likie him.
Makie plentie sing song, savie by and bye.
China man a willie man, laugh hi! hi!

Minstrel songs also paid great attention to Chinese foodways; indeed it is uncommon not to find some reference to Chinese eating habits in a minstrel song. Food habits, customs, and rules are central symbolic structures through which societies articulate identity; you are,
symbolically at least, what you eat. While the eating of wild animals might endow the young frontiersman with savage strength, the Chinese are identified with eating dogs and cats, animals that are domesticated but not raised for food. Typical of these images are these stanzas from Luke Schoolcraft’s, “Heathen Chinee.”

Lady she am vellie good, make plenty chow chow  
She live way up top side house,  
Take a little pussy cat and a little bow bow  
Boil em in a pot of stew wit a little mouse  
  Hi! hi! hi!  
Some say pig meat make good chow chow  
Too much largie, no muchie small  
Up sky, down sky, down come chow chow  
Down come a pussy cat, bow bow and all  
  Hi! hi! hi!

The Chinese are also identified as eating mice and rats, animals considered filthy and disease-carrying and therefore dangerous and polluting. In the last stanza of Billy Rice’s “Chinese Ball,” the visitor recounts an imagined Chinese supper.

For supper we had red-eyed cats  
And boot-legs stuffed with fleas.  
We had fish boiled in castor oil,  
Fried clams and elephant knees,  
We had sauer-kraut and pickled meuse,  
and oysters on the half-shell.  
We had Japanese tea in the key of G,  
which made us feel quite well.

A third focus of minstrel attention was the braided plait of hair or queue worn by Chinese men. While nineteenth century Chinese wore the queue as a required sign of loyalty to the Qing dynasty, in California the Chinaman’s queue was a public site of ambiguity and transgression and
thus became a principal target for the victimization of the Chinese by every bigot, old and young. Bret Harte reported in a letter to the *Springfield Republican* March 30, 1867,

> Even legislation only tolerated [the Chinese], and while they were busy in developing the resources of the state, taxed them roundly for the gracious privilege. Regularly every year they were driven out of the mining camps, except when the enlightened Caucasian found it more convenient to rob them—a proceeding which the old statutes in regard to the inadmissibility of their evidence in the courts rendered quite safe and honorable. They furnished innocent amusement to the honest miner, when gambling, horse racing or debauchery palled on his civilized taste, and their Chinese tails, particularly when tied together, cut off or pulled out, were more enjoyable than the Arabian nights entertainments. Nature seemed to have furnished them with that peculiar appendage for the benefit of the Anglo-Saxon.

The cutting of the Chinaman's pigtail allowed white men in the mid and late nineteenth century to reenact, at least at a symbolic level, an earlier savage eighteenth century American ritual—scalping. Indeed, the cutting of queues in conjunction with the collection of taxes is reminiscent of the taking of Indian scalps for bounty, a popular practice among English colonists on the Old Frontier. The taking of scalps enabled white working-men to relive an imagined earlier pre-industrial past. It enabled them to reenact their economic anxiety and social frustration in the symbolic castration and disempowerment of a potentially dangerous pollutant. While the display of cut-off queues was not a common public practice, the similarity between scalp-taking and the taking of the queue was not limited to the level of the symbolic. Hundreds of Chinamen were murdered before, during, and after their queues were removed.
The Coolie

Although they had come to America as free, albeit highly proletarianized, workers, Chinese immigrants found themselves segregated into a racially defined state of subordination as coolie labor. The image of the Chinese immigrant worker as a coolie was a product of the racialized and gendered process of working class formation in the 1870s and 1880s. In the 1850s, the principally American-born migrants who fled the Eastern seaboard to California in the face of proletarianization sought desperately to reconstruct a precapitalist social order on the free labor of small producers. By 1870 such a vision was problematic. As factory production boomed and as the internal structure of the industrial workplace became progressively less stratified, the small-producer ethic, which was the basis of Free Labor ideology, was stretched to its ideological limits. Even as ever more skilled workers became machine tenders working in ever larger factories, Free Labor maintained a craft consciousness based on a nostalgic reconstruction of a precapitalist White Republic.

In the 1870s, California’s fragmented working class coalesced around the demand to remove the Chinese from the White Mechanics’ Republic by barring them from entering the territory and by driving them from the workplace. The great majority of those who harangued, sang, marched, and rioted against the Chinese in the 1870s were themselves new to California. While their anti-Chinese movement scapegoated Chinese Californians for immediate economic problems, it could draw on a dense set of symbols already in play in the ideological imagination of the state. Prior to the Civil War, separated by boundaries of race, from black chattel slavery and Chinese proletarian labor, the ideology of Free Labor held out the hope to the white workingman of the 1850s and 1860s that the downward mobility into wage labor might be only temporary and that the permanent racial status of white-
ness might provide a new center for an imagined organic community of farmers and artisans.

As mechanization threatened to reduce factory work to the lowest common denominator of unskilled labor and craft guilds resisted by striking, manufacturers turned to immigrants as a reserve army of labor. The use of Irish and Italian as well as Chinese immigrants as strikebreakers became commonplace in the 1870s. After Emancipation, anxiety brought about by the absence of slavery as a racially defined category of labor only heightened when cultural differences of language, religion, and folkways exploded on the factory floor or in city life. In the post-emancipation reconfiguration of an industrial working class, white workers responded by invoking whiteness as a broadly inclusive racial category able to encompass broad cultural or ethnic differences among a growing myriad of European immigrants. Although differences attributed to national origin had not yet collapsed into the term "ethnicity," at this moment they were accorded a status different from race and the distinction between ethnicity and race became critically important.

The Chinese coolie was portrayed as unfree and servile, a threat to the white workingman's family, which was the principle symbol of an emergent working class identity which fused class consciousness with national and racial identity. In March of 1876, hoping to influence the California state constitutional convention, The Marin Journal printed the following broadside in the form of a resolve against the Chinese residents of California. The broadside listed several charges that had been leveled against the Chinese presence in California "on behalf of the workingmen of the state and their families."

That he is a slave, reduced to the lowest terms of beggarly economy, and is no fit competitor for an American freeman. That he herds in scores, in small dens, where
a white man and wife could hardly breathe, and has none of the wants of a civilized white man. That he has neither wife nor child, nor expects to have any. That his sister is a prostitute from instinct, religion, education, and interest, and degrading to all around her. That American men, women and children cannot be what free people should be, and compete with such degraded creatures in the labor market. That wherever they are numerous, as in San Francisco, by a secret machinery of their own, they defy the law, keep up the manners and customs of China, and utterly disregard all the laws of health, decency and morality. That they are driving the white population from the state, reducing laboring men to despair, laboring women to prostitution, and boys and girls to hoodlums and convicts. That the health, wealth, prosperity and happiness of our State demand their expulsion from our shores.

Subscription to these demands defined the working-class movement in terms of its own craft elite, and simultaneously met the demand of European immigrant workers, who by 1870 made up a majority of industrial labor, for inclusion as part of an ethnically diverse working class which would be racially defined as white.

The myth of the Chinese coolie laborer racially unfit for membership into the brotherhood of workingmen allowed white American workers, both native-born and immigrant, to racialize a stratum of wage work which it equated with wage slavery, while reserving for whites a privileged semi-artisanal status within the wage labor system. The Coolie representation not only allowed the nascent labor movement long dominated by its skilled trades to exclude Chinese from the working class; it
also enabled the skilled trades to ignore the needs of common labor which it racialized as “cooie labor” or “nigger work.”

Irish immigrants who themselves were in the process of consolidating their own claim to Americanness and a white racial identity led the popular anti-Chinese movement. Among the songs praising the Irish immigrant Denis Kearny as the leader of the white workingman, “Denis Kearny The White Working Man’s Hero” displays a range of Irish names and places Kearny squarely in the context of Irish immigration, and explicitly links Irishness and whiteness in a war against the Chinese.

You have heard of Moriarty, Mulcahey and Malone,  
Also of McNamara, O’Malley and Muldoon;  
But I will sing of Kearny, an anti-Chinaman,  
He’s down upon Mongolians, and all their dirty clan.  
So give three cheers for Kearny,  
For he’s a solid man;  
He’ll raise a grand big army  
and drive out the Chinaman.  
Last week we held a meeting, down forenest the City Hall  
The bold undaunted Kearny was first to get the call.  
Said he, my fellow laborers, if you’ll be lead by me  
We’ll make Capital respect us  
and drive out the cursed Chinee

Kearny’s well-known anti-Chinese posture enables him to rally a working class defined by ethnically inclusive but racially exclusive whiteness, not only against the Chinese, but against capitalists as well. In the final stanza, Kearny, the Irish immigrant politician, stands as hero to labor, racially defined in terms of the “white workingman.”

Now goodnight, my fellow-laborers, I have to go away,  
I’d like to stop and talk to you, but believe me I can’t stay  
So join me in the chorus now, and let your motto be,
God Bless the poor white workingman
and the devil take the Chinee.

The Deviant

The Oriental as Deviant is a figure of forbidden desire in the person of the Chinese household servant. Nowhere was the capitalist transformation in mid and late nineteenth century America so powerfully felt as within the family. Structures and meanings of kinship changed as extended households were downsized into nuclear families. Gender roles were redefined as women and men both left (or were forced from) hearth, farm, and workshop into the factory.

By 1870, cities populated by a new working class, by free people of color, and by immigrants created new possibilities for encounters across class, racial, and sexual boundaries unimaginable a decade or two earlier. By contrast, in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, the transformation of the pre-capitalist household into the nuclear family established polarized middle-class gender roles and sexual behavior. The Cult of Domesticity established an increasingly binary and naturalized code of gender and sexuality in an attempt to restore order to sexual behavior. Victorian moralists regarded sexual passion in women as unnatural, deviant and a marker of degraded lower-class status. Chastity and moral order formed the ideal in which Victorian middle-class women were to fulfill the true nature of their sex. The unbridled sexual energy of men, celebrated in the myth of the Western hero, was to be sublimated to the psychic demands of the marketplace or brought into the service of class reproduction within the privatized family. Sexuality was harnessed to reproduction; the pleasure of the erotic, especially the autoerotic and homoerotic, was to be strictly suppressed.

The Cult of Domesticity, only partially successful as an ideology
of sexual repression, succeeded in constructing the bourgeois family as a private sphere of chastity and piety. It established a reproductive heterosexual regime over the erotic. On the other hand, a public sphere of sexualized activity also flourished. Prostitution in various forms, from the informal exchange of sexual favors for gifts and meals to the exchange of cash, grew to be commonplace in mid-century American cities. In his 1858 study of prostitution in New York, the social reformer, William Sanger, found that fully one quarter of his male respondents had visited prostitutes.

In the transition from the male-bonded world of Gold Rush California to the settled California of the 1870s under the discipline of Victorian domesticity, the Chinese represented a “third sex,” that is to say, an alternative or imagined sexuality that was potentially subversive and disruptive to the emergent heterosexual orthodoxy. The Oriental in America could be imagined as an erotic threat to domestic tranquility for two related reasons. First, during the later decades of the nineteenth century, over ten thousand Chinese women were brought, for the most part forcibly, to the United States as prostitutes. The Chinese prostitute embodied the carnal, available, and mute, but proletarianized, sexuality that mirrored the exoticized female long displayed in the Western literary tradition of Orientalism. Unless it could be contained by race boundaries, this image of female sexuality, uninhibited albeit coerced, threatened to undermine the Victorian image of the passionless true woman embodied in the middle-class homemaker as the moral center of the chaste and obedient social order. Second, thousands of Chinese immigrant men, displaced from earlier employment in manufacturing, agriculture, or mining, entered the new middle-class family as household servants. This entry into the domestic sphere not only displaced female labor (more often than not female Irish immigrant workers) but, by opening up possibilities for relations of intimacy and desire across race and class, threatened to disrupt the patriarchal relations of the family. The
Chinese as a “third” sex represents the possibility of alternative desire in a period during which middle-class gender roles and sexual behavior were being codified and naturalized into a rigid heterosexual cult of domesticity. The representation of Oriental as Deviant justified a taboo against intimacy through which racial and class stability could be preserved.

Unlike the unalloyed hostility toward Chinese immigrants on the part of organized white labor, the attitude of middle-class whites towards the Chinese during the late nineteenth century was ambivalent. On the one hand, the Chinese were highly desired and often considered indispensable as domestic labor; on the other, they represented a threat of racial pollution within the household. The construction of a representation of the Oriental which was both seductively childlike and threateningly sexual allowed for both sympathy and repulsion.

The Yellow Peril

By the turn of the century, Asian immigrants were represented as the Yellow Peril, a threat to nation, race and family. The acquisition of territories and colonies brought with it a renewed threat of “Asiatic” immigration, an invasion of “yellow men” and “little brown brothers.” At the moment when the United States prepared to pick up “the White Man’s Burden” in the Caribbean and the Pacific, “Asiatic immigration” was said to pose “the greatest threat to Western civilization and the white race.”

Domestically, the triumph of corporatism, the homogenization or de-skilling of industrial labor, urbanization, and immigration had all contributed to massive changes in both middle and working class families. These changes resulted in the construction of a culture of consumption which was reflected in new gender roles and new sexual attitudes and behavior among both men and women of both classes. In the
aftermath of the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, these domestic social and cultural transformations were accompanied by deep anxieties about racial suicide and class struggle.\textsuperscript{13}

The Yellow Peril, embodied in the Oriental immigrant, threatened to undermine what Lothrop Stoddard, a popular advocate of eugenics and racial geopolitics, called the “inner dikes” of the white race through its subversion of the family. While Sax Rohmer’s Fu Manchu was making Chinatown the headquarters for Oriental evil on a global scale, two of the first American feature films, Cecil B. De Mille’s \textit{The Cheat} and D.W. Griffith’s \textit{Broken Blossoms} confirmed visually to white audiences the subtle and intimate dangers of Chinatown as home to the Yellow Peril in their midst. These movies allowed Americans to “see for themselves” what writers could only describe about the Oriental, Chinatown, and the Yellow Peril. Even Asians who might appear assimilated even upper class, such as the wealthy playboy Tori played by Sessue Hayakawa in \textit{The Cheat}, were, beneath their surfaces, cruel and brutal. Even the wispy and pure of heart Cheng Huan played in Yellowface by Paul Muni in \textit{Broken Blossoms} could transform a white girl into a prostitute, because his intentions were ultimately irrelevant; his very presence induced moral decay in everyone with whom he came into intimate contact.

\textit{The Cheat} and \textit{Broken Blossoms} followed Fu Manchu in consolidating “The Oriental” as a trope of racial difference beyond the Chinese. Distinctions between Hisuru Tori, the Japanese (or in a later version of the film, Araku, the Burmese), and Cheng Huan, called the Yellowman, and the myriad of Malays, Dacoits, Thugees, and Tibetan princesses that inhabited Fu Manchu’s netherworld were collapsed into a single racial trope of a pan-Asian Orient. In a wide angle shot of an opium den deep in Griffith’s London Chinatown, a white woman dressed in the masculine mode identified with the New Woman of the Jazz Age reclines among a motley crew of “Orientals” who could have come directly out
of a Fu novel. In the scene, "Chinese, Malays, and Indians" and colored men of all sorts mix here easily and scandalously with white women. The audience can imagine that orphan Lucy’s missing mother is not dead at all, but has simply abandoned the family. She may be this “new woman” lost, at the level of the visual at least, to the opium den.

This shot visually confirms the reports Americans had read about Chinatowns as sinks of iniquity since the very establishment of Chinese settlements in the 1870s. Even sympathetic travel narratives from journalists such as Charles Nordhoff in California for Travellers and Settlers and Mrs. Frank Leslie’s travel accounts in Leslie’s Weekly Magazine reported in detail on the dark side of the Chinese quarters. In 1880, the virulently anti-Chinese San Francisco Public Health Committee issued a report declaring San Francisco’s Chinatown a “public nuisance.” In the early years of the twentieth century, journalist Louis Beck in New York Chinatown, the Progressive urban social reformers Helen Campbell and Colonel Thomas Knox in Lights and Shadows of New York, and Jacob Riis in How the Other Half Lives all described in lurid detail the moral corruption of New York’s Chinatown.

Both The Cheat and Broken Blossoms portrayed the Asian male immigrant as undermining national strength by seducing the white woman and subverting the already weakened white family. In both the DeMille and Griffith films, Asian immigrant men are not redeemed either by their social assimilation (The Cheat) or by sympathetic and noble behavior (Broken Blossoms) because their race renders them irredeemable. In both cases, the irreducible difference of race is revealed through the Asian man’s (unrealized) desire for sexual relations with a white woman. In the critical scene of thwarted desire in each film, the white heroine “instinctively” draws away, much as the Supreme Court would later say that the great majority of “our people” will “instinctively reject assimilation” [with Asians].
The Model Minority

The representation of Asian Pacific Americans as a Model Minority, although popularly identified with the late 1960s and 1970s, originated in the racial logic of cold war liberalism of the 1950s. The image of Asian Pacific Americans as a successful case of ethnic assimilation helped to contain three specters that haunted Cold War America: the red menace of communism, the black menace of racial integration, and the white menace of homosexuality. In place of radical critiques which called for structural changes in American political economy, the Model Minority mythology substituted a narrative of national modernization and ethnic assimilation through heterosexuality, familialism and consumption.

The Second World War was a contradictory experience for Asian Pacific America; on the one hand, state sponsored anti-Asian racism reached its apex with the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans, at the same time anti-Nazi ideology and the demands of new political alliances in Asia resulted in the abrogation of racially defined prohibitions against Chinese, and later Indian and Filipino immigration. By 1952, in the midst of the Korean War, the bar against Japanese immigration was lifted and the right to naturalization was extended to all Asian immigrants. The changes in official attitudes towards Asian immigration and Asian Pacific Americans reflected a cold war imperative. After the division of Europe into opposing, but relatively stable blocs, the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union was to be carried out in what was to be called the Third World. This required a new set of political alliances with post-colonial nationalist regimes, which were often wary of racial segregation and discrimination in the United States. In order to counter Soviet suggestions to the Third World that United States held the same white supremacist attitudes as their former European colonial masters, the federal government began to intervene on the side of domestic racial
civil rights. In key landmark cases dismantling segregation, a key rationale put forward by the federal government was that the appearance of racial discrimination had a negative impact of the struggle against Communism.

It was in the context of this policy of ethnic liberalism, that the heretofore unassimilable Oriental became Asian Pacific American. The narrative of Asian immigrants as morally unfit for citizenship gave way to a narrative of the Asian immigrant experience as model of the successful assimilation of a minority which had overcome its racial disadvantage. As the United States assumed the mantle of empire in the Pacific, interracial relations between white men and Asian women were celebrated on the stage and screen in South Pacific and Sayonara. Indeed, in both of those productions of James Michener's stories, it is the openness of America to these relationships that is the measure of America's claim to be the rightful leader of the Free World.

America's celebration in the new assimilability of Asian immigrants was not limited to the stage or silver screen. Magazines such as Life, The Saturday Evening Post, and Redbook ran scores of stories about the integration of Japanese warbrides into white American families. The narrative of the Warbride became the narrative of Asian assimilation into American society. In the face of anxieties about the American family in an era of bomb shelters and Kinsey reports, The Warbride was not only a symbol of Pax Americana, but also restored patriarchy to its rightful place in the national family.

The Gook

Since the 1970s, the Model Minority image has coexisted with and reinforced a representation of the Asian Pacific American as the Gook. The shift in the U.S. economy from large-scale industrial pro-
duction to flexible accumulation and the global realignment of capital and labor have brought about new crises of class, race and national identity. In the context of these contemporary crises, the "intact" and "traditional" Asian Pacific American family is promoted as a model of productivity, savings and mobility, not just for African America or Latino families but now for all American families, including those of the white middle-class. Simultaneously, however, in post-Vietnam and post-liberal American popular culture, the Asian Pacific American is represented as the invisible enemy and the embodiment of inauthentic racial and national identities, the Gook.

The Vietnam War is replayed throughout American popular culture as the narrative of America's decline in the post-industrial era. The received wisdom of the Vietnam War narrative is that America's defeat in Southeast Asia was brought about by a faceless and invisible Asian enemy aided and abetted by an American counter-culture. The rapid growth of the Asian Pacific American population and its apparent success render the Model Minority, like the now mythic Viet Cong, everywhere invisible and powerful. In these narratives, for example in the movie *The Year of the Dragon*, or on the television series *Magnum P.I.*, the war in Vietnam is replayed on American soil but with different results.

In more contemporary narratives of American decline, Asian Pacific Americans are represented as the agents of foreign or multinational capital. Asian Pacific American success is seen as camouflage for subversion. The Model Minority is revealed to be a simulacrum, a copy for which no original exists, and thus a false model of the American family. The Model Minority resembles the Replicants in the science fiction film *Blade Runner*, perfectly efficient but inauthentically human, whose difference is invisible to all but the highly trained eye, the perfect Gook.

In the 1990s, Asian Pacific Americans figure in the narrative of American decline as a harbinger of an invasion of Asian capitalism. The films *Rising Sun*, *Menace to Society* and *Falling Down* all tell a story of the
impact of globalized capital on American society. In these films, all set in Los Angeles, the American urban landscape is portrayed as an economic and social desert laid waste by the invasion of Asian capital. Much the same way that Chinese immigrants in the middle of the nineteenth century were represented as the polluting harbingers of industrial capitalism, today’s Asian immigrant, whether corporate executive or neighborhood shopkeeper, is portrayed as the embodiment of global capitalism.

Conclusion

The racist humor of portraying Bill and Hillary Clinton and Al Gore in Yellowface works only because The First Family is presumptively white, an enduring, if anachronistic, symbol of America as a White Nation in the popular imagination. Yellowface transforms the First Family, historically and symbolically white, into the Oriental family; Bill, Hillary and Al have, through the pollution of Asian money, become alien, Yellow and Oriental.

The reappearance of the Yellowface grotesque on the front pages of a national magazine was deeply unsettling, particularly to those Asian Pacific Americans who had bought into the myth of the Model Minority. Since the mid-1960s the national media had popularized an image of Asian Pacific Americans as the perfectly assimilated and presumptively accepted ethnic minority in the United States. Among many Asian Pacific Americans, the emergence of the Model Minority image led to a popular preoccupation with “good” stereotypes vs. “bad” stereotypes. However, this preoccupation with “positive” and “negative” stereotypes legitimates and reinforces the racial discourse of the Oriental which produces and reproduces both the Coolie and the Model Minority. We need to understand the Oriental as a complex field of racial representation which contains multiple, contradictory images and stereotypes. It is precisely the complexity, the density and ambiguity of the multiple images
contained within it, that gives the Oriental its ideological power, its ability to be imbedded within the broadest web of social concerns, race, gender, class, and its power to survive, mutate and reproduce. Only a critical analysis of these images as agents in a complex racial ideology can lead us to a sharper understanding of race as a social practice and provide us a tool for dismantling it.
Endnotes


2 These included Simon Fierman who had been fined $6 million (the largest such fine ever levied) and Thomas Kramer, a German national who had been fined $323,000, by the Federal Election Commission for illegal campaign contributions. See "Petition of the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium et. al. to the United States Commission on Civil Rights," September 10, 1997 reprinted at http://www2.ari.net.oca.org.complaint.html.


6 See Petition of the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium et. al. to the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

7 Of the many and varied periodizations of American economic history, the one I have found most useful for this study is the analysis of changes in the labor market and the social structure of accumulation by Gordon, Edwards and Reich. See David M. Gordon, Richard Edwards, Michael Reich, *Segmented Work, Divided Workers: The Historical Transformation of Labor in the United States* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Gordon and his colleagues examine the relationship between long cycles economic activity and the social structure of accumulation. They outline three periods in the development of American capitalism with regard to labor: the period of initial proletarianization from 1820s to the 1890s; the period of homogenization from the 1870s to the onset of WWII during which the labor markets became more competitive and jobs in the capitalist sector of the economy were transformed into the common denominator of semi-skilled labor; the period of segmentation from the 1920s to the present, during which political and economic forces have produced qualitative differences in the organization of work and three distinct labor markets, a secondary labor market and a primary labor market divided into independent and subordinate sectors. Gordon and his colleagues link these broad periods to long swings (on the order of twenty-five years) in global economic activity, each associated with a distinct social structure of accumulation, the institutional environment in which capital accumulation takes place. For a periodization shaped by both economy and culture see Herbert Gutman, *Work, Culture, and Society in Industrializing America: Essays in American Working-Class and Social History* (New York, NY:


Mary Douglas observes that boundary crises most often focus attention on bodily orifices as symbolic entry and exit points into the social system. Douglas, *Purity and Danger*, 44.


Part II

Racial Interactions
Residential Patterns of Asian Pacific Americans

Tarry Hum
and Michela Zonta

Introduction

Residentially segregated neighborhoods are among the most visible manifestations of the perniciousness and persistence of racial discrimination. The significance of residential patterns is tied to very basic and fundamental human needs in forming social relationships and building community. Neighborhoods are also important sites for services and resources including education, employment, and civic institutions that shape individual opportunities and life chances. For these reasons—at once economic and psychological—residential choices and patterns represent a critical terrain where social relations, racial attitudes, and market forces coalesce. Much research on residential patterns, in particular, the persistence of racial segregation has focused on the social and geographic distance between blacks and whites (Massey and Denton 1993). The demographic landscape of many major metropolitan areas, however, has moved beyond this racial duality. New immigration is a vital engine of sociodemographic growth, without which many cities would experience dramatic declines in population numbers, and subsequent repercussions on the local economy and labor force (James, Romine, Zwanzig 1998; Muller 1993). For the past three decades, Asian immigration has been a key catalyst for urban growth and diversification.

The landmark Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 eliminated restrictive quotas based on national origin and facilitated an influx of Asians contributing to the demographic transformation of many urban and suburban neighborhoods throughout this nation. While race still influences Asian Pacific American (APA) settlement patterns, it is certainly not to the extent that had prevailed in the past. After a century
of racial segregation sanctioned by state and local governments, the period following WWII provided opportunities for APAs to exercise greater residential choice. The movement toward full residential integration; however, has slowed in the past decade or so, and APA settlement patterns are increasingly complex and varied. On the aggregate, APAs remain the least residentially segregated among racial groups; however, the influx of new and diverse immigrants has helped to facilitate the reemergence of historic and new enclaves in both central cities and suburbs.

This study documents how racial attitudes, new immigration, and increasing ethnic and class diversification have shaped the formation of APA communities. A brief historic overview discusses the impact of immigration and housing policies. To study contemporary APA settlement patterns, we use a variety of data resources including the 1970, 1980, and 1990 Census, 1992-1996 Immigration and Naturalization Services records, and the 1993-1994 Multi-City Survey on Urban Inequality (MCSUI). We select the top 30 metropolitan areas with the largest APA populations in 1990 and construct dissimilarity indices to measure the spatial distribution of different racial groups. We study how residential patterns as measured by the dissimilarity index change over time and vary across metropolitan areas, and we identify the factors contributing to inter—metropolitan and interethnic variations. In addition, we document how racial group differences in attitudes relate to individual preferences and choices in housing and neighborhood locations.

Finally, we conduct a detailed analysis of APA residential patterns in four metropolitan areas with a large and growing APA population: Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Oakland. Since APA population growth is driven by immigration, we will look at new immigration in the 1990s to examine whether traditional enclave communities continue to be central settlement sites. We conclude with a brief
discussion of two related observations on the significance of APA residential patterns. One observation is that while the aggregate profile of APA residential patterns indicates a high level of integration and residential choice, significant disparity in the housing and neighborhood conditions of APAs persists. A second observation is that the process of residential integration has not been free of conflict, with race continuing to be a salient factor in shaping the homes and communities of all Americans.

Patterns of Asian Pacific American Settlement and Segregation

The early history of APA communities has been one of exclusion and ghettoization. Early APA settlements were the products of successive waves of immigrants from China, Japan, and the Philippines who served as an indispensable labor source for the agricultural and industrial development of the West. These spatially concentrated communities, comprised largely of farmers and laborers, became the targets of racial oppression, forced relocation, and anti-Asian violence. Acquiescing to nativist movements and organized labor, Congress passed laws severely restricting Asian immigration and naturalization in the mid-to-late 1800s that remained part of the U.S. legal codes until the 1950s. State and local laws barred land and business ownership, as well as interracial marriages, which further constrained social and economic choices for APAs. The California Alien Land Laws of 1913 prohibited "aliens ineligible for citizenship" from purchasing or leasing land for longer than three years. These laws were not repealed until 1956. Restrictive covenants, threats of violence, and landlord discrimination were additional tools employed to effectively segregate APAs (Chan 1991; Hing 1993).

Societal hostility and discriminatory practices circumscribed life for APAs in the United States and fostered a reliance on co-ethnic
resources and strategies as a means for survival (Chan 1991). For the
Chinese, collective survival strategies and legal restrictions led to the
formation of some of the earliest racial ghettos in this country (Ong 1984;
Wong 1982). Well before zoning was legitimately used to separate
incompatible activities, cities in California innovated the application of
land-use laws as a means to segregate and control the Chinese (Kayden
and Haar 1989). Largely “bachelor societies” due to the dominance of
male laborers, the sociopolitical organization of the early Chinatowns
were centered on traditional associations based on regional, dialect, and
kinship ties (Wong 1982; Chan 1991; Kwong 1987; Hing 1993). In
contrast, Japanese immigrants were allowed to bring their wives and, as a
result, they were able to sustain a family-centered community life. In
part, the ability to maintain families reduced the need to establish concen­
trated enclave communities (Kitano and Kitano 1998). Although the
1913 California Alien Land Laws may have prompted the establishment
of Japantown in San Francisco and Los Angeles (Hing 1993),
Japantown, as an urban enclave, never achieved a level of concentration
and centrality comparable to that of Chinatown. Moreover, the forced
relocation to internment camps during World War II “essentially ended
the Japantown phenomenon” (Hing 1993, 59), as the four-year
internment period resulted in lost property, disruption of community life,
and the dismantling of many established Japanese communities
(Langberg and Farley 1985). This represented the removal of urban
minority neighborhoods at an unprecedented scale, many times more
destructive than the impacts of urban renewal decades later.

With the implementation of the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act
followed by the Gentlemen’s Agreement in 1907, employers turned to
another cheap labor source, Filipinos. Filipinos were exempt from
immigration restrictions due to their status as U.S. nationals, an outcome
of U.S. colonization. The first major influx of Filipino immigrants
occurred in the 1920s and was largely a migration of male laborers
seeking work in the agricultural and cannery industries in Hawaii, California, and the Pacific Northwest. Due to the seasonal nature of agricultural work, Filipino workers migrated back and forth between California and the Pacific Northwest's farming regions and cities, notably Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. Similar to early rural Chinatowns, "Little Manila" formed in cities near farming regions such as Stockton, California (Melendy 1976). These early communities served as a refuge during the off-seasons providing information about employment prospects, social supports, and recreational activities (Melendy 1976).

The alliance between China and the United States during World War II created the political necessity to repeal the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act over 60 years after its enactment, and in 1943 a yearly quota of 105 Chinese was established. The 1946 War Brides Act also provided a mechanism promoting Asian immigration as the wives of U.S. servicemen stationed in Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and South Vietnam were allowed to join their spouses in the United States. The influx of women countered the gender imbalance particularly acute in the Chinese community and as a result, family formation became a more common event.

After World War II, the residential mobility of APAs improved considerably as a result of changes in housing and immigration legislation as well as in racial attitudes. In 1948, restrictive covenants were declared unenforceable in the case of Shelley v. Kraemer thus ending the practice of racist deed restrictions in the sale or leasing of property (Massey and Denton 1993). Stemming from the civil rights movement, the 1968 Fair Housing Act banned discrimination in the rental and sale of housing, and served as a critical catalyst and tool to desegregate residential markets and monitor the key institutions which shape housing consumption patterns, namely banks and realtors. During this period, the 1965 Immigration Act eliminated discriminatory national origins quotas and facilitated a
renewed and diverse immigrant flow of which APAs comprised a significant share. The growing APA population further diversified as the 1980 Refugee Act resettled thousands of Southeast Asian refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos during the late 1970s and early 1980s. A mandate of this federal policy was to disperse Southeast Asian refugees throughout the country in order to facilitate their economic and social incorporation into American society.

Contemporary Asian immigration represents a rich heterogeneity in national origins, ethnicity, education and skill levels, language, cultural practices, political experiences and orientations. Historic immigrant groups including Chinese and Filipinos are joined by growing numbers of Koreans, South Asians, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Thai, and others. This diversity in human, social, and financial capital promotes varied and complex strategies for incorporation and adaptation to urban life in the United States. For more fortunate new immigrants, along with many U.S.-born and raised APAs, high levels of educational attainment and household income, coupled with less white resistance have enabled them to integrate into non-APA neighborhoods. For other newcomers, migration networks tend to concentrate these immigrants in cities and neighborhoods where families and friends reside. The effect of this settlement pattern have simultaneously revitalized historic enclaves and expanded their geographic boundaries, and established new “satellite” communities (Lin 1998; Zhou 1992; Massey and Denton 1987, 1991; Boyd 1988). This duality of integration and continued ethnic isolation are explored in detail in later sections.

Present Levels of Segregation and Integration

Although APAs constitute a relatively small share of the total population in most metropolitan areas, their rapid and dramatic growth in the past decades has doubled and, in some cases, tripled or quadrupled
their numbers. In 1990, APAs made up 20.5 and 17.5 percent of San Francisco and San Jose’s total population, respectively (Table 1; see appendix for all tables). Other West Coast metropolitan areas where APAs comprise a sizable share of the total population range from 10.8 percent in Los Angeles to 8 percent in San Diego. The New York metropolitan area represents the largest concentration of APAs east of California with over 550,000 comprising 6.5 percent of the total population in 1990.

Recent population projections indicate that in 1998, APAs numbered well over 1.2 million in Los Angeles County, an increase of 24 percent since 1990. According to these census projections, APAs at 111,111 now comprise a full 17 percent of the population of Queens, New York. Overall, APAs are highly concentrated in several West Coast metropolitan areas and the New York metropolitan region on the East Coast, in other words, the historic places of arrival for early immigrants. This pattern of APA settlement is also characterized by notable ethnic group concentrations (Barringer 1995). Chinese, Koreans, and South Asians are concentrated in the Northeast, whereas Filipinos, Japanese, Cambodians, Vietnamese, Hmongs and Indonesians show a higher concentration in the West (Fong 1998).

One common measure of the level of segregation (and conversely, the level of integration) is the dissimilarity index, which ranges from 0 to 1. The higher the value of the dissimilarity index, the greater the level of segregation. The results in Table 2 for thirty U.S. metropolitan with the highest number of APAs show that APAs are the least residentially segregated minority group. However, there is considerable inter-metropolitan variation in the APA dissimilarity indices. For example, in 1970, the index ranged from 0.25 for San Jose to 0.56 for Chicago. The relative ranking changed over time and in 1990, Stockton had the highest dissimilarity index (0.58) while Portland experienced the lowest level of segregation (0.33). The areas with relatively high levels of segregation in 1990
include historic APA destinations (Los Angeles, San Francisco and New York) as well as fairly recent destinations for new Southeast Asian groups (Fresno and Stockton). Interestingly, with the exception of Anaheim-Santa Ana, the metropolitan areas with the lowest segregation levels are found outside of California. Many of them such as Bergen-Passaic, NJ, Newark, NJ, Nassau-Suffolk, NY, and Washington DC have more than doubled their APA population during the 1990s.

While dissimilarity indices show a decline in African Americans' residential segregation in the last two decades, during the same period, the segregation measures for both APAs and Latinos have increased indicating declining contact with whites. This pattern of increasing spatial isolation is largely attributable to the influx of new immigrants and subsequent population growth. For Latinos, the average dissimilarity index increased from 0.41 in 1970 to 0.48 in 1990, while for APAs, the index increased from 0.41 to 0.44. For both groups, however, segregation scores remain considerably below those of African Americans.

Interestingly, this trend in segregation measures varies across different metropolitan areas. As Table 2 shows, sixteen out of the thirty metropolitan areas present an increase in the index of dissimilarity between APAs and whites from 1970 to 1990, while it has declined in the other metropolitan areas. Some of the increase can be explained by the recent status of new groups who tend to concentrate in specific neighborhoods within metropolitan areas. This most likely occurs in areas with sharply increased immigration levels among the new APA groups—Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians. Such groups tend to have a low socioeconomic status and are generally less able to afford to live in integrated neighborhoods. As Table 3 illustrates, the areas showing the greatest increases in APA segregation scores during both decades are in California, and include primary destinations for new immigrant groups from Southeast Asia. In
particular, Fresno represents a major pole of attraction for Hmong, whereas in Stockton, Cambodians and Laotians are the largest APA group.

In addition to regional differences in segregation measures and trends, dissimilarity indices also vary based on ethnic groups indicating important differences in the level of spatial isolation among APAs. While Japanese Americans experience fairly low levels of segregation, the dissimilarity indices for Southeast Asians and Chinese are high indicating that these ethnic groups experience greater social isolation. The dissimilarity indices for APA ethnic groups in the four most concentrated APA populations outside of Hawaii—Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Oakland—indicate general patterns of variation in the level of segregation experienced by different APA ethnic groups (Table 4; see appendix for all tables). In Los Angeles, Chinese and Southeast Asians experience a fairly high level of segregation. A comparable level of segregation is experienced by Filipinos and Southeast Asians in San Francisco, while the only APA ethnic group that experiences a notable level of segregation in Oakland are Southeast Asians. In contrast, many APA ethnic groups—Chinese, South Asians, Koreans, and Southeast Asians—in New York experience fairly high levels of segregation. Clearly, ethnicity remains an important variable in mediating settlement patterns and the level of residential segregation experienced by APAs.

In summary, while the aggregate level dissimilarity index for APAs at .44 indicates that APAs are the least segregated minority group, we find that there is significant variation when we disaggregate these segregation measures based on region and ethnicity. Moreover, we find that APA segregation has increased in the past two decades on both the aggregate or national level and, notably, in several major metropolitan areas including New York, Houston, San Francisco, and San Diego. A factor shaping APA segregation patterns is the dramatic influx of new immigrants in several metropolitan regions. Multivariate models
confirm that the arrival of new immigrants in metropolitan areas is related to the changing levels of APA segregation in the past decade. As expected, the increasing numbers may create a critical mass for enclave formations and/or elicit reactions such as out-migration and suburbanization of non-Hispanic whites. In contrast, linguistic isolation and poverty do not seem to be highly correlated with segregation, since in many cases metropolitan areas with high levels of APA poverty and linguistic isolation do not experience high levels of segregation.

Asian Pacific American Residential Integration

Given the history of segregation, the contemporary patterns of integration for a significant number of APAs poses an important question as to why this is the case. As the previous section reveals, APAs are more integrated with whites than any other minority group despite the increase in APA segregation levels during the 1980s. The research on residential segregation points to a multifaceted explanation invoking both involuntary and voluntary forces (Lieberson and Carter 1982). Aggregate residential patterns stem from the combination of several individual-level processes and structural conditions (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Massey 1985; Schelling 1978). An individual's choice of housing location, for instance, may well be influenced by cost and affordability, location, proximity to work and to good quality schools, stage in the life cycle, as well as by an individual's willingness to reside in a neighborhood of a particular racial/ethnic, socioeconomic, or cultural composition. Moreover, the state of the housing market and the urban economy, the history and scale of immigration, and the physical stock of the city bear much of the explanatory weight for residential segregation (Massey 1985). Last but not least, private and public discrimination in the housing market has played a major role in the perpetration of racial segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas, especially in the case of African Americans (Massey and Denton 1993).
Scholars have generally employed the assimilation model to explain APA integration as well as the difference-in-preference approach. The assimilation model argues that a group's spatial assimilation is an outcome of the social attainment process. According to this perspective, as members of minority groups earn higher incomes and acquire higher educational levels, they attempt to leave behind less successful members of their groups and tend to convert these status achievements into improved residential outcomes by purchasing residence in neighborhoods with greater prestige, more amenities, better schools, and higher-value homes. Moreover, for minority members, economic and social advancement is associated with greater proximity and similarity to white Americans—the historical and current dominant group in American society. Therefore, the process of upward mobility may include the dispersion of minority group members from an ethnic enclave to areas inhabited predominantly by majority group members. Since rising socioeconomic status and acculturation reduce the social distance between minority members and native-born whites, resistance and out-migration by the latter become unlikely when minority members enter a white neighborhood. This process ultimately results in higher residential integration between minority and majority group members (Alba and Logan 1991; Logan and Alba 1993).

Previous research has found that, consistent with the assimilation model, APAs are not only less segregated than other minority groups, but also that their degree of segregation declines significantly with increasing socioeconomic status, especially in metropolitan areas with the largest APA populations (Massey 1985; Denton and Massey 1988; Massey and Fischer 1999). Studies have also found that suburbanization of APAs in a metropolitan area—which is strongly associated with each group's average income level—constitutes a key step in the process of spatial assimilation, since in most metropolitan regions, suburban areas have higher socioeconomic status than central cities, and suburban residence is
typically associated with higher probabilities of contact with white Americans (Massey and Denton 1987; Massey and Denton 1988; Alba and Logan 1991; Zhou and Logan 1991). Asian Pacific Americans have been found to be indeed the most suburbanized of the three major minority groups (Massey and Denton 1988a). In suburbs, APAs have been able to achieve access to relatively advantaged resources and experience segregation levels comparable to those experienced by Euro-American ethnic groups (Logan and Alba 1993; Massey and Fischer 1999).

Recent national socioeconomic trends corroborate the spatial assimilation hypothesis in explaining APAs' low segregation levels compared to those of other minority groups. Indeed, APAs have featured a socioeconomic status comparable to that of whites. On the aggregate, APAs have been distinguished from other groups by their unusual human capital investment and, like whites, they have been likely to fill the jobs that are most highly rewarded. As of 1990, APAs represented the most advantaged minority group along such dimensions as school enrollment, educational attainment, employment, occupational achievement, and earnings (Farley 1997). As Figure 1 illustrates, during the 1990s, APAs had the highest median household income among the racial groups. Further, while their income was relatively similar to that of non-Hispanic whites, they clearly continued to be economically advantaged with respect to blacks and Latinos. In 1998, the median household income of APAs was about $46,600 compared to $28,300 for Latinos of any race and $25,400 for blacks (U.S. Census Bureau 1999). Moreover, in recent years, APAs have continued to show high levels of educational attainment. In 1996, the proportion of APAs with a college education was almost twice that of the non-Hispanic white population (42 percent and 26 percent, respectively). Further, APAs were more than 1½ times as likely to have a bachelor's degree than non-Hispanic whites. As these figures suggest, APAs are advantaged compared to other groups in terms of the economic resources that make residential mobility possible. Their higher purchasing power may help them relocate in areas characterized
by a high socioeconomic status and by a significant presence of whites, thus increasing the probability of spatial integration with the majority group.

Economic factors and elements of the urban structure, however, do not act alone in generating and maintaining ethnic and racial integration in cities, but often act in association with interethnic attitudes and preferences (Schelling 1978; Clark 1986, 1992; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996). According to the preferences approach, minor variations in nonrandom neighborhood racial group composition preferences lead in the aggregate to distinct residential patterns. Not all groups show the same preferences or willingness to accept other-race neighbors, and when areas “tip” beyond tolerance levels for diversity, residential segregation eventually occurs. Experimental data on racial attitudes and neighborhood composition preferences have shown a clear upward trend in the acceptance of integration (Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). Nevertheless, there is considerable variation along the racial/ethnic spectrum. In general, despite being the least likely to object to residential integration, blacks continue to confront the most resistance from other groups. Whites, on the other hand, stand out as the most desirable neighbors, and yet are the most likely to object to interracial residential contact (Clark 1992; Zubrinsky and Bobo 1996; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996).

In the following discussion, we adopt the difference-in-preference perspective in order to provide a further plausible explanation of why APAs are the least segregated among the three minority groups. We assume that higher levels of integration with whites depend in part upon the willingness of APAs to enter largely white areas. Further, we assume that whites’ acceptance of residential integration with APAs also plays a key role in maintaining lower levels of APA segregation relative to those of Latinos and African Americans.

Our analysis is based on data from the 1993-94 Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality. To examine group differences in residential preferences, the survey used the showcard procedure originally designed
for use in the Detroit Area Study (Farley et al. 1978) and presented white, black, Latino and APA respondents with a series of hypothetical neighborhood types that varied in degrees of racial/ethnic integration. Like black and Latino respondents, APA respondents were asked to consider attractive levels of integration with other groups – in this case with whites, blacks, and Latinos. Consistent with previous research (Clark 1992; Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Zubrinsky and Bobo 1996), our results show that the majority of APA respondents express a clear preference for an all-APA neighborhood, although the attractiveness of the different neighborhoods depends on the race of potential neighbors. Whites stand out as the most desirable neighbors, whereas Latinos are the least desirable neighbors, followed by blacks. Forty-one percent of APAs prefer an all-APA neighborhood when blacks are the target group, and 49 percent prefer an all-APA neighborhood when Latinos are the target group compared to 15 percent of APA respondents who prefer this type of situation when whites are the target group. Sixty percent of APAs rate a nearly half APA neighborhood as the most attractive when whites are the target group. Further, APAs are the least likely to find predominantly out-group neighborhoods attractive. Neighborhoods with only two APA houses or none are unattractive to all APAs with non-white neighbors (Table 5; see appendix).

Another set of questions inquired about the willingness to move into a neighborhood with varying degrees of integration with whites, blacks, and Latinos. Again, whites appear to be the most desirable neighbors. Virtually all respondents express the willingness to move into a neighborhood, which is roughly half-white and half-APA, and 89 percent are willing to move into a majority white neighborhood. By contrast, only 68 percent and 73 percent express the willingness to move into a majority black or Latino neighborhood, respectively. These percentages drop to 0 percent and 1 percent, respectively, when APA respondents are asked whether they would be willing to pioneer in a 100 percent black or Latino neighborhood (Table 6; see appendix).
Table 7 illustrates white respondents’ willingness to move into neighborhoods with varying degrees of integration with minority group members. Clearly, as the proportion of non-whites increases, willingness to move decreases. However, willingness to move into majority white neighborhoods depends very much on the race of the target group. As expected, whites seem to favor APAs as potential neighbors, whereas the percentages of whites willing to pioneer in a majority black or Latino neighborhood decrease at a faster rate. While over half of white respondents would move into a 100 percent APA neighborhood, only 31 percent and 45 percent would pioneer in a 100 percent black or Latino neighborhood, respectively. Moreover, while a full 95 percent of white respondents would move into a nearly half APA neighborhood, their percentage drops to 75 percent and 86 percent, respectively, when blacks and Latinos are the target group. Again, our results are consistent with previous research on the degree of comfort with racial neighborhood change (Clark 1992; Schuman and Bobo 1988; Zubrinsky and Bobo 1996).

As the analysis suggests, preferences for neighborhoods with varying degrees of integration with different racial/ethnic groups are race-specific. Both APAs and whites show a relatively strong pattern of avoidance of African American and Latino neighbors, whereas they are significantly more likely to feel comfortable with substantial integration when their potential neighbors are either white or APA. Therefore, it seems plausible to attribute a significant part of APAs’ high integration with whites both to APAs’ strong preference for white neighbors and to whites’ high levels of acceptance of APA neighbors.

Continued Importance of Ethnic Enclaves

Despite a relative low level of housing segregation, APA residential patterns include the revitalization and expansion of enclaves, defined as
concentrated ethnic residential neighborhoods (Portes 1995; Waldinger 1987). This observation complicates a simple and "straight-line" trajectory of APA residential integration (Gans 1992; Marcuse 1997). As noted, one of the impacts of new Asian immigration is the revitalization, expansion, and formation of ethnic enclaves. The revitalization of historic enclaves is evident in the post-1965 development of Chinatowns (Kwong 1987; Zhou 1992; Lin 1998). Notable examples include New York's Manhattan Chinatown, which has extended into neighboring historic immigrant enclaves such as the Lower East Side and Little Italy, while San Francisco's Chinatown has spilled into North Beach. In addition, APA immigrants have established and consolidated new "satellite" communities and diversified the "crabgrass frontier" as many increasingly opt for homeownership in surrounding suburban communities.

The revitalization of historic enclaves, namely Chinatowns, has been accompanied by the establishment of new ethnic enclaves. Koreans have established Koreatown in Los Angeles, while Indochinese refugees have established several ethnic enclaves in Southern California, including "Little Saigon" in Westminster and "Little Phnom Penh" in Long Beach. In contrast, Filipinos and South Asians have not established concentrated "territorial" enclaves comparable to a Chinatown or Koreatown. Socioeconomic qualities including higher educational attainment and occupational positions, English language proficiency, and subgroup religious and regional differences mitigate the need to establish an enclave among South Asians and Filipinos (Sheth 1995). While residential enclaves may not characterize the South Asian experience, economic enclaves have formed in many metropolitan areas such as Queens, New York where a section of Jackson Heights is referred to as Little India due to the agglomeration of South Asian-owned retail shops (Kasinitz, Bazzi, Doane 1998).¹⁶

One of the unique features of many newer enclaves is their location within the region. Although Koreatown is an inner-city neigh-
borhood, others are not. The saturation of historic enclaves has prompted immigrants to "leapfrog" traditional "ports of entry" neighborhoods and settle in new communities (Lin 1998; Zhou 1992; Massey and Denton 1987). The "Asianization" of central city neighborhoods is also accompanied by immigrant homeownership in surrounding areas (Pitkin et al. 1997), the formation of new "satellite" enclaves (Lin 1998; Chen 1992; Smith 1995) and suburban enclaves or "ethnoburbs" (Fong 1994; Li 1999). Few Asian enclaves, however, continue to reproduce the homogeneity and insularity of historic enclaves. Racial exclusion is no longer the key dynamic driving enclave residence, rather the agglomeration of immigrant-owned businesses and ethnic labor markets offers opportunity structures for new immigrants, which are not available in the mainstream society (Zhou 1992; Portes and Rumbart 1990; Li 1999). Typically, immigrants with resources will avoid the dense urban conditions of enclaves and choose to settle in surrounding suburbs. The high rate of APA suburbanization has facilitated the formation of "ethnoburbs" (Li 1999). A common view is that these suburban APA communities are "Chinatown No More," and notable examples include Monterey Park in Los Angeles, Flushing and Elmhurst in Queens, New York, and Sunset and Richmond in San Francisco (Chen 1992; Fong 1994; Sanjek 1998).

The noncontiguous development of APA enclaves creates different types of community networks. Some civic leaders claim that historic enclaves and their satellites constitute a "community of interest" since they are settled by immigrants with similar socioeconomic characteristics as historic enclave residents. This can be seen among the community organizations which have branch offices in satellite neighborhoods illustrating a shared institutional infrastructure and social service needs. For example, the main offices of New York's Chinese American Planning Council, Asian Americans for Equality, Chinese Staff and Workers Association, and UNITE Worker Centers are located in
Manhattan Chinatown, while branch offices are located in neighborhoods in other boroughs. Similar patterns can also be seen in Los Angeles as the more established institutions in the older urban core reach out beyond their traditional geographic boundaries.

More recently, the high rates of APA suburbanization and the declining influx of immigrants, especially from Japan, have brought increasing attention to the importance of “symbolic” communities centered on cultural institutions and small businesses that serve an ethnic niche market. For example, Bay Area civic leaders are preparing plans to establish a Filipinotown in Oakland’s waterfront that will offer restaurants, senior housing, and a cultural center (Wong 1995). There is strong interest among Bay Area Filipinos to create a visible spatial community that will generate a political presence as well as celebrate Filipino cultural heritage and practices. The development plans include senior housing to accommodate those who may need easy access to the conveniences of ethnic services and products. The declining influx of immigrants may also facilitate the transition of enclave communities into “symbolic” communities. As barriers to residential mobility have declined and the numbers of new immigrants are diminishing, the settlement of Japanese Americans is marked by a high degree of spatial assimilation and suburbanization. As a result, traditional enclaves such as Japantown in San Francisco and Little Tokyo in Los Angeles have evolved into a symbolic community serving as cultural centers and home to a largely elderly population.

To provide a better understanding of APA enclaves, we focus on four metropolitan areas—Los Angeles, San Francisco, Oakland, and New York, which contain the largest numbers of APAs outside of Hawaii. We define an enclave as neighborhoods (zip code areas) with a significant number of APAs rather than restricting the definition to only those neighborhoods with a dominant or majority APA population. This approach, moreover, allows us to capture neighborhoods that are undergoing an initial stage of ethnic transition, and neighborhoods that have a
significant APA influence. The definition for an enclave is not standardized across the four metropolitan areas but rather was constructed to reflect the relative share of APAs in the total metropolitan population. In other words, since APAs comprise 21 percent of San Francisco's population, the definition of a highly concentrated APA neighborhood (i.e., an enclave) is an area with 41 percent or more APAs compared to 16 percent or more for New York, where APAs constitute only 7 percent of the region's total population. This classification takes into consideration the specific demographic context of each metropolitan area, and allows us to compare the neighborhood qualities of enclaves, and contrast high and low APA concentrated neighborhoods with respect to such social indicators as poverty level, homeownership, linguistic isolation, and proportion foreign-born. Based on our definition, we find that enclaves continue to be important residential communities as approximately one-third of the APA population in New York (34 percent), Los Angeles (38 percent), and San Francisco (38 percent) resides in a high concentration APA neighborhood (Table 8; see appendix). In comparison, only one in five APAs (21 percent) in Oakland similarly reside in an enclave neighborhood.

Enclave neighborhoods are especially important in facilitating the socioeconomic incorporation of immigrants faced with language and skill barriers (Portes 1995; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). The concentration of linguistically isolated and poor APAs affirms this central function of enclave neighborhoods. Moreover, it is consistent with the demography of enclave communities that a larger share of the foreign-born reside in concentrated neighborhoods relative to other neighborhood types, with only a small share of homeownership indicating a concentration of rental housing and a denser environment.

The enclaves in the four metropolitan areas are diverse to the degree that their generalization as insular and ghetto-like is no longer the sole definition of enclave neighborhoods. In our four metropolitan areas,
the neighborhoods with the highest concentration of APAs are the Chinatowns with the Chinese being the dominant ethnic group (Tables 9 and 10; see appendix). These Chinatowns have high rates of poverty and linguistic isolation as well as minimal levels of APA homeownership. Asian enclaves also include other ethnic-specific neighborhoods such as Koreatown and Filipinotown in downtown Los Angeles, a Southeast Asian enclave in Long Beach, CA and Filipino enclaves in Oakland’s Hercules and Union City, and Daly City in the San Francisco area. Other enclave neighborhoods are multiethnic, that is, pan-Asian in demographic composition. Finally, Asian enclaves are also located in suburban settings with several which are quite affluent indicated by high levels of median household income and APA homeownership.

New York has eight neighborhoods with relatively high concentrations of APAs, including Manhattan Chinatown and the Queens neighborhoods of Flushing, Elmhurst, Woodside, Sunnyside, and Jackson Heights. Unlike historic Manhattan Chinatown, which is ethnically homogenous with the Chinese comprising 95 percent of the APA population, Asian enclaves in Queens reflect the ethnic diversity of post-1965 immigration. For example, Koreans comprise approximately one-third of the APAs who reside in Flushing, Woodside, and Sunnyside. South Asians are also prominent in Queens and comprise the largest APA ethnic group in Jackson Heights. In addition to Asian enclaves in Queens and Manhattan, concentrated APA neighborhoods are emerging in Brooklyn with the largest in Sunset Park. Since Chinese residents comprise more than three-quarters of the APA population in Sunset Park, its designation as New York’s third “satellite” Chinatown seems apt (Oser 1996; Aloff 1997; Matthews 1997). While the rates of poverty and linguistic isolation of APAs residing in enclave neighborhoods outside Manhattan Chinatown indicate a less impoverished condition, the differences in our socioeconomic indicators are not so great suggesting that generally, APAs in New York who reside in concentrated
neighborhoods, i.e., enclaves, are generally of more modest means.

In contrast to New York, Asian enclaves in Los Angeles encompass a broader socioeconomic profile as well as location. Los Angeles is distinguished by the growth of suburban enclaves (Li 1999). In addition to the cluster of enclaves around downtown Los Angeles—Chinatown, Koreatown, and Filipinotown—enclaves have been established throughout the region, including the San Gabriel Valley, the South Bay, and the "eastern county district."

In the San Gabriel Valley, Monterey Park has been referred to as a "suburban" Chinatown (Fong 1994), and more recently, as an "ethnoburb" (Li 1999). Monterey Park is the only U.S. city outside of Hawaii with an APA majority population and its social, economic and political transformation is the focus of much recent scholarship (Horton 1995, Saito 1999, Fong 1994, Li 1999). More than one-half of Monterey Park’s population is APA with close to two-thirds who are Chinese. The surrounding cities of Alhambra and San Gabriel also have large APA populations of which the Chinese comprise the largest ethnic group followed by Japanese and Southeast Asians. In contrast to the downtown enclaves, Koreans have a minimal presence in the San Gabriel Valley. The Alhambra and San Gabriel enclaves comprised largely of Chinese and Southeast Asians are distinguished by high rates of poverty and linguistic isolation comparable to Los Angeles’ downtown enclaves.

The dominant ethnic group in the South Bay enclaves is Japanese followed by Filipinos, and Koreans. This cluster of concentrated APA neighborhoods includes the historic enclave communities of Gardena, Torrance, and Carson. They are distinguished by low levels of APA poverty and linguistic isolation, and high rates of APA homeownership. Additionally, the South Bay enclaves includes two in the Long Beach area—one is largely comprised of Filipinos and exhibits similar qualities to South Bay enclaves, while the second is an
Southeast Asian enclave and has a poverty rate of 44 percent indicating an extreme level of economic impoverishment.

The southeast cities of Diamond Bar, Walnut, Rowland Heights, and Hacienda Heights and neighboring Cerritos and West Covina represent fairly wealthy Asian enclaves as indicated by the low levels of APA poverty, high median household incomes, and APA homeownership. Half of these enclaves are also distinguished by its multiethnic composition—no one APA ethnic group is a majority. Rosemead, however, stands out among the southeast cities with poverty and linguistic isolation levels comparable to Asian enclaves in downtown Los Angeles and Alhambra in the San Gabriel Valley. It is also notable that the APA population in Rosemead is largely comprised of Chinese and Southeast Asians and displays the same correlation between high levels of economic impoverishment and the concentration of Chinese and South Asians as other enclaves throughout Los Angeles County. Finally, Cerritos and West Covina are noteworthy since APAs comprise 39 percent and 29 percent of the total population, respectively. Filipinos make up over one-half of West Covina’s APA population while Cerritos is multiethnic, and both share the socioeconomic qualities of fairly affluent Asian enclaves in the southeast section of Los Angeles County.

The areas in the Oakland metropolitan area with a high concentration of APAs are in the cities of Hercules, Fremont, Union City, Oakland, and Berkeley. Hercules and Union City represent Filipino enclaves and some community leaders speculate that if Filipino Americans continue their rate of growth, these enclaves will soon replace San Francisco’s Daly City as the hub of the Filipino American population in the Bay Area (Wong 1995). The APA population in Fremont is multiethnic comprised of sizable shares of Chinese, Filipino, and a South Asians. Common to these three enclaves are low rates of APA linguistic isolation and poverty. These indicators are further reinforced by high median household incomes and APA homeownership rates. In contrast, the
enclaves in Oakland and Berkeley are characterized by socioeconomic hardship. Located in the northern section of Alameda County, the APA population in these enclaves is largely Chinese. Approximately one-third of the APA population in the Oakland enclave is Southeast Asian and is also distinguished by a high rate of poverty and linguistic isolation. In addition to Chinese, Koreans also make up a sizable share of the APA population in Berkeley's highly concentrated APA neighborhood where linguistic isolation is low but the APA poverty is among the highest at 34 percent.

Of the four metropolitan areas in our study, the San Francisco area clearly stands out with the most numerous densely concentrated APA neighborhoods. APAs constitute the majority racial group in seven San Francisco areas. In addition to Chinatown, enclaves are found in the neighborhoods of Sunset, Richmond, and North Beach. With the exception of Daly City, which is referred to as "Little Manila," densely concentrated APA neighborhoods are overwhelmingly Chinese with Filipinos as the second largest ethnic group. Among these neighborhoods, linguistic isolation is correlated with high poverty and is common in the central city enclaves of Chinatown and North Beach.

The profiles show there are important variations in the ethnic composition and socioeconomic characteristics among APA enclaves. They are no longer necessarily poor homogenous communities. Although many are impoverished communities—in particular, Chinese and Southeast Asian enclaves—there are notable examples of affluent and multiethnic enclave neighborhoods. We further examine this bifurcated pattern of neighborhoods by examining in-migration into enclave neighborhoods, focusing on immigrants in the 1992-1996 INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) data set. During this period, Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, and Oakland remained key ports of entry. Overall, New York's historic position as an immigrant capital is affirmed in the 1990s as it received the largest number of new immigrants followed by Los Angeles (Table II; see appendix). Although San Francisco and
Oakland received more modest numbers, more than one in two newcomers during this period are from Asian countries. In fact, Asian countries were among four of the top five sending countries to San Francisco and Oakland. Immigration to New York and Los Angeles is significantly more diverse as APAs constitute approximately one-quarter (23 percent) to one-third (35 percent) respectively, of new immigrants.

While the Chinese comprised the largest ethnic group among APA newcomers to our four metropolitan areas during the 1990s, Asian immigration is, nevertheless, quite diverse. Asian immigration to Los Angeles includes sizable shares of Filipinos, Koreans, and Southeast Asians. Asian immigration to Oakland is similarly ethnically diverse, while in New York South Asians comprise the second largest ethnic group after the Chinese. San Francisco stands apart in that Asian immigration is largely comprised of Chinese and Filipinos. There are notable regional patterns with respect to the national origins of Chinese immigrants suggesting important differences in social background and resources. More than one-third (35 percent) of Chinese immigrants to Los Angeles are Taiwanese and 14 percent are from Hong Kong. Chinese immigration to New York, on the other hand, is dominated by immigrants from the People's Republic of China with less than one-fifth (17 percent) from Taiwan or Hong Kong.

Based on our three level categorization of APA concentrated neighborhoods, we find that overall, new immigrants are only slightly more likely to settle in a highly concentrated APA neighborhood relative to a moderate or low APA concentration neighborhood (Table 12; see appendix). New APA immigrants to Oakland are least likely to settle in an enclave neighborhood. On the other hand, 40 percent of new APA immigrants to Los Angeles settled in a highly concentrated APA neighborhood which may be an outcome of the multiple and diverse clusters of APA communities in the Los Angeles-Long Beach PMSA. Comparable shares of new APA immigrants to New York (36 percent)
and San Francisco (38 percent) settled in a highly concentrated APA community.

"Chain" migratory patterns to well-established ethnic enclave neighborhoods continue to influence immigrant settlement patterns, particularly those of historic immigrant groups such as the Chinese. A comparison of the settlement patterns of new immigrants during the 1990s indicates that those ethnic groups with a sizable presence in highly concentrated APA neighborhoods also receive a large share of new co-ethnic immigrants (Table 12). Well over one in two Chinese immigrants to Los Angeles settled in a highly concentrated APA neighborhood. A similar finding applies to New York and San Francisco where close to one-half of Chinese immigrants settled in an Asian enclave neighborhood. The centrality of historic and satellite Chinatowns in Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco is especially notable in the settlement patterns of new Chinese immigrants.

There are notable regional variations in settlement patterns among APA immigrants in our four metropolitan areas which may reflect historic trends in ethnicity and community formations. For example, Filipino immigrants are more likely to settle in a highly concentrated APA neighborhood if their destination is Los Angeles, San Francisco, or Oakland rather than New York, which does not have a historic Filipinotown or contemporary residential concentration of Filipinos. In fact, close to 60 percent of Filipino immigrants to New York settled in a low concentrated APA neighborhood. Japanese immigrants are also more likely to settle in a highly concentrated APA neighborhood if their destination is Los Angeles or San Francisco where historic Japanese enclaves continue to thrive. While Southeast Asians comprise 15 percent of APA immigrants to Los Angeles and Oakland, more than two-fifths of Southeast Asians settling in Los Angeles will reside in an Asian enclave compared to a significantly smaller share of Southeast Asians who settle in a concentrated APA neighborhood in Oakland. This regional
difference may be accounted for by the notable presence of a large Southeast Asian enclave in Long Beach. The residential patterns of Korean immigrants also affirm the importance of existing enclave neighborhoods in shaping the settlement patterns of new immigrants. Similar to the Chinese in New York, the 1990 Census finds that Koreans also tend to reside in highly concentrated APA neighborhoods. Subsequently, close to one-half of new Korean immigrants to New York settled in an Asian enclave neighborhood. Interestingly, South Asians are the least likely ethnic group to settle in a concentrated APA neighborhood across all four metropolitan areas.

Finally, the literature also proposes that ethnic enclaves are the destination of low-skill immigrants most in need of the informal networks and resources of ethnic-based institutions, while newcomers with greater human and financial capital settle where APAs are fewer but homeownership and quality of neighborhood life are much improved. By looking at the data on occupational status prior to migration to the United States, we note a difference among the various occupational categories in the propensity to settle in highly concentrated APA neighborhood (Table 13; see appendix). Overall, approximately one in two (48 percent) APA immigrants who held a laborer or farm, forestry, and fishing related occupation settled in an Asian enclave, compared to 29 percent of those who held a professional, executive or managerial position. Even in Oakland where the majority of new APA immigrants settle in moderate or low concentrated APA neighborhoods, those who were employed in low-skill jobs were more likely to settle in a high concentrated APA neighborhood. In New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, immigrants who held low-skill employment as farmers or laborers were significantly more likely to settle in a highly concentrated APA neighborhood compared to their professional counterparts. A notable exception in this bifurcated pattern is Los Angeles where 42 percent of new immigrants who held professional positions settled in a highly
concentrated APA neighborhood. The establishment of affluent Asian enclaves in Los Angeles may explain why professionals, executives, and managers are just as likely as those with low-skill occupations to settle in a highly concentrated APA neighborhood although they are unlikely to be settling in the same enclaves.

Conclusion

Our study on APA residential patterns is cause for both optimism and caution. The post-WWII trend towards residential integration is a key spatial trajectory of APAs. Their spatial assimilation is evident in the relatively low segregation measures in a majority of U.S. metropolitan areas. The high tolerance for APA neighbors among non-Hispanic whites suggests continued movement towards assimilation. The influx of new immigrants has transformed the local landscape of many communities across the nation. Their residential incorporation has served as a catalyst in revitalizing central city neighborhoods including revitalizing historic enclaves, establishing new ethnic concentrations, and diversifying suburban neighborhoods. Increasingly, multiracial and multiethnic neighborhoods are becoming an integral part of the social fabric of major metropolitan areas (Nyden, Lukehart, Maly, Peterman 1998). The continuing influx of new immigrants to moderate and low concentration APA neighborhoods will certainly further this trend towards a diverse urban demography.

An area of concern, however, is that the resulting sociodemographic transitions in the housing and economic marketplace of local neighborhoods have not always brought welcome reactions. Where APAs constitute a numerical minority such that they pose no visible impacts on neighborhood change, their presence typically does not generate much reaction; however with a growing critical mass, long-time residents resent the "Asianization" of their neighborhood, and racial...
conflicts often bearing anti-immigrant tones become more overt and frequent (Smith 1992). Moreover, as neighborhoods are increasingly ethnically and racially diverse, conflict often erupts between minority groups (Johnson and Oliver 1989). In our four case study metropolitan areas, the influx of APAs in neighborhoods has generated conflict centered on the “externalities” of economic growth such as traffic congestion and commercial signage, and increasing interracial competition for housing and public education.

A second area of concern is the growing disparity in APA neighborhood and housing conditions. Our profile suggests a broad range in the residential conditions of APAs as indicated by the varying levels of poverty, linguistic isolation, median household incomes, and homeownership rates. The socioeconomic bifurcation of APAs is evident in the residential patterns profiled in this chapter which indicates both the prevalence of affluent suburban communities and central city immigrant enclaves characterized by housing density and substandard conditions (Schill, Friedman, Rosenbaum 1998). Moreover, the significance of these spatial disparities pertains not only to daily-lived conditions, but also addresses the long-term effects of neighborhood structures, institutions, and networks in mediating opportunities for economic and residential mobility (Galster, Metzger, Waite 1999). Hence, while the residential patterns of APAs indicate a high level of spatial assimilation, the continuing influx of new immigrants underscores the need for renewed policy and programmatic strategies and resources to address persistent disparities in community formations and housing conditions.
Endnotes

1 Although this period represents significant efforts to remedy institutionalized discrimination in the housing market, attitudinal changes and practices were much slower to change. For example, Acting Assistant Attorney General Bill Lann Lee often retells the story of his father returning to New York City as a WWII veteran and experiencing difficulty in renting an apartment due to racial discrimination (Lee 1999).

2 MCSUI is a large, multifaceted research project designed to explore inequality in the metropolitan areas of Detroit, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and Boston and asks respondents about their general perceptions of various neighborhoods, their personal preferences, and evaluation of the desirability of neighborhoods based on the racial composition of neighbors.

3 A dissimilarity index measures “the proportion of minority members that would have to change their area of residence to achieve an even distribution, with the number of minority members moving being expressed as a portion of the number that would have to move under conditions of maximum segregation” (Massey and Denton 1988, 284). The dissimilarity index ranges from 0.0 indicating that no minorities would have to move to 1.0 indicating maximum segregation, i.e., that all minorities would have to move.

4 A provision which exempted Chinese wives of U.S. citizens from this annual quota of 105 was passed three years later (Hing 1993).

5 In 1996, over one-third (36 percent) of all new immigrants to the U.S. came from an Asian country.

6 The Refugee Act of 1980 created the Office of Refugee Resettlement in the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to resettle and assist refugees achieve self-sufficiency. Based on partnerships with state and local governments, the guideline for resettlement states that “a refugee is not initially placed or resettled in an area highly impacted (as determined under regulations prescribed the Director after consultation with (state and local) agencies and governments) by the presence of refugees or comparable populations unless the refugee has a spouse, parent, sibling, son or daughter residing in that area.”

7 Honolulu was excluded from the list.

8 South Asians are defined as Asian Indians, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, and Bangladeshis.

9 It is important to note that for some metropolitan areas, the dissimilarity index for APAs may be inflated due to random effects stemming from the small number of APAs relative to the number of tracts, particularly in large metropolitan areas such as Detroit, Boston, and Dallas.

10 Over the past two decades, the average segregation scores of African Americans have

Residential Patterns of Asian Pacific Americans (219)
declined from 0.78 in 1970 to 0.68 in 1990. Declines in Black residential segregation are consistent with other trends emanating from the civil rights movement including the growth of the Black middle class, changes in racial attitudes, and an increase in Black suburbanization. African Americans, however, continue to be the most spatially isolated of the three minority groups.

11 Past studies on residential proximity to whites generally offer support for the assimilation model, with the exception of black patterns. As a matter of fact, while residential outcomes are positively related to socioeconomic status for APAs and Latinos, the relationship between social mobility and residential integration is weaker for blacks and Puerto Ricans, suggesting that some external factors—such as discrimination in the housing market—may be impeding the spatial assimilation process for these groups (Alba and Logan 1993; Gross and Massey 1991; Massey and Denton, 1985.)

12 Note, however, that APAs consist of many distinct groups that differ in socioeconomic characteristics.

13 There were a total of 8,916 respondents, of whom 2,965 were white, and 3,167 were black. Data for Latinos and APAs were collected only in two of the cities in the MCSUI - Los Angeles and Boston. In such cities, 1,695 of the respondents were Latino, and 1,089 were APA of Korean, Japanese, or Chinese descent.

14 APA respondents were asked to imagine that they have been looking for a house and have found a nice one that they can afford. They were told that the house could be located in several different types of neighborhoods, and shown a series of five cards. Each card depicts 15 houses with varying degrees of integration with either whites, blacks and Latinos. The respondent's home is represented by the house in the middle of the card.

15 A majority white neighborhood is defined here as 87 percent white.

16 South Asian economic centers have also formed in Flushing, New York, and in the cities of Edison and Iselin in New Jersey (Sheth 1995). In Pacific Palisades, New Jersey, community residents have responded negatively to the agglomeration of Korean shops and have amended their city ordinances to require that stores close at 9 p.m. setting off a protest among Korean Americans (New York Times, 24 November 1999).


18 Chinatown No More is the title of a 1992 book on Flushing, Queens by Hsiang-shui Chen.

19 The percentage of APAs in the total PMSA population served as the cutoff for the low concentration category. For example, the low concentration category for New York
is 0-7 percent, Los Angeles is 0-11 percent, San Francisco is 0-21 percent and Oakland is 0-13 percent. The bottom range of the high concentration category is approximately twice the APA population percentage while the moderate concentration category captured the range between the low and high concentration categories.

20 New York City is comprised of five boroughs or counties-Bronx, New York (Manhattan), Queens, Kings (Brooklyn), and Richmond (Staten Island). The New York PMSA includes the five counties of New York City in addition to the surrounding suburban counties of Westchester, Putnam, and Rockland.

21 See a recent article on Woodside, Queens, "From a Babel of Tongues, a Neighborhood," (New York Times, 26 December 1999).

22 Highly concentrated APA zip codes in Oakland are defined as comprising 26 percent APAs or more.

23 Highly concentrated APA zip codes in Los Angeles are defined as comprising 23 percent APAs or more.

24 Approximately 30 percent of new Asian immigrants who settled in a high concentrated APA neighborhood and had previously worked as a laborer or farm worker settled in a downtown LA enclave (defined as zip codes 90004, 90005, 90012, 90014, 90020, 90026, 90031) compared to 11 percent of those who had held a professional, managerial or executive position prior to migration.
Appendix
Table 1. Distribution of Asian Pacific American Population in 30 U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1970-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA</th>
<th>1970 Total</th>
<th>1980 Total</th>
<th>1990 Total</th>
<th>Percentage Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>APA %</td>
<td>Population</td>
<td>APA %</td>
<td>Population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaheim-Santa Ana, CA PMSA</td>
<td>1,420,386</td>
<td>24,545</td>
<td>1,952,709</td>
<td>86,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergen-Passaic, NJ PMSA</td>
<td>1,068,687</td>
<td>6,621</td>
<td>1,292,970</td>
<td>25,125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston, MA PMSA</td>
<td>2,753,700</td>
<td>21,792</td>
<td>2,763,357</td>
<td>37,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago, IL PMSA</td>
<td>6,978,947</td>
<td>66,662</td>
<td>7,103,624</td>
<td>141,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas, TX PMSA</td>
<td>1,555,950</td>
<td>7,278</td>
<td>2,974,805</td>
<td>24,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston, TX PMSA</td>
<td>1,985,031</td>
<td>11,949</td>
<td>2,905,333</td>
<td>51,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey City, NJ PMSA</td>
<td>608,894</td>
<td>5,805</td>
<td>556,972</td>
<td>16,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York, NY PMSA</td>
<td>8,777,683</td>
<td>173,437</td>
<td>8,247,961</td>
<td>267,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland, CA PMSA</td>
<td>1,495,500</td>
<td>59,247</td>
<td>1,761,759</td>
<td>120,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia, PA-NJ PMSA</td>
<td>4,817,914</td>
<td>25,099</td>
<td>4,716,818</td>
<td>45,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside-San Bernardino, CA PMSA</td>
<td>1,143,146</td>
<td>17,288</td>
<td>1,559,182</td>
<td>24,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento, CA MSA</td>
<td>800,592</td>
<td>30,910</td>
<td>1,014,002</td>
<td>45,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego, CA MSA</td>
<td>1,357,854</td>
<td>38,145</td>
<td>1,861,846</td>
<td>89,861</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco, CA PMSA</td>
<td>1,416,474</td>
<td>127,501</td>
<td>1,488,871</td>
<td>215,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose, CA PMSA</td>
<td>1,064,714</td>
<td>38,678</td>
<td>1,295,071</td>
<td>99,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle, WA PMSA</td>
<td>1,421,869</td>
<td>33,785</td>
<td>1,607,469</td>
<td>63,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, DC-MD-VA MSA</td>
<td>2,861,123</td>
<td>29,175</td>
<td>3,060,922</td>
<td>82,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockton, CA MSA</td>
<td>249,081</td>
<td>8,832</td>
<td>347,342</td>
<td>19,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit, MI PMSA</td>
<td>4,199,931</td>
<td>17,445</td>
<td>4,353,413</td>
<td>33,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresno, CA MSA</td>
<td>413,053</td>
<td>17,944</td>
<td>514,621</td>
<td>14,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex-Somerset-Hunterdon, NJ PMSA</td>
<td>574,528</td>
<td>2,684</td>
<td>886,383</td>
<td>16,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark, NJ PMSA</td>
<td>1,855,230</td>
<td>13,193</td>
<td>1,762,840</td>
<td>24,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta, GA MSA</td>
<td>1,390,164</td>
<td>2,496</td>
<td>2,029,710</td>
<td>11,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa, CA</td>
<td>249,081</td>
<td>8,832</td>
<td>334,402</td>
<td>20,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland, OR PMSA</td>
<td>1,009,129</td>
<td>10,977</td>
<td>1,242,594</td>
<td>23,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore, MD MSA</td>
<td>2,070,670</td>
<td>8,798</td>
<td>2,174,023</td>
<td>21,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver, CO PMSA</td>
<td>1,227,529</td>
<td>12,425</td>
<td>1,620,902</td>
<td>20,483</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. Residential Dissimilarity of Asian Pacific Americans, Blacks, and Latinos from Whites in the 30 U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1970-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MSA</th>
<th>APA</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>APA</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>APA</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>% Pop. Change 70-80</th>
<th>80-90</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anaheim-Santa Ana</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergen-Passaic</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jersey City</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles-Long Beach</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minneapolis-St. Paul</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nassau-Suffolk</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riverside-San Bernardo</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramento</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Jose</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stockton</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fresno</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex-Som.-Hunt.</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.79</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portland</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denver</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by authors from U.S. Census data
### Table 3. Metropolitan Areas Presenting Major Variations in Dissimilarity Indexes of Asian Pacific Americans, 1970-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biggest Increase</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa</td>
<td>Fresno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.13)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>Stockton</td>
<td>Stockton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biggest Decrease</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1</td>
<td>Newark</td>
<td>Boston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.12)</td>
<td>(-.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Nassau-Suffolk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-.098)</td>
<td>(-.03)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by authors from U.S. Census data
### Table 4. Percentage Distribution of Asian Pacific Americans by Ethnicity and Segregation Measures in Study Areas, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Los Angeles PMSA</th>
<th>San Francisco PMSA</th>
<th>Oakland PMSA</th>
<th>New York PMSA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total APA</td>
<td>955,329</td>
<td>329,499</td>
<td>270,136</td>
<td>553,987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Indian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hmong</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laotian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islander</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissimilarity Index</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exposure Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentration Index</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delta</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Absolute</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>0.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by authors from U.S. Census data
Table 5. Attractiveness of Neighborhoods with Varying Degrees of Integration with Whites, Blacks, and Latinos, Asian Pacific American Respondents (N=1,067)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If remainder of neighbors are:</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.7% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>1,067</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1993-1994 Multi-City Survey on Urban Inequality
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Remainder of Neighbors</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.7% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0% APA Neighborhood</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1993-1994 Multi-City Survey on Urban Inequality
Table 7. Willingness to Move into Neighborhoods with Varying Degrees of Integration with Blacks, Latinos, and Asians, White Respondents (N=2,705)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If remainder of neighbors are:</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Latinos</th>
<th>APAs</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100% White Neighborhood</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67% White Neighborhood</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.7% White Neighborhood</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13% White Neighborhood</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0% White Neighborhood</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,727</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>2,705</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1993-1994 Multi-City Survey on Urban Inequality
**Table 8. Distribution of Asian Pacific American Population by Neighborhood Concentrations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Los Angeles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>957,788</td>
<td>250,123</td>
<td>422,637</td>
<td>124,836</td>
<td>2,906,407</td>
<td>1,463,315</td>
<td>136,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High [23% and up]</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate [12-22%]</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low [0 - 11%]</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>San Francisco</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>330,820</td>
<td>88,187</td>
<td>153,859</td>
<td>33,628</td>
<td>442,718</td>
<td>312,236</td>
<td>49,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High [41% and up]</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate [22-40%]</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low [0 - 21%]</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oakland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>270,136</td>
<td>54,546</td>
<td>110,925</td>
<td>29,240</td>
<td>337,435</td>
<td>458,376</td>
<td>42,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High [26% and up]</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate [14-25%]</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low [0 - 13%]</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>553,693</td>
<td>171,391</td>
<td>207,940</td>
<td>83,611</td>
<td>2,285,295</td>
<td>1,082,791</td>
<td>140,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High [16% and up]</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate [8-15%]</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low [0 - 7%]</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census 1990
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percent APA</th>
<th>Top Two Asian Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>APA Poverty Rate</th>
<th>Linguistic Isolation</th>
<th>Median HH Income</th>
<th>APA Homeownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>San Francisco</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94108 Chinatown</td>
<td>14,230</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>Chinese (88%)</td>
<td>SE Asian/Filipino (4%)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>$21,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94133 North Beach</td>
<td>27,331</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>Chinese (93%)</td>
<td>Filipino (2%)</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>$28,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94121 Outer Richmond</td>
<td>40,559</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>Chinese (70%)</td>
<td>Japanese (9%)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>$36,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94015 Daly City</td>
<td>57,539</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>Filipino (58%)</td>
<td>Chinese (27%)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>$43,557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94116 Parkside</td>
<td>39,424</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>Chinese (76%)</td>
<td>Filipino (9%)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>$42,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94134 San Francisco</td>
<td>34,603</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>Chinese (55%)</td>
<td>Filipino (36%)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>$32,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94122 Outer Sunset</td>
<td>52,828</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>Chinese (74%)</td>
<td>Filipino (10%)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>$36,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oakland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94547 Hercules</td>
<td>16,502</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>Filipino (60%)</td>
<td>Chinese (26%)</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>$55,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94555 Fremont</td>
<td>29,312</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>Filipino (36%)</td>
<td>Chinese (32%)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>$58,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94506 Oakland</td>
<td>38,497</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>Chinese (56%)</td>
<td>Southeast Asian (31%)</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>$22,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94587 Union City</td>
<td>52,881</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>Filipino (55%)</td>
<td>Chinese (16%)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>$47,245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94704 Berkeley</td>
<td>23,487</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Chinese (48%)</td>
<td>Korean (12%)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>$17,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manhattan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10013 Chinatown-Tribeca</td>
<td>22,115</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>Chinese (96%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>$28,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10002 Chinatown-Lower East Side</td>
<td>84,206</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>Chinese (96%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>$17,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10038 Chinatown-South St.Seaport</td>
<td>13,815</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>Chinese (97%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>$22,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10012 Soho-Chinatown</td>
<td>25,801</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Chinese (85%)</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>$32,649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Queens</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11355 Flushing</td>
<td>69,756</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>Chinese (43%)</td>
<td>Korean (28%)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>$30,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11354 Flushing</td>
<td>51,513</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Korean (47%)</td>
<td>Chinese (37%)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>$30,146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11373 Elmhurst</td>
<td>88,039</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>Chinese (36%)</td>
<td>Korean (27%)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>$31,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11377 Woodside</td>
<td>76,519</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Korean (31%)</td>
<td>Chinese (29%)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>$29,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11104 Sunnyside</td>
<td>26,059</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>Korean (40%)</td>
<td>Chinese (27%)</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>$27,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11432 Jackson Heights</td>
<td>33,127</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Asian Indian (37%)</td>
<td>Filipino (26%)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>$35,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11364 Oakland Gardens</td>
<td>32,093</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>Chinese (44%)</td>
<td>Korean (36%)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>$45,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Brooklyn</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11220 Sunset Park</td>
<td>76,875</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Chinese (76%)</td>
<td>South Asian (9%)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>$25,244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: U.S. Census 1990*
### Table 10. Characteristics of Asian Enclaves in Los Angeles County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Los Angeles County</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percent APAs</th>
<th>Top Two Asian Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>APA Poverty Rate</th>
<th>Linguistic Isolation</th>
<th>Median HH Income</th>
<th>APA Homeownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Los Angeles</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90020</td>
<td>35,016</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Korean (61%) Filipino (22%)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>$21,666</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90012</td>
<td>28,487</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>Chinese (74%) Southeast Asian (14%)</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>$16,334</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90031</td>
<td>40,111</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Chinese (79%) Southeast Asian (13%)</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>$22,439</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90004</td>
<td>61,141</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Korean (48%) Filipino (34%)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>$24,009</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90005</td>
<td>35,606</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>Korean (68%) Filipino (15%)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>$18,724</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90026</td>
<td>75,214</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Filipino (46%) Chinese (23%)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>$24,997</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90014</td>
<td>2,825</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Korean (69%) Chinese (15%)</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>$7,076</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Bay/Long Beach</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90247 Gardena</td>
<td>41,923</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>Japanese (56%) Korean (18%)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>$31,863</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90248 Gardena</td>
<td>9,624</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>Japanese (73%) Korean (10%)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>$39,063</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90745 Carson</td>
<td>50,116</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>Filipino (67%) Korean (6%)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>$41,916</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90504 Torrance</td>
<td>30,278</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>Japanese (54%) Chinese (15%)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>$45,811</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90503 Torrance</td>
<td>40,330</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Japanese (37%) Korean (25%)</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>$47,559</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90810 Long Beach</td>
<td>36,713</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>Filipino (70%) Southeast Asian (9%)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>$30,625</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90813 Long Beach</td>
<td>58,022</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Southeast Asian (80%) Filipino (7%)</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>$18,110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>San Gabriel Valley</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91754 Monterey Park</td>
<td>62,201</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>Chinese (63%) Japanese (17%)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>$32,508</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91801 Alhambra</td>
<td>51,003</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>Chinese (70%) Southeast Asian (10%)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>$30,753</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91803 Alhambra</td>
<td>30,572</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>Chinese (66%) Southeast Asian (14%)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>$32,343</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91776 San Gabriel</td>
<td>34,957</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>Chinese (66%) Southeast Asian (14%)</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>$29,909</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91775 San Gabriel</td>
<td>21,299</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Chinese (52%) Japanese (22%)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>$45,068</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast Cities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91789 Walnut</td>
<td>42,339</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>Chinese (32%) Filipino (30%)</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>$61,686</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91770 Rosemead</td>
<td>39,961</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>Chinese (58%) Southeast Asian (22%)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>$30,560</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91748 Rowland Heights</td>
<td>40,645</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>Chinese (38%) Filipino (25%)</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>$45,635</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91745 Hacienda Height</td>
<td>51,987</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Chinese (58%) Korean (14%)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>$51,604</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91765 Diamond Bar</td>
<td>42,027</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Chinese (29%) Filipino (22%)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>$59,544</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91108 San Marino</td>
<td>13,067</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>Chinese (79%) Japanese (11%)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>$100,536</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91007 Arcadia</td>
<td>5,745</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>Chinese (65%) Korean (14%)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>$42,144</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90701 Cerritos</td>
<td>69,153</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>Filipino (28%) Chinese/Korean (22%)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>$53,761</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91792 West Covina</td>
<td>30,450</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>Filipino (51%) Chinese (26%)</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>$46,138</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Census 1990
**Table 11. New Immigration to the Four Study Areas, 1992-1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of Birth</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
<th>San Francisco</th>
<th>Oakland</th>
<th>New York</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total New Immigrants</td>
<td>384,603</td>
<td>91,382</td>
<td>70,976</td>
<td>613,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islands</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Top Five Sending Countries**

- **Mexico** (20%)
- **People's Rep. Of China** (18%)
- **Philippines** (18%)
- **Dominican Republic** (19%)
- **People's Rep. Of China** (9%)

- **Philippines** (10%)
- **El Salvador** (9%)
- **People's Rep. Of China** (5%)
- **Iran** (5%)
- **Hong Kong** (6%)
- **Ukraine** (5%)
- **Vietnam** (5%)
- **Vietnam** (8%)
- **India** (8%)
- **Jamaica** (5%)
- **Guyana** (5%)
- **Ecuador** (3%)

*Source: INS 1992-1996*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>San Francisco</th>
<th>Oakland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High Moderate Low Total</td>
<td>High Moderate Low Total</td>
<td>High Moderate Low Total</td>
<td>High Moderate Low Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chinese</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Population</td>
<td>53% 28% 20% 249366 [26%]</td>
<td>43% 30% 27% 248949 [45%]</td>
<td>48% 27% 24% 168509 [51%]</td>
<td>21% 44% 35% 90703 [34%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Immigrants</td>
<td>56% 28% 17% 40492 [30%]</td>
<td>49% 25% 26% 63129 [45%]</td>
<td>48% 28% 25% 23589 [48%]</td>
<td>18% 48% 34% 13522 [32%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Filipino</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Population</td>
<td>31% 34% 34% 223815 [23%]</td>
<td>25% 27% 48% 51332 [9%]</td>
<td>30% 43% 27% 86444 [26%]</td>
<td>25% 39% 35% 79048 [29%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Immigrants</td>
<td>30% 35% 35% 37084 [27%]</td>
<td>18% 24% 58% 18323 [13%]</td>
<td>30% 46% 25% 14670 [30%]</td>
<td>22% 42% 36% 12475 [29%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japanese</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Population</td>
<td>33% 33% 34% 132682 [14%]</td>
<td>32% 59% 27461 [5%]</td>
<td>19% 20% 62% 24048 [7%]</td>
<td>9% 38% 52% 22341 [8%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Immigrants</td>
<td>28% 33% 39% 4912 [4%]</td>
<td>6% 25% 68% 3691 [3%]</td>
<td>18% 24% 58% 1271 [3%]</td>
<td>8% 29% 64% 664 [2%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Korean</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Population</td>
<td>36% 36% 28% 143377 [15%]</td>
<td>46% 25% 29% 76029 [14%]</td>
<td>30% 29% 41% 10502 [3%]</td>
<td>15% 41% 44% 13742 [5%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Immigrants</td>
<td>37% 35% 28% 15100 [19%]</td>
<td>47% 24% 29% 7959 [6%]</td>
<td>24% 30% 46% 877 [2%]</td>
<td>14% 36% 51% 1036 [2%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Asian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Population</td>
<td>23% 31% 43% 42341 [48%]</td>
<td>24% 36% 39% 98951 [18%]</td>
<td>17% 24% 59% 7716 [2%]</td>
<td>23% 43% 34% 19936 [7%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Immigrants</td>
<td>20% 30% 50% 10297 [8%]</td>
<td>26% 40% 35% 40036 [29%]</td>
<td>14% 29% 57% 2189 [4%]</td>
<td>22% 41% 37% 6643 [16%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Southeast Asian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990 Population</td>
<td>39% 33% 28% 94882 [10%]</td>
<td>18% 22% 60% 12146 [28%]</td>
<td>27% 38% 35% 14781 [4%]</td>
<td>26% 41% 34% 26761 [10%]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Immigrants</td>
<td>42% 27% 31% 20619 [15%]</td>
<td>19% 26% 55% 3043 [2%]</td>
<td>24% 55% 21% 4275 [9%]</td>
<td>26% 44% 30% 6527 [15%]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by authors from U.S. Census and INS data
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
<th></th>
<th>New York</th>
<th></th>
<th>San Francisco</th>
<th></th>
<th>Oakland</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional, Executive, Managerial</td>
<td>19,680</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>13,928</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>6,535</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Professional</td>
<td>4,016</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>7,110</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1,094</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative, Clerical</td>
<td>7,040</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>5,190</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>2,569</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales/Services</td>
<td>9,028</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>12,208</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>3,523</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precision Craft</td>
<td>3,169</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>2,449</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>1,271</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm, Forest, Fishery</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>5,569</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>2,606</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>4,070</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>4,753</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2,563</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/Retired</td>
<td>29,082</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19,838</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>7,586</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: INS 1992-1996
FIGURE 1. MEDIAN HOUSEHOLD INCOME BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN: 1988 TO 1998

References


After the Civil Rights Decade." Social Science Research, 26: 235-262.

"Chocolate City, Vanilla Suburbs: Will the Trend Toward Racially
Separate Communities Continue?" Social Science Research, 7: 319-344.

Multi-Ethnic Metro Areas: Findings from the 1990 Census." PSC Research
Report No. 93-278, University of Michigan, Population Studies Center.

Fong, T.P. (1994). The First Suburban Chinatown: The Remaking of Monterey Park,

Prentice Hall, Inc.

Structures and Immigrants’ Socioeconomic Advancement." Journal of Housing
Research, 10(1): 95-127.

Ethnic Futures of the Post-1965 American Immigrants." Ethnic and Racial

Hing, B.O. (1993). Making and Remaking Asian America through Immigration Policy,


Immigration on Urban Communities." Cityscape: A Journal of Policy Development
and Research, 3(3): 171-192.

America: The Effects of Economic and Social Dislocations." Urban
Geography, 10: 449-463.


From Vincent Chin to Joseph Ileto: 
Asian Pacific Americans 
and Hate Crime Policy 

Karen Umemoto

Over the Fourth of July weekend in 1999, Benjamin Nathaniel Smith, a sympathizer of the white supremacist World Church of the Creator, began an interstate shooting rampage, killing two people and wounding eight others. His victims included an African American coach, six Orthodox Jews and several Asian Pacific Americans (APAs). One APA victim was killed. His name was Won Joon Yoon, a 26-year-old Korean doctoral student at Indiana University. At the end of the two-day rampage that began in a Chicago suburb and ended in southern Illinois, Smith took his own life.

Later that month, memorial vigils were held in Chicago, Los Angeles and elsewhere. More than 2,700 people attended the memorial service and candlelight vigil at the campus opera house in Bloomington, Indiana. At the memorial vigil in Los Angeles, one speaker poignantly asked if it must take a multiracial mass shooting to bring such a mixed audience together. This vigil was held at the First African Methodist Episcopal Church in the heart of South Central. Almost half the audience was comprised of APAs, mainly Korean Americans. The rest of the attendees were divided almost equally between African Americans and Jews, with Latinos and others also in attendance. The program began with the music of the gospel choir. It ended with a Korean prayer ceremony. The crowd of over 200 was one of the largest recent gatherings of Korean Americans, Jews and African Americans coming together in solidarity around the common cause of justice. In the backdrop of historic tensions between members of these communities, this unified demonstration of support was quite significant.

One month later, on August 10, 1999, Buford O. Furrow, Jr., an avowed white supremacist, shot and killed 39-year-old Joseph “Jojo”
Ileto, a postal carrier, following a shooting rampage at a Jewish community center in Los Angeles County's San Fernando Valley where he left five wounded. One of Ileto's sisters shared the acronym that her brother has come to represent. She explained that "Joseph" stands for: Join Our Support, Education, Prevent Hate. "Ileto" stands for: Instill Love, Equality, and Tolerance to Others. Following the tragic incident, Filipino communities across the nation from New York to Seattle organized protest rallies, vigils, and marches. They joined other APA, African American, Latino, Jewish, and other communities in statements and demonstrations against violence and hatred.

In the most hopeful scenario, these demonstrations of solidarity may be a sign of a turn in race relations, with unity overcoming instances of conflict. But will it? What are the challenges that must be overcome? And what does the issue of hate crimes portend for the future of race relations in this country? In the following sections, I will give a brief overview of hate crime policy, present data describing the nature and magnitude of the problem for APAs, discuss the challenges that hate crimes and related policy discourse pose for race relations and, finally, discuss recommendations for research, policy, and organizing. In the discussion of the implications of policy and policy discourse on race relations, I argue that the reframing of the problem from racial violence to the more specific problem of hate crime presents both challenges and opportunities for multiracial coalition building. I argue that if we are to build meaningful and effective coalitions to combat hate violence, we must reframe the issue into the broader context of racial violence, inequity, and, what Eric Yamamoto has termed "interracial justice."

The Meaning of Hate Crimes for Asian Pacific Americans

Hate crimes are the most extreme manifestation of personally felt antagonism toward a category of people. Hate incidents include any criminal act, from vandalism or threat to assault and murder, directed
against a victim based on their real or perceived group identity, such as race, religion, sexual orientation, gender or disability. While there are controversies over the definition of a hate crime, which will be discussed later, there is one undisputed fact: the impacts of hate crimes are not only felt by the victims themselves, but are felt by whole groups of people against whom the crimes were directed. APAs have long been victims of hate crimes along with racial, ethnic and religious minorities and others that have faced a history of discrimination and marginalization.

The term “hate crime” is relatively new. It became a legal term upon the passage of the first piece of hate crime legislation in 1990, the Hate Crime Statistics Act. Before this time, APA communities used the term “anti-Asian violence” to define the broader problem.

Perhaps the most significant event that crystallized the current movement against anti-Asian violence was the brutal murder of twenty-seven-year-old Vincent Chin in 1982. Chin, a Chinese American engineer, was killed by a frustrated, unemployed autoworker and his stepson, in the era of industrial downsizing and Japan-bashing. Vincent Chin was celebrating his coming marriage with friends at a topless bar in Detroit when Ronald Ebens and Michael Nitz engaged Chin and his friends in a brawl. After leaving the bar, Ebens and Nitz searched for Chin and his friends. They eventually found Chin and ran him down on the street and, with a baseball bat, bashed him in the skull. Chin died four days later. The case became a cause celebre for the APA community and launched a national campaign against anti-Asian violence, giving birth to numerous civil rights organizations that continued long after publicity about the case faded. The case and events leading up to it were documented in a moving film by Renee Tajima and Christine Choy, entitled Who Killed Vincent Chin?

But the tragedy of Vincent Chin is only one in a long history of racial violence that has marked the colonial history of the United States. Native Americans bore the brunt of racial violence during the period of
westward expansion, resulting in their genocide and forced removal. Much of this took place under government supervision. In the spring and summer of 1838, for example, more than 15,000 Cherokee were removed by the U.S. Army and held in concentration camps and later forced to travel nearly 1,000 miles in the harsh winter months. The trek left 4,000 dead along what was later called The Trail of Tears. African Americans were victims of racial violence from the time of their enslavement and long after the signing of the Emancipation Proclamation. In 1923, for example, an estimated eight to over twenty African Americans were killed during a massacre in the Florida town of Rosewood. White residents burned down the town after a white woman claimed that an African American man attacked her. Survivors and descendants of the victims were awarded 2 million dollars, the first case in which the U.S. government paid compensation in a case of mass racial violence. Chicanos, Mexicanos and other people of color also share this history. And APA communities have certainly not been immune to racial violence. In 1885, for example, over two dozen Chinese mine workers were killed and several hundred driven away in the Rock Springs Massacre as white miners rioted and looted the Chinatown section of the small Wyoming town of Rock Springs. In 1934, Japanese American farmers were targets of a series of bombings during a “yellow peril” anti-alien campaign known as the Salt River Valley incident. These are but a few of hundreds of incidents that reflect a vital aspect of race relations during those periods. Many of these and other events are chronicled by Michael and Judy Ann Newton’s (1991) *Racial and Religious Violence in America: A Chronology.*

The stories of resistance against this violence also span this history. Long-time civil rights organizations have utilized the courts, the press, legislative and administrative channels to fight racial violence and create reforms. The movement in support of hate crime legislation during the 1980s and 1990s demanded greater government intervention
in acts of violence against historically oppressed groups. This movement emerged in the face of criminal attacks motivated by hatred, especially against racial and religious groups, but also against gays and lesbians. Many criminal acts had gone unpunished, and many feared that the lack of punishment sent a signal that it was the policy of this nation to condone hate-motivated violence. In the case of Vincent Chin, for example, Wayne Circuit Court Judge Charles Kaufman sentenced the killers to three years of probation and fined them $3,780 each, explaining that they were "not the kind of people you send to prison." (Altschiller 1999) APA communities and civil rights organizations, expectedly, expressed outrage at the lenient sentence.

The Chin case became one of several focal points for pan-Asian unity during this period (Espiritu 1992). Within the APA community, many existing organizations such as the west coast Asian Pacific Student Union (APSU), Chinese for Affirmative Action, Japanese American Citizens League and the Organization of Chinese Americans protested the decision and conducted widespread education about the problem of anti-Asian violence. It was also a catalyst for the formation of new organizations such as the American Citizens for Justice in Detroit, Asian Americans for Justice in San Francisco, the Southern California Justice for Vincent Chin Committee, and the Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence (CAAAV) in New York City (Espiritu 1992).

The 1990s saw continued organizing efforts. In 1992, twelve Asian Pacific American organizations joined together to form the National Network Against Anti-Asian Violence to monitor and track cases and also to strengthen their collective organizing efforts. Organizations, such as the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund in New York City, Asian Pacific American Legal Center of Southern California and the Asian Law Caucus in the San Francisco Bay area, established outreach and education programs to inform APA communities about the problem of hate crime. Some provided resources
to assist victims. In 1993, the Washington, DC headquartered National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC) began to issue an annual *Audit of Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans*. Groups such as the Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence also published regular newsletters publicizing various cases and support activities surrounding these cases.

With each hate crime against an Asian Pacific American, individuals and groups have joined in coalition with others to address the problem of racial violence. After the murder of Joseph Ileto, the National Federation of Filipino American Associations (NaFFAA) and the Filipino Civil Rights Advocates (FilCRA) joined other APA organizations to support the Ileto family, call for the prosecution of Furrow to the fullest extent of the law, and passage of stronger federal hate crime legislation. Despite the passage of important legislation and organizational sophistication among advocacy organizations, however, hate crimes remain as serious a problem for APAs as it does for the nation.

**Hate Crime Policy: Reframing an Old Problem**

Hate crime policy has been developed at various levels of government, including Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, state legislatures and local law enforcement agencies. At the federal level, there are four major legislative acts that address hate crimes. The *Hate Crime Statistics Act* (28 U.S. Code 534), enacted in 1990, requires the U.S. Department of Justice to collect data from law enforcement agencies throughout the country on crimes that “manifest prejudice based on race, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity” and to publish an annual summary of findings. In 1994, the act was expanded to include bias crimes based on “disability.” The category of gender is still not included as a bias category in federal law.

The 1994 *Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act*
Public Law 103-322 included a provision requiring the U.S. Sentencing Commission to provide sentencing enhancements of no less than three offense levels for crimes that are determined beyond a reasonable doubt to be hate crimes. This act included bias motives based not only on the categories identified in the Hate Crime Statistics Act, but also on national origin and gender. Gender-bias crime victims were given some relief in Title IV of the 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act which provided training for police and prosecutors, support for domestic violence and rape crisis centers, and provisions for punitive and compensatory damage awards. Finally, the Church Arsons Prevention Act (18 U.S. Code 247) enacted in 1996 broadened criminal prosecutions for attacks against churches and established a loan guarantee program for church rebuilding. Many federal agencies became involved in the implementation of these laws, including the Department of Justice, Department of Education and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.

Since these laws were enacted, several U.S. Supreme Court cases tested the constitutionality of these statutes on the basis of the First Amendment. The outcome of a 1993 U.S. Supreme Court case, Wisconsin v. Mitchell, effectively made clear the distinction between an individual's bigoted ideas and hate acts, ruling that hate penalty enhancements do not violate the first amendment when bias motivation is connected with a specific criminal act. Upon this decision, many states upheld or enacted hate crime legislation. State statutes include the prohibition of specific types of bias-motivated acts, the provision of compensation to victims of hate crimes, the training of law enforcement personnel on identifying and responding to hate crimes and the collection of hate crime statistics. Many of these statutes have altered the policies and practices of local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies, many of which have established special units to investigate and prosecute hate crimes. One of the most commonly used policy tools is the enhancement
of penalties. Penalties are enhanced by adding years to a sentence, limiting parole, or elevating a misdemeanor to a felony.

Hate crime policies continue to stir controversy. Opponents of hate crime legislation argue that a crime should not be given special consideration based on motive. Not only is motive difficult to discern, but opponents argue that it would be wrong to say that a crime against one person is more serious than a crime against his or her neighbor. But advocates argue that hate crimes are unlike other types of crime. First of all, they tend to be more brutal than other types of crimes as they are committed with the passion of hatred (Jenness and Broad 1997; Herek and Berrill 1992; Levin and McDevitt 1993). More importantly, they not only affect those who are direct victims of crime, but instill fear in the whole category of people against which the hatred was directed. Hate crimes, therefore, constitute a threat to the stability of democratic governance. Not only do hate crimes challenge the moral foundations of tolerance and respect for differences, but advocates also see hate crimes as an attack on our identity as a nation of diverse peoples. Hate crimes scholars like Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt have described these crimes as “acts of domestic terrorism.” Frederick Lawrence (1999, p. 8) put it this way, “If bias crimes are not punished more harshly than parallel crimes, the message expressed by the criminal justice system is that racial harmony and equality are not among the highest values held by our society.”

A number of high-profile cases emerged in the midst of a campaign initiated by President Clinton under the banner of his “Initiative on Race.” In line with this initiative, he convened a White House Conference on Hate Crimes on November 12, 1997, while announcing new law enforcement and prevention initiatives. In 1999, the Hate Crimes Prevention Act was introduced that would allow for greater federal involvement in hate crimes. Though the bill failed to pass, the issue of hate crimes remained on the national agenda. The broad publicity that these hate crimes received, coupled with the political
attention given to the issue by prominent officials, has made room for needed national discourse on the issue.

Hate Crimes and Asian Pacific Americans

While the Vincent Chin case is probably the most well-known hate crime case against an Asian Pacific American, there are hundreds of cases in which APAs have fallen victim to hate crimes. These are just a few of the more widely publicized cases since the beating death of Chin in 1982:

• In September 1987, a gang called the Dot Busters in Jersey City beat to death Navrose Mody, an Asian Indian American.

• On July 29, 1989, two brothers beat to death Ming Hai “Jim” Loo in Raleigh, North Carolina. The brothers mistook the 24-year-old Chinese American man as a Vietnamese against whom they harbored resentment after their brother served in the Vietnam War and never returned.

• On December 7, 1993, Colin Ferguson, a Jamaican immigrant, murdered six people and left 19 others injured on the Long Island Railroad in New York. Among the murdered were two Asian Americans, Mi Kyung Kim and Marita Theresa Magtoto.

• On January 29, 1996, two white racist skinheads, including Gunner Lindberg, attacked Thien Minh Ly, a 24-year-old Vietnamese American, on a tennis court in Tustin, California. They kicked, stomped, and stabbed Ly more than a dozen times. Lindberg was the first person in California to receive the death sentence for a murder motivated by racial hate.
On September 20, 1996, Richard Machado sent threatening email messages to 60 Asian American students at the University of California at Irvine. In his email message, he stated, "I personally will make it my life career to find and kill every one of you personally."

On April 5, 1999, Douglas Vitaioli shot to death Naoki Kamijima of Crystal City, Illinois after he had gone from store to store asking the ethnicity of the owners.

The detailed stories of each of these cases are filled with horror and tragedy. And there are many others that have not received much attention or have gone unreported.

Underreporting of hate crimes among APAs is a serious problem. There are several reasons for underreporting. First of all, many APAs are immigrants to this country. Immigrants or those who are undocumented are suspected of underreporting all types of crime, including hate crime. Hate crime laws are relatively new and may be reported even less often, especially in less severe cases such as crimes against property. Secondly, law enforcement agencies have only begun to record hate crimes as such since the passage of the 1990 Hate Crime Statistics Act. There were no official or systematic reports on hate crimes before that time. Even after the passage of the federal legislation, there are many obstacles to obtaining accurate reports, as will be discussed further.

The first published report on anti-Asian violence was a report by the Japanese American Citizens League in 1983. A subsequent report was published as a set of proceedings based on a conference entitled, "Break the Silence," sponsored by the Japanese American Citizens League, the Asian Law Caucus, and the Chinese for Affirmative Action in San Francisco in 1985. They noted the increase in hate violence against APAs using 1981 data as baseline information. The rationale for
this was that 1981 marked the year when the monetary amount of trade across the Pacific exceeded that across the Atlantic. It was during this period that resentments against APAs were fanned by political pundits who pointed to foreign trade with Asia as the reason for economic woes in the United States. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights also conducted hearings and published reports on civil rights issues concerning APAs. Their 1992 report, Civil Rights Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990’s, underscored the problem of anti-Asian violence.

As previously mentioned, the National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium (NAPALC) began to publish an annual Audit of Violence Against Asian Pacific Americans in 1993. Up to now, this has been the only national compilation of information on hate crimes against APAs in addition to statistics compiled by the FBI under the Hate Crimes Statistics Act. NAPALC mainly collects information from victims, community organizations and from media sources. Some of the contributing organizations include Asian Pacific American bar associations, Bay Area Hate Crimes Investigators Association, Klanwatch of the Southern Poverty Law Center, National Korean American Service and Education Center, and the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission. The data they collect not only include hate crimes but also hate incidents that may not be categorized as criminal activity.

According to their figures, there had been a steady rise in the number of anti-Asian incidents from 1993 through 1996 followed by a slight decrease in 1997. Incidents increased from 155 in 1993 to 534 in 1996 with a decrease to 481 incidents in 1997. These numbers are charted in Table 1.
TABLE 1: REPORTED ANTI-ASIAN INCIDENTS BY YEAR, 1993 – 1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Incidents</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Of the 481 reported incidents in 1997 collected by NAPALC, the ethnicity of the victim was unknown in all but 68 cases. Among the 68 cases in which the ethnicity was known, the largest victim group was Chinese (36 percent), followed by Vietnamese (24 percent), Korean (16 percent), Japanese (12 percent) and Filipino (7 percent). South Asian, Thai and Cambodian victims comprised a total of 5 percent.

The most recent count of anti-Asian incidents by NAPALC was higher than the number of hate crimes against APAs as reported to the FBI. According to the most recent FBI hate crime report for 1997, there were 8,049 hate crimes reported in the U.S. 4,710 (69 percent) were race or ethnicity-bias crimes. Of those, 347 (7 percent) were anti-Asian. APAs were also among the hate crime perpetrators, though in a much lower proportions. APAs were perpetrators in 46 (.8 percent) of the 5,898 race-bias offenses, along with six (.4 percent) of the 1,483 religion-bias offenses, five (.3 percent) of the 1,375 sexual orientation-bias, and 27 (.2 percent) of the 1,083 ethnicity-bias offenses.

As with hate crime data generally, it is difficult to make strong conclusions about trends. Many advocacy organizations argue that hate crimes have indeed increased during the eighties and most of the nineties. Others have attributed the increase in hate crimes within jurisdictions
primarily to improvements in reporting. As citizens learn to report hate crimes and law enforcement personnel are trained to identify them, the data may reflect an increase in hate crime rates. Conversely, some hate crime scholars and government officials have attributed decreases in national rates to an increase in the number of jurisdictions that underreport such incidents (Balboni and Bennett 1999). National figures show a decrease in the rate of hate crime perpetration over this same time period while the number of reporting agencies have increased. Among reporting jurisdictions are whole states such as Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi that submit reports, but report zero hate crimes. Many Asian Pacific American advocates have argued that hate crimes are severely underreported among Asian newcomers who are often unaware of hate crime policy, distrustful of law-enforcement or fearful of retaliatory consequences. Immigrants and other vulnerable populations, including women, may very well experience a much higher rate of victimization than official statistics reflect. It is also difficult to discern patterns among the various Asian Pacific American ethnic groups since many law-enforcement agencies do not include information concerning ethnicity.

Hate Crimes in Los Angeles

Data from Los Angeles, California, one of the most diverse places in the world, provide additional insights into the nature of hate crimes involving APAs, as well as other groups. The hate crime rate in Los Angeles is higher than the national rate according to official law enforcement statistics. According to hate crime data collected from various law enforcement agencies by the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, the number of hate crimes peaked in 1996 with 995 reported incidents. Nearly three-fourths of all hate crimes were racially motivated as opposed to gender, sexual orientation, disability or religion biased.

One of the most disturbing trends among racially motivated crimes is the changing face of hate (see Figure 1). Among the cases where the racial identity of the perpetrator is known, there was an increase in a
Figure 1.
Number of Victims by Race
Race-bias Hate Crimes in
Los Angeles County, 1994-1997

Number of Perpetrators by Race
Race-bias Hate Crimes, 1994-1997
Figure 2. Percentage of Hate Crime Victims, Perpetrators and Population by Race, Los Angeles County, 1994-1997
number of white perpetrators from 100 in 1994 to 119 in 1997 (19 percent). But the most dramatic increase was among Latino perpetrators. They numbered 103 in 1994, but steadily rose to 164 by 1997—an increase of almost 60 percent. Concurrently, the racial group that experienced the greatest increase in victimization was African American. These trends in the racial characteristics of victims and perpetrators can be seen in comparison to the population proportion of each respective racial group. Figure 2 shows the percentage of victims, perpetrators and population over the four-year time span.

A matrix of reported victims and perpetrators between 1994-1997 shows the racial distribution of victims and perpetrators by pairs (see Table 2). Of the 1,837 race-bias incidents that were reported during this time, the racial identity of the victim and perpetrator were recorded in 1,166 cases. APAs were reported to be victimized equally by Latino and European American perpetrators and less often by African Americans. In contrast, the racial group most often victimized by APAs during this same period was African American.

**Table 2. Race-bias Hate Crime Victims and Perpetrators by Pairs, Los Angeles County, 1994-1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race of Perpetrator</th>
<th>African American</th>
<th>Latino</th>
<th>APA</th>
<th>European American</th>
<th>Total Perpetrators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European American</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Victims</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>1166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table includes 1,166 race-bias crimes in which both victim and perpetrator race were reported. There was a total of 1,837 reported race-bias crimes during this time period.
African Americans were victimized more often by Latino suspects than they were by European Americans and much less frequently by APAs. Latinos were reportedly victimized more often by African Americans than members of other groups. And European Americans were victimized more often by African American perpetrators than by members of other racial groups.

Before reaching any strong conclusions from these figures, we must be aware of the serious limitations of the data. Though all the law enforcement and agency reports collected were screened by the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission using Los Angeles County District Attorney's definition of hate crimes, there are several problems that may skew the data. One is inconsistency among law enforcement agencies in the classification and definition of a hate crime. Law enforcement agencies also vary in the amount of training given to officers in reporting hate crimes. There are also problems of underreporting, especially among immigrant populations, of which a large proportion are Latino and Asian. Also, 37 percent of all race-bias hate crimes for that period had no record of the racial identity of the perpetrator. Many of these involved crimes against property, such as vandalism, in which the perpetrators may have been of one racial group in disproportionate numbers. Also, not all of the 88 cities in the County report hate crime data nor do they all report the data consistently. These irregularities may skew that data, and we should limit the degree to which we make any strong conclusions from them.

The figures do, however, present three indisputable facts. First, members of all racial groups who are victims are also perpetrators. Second, not only is there white-perpetrated hate crime against people of color, but there is also a substantial number of hate crimes perpetrated by people of color against other groups, including whites as well as other non-white groups. And third, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of hate crimes reported by African American victims in which the suspect was Latino as well as white.
Causes of Hate Crimes Against Asian Pacific Americans

The lack of consistently reliable data over time makes it difficult to identify those factors that lead to an increase or decrease in hate crimes directed against APAs. However, we can infer various causes from the literature on hate crimes as well as on racial conflict. These explanations can be categorized in the following ways: a) perceived or real economic competition in overlapping niches; b) ideologically or culturally based prejudice or bigotry; c) popular portrayal of a group as responsible for social ills or as a threat to one’s own well-being; or d) exclusionary forms of social mobilization based on racially or ethnically defined boundaries.

Asian Pacific Americans have been victims of ideologically and materially motivated attacks, sources that are usually intertwined. In fact, similar sources of conflict can be seen consistently throughout history. The Rock Springs Massacre of 1885 resulted from anti-Chinese sentiment over their role as cheap labor. Chinese were used by industrialists as strike breakers in the mines and on the railroads. This fed a growing resentment among white workers who felt their livelihood threatened. Organized political movements seeking to end Chinese immigration to the U.S. fed newspapers with degrading depictions of Chinese as subhuman, leading to the passage the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Racial group competition in a racially charged political environment, led to the exclusion of further Chinese immigration, and provided fertile soil for the outbreak of racial violence. Similar sentiments arose against the Japanese who were brought to replace Chinese labor, leading to exclusionary legislation such as the 1913 (California) Alien Land Law prohibiting Japanese immigrants from purchasing agricultural land as well as the Immigration Act of 1924 ending further Japanese immigration to the United States. Turn of the century political movements were well equipped with the demeaning and degrading caricatures of Asian newcomers as heathen, womanizing, slant-eyed
threats to the livelihood and way of life of Western pioneers. Vehement anti-Asian sentiment was fanned by politicians for political purposes but took its most physically brutal form in mob attacks on communities and individuals.

While the social norms for many Americans have changed and some degree of political appropriateness has been established to temper acts of mass violence or hatred, many populations continue to feel the effects of this age-old problem. Returning to the case of Vincent Chin once again, we see that his perpetrators were recently laid-off as autoworkers during the height of ferment against Japanese auto-makers. The U.S. auto industry was among those that initiated and supported the "buy American" anti-imports campaign. Detroit, where the killing took place, was the capitol of the auto industry and the hotbed of anti-Japanese sentiment. Vincent Chin, though Chinese American, was categorized in the minds of his perpetrators as responsible for the plight of the unemployed autoworkers. Chin suffered the brunt of this resentment based on economic competition, prejudice and scapegoating. We can find similar threads in other stories of hate crimes against APAs today.

One source of resentment against APAs is what Leland Saito (1998) calls "Asian flack." He describes this problem as resentment against all APAs based on the conspicuous wealth of a small minority of the population. In his case study of APAs, Latinos and whites in the San Gabriel Valley, he documents sources of resentment and arenas of cooperation between these groups. Among the sources of resentment against Asian residents was a perception that most were wealthy and thus able to gain undue control over the economic life and political institutions of the region. One manifestation of the tensions was the perpetration of hate crimes against APAs, particularly immigrants, by Latino and white residents. Nor were APAs faultless in this scenario, as many held their own prejudices against other groups and were not necessarily sensitive concerning the impacts of the rapid Asian immigrant population growth.
on other long-time residents of the region.

In this way, hate crimes are one barometer of general race relations. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, hate crimes represent the most severe form of racial antagonism—that which manifests itself in the form of criminal activity directed against an individual as a surrogate for a whole group. Cities in which hate crimes occur repeatedly are often cities experiencing ongoing racial conflicts or tensions, including those that may not take the form of criminal activity. It is not uncommon that when hate crimes hit the radar screen in a particular city, racial tensions have been festering for some time. For example, hate crimes may first emerge in the form of student fights on school grounds, but only after a series of racial conflicts over school board elections or personnel controversies in which racially defined interests were contested.

There are, of course, exceptions in which the repeated occurrence of hate crimes in a city is less reflective of the tenor of race relations and more indicative of the existence of a small, aberrant group of hate crime perpetrators in a more harmonious social climate. This is an important reminder of the danger of the ecological fallacy in the study of hate crimes. It would be erroneous to think that all individuals who live or work in areas where hate crimes occur exhibit the same characteristics as those involved in hate crimes. In fact, we may often find residents in affected areas who actively promote tolerance and cross-cultural understanding because they have witnessed hate crimes in their community.

Limitations of Current Policy

Just as hate crimes occur within a social context, solutions are only effective to the extent they address the social context. This is, of course, in addition to dealing with individual perpetrators and assisting victims. We face many challenges in all three areas, social context, perpe-
trators and victims. Hate crime policies, to date, focus primarily on the latter two areas.

Hate crime legislation is no doubt critical to protecting the ideals of respect and tolerance for difference. It is an important step towards lessening the number of physical attacks and verbal threats against historically marginalized or oppressed groups. It also sends a moral message that abuse against an individual based purely on their identification as a member of a particular group is not an action that society condones. In light of the numerous hate-motivated mass attacks, such as in Littleton, Colorado and Los Angeles, California, not only is the legislation important for hortatory purposes, but also additional resources and powers must be granted by legislation to address this problem. Enhancements to sentences, victim assistance and resources for enforcement agencies as provided by current legislation are vitally important. At the same time, there are many shortcomings of current policy and policy discourse.

Lack of State Hate Crime Legislation

Not all states have hate crime legislation. As of this writing, eight states have no hate crime laws at all, including the states of New York and Hawai'i, which have the second and third largest APA populations respectively in the nation. Combined, these two states are home to approximately one-fifth of the APA population in the U.S. In addition, not all states protect against all types of bias motivated crimes. For example, 21 states exclude sexual orientation as a bias motive from their hate crime laws (Lawrence 1999).

Lack of Accurate Reporting

There are two types of problems in reporting which make it difficult to monitor the level of hate crime victimization and perpetration among APAs. One is the lack of reporting and the second is the lack of
ethnic information in hate crime reports. As mentioned earlier, the lack of reporting results from the underreporting of crimes among APA victims as well as the problems of data collection among law enforcement agencies. In terms of the latter, only six out of every 10 police agencies voluntarily report bias crimes to the FBI. What is more disturbing, however, is that four out of five police agencies claim that they have no hate crimes (Fritz 1999). Whole states have submitted reports claiming they have no hate crimes statewide. In 1997, for example, Alabama, Arkansas and Mississippi reported tallies from their law enforcement jurisdictions totaling zero hate crimes in each of those states.

Some reasons for the lack of police reporting have to do with procedural problems such as the additional paperwork required to report hate crime. There is also unevenness in personnel training so that not all police officers know how to identify a hate crime. But there are more serious problems that contribute to the lack of reporting. One is the fear among local politicians of having one's city named the "hate crime capitol" of the region. This can affect future economic investment into the city as well as future in- and out-migration of residents based on this image. A second problem is political complicity with the activities of hate perpetrators. In some cities, hate crimes go unanswered because officials may share similar biases with hate crime perpetrators and, in effect, condone their actions by not pursuing suspects or enforcing criminal law. This reporting problem is similar to that of domestic violence in earlier years. As Jack McDevitt, director of the Center for Criminal Justice Policy Research at Northeastern University, stated in reference to the enforcement of hate crime for gay-bashing, "You've got to get them over their bias that it's OK, which a lot of them believe." (Fritz 1999) For APAs, especially those who may live in isolated areas or areas where there is some level of political hostility against them, the lack of reporting and enforcement can leave them more vulnerable to hate crime victimization.
ENFORCEMENT PROBLEMS

Even when hate crimes are reported, there is a low rate of prosecution and conviction. Hate crimes in general have low conviction rates, approximately 15 percent. Part of this is due to the difficulty in finding the suspect who sprayed racial epithets on someone's garage door in the middle of the night. But it is also due to the fact that hate crime victims, like victims of many other types of crime, fear retaliation by suspects and refuse to testify. Since bias crimes are motivated by hatred, not only do victims fear personal retaliation, but retaliation against friends, family and other members of the target group. In the case of organized hate groups or gangs, not only do victims fear retaliation by suspects themselves, but also from members of the suspect's group. Unless the police have a very good relationship with the victim or the victim's community where victims feel they can entrust their safety to law enforcement officers, it is often difficult to gain cooperation from victims or witnesses in hate crime cases. For Asian Pacific American immigrants who may be new to the country or unfamiliar with their local law enforcement agencies, these challenges are multiplied.

Since hate crime legislation is relatively new and there are variations in the laws across states, not all law enforcement agencies have adequate expertise to investigate and prepare a hate crime court case. Not only must one prove guilt of committing the crime, but must also prove that bias is a motive in the commission of that crime. Unevenness in expertise between police investigators and prosecutors can also lead to failed cases.

Dangers in Policy Discourse: From Racial Violence to Hate Crime

The first stage of any policy-making process entails defining the problem. How one defines the problem limits the range of policy solutions that lawmakers consider in addressing the problem. Within the APA community, the term "anti-Asian violence" became the common
term in the 1980s to describe the problem. But as policy debates concerning this problem centered on the issue of “hate crimes,” the issue of racial violence was defined in the policy vernacular of criminal justice. On one hand, the specificity of the term hate crime helps to identify an institutional and legislative “home” for any policy development and implementation; the problem is defined in terms of criminal law and placed under the jurisdiction of law enforcement and justice agencies. This, however, narrows the scope of the problem as originally defined by APA and other communities.

The original definition encompassed a wide range of issues, ranging from hate crimes to police brutality. In fact, many of the issues championed by groups such as the Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence (CAAAV) included cases of police abuse. In 1996, for example, CAAAV published a report entitled, *Police Violence in New York City’s Asian American Communities* (1986-1995). This report was dedicated to Vuthikrai Thienvanich (1946-1987) and Yong Xin Huang (1978-1995). Vuthikrai Thienvanich was a 41-year-old Thai janitor who was shot five times in the chest, abdomen and extremities by Transit Authority police in Brooklyn, New York. Yong Xin Huang was a 16-year-old teen who was playing with a BB gun with friends and was shot in the back of the head at point-blank range by a New York Police Department officer. Neither officer involved was indicted. According to this report, 25 percent of all cases addressed by CAAA V involved law enforcement officers as active or passive accomplices to civilian offenders of anti-Asian violence. They define law enforcement “accomplice” broadly, ranging from passive (an officer who responds insensitively to a hate crime victim) to active (an officer who acts as or assists the perpetrator of anti-Asian violence).

Changing the problem definition from “anti-Asian violence” to “hate crime” and moving the problem of police abuse and racism under the problem of “police community relations” created a separation between
civilian hate violence and police misconduct within policy debates and policies themselves. This presents the danger of narrowing the original problem definition and thereby limiting the parameters of policy solutions away from addressing the greater problem of racial violence, whether the perpetrators are civilians or law enforcement officers. There remains no equivalent set of policies to directly address bias-related abuses among law enforcement officers. This is particularly important given the continued occurrence of police misconduct cases in large metropolitan cities like New York and Los Angeles, home to large concentrations of people of color, including APAs.

The narrowing of the problem to an issue of criminal justice also shifts attention away from the political, social, economic, historical and cultural factors that generate racial or ethnic conflicts. By placing the policy discourse so squarely in the domain of criminal justice, the selection of policy tools becomes limited to those available to law enforcement agencies, mediators and human relations agencies. Left outside of policy discourse is a whole range of inequities and unresolved social grievances that may be associated with hate crimes. The question of how we are to resolve conflicts in a multiracial civil society remains out of the scope of enforcement-centered policy deliberations. While hate crime policy is an important element in addressing the criminal manifestation of racial conflicts and antagonism, it is important not to be bound by the parameters of analysis surrounding current discourse. We need to think about racial violence not only as a criminal problem, but as an overarching social problem. Solutions must not be limited to criminal punishment and victim assistance, but to the resolution of the sources of conflict, including a range of justice acts, from atonement and reparations to mediation and institutional reform.

Challenges Hate Crimes Pose for Race Relations Today

White supremacy, bigotry and homophobia have indeed been the
culprit in most of the high profile cases that have received national media attention over the past decade. In 1989, Yusuf Hawkins was shot and killed after he and three other African American teenagers walked into the predominantly white, working class neighborhood of Bensonhurst in Brooklyn, New York. The spring 1995 bombing of a federal office building in Oklahoma City turned national attention to the growing problem of organized hate groups in the U.S. More recently, in summer 1998, James Byrd Jr., an African American man, was dragged from a pickup truck for nearly three miles, with body parts and his mangled torso strewn along the road. In fall 1998, University of Wyoming student Matthew Shepherd was brutally and fatally beaten because he was gay. The following year brought more mass shootings, including a massacre of 12 students and a teacher on the grounds of a Colorado high school in April and a shooting spree at a Los Angeles Jewish day-care center in August 1999.

The vast majority of the publicity surrounding hate crimes focuses on white perpetrators of race-bias crimes. There may be some statistical explanation to this. Among bias incidents that were racially motivated, there was a total of 5,898 offenses nationally in 1997 according to the FBI. The racial background of the suspect was known in 3,982 of those cases. White suspects comprised 73 percent of the total number of race-bias hate crimes suspects in which the racial background was known. Of the race-bias incidents in which the race of both the victim and suspects were known, 59 percent involved white perpetrators and black victims. In other words, publicity may have focused on white perpetrated hate crimes because they make up the majority of suspects in race-bias as well as all bias-motivated hate crimes.10

But the focus on white perpetrated hate crime overshadows another type of race-bias hate crime, interminority group crime. Focusing on white supremacists keeps the issue in less controversial political waters, especially when many of the victims in these publicized cases are also white.
The enemy is bigotry and the target “problem” populations are organized white supremacist groups and the psychologically unstable followers of their propaganda. The solution that follows this journalistic analysis is stricter law enforcement and a crackdown on hate groups. Indeed, this has been the policy alternative that receives greatest legislative support. But scholars have long noted two facts that run counter to much of the analyses found in the popular press. First, individuals who are not members of hate groups commit the most hate crimes. In fact, the majority of perpetrators have no prior history of criminal activity or psychological problems. Second, hate crimes tend to occur where there is a general culture of hate. Political leaders may promote this culture in their efforts to mobilize a constituency. Moreover, popular culture such as music, media and the arts may also contribute to the culture of hate. While a law enforcement crackdown on white supremacist organizations is extremely important, we must not lose sight of the problem in its entirety.

While the Vincent Chin case and the anti-Asian violence movement was a major source of pan-Asian solidarity and coalition building, the interracial and interethnic character of hate crimes in contemporary America carries with it the potential for conflict and division. Asian Pacific American community organizations in the U.S. enter policy debates under these circumstances that have implications for race relations more generally. In the continental U.S., Asian Pacific American populations are concentrated in metropolitan areas where there is a diversity of racial and ethnic groups. While APAs are victims of hate crimes by those with white supremacist views, they are also victimized by other people of color. Likewise, APAs are also perpetrators of hate crimes against all other groups, including other APAs of different ethnic backgrounds. The problem is not as simple or clear-cut as in the case of Vincent Chin. We are victims as well as perpetrators. White supremacy is not the only source of the problem. And when it comes to interminority hate crimes, issues of past oppression, economic disparity and ethnic
politics enter the fray. The contained problem of white supremacy is complicated by the multiracial character and entangled social problems of the modern metropolis.

In many ways, the hate crime issue reveals, in the most extreme sense, the challenges before us in addressing the problem of race relations. Indeed, hate crime perpetrators terrorize whole communities, but they do even more. They often create deep chasms between whole groups despite the fact that perpetrators may represent a minority perspective within a community. At the same time, there is a strong basis to build coalitions in opposition to hate crimes. It is safe to assume that the vast majority of people on simply a moral basis would oppose random acts of violence against individuals. Moral beliefs aside, anyone can become a victim of a hate crime, since perpetrators are seeking a category of people rather than a particular individual. In this sense, it is in everyone's interest to prevent hate crimes.

But, building coalitions is complicated by the multiracial character of many urban hate crimes. Take, for example, the case of Kingman Quon, 23, a student at California State Polytechnic University in Pomona. Quon pled guilty to seven misdemeanor counts and was sentenced of two years in federal prison after e-mailing racially charged threats to dozens of Latinos around the nation. On one hand, this incident fueled racial tensions. On the other hand, it was an opportunity for APA and Latino communities to join together against this type of activity. But unless racial communities to which the perpetrator belongs join those of victim groups, hate crimes can lead to greater social division. There is, then, an urgent need for political leadership, community organizing, and coalition building to insure that the issue of hate crimes becomes a focal point for unity, as opposed to greater division.
The Need for Self-Reflective Race Relations Discourse

The multiracial character of hate crimes in diverse metropolitan cities poses a serious challenge for race relations and coalition building. One of the most important challenges is the ability to create public space for dialogue in which members speaking from the position of racial identities can be self-reflective and critical of actions by members of their racial group. Currently, those who do this risk being accused of “selling out their people” or becoming the spotlight of media sensationalism.

A case in point was a summer 1999 talk show on Black Entertainment Television cable network hosted by Travis Smiley entitled “BET Live.” The topic was race relations between African Americans and APAs. Two of the guests were Asian Pacific American and one was African American, all active in civil rights organizations and generally advocates of coalition building across racial divides. The host presented a variety of examples where APAs and African Americans have come into conflict or may potentially conflict in the future. Tensions in public housing, public schools and in electoral campaigns were among the topics discussed. The strategy of the Asian Pacific American guests was to tie the problem of intergroup conflict to the institutional structures that produce inequality and perpetuate injustice. The effect was to “depersonalize” the problem and refocus attention to political and economic solutions.

On one hand, this approach is quite prudent. The lack of jobs and competition for housing and resources often leads to conflict along racial cleavages. Many activists argue, and history supports the contention, that meaningful multiracial coalitions are built when groups come together in joint work on common concerns and find effective ways to reach their mutual goals. Focusing on “what we have in common” and “what we can work on together” points forward rather than backward. This is important if we are to move beyond finger-pointing to arm-linking.

At the same time, one of the issues that the guest representing
African American concerns raised repeatedly was the issue of respect. He was critical of those APAs who treated African Americans with disrespect. But instead of addressing that issue squarely, the Asian Pacific American guests repeatedly brought the focus back to structural problems, presumably leaving the other guest and viewers dissatisfied. I can understand the predicament facing the Asian Pacific American guests. If they had spent any substantial amount of time focusing on the problem of bigotry or cultural styles among APAs, those admissions could have preempted any forward-looking discussion on broader structural problems. In fact, statements such as, "yes, there are Asians who hold prejudiced views towards blacks," would probably get reproduced dozens of times through various media. Nothing else may have been reported about the interview. This could further inflame race relations in the reproduction and recontextualization of such statements.

The inability to have self-reflective and self-critical public discourse prevents us from actually getting to those larger institutional issues. It is important for people to hear acknowledgement of their concerns. The issue of bigotry among APAs is very real, as is bigotry against APAs that exists among members of other racial groups. Self-critical discourse is necessary in order to build trust and understanding upon which coalitions can stand. In addition to asking the question "what we do have in common?," we must also be able to ask "how are we contributing to the problem?" Of course, these questions need to be put into the context that creates a "safe" and constructive environment for discussion. In regards to the issue of hate crimes, self-reflective and self-critical discourse is a necessity. Hate crime perpetrators come in all orientations and colors.

There are opportunities to build multiracial coalitions around the issue of hate crimes. I will outline some policy recommendations below. Building coalitions around such a reform agenda, however, will involve much more than a discussion about policy. Key to building effective
coalitions is broadening the discourse so that the social, economic and political sources of racial conflict and injustice can be addressed. Otherwise, controversy over hate crimes may degenerate to a discussion of “whodunnit.” Not that identifying the perpetrator of a hate crime is not important, but long-term solutions may need to involve a fuller reconciliation of conflict among racial groups.

To the extent that hate crimes are reflective of larger intergroup conflicts involving notions of justice, the practice of intergroup conflict resolution or group reconciliation is critical. Eric Yamamoto (1999) argues for a particular type of resolution that he calls “interracial justice.” He argues that a meaningful resolution of conflict is not simply a legal resolution between litigants, but a social process through which parties in conflict reach a mutual agreement based on the concept of interracial justice. This idea rests upon the acknowledgement of the historical and contemporary ways in which racial groups harm one another along with affirmative efforts to redress justice grievances. Conflicts between individuals are always understood in historical context and intergroup relations. Yamamoto writes, “without historicizing contemporary intergroup power relations and grounding them in concrete particulars, racial groups facing real-life intergroup grievances and claims of injustice are likely to assume the understandings of ‘others’ based on social constructed racial meanings often of stereotypical quality” (p. 122). He outlines four dimensions of interracial justice along which grievances or past injustices may be resolved. He refers to these as the four “R’s”: a) recognition of emotions, constraints, related justice grievances, and disabling perceptions faced by racial group members; b) responsibility of racial group members as the subordinated as well as the subordinating group in interracial power relationships; c) reconstruction or acts of healing the social and psychological wounds resulting from past injustices; and d) reparation in the form of material changes in the structure of the relationship. We may find that long-term solutions to the problem of hate crime against APAs lie in processes of group reconciliation such as these.
Recommendations for Policy, Research and Organizing

Some predict that hate crimes will only worsen in the future while prevention will become more difficult. Petrosino (1999), for example, suggests that the prevention and control of hate crimes will become more difficult given the accessibility of weapons of mass destruction, a growing acceptance of extremist ideology and an increase in religious zealotry among hate crime perpetrators. In addition, the dissemination of hate ideology over the Internet will continue to foster the creation of virtual communities of hate groups that span the globe. Public policies can provide important tools to lessen hate crimes and address their underlying causes.

There are policy reforms, future research and organizing that can benefit Asian Pacific American communities and all others in the prevention and intervention of hate crimes. I outline six major areas: a) improve reporting by Asian Pacific American victims and law enforcement agencies; b) pass or strengthen hate crime legislation at the state and federal levels; c) develop comprehensive law enforcement protocols responsive to the cultural and social circumstances within Asian Pacific American and other communities; d) support Asian Pacific American and other community organizations addressing the hate crimes problem; e) build multiracial coalitions and a human relations infrastructure; and f) conduct research to better understand and address underlying sources of conflict associated with hate crimes.

A) Improve reporting by Asian Pacific American victims and law enforcement agencies

Law enforcement agencies can establish systems, training programs, and job duties so that hate crimes and hate incidents are accurately reported. Public and private agencies can also conduct education to communities so victims can recognize incidents and be encouraged to report them. A critical component to victim reporting is community and law enforcement protection from retaliatory action by perpetrators.
B) Pass or strengthen hate crime legislation at the state and federal levels
Adopt hate crime statutes in states that have weak or no hate crime legislation. Strengthen federal laws to include gender as a bias category and expand federal powers to prosecute hate crimes. Support increased resources to the Community Relations Service of the Department of Justice to assist communities affected by hate crimes and related conflict.

C) Develop a law enforcement protocol that is responsive to the cultural and social circumstances within Asian Pacific American and other communities
Since hate crimes, especially race-bias hate crimes, can be associated with larger community tensions, it is important for law enforcement officers to work with residents, school and human relations personnel, mediators, youth works, community leaders and others to develop more comprehensive community strategies that are culturally and socially appropriate.

D) Support Asian Pacific American and other community organizations addressing the hate crimes problem
Support community organizations in their efforts to document hate crimes among APAs, to provide assistance to victims, to mediate community conflicts, to advocate for effective hate crime policies, and to organize coalitions against hate crimes.

E) Build multiracial coalitions and human relations infrastructure
Multiracial and otherwise diverse coalitions play important roles in demonstrating public opposition to hate activity and in reconciling conflicts between groups. They are an important component of a broader human relations infrastructure—institutional structures based on partnerships between residents, government agencies, human rela-
tions organizations and the private sector equipped with leadership skills, networks and necessary resources to promote tolerance and respond effectively to the outbreak of hate crimes and intergroup conflicts.

F) **Conduct policy-oriented research to better understand and address hate crimes and its underlying causes**

Further research is needed to inform effective policy-making on various types of bias crimes against APAs and others. Areas of further research include: the causes of hate crime perpetration, impact on victims, organization of hate groups, effects of legal sanctions, and methods of prevention, intervention and prediction.

Crimes motivated by hatred against random individuals affect our security, disposition and identity as a nation of diverse peoples. For those who envision a society that lives up to the ideals of equal justice, cultural pluralism and democracy, the issues of hate crime and racial violence are an important part of the work at hand.
Endnotes


4 For a detailed history and legal discussion of hate crime law, see Lawrence (1999).

5 For a critique of hate crime laws, see also Jacobs and Potter (1998).

6 According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Hate Crime Statistics, 1997, there were 11,211 participating law enforcement agencies in 48 states and the District of Columbia. Hawai’i and New Hampshire did not participate in the 1997 report.


8 It is difficult to accurately estimate the rate of hate crime for reasons mentioned elsewhere in the article. Understanding these limitations, official statistics do indicate a higher rate for Los Angeles. According to law enforcement statistics, there were 53 hate crimes per one million persons in Los Angeles as compared to 32 nationally in 1997. Also, the reported rate for the nation overall may be lower than the actual rate, since a number of states report no hate crimes when they may, in fact, occur.

9 It would also be erroneous to use hate crime data as the only source of data to understand race relations or racial conflict. A study of hate crimes would not capture non-criminal acts nor would they always flag conflicts dispersed over large areas. Well-publicized conflict between Korean merchants and African American residence in South Central Los Angeles do not always involve criminal threats or criminal acts. It is also important to note that hate crime perpetrators vary in their degree of racial prejudice. Jacobs and Potter (1998), for example, argue that not all hate crimes labeled as such accurately represent the extent of the offender’s prejudice. Hate crime data can overstate the extent of the hate crime problem depending on the degree to which prejudice was the primary motive of the crime.

10 In 1997, out of 8,049 bias motivated criminal incidents reported to the FBI by 11,211 law enforcement agencies across the country, the majority (almost 60 percent) were motivated by racial bias. Of the 9,861 total offenses for all bias-motivated crimes that year, the race of the suspect was known in 60 percent of those offenses. And of those offenses for which the race of the suspect was known, whites comprised 75 percent of all suspects.
References


Introduction

Human Rights/Relations Commissions represent one of the oldest institutionalized efforts to improve inter-group relations. Although early efforts can be traced to at least the early 1940s in the form of ad hoc committees appointed by mayors and other elected officials to resolve racial tension and conflicts, the number of human rights/relations organizations grew rapidly in the 1960s and early 1970s largely in response to urban riots in Black communities. However, there are serious limitations. While many agencies have been concerned about basic problems in housing, schooling and employment, the authority to address these problems often resides in other organizations. Over time, human rights/relations organizations took on a more narrowly defined set of activities, including conflict resolution, cultural sensitivity training, leadership training, and providing forums for inter-group discussion.

The commissions have also changed with broader changes in society. The initial focus on race relations has shifted to include a more diverse population and issues such as gender, sexual orientation, religion, and physical disabilities. In recent years, commissions faced new changes due to declining resources, new developments in race relations, and new forms of inter-group tension and conflict (especially between minority groups), many of which involve Asian Pacific Americans (APAs). This chapter is concerned with understanding how commissions can respond to the growing complexity of race relations in general and with APAs specifically.

To gain insights into these issues, the analysis draws on existing literature for Human Relations/Rights Commissions (HRCs) such as
published material, news media accounts, and organizational reports and
interviews with key individuals associated with each HRC. Existing
documentation was used to examine the agency’s structure (e.g., whether
it is an independent department or operates like a commission), size and
composition of the staff and any governing body, decision-making
process, particular history and stated mission, mandates and the available
mechanisms/resources to carry out its mandate(s), and sources and
amount of funding. The purpose of this analysis is to gain an under­
standing of the organization and how its day-to-day operations are struc­
tured to respond to APA race relations. Interviews with HRC executive
directors, commissioners, staff, and key individuals from the Asian
Pacific American community were conducted on site at seven HRCs
representing various regions of the country including Austin, Texas,
Chicago, Los Angeles City, Los Angeles County, New York, San
Francisco, and Seattle. The interviews were used to expand and elaborate
on information gained from the review of agency and news documen­
tation and to provide detailed insights and opinions regarding the organi­
zation’s response to Asian Pacific American issues and race relations.

The first section of this chapter will present information on
HRCs based on case study interviews conducted for this study. The
second section will delineate the scope of the problem and key policy
questions/issues relevant to Asian Pacific Americans. Specifically, the
following research objectives are addressed: 1) The nature and extent of
group tension and conflicts involving APAs, 2) the responses of HRCs
to APA-related issues, 3) the effectiveness of conflict-resolution through
negotiation and mediation, and 4) the roles of APAs on commissions and
staff. For APAs who are either staff or board members, the research will
also examine the following questions: 1) In their role, have they had the
opportunity to provide meaningful input that redefines the mission,
operation and priorities of their agency? 2) Have they had access through
their agency to key leaders and decision-makers? 3) What are their
opinions on the state of race relations, the most pressing immediate problems, and a vision of what America should be?

HRC: History, Mission, and Structure

HISTORY OF HUMAN RELATIONS/RIGHTS COMMISSIONS

The United States has an extensive history of racial conflict and oppression. Racism against APAs in this country reaches back to 160 years when the first sizable number of Chinese immigrants came to work on Hawaii’s sugar plantations (Takaki, 1989). The underlying causes and manifestations of and responses to racism can be linked to an ever-changing social, political, economic, and socio-demographic context. The formation of human relations agencies is a reflection of this context.

Within a context of wartime politics and racial oppression, violence began to erupt against minorities, leading to the creation of the first HRCs. During the 1940s, World War II spurred strong racial tensions in the United States, especially in large urban areas such as Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York, where diverse and growing populations resided. The war brought about severe labor shortages in the West and North, attracting poor Black and Mexican Americans who began a significant migration to urban areas in search of jobs in the booming war industry. This mass migration created housing problems and competition for resources, resulting in racial tensions within the working class and often antagonistic responses from the police and justice system. Wartime politics and propaganda further contributed to rising racial tensions. The federal government mounted extensive campaigns to encourage patriotism and spur the defense efforts. Those who jarred cultural norms became vulnerable to abuse (Valdez, 1978). The Zoot Suit Riots erupted in Los Angeles between young Mexican American males and a few Filipino immigrants with Caucasian servicemen on June
3, 1943. At a 13-week trial involving Mexican American youths, newspapers and radio commentators took on a prejudicial tone and accentuated the negative portrayal of these youths as gang members. Compounded by wartime sentiments against Japan, anti-minority sentiment increased. Japanese Americans were forced from their homes on the West Coast into internment camps due to growing hysteria and racial prejudice (Los Angeles County HRC, 1996). It has been suggested that the true source of the violence directed at Mexican Americans by the servicemen involved in the Zoot Suit Riots was subconscious fear of Japanese American residents who had been interned (Greene, 1994). In view of increasing racial tensions, a group of concerned citizens met and recommended to the Los Angeles Board of Supervisors that a governmental agency was needed to confront the issue of intergroup relations. In response, the Joint Committee for Interracial Progress was created to “seek out the causes of racial tension and devise all means possible to eliminate them” (Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, 1969). Shifting its focus to include other issues, the Committee stated that the problems which existed between different groups were not only based on race, but included religious and nationality tensions.

Within Black communities, the U.S. involvement in a war against the Nazis and their overt racist ideology brought to the forefront racial inequality in the United States and within its armed forces. Some Black Americans debated whether or not this was a “Black man’s war.” In this highly charged racial climate, a major riot in Harlem erupted during 1943. A Black American soldier was shot in the shoulder by a New York policeman while attempting to resist his girlfriend’s arrest. Rumors quickly spread throughout the Black community that a White police officer shot a Black soldier in the back, in front of his mother.

The 1960s were an era of civil rights movements. Ongoing racism and structural barriers to housing, education and employment
contributed to urban poverty in communities of color and gave impetus for the massive mobilization of the civil rights movement. The lack of serious institutional response to this movement resulted in violent urban uprisings. The number of human relation organizations grew dramatically in the 1960s and early 1970s, largely in response to racial tensions. The Los Angeles City HRC was created soon after the Watts Riot. Not all cities waited until violence erupted locally before establishing a municipal HRC. In Chicago, Seattle, and San Francisco, the formation of human relations commissions was not a reaction to urban riots, although local demonstrations and racial tensions prompted a somewhat more proactive response to suppress potential violence. The San Francisco HRC was established after massive protests and demonstrations on “Auto Row” by Black Americans who could purchase automobiles but were barred from employment to sell or service them. In Seattle, community members and the city officials recognized a need for a human relations commission to alleviate tensions that were intensifying between the city and minority groups concerning housing. Although initially many Seattle citizens believed that the city did not have race problems, repeated local demonstrations against housing discrimination, along with a series of racial crises in public high schools, and the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. culminated in the formation of the HRC (City of Seattle HRC Report, 1968). Racial riots in nearby Detroit and conflicts locally provided an impetus for the formation of the Chicago HRC. Following the lead of the creation of a State Department of Civil Rights in Texas, Austin established a local HRC.

Early HRC efforts to resolve racial tension and conflicts generally began in the form of ad hoc committees appointed by mayors and other elected officials largely in reaction to racial tensions. The methods of resolution were generally preventive through education with minimal focus on addressing larger structural issues. Early HRCs were generally characterized by a paradigm structured towards resolving
conflicts between minorities and other groups. The paradigm was largely based on conflict resolution between Blacks and Whites. The legacy of this early paradigm is still present in many of the HRCs today.

**Conemporary Mission**

Mission statements describe the nature of the organization, values and beliefs which guide activities and the direction it wants to go. A mission statement has several functions: it serves as a communication tool, educates the public about activities and programs that can be expected from the organization, provides a planning and evaluation tool, and provides a target to which long-range goals can be directed. The early HRC mission statements were strikingly similar. All of the mission statements convey an explicit or implicit goal and vision to eliminate or reduce discrimination and/or improve the quality of people's lives. Here is a sampling of these missions: eliminate discrimination (Seattle), enhance the quality of life and economic well-being of citizens (Austin, Texas), build effective communities where each person is valued and included (Los Angeles County), create a city free of racism and violence (Los Angeles City), create a bias-free city (Chicago) promote human rights for all (San Francisco), and prohibit discrimination (New York). Implicit in the mission statements is the assumption that social problems occur because of cultural and social heterogeneity in their respective cities.

Mission statements are closely tied to the authority granted to the HRC by city ordinances and state and federal anti-discrimination laws. The responsibility to enforce city, state or federal anti-discrimination laws is referred to in mission statements by HRCs with direct or indirect enforcement powers. HRCs without powers of enforcement generally refer to human relations and the quality of life. Regardless of the agency's responsibilities, the vision appears to be one of equality. With the exception of Seattle, the mission statements make no reference to the
development of anti-discrimination policies that address structural barriers or social conditions. The mission statements tend to implicitly communicate a preventive response to discrimination through education and/or a reactive response through enforcement after discrimination has occurred.

The formal mission statements do not always reveal the direction and activities of an agency. Two HRC executive directors described HRC mission statements as "fuzzy, vague and outdated" and not reflective of an agency’s actual programs and activities (Interviews 3 & 5). HRCs began in response to conflict and violence between minorities and other groups but have now expanded their mission to include almost anyone who can be discriminated against. New York’s mission statement explicitly lists the categories to be protected: race, creed, color, age, national origin, alienage or citizenship status, gender, sexual orientation, disability, lawful occupation, arrest or conviction, marital and family status, and retaliation (NYC Commission on Human Rights, Annual Report, 1996). Chicago adds parental status, discharge status and source of income (1997 Adjudication Report: Discrimination in Chicago). The mission statements do not tend to single out one protected group as more important than another. Although APAs as a racial group may be one of many groups, they may also fit into several categories such as alienage, immigrant, creed, gender, sexual orientation and others. Discrimination specifically directed against APAs may at times be difficult to identify depending on the interpretation and context in which the discrimination takes place.

Organizational Structure

The HRCs in the study are City and/or County agencies and show some similarities and differences in their structures and in how the Executive Director and Commissioners are appointed, and the agency’s
place in the hierarchy of government affairs. Disparities in organizational structure are heavily influenced by historical factors and politics. Local HRCs are generally differentiated from State Human Rights Commissions by their powers of enforcement. State commissions have the power to investigate and legally enforce sanctions against proven discrimination cases, while the majority of HRCs may investigate but use powers of persuasion to obtain a resolution. The New York and Seattle HRCs are unique exceptions, with legal authority to investigate and prosecute. Local HRC activity is confined to a particular geographical area such as a city or county, while State HRCs service areas covers the entire state in which it is located.

All local HRCs exist within the hierarchy of city and/or county government. All HRCs are under the authority of city government and ultimately answer to mayors and city councils. Placement in the government hierarchy showed little consistency among the seven HRCs: county department (Los Angeles County), city department (Los Angeles City), city and county agency (San Francisco), city agency (Chicago, New York, and Seattle), and a sub-division within the Department of Human Resources (Austin, Texas). City agencies, such as New York and Seattle, have more extensive powers and independence than departmental and city HRCs.

There are some similarities in the organizational structures within the HRCs. All agencies have an executive director or chair and one or more commissions or advisory commissions headed by a president or chair. Chicago has eight advisory boards representing selected members of identified protected groups specifically, women, immigrant/refugee, gay and lesbians and Asian, Arab, and African American affairs. The Seattle Office for Civil Rights (SOCR) consists of three specialized advisory commissions: Human Rights, Women's Rights, and Sexual Minorities. They are concerned with discrimination in housing and employment against all protected groups including
ethnic/racial minorities and overlap with some of the issues relevant to sexual minorities and women. The City of Chicago’s Commission is comprised of eight Advisory Committees; African, Arab, Asian, Immigrant/Refugee, Latino, Veterans, and Women’s Affairs. Los Angeles City and County, New York, San Francisco and Texas are comprised of one commission.

Commission appointments appear to be highly political. Commissioners are appointed by mayors, city councils, and county boards of supervisors depending on the place of the HRCs in the governmental structure. The Seattle commissioners are appointed by the mayor and city council who, in turn, appoint one to two commissioners. Length of appointment and number of commissioners vary from one agency to another and range from three to four years with an average of 15 members per commission. Criteria for appointment does not seem to be readily available. Except for being representatives of the communities or groups which the HRCs serve, appointments are entirely in the hands of political officials. Since commissioners are not compensated except for reimbursable items related to fulfilling their function as commissioners, motivations to serve may range from altruism to political exposure. The majority of commissions serve in an advisory capacity to the mayor and other city officials who appoint them. Some commissions are charged with monitoring the HRCs programs, approving commission policies and/or agency budget requests. Commissioners may possibly advocate and support the agenda of their “appointers” rather than the needs of the agency (Interview 3). Moreover, without formal criteria regarding qualifications, commission members may not possess the experience or knowledge of race relations and politics necessary to support the direction of the agency. There does not appear to be any one pattern that characterizes how HRCs decide on the composition of the commissions. Seattle and Chicago’s specialized commissions (e.g., women, gay and lesbians and ethnic affairs) generally include individuals who are members of the
communities they represent. Other HRC appointments appear to be based on a mix of rationales including current concerns to the HRC and their respective city and/or city demographics.

The daily activities of the agency are run by a salaried executive director or chair who holds the highest administrative position. With the exception of one HRC, the appointment of executive directors are subject to the same politics as the commissions. The majority of the executive directors appear to be highly qualified for their positions with previous experience in race relations and city government. Of the seven interviewed HRCs, all had an executive director who was a member of an ethnic/racial group and/or was a woman.

The size and composition of staff vary according to the budget, mission, and programs. Staff sizes range from 15 to 133, not counting commissioners. HRCs that focus on race relations have the smallest staff, while those with enforcement powers, both legal and compliance, have the largest staff. The ethnic composition of the staff vary. The majority of HRCs are ethnically and racially diverse. The demographics of the HRC catchment area does appear to have some influence on the race and ethnicity of the staff. In addition, it appears that staff working in intervention programs are selected to represent those groups who are perceived as requiring attention or being at-risk for possible conflict. Most HRC executive directors who were interviewed and had small staff sizes were able to cite the job positions and ethnicity/race of all of the agency’s staff. On the other hand, one administrator of a large urban HRC stated that the ethnic composition of staff was unknown. It was further explained that the ethnic/racial composition of the HRC was an outcome of the civil service system that seeks to be impartial. Applicants for staff positions must take and pass the civil service exam, and the agency then hires from the “top of the list.” The administrator went on to add that all ethnic groups complain about low representation on the HRC staff and gave the example of an Italian man who complained there were not enough Italians represented on staff.
City and state politics generally mandate the type of enforcement authority that an agency possesses. This is reflected in the types of programs and activities an HRC develops and provides. Based on powers of authority, HRC programs are characterized by the amount of resources (time, staff, and funding) invested in a particular set of activities. The characteristics of the various HRC programs can be grouped into one of three models. Overlap does occur because HRCs will engage in varying degrees in more than one program activity. However, HRC program activities generally tend to emphasize one type of program over another.

The first program model is the “traditional prevention/intervention” model. These programs are comprised of “process oriented” “human relation” activities that exist along a continuum from proactive prevention to crisis intervention (Interviews 3, 5 & 6). The Los Angeles County HRC employs a “triage approach” of proactive prevention, intervention and suppression programs. Without the legal authority to enforce, this model relies heavily on powers of persuasion. Programs are reminiscent of those that existed when HRCs were first established. These programs do not provide direct services to individuals and instead work with groups and communities. This model relies on establishing formal and informal networks with community groups and organizations. Prevention programs can take many forms including education in the schools, research, the dissemination of brochures and flyers that inform community members of the rights of protected citizens, speakers at community events, annual multicultural celebrations and dinners to honor selected members from the community for their work in combating discrimination. Workshops are offered by some HRCs to train police officers, educate employers and landlords on the rights of protected citizens, provide limited English speaking immigrants with information on how to file for public benefits, and creation of an HIV prison project.
The purpose of an educational component is to empower individuals to exercise their rights and prevent discrimination. Identifying potential risk areas for the emergence of conflict is also seen by some HRCs as a proactive response. However, more intervention programs are implemented after incidences of violence have already emerged. These programs are viewed as proactive attempts to contain large-scale violence. During the proactive intervention phase, risk areas are identified (e.g., reports of hate crimes in a particular geographical location that the HRC serves), and a team of field workers is sent in to coordinate resources to address the problem. The Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission builds existing infrastructure within a community in an effort to provide services. The team of field workers pulls together public and private resources such as law enforcement, community-based organizations (e.g., churches, ethnic/racial and gay and lesbian organizations), schools, and private businesses and corporations. These groups form a mutual assistance consortium to deliver services. This approach is partly the result of limited resources and an attempt to involve all factions in the community to address the problem. When conflict emerges, the community is empowered and the infrastructure is in place for resolution and intervention. A final intervention strategy is suppression. Suppression is employed when conflict has erupted into violence. The consortium of organizations established earlier is put into action. Process-oriented resolution strategies and dialogues are employed to contain the violence. However, some communities do not have an existing infrastructure, and the HRC must assist in creating one.

The second program model is one of “legal investigation and resolution through compliance.” HRCs under this model have the power to legally investigate complaints of discrimination and seek resolution. They do not, however, have the authority to legally prosecute. Authority to investigate charges of discrimination is derived from the creation of new civil right laws passed during the 1980s through municipal codes
and state legislation (e.g., articles of the Housing and Urban Development legislation). However, enforcement does not include the power to prosecute or impose civil penalties. The Austin, Chicago and San Francisco HRCs are characteristic of this model. This model depends on the formal collaboration of community organizations and agencies. If an investigation finds that discrimination has occurred, resolution then depends on the voluntary participation of the individual, business, or organization charged with discrimination and the individual who filed the complaint. Among the three HRCs in this model, there is some variation in specific procedures during the process of investigation and resolution of complaints. However, all lack legal authority to prosecute. For example, using field representatives and/or lawyers, the San Francisco HRC may investigate a charge of employment discrimination and convene a mediation hearing. The executive director will evaluate investigative and hearing reports, then issue a finding towards resolution (e.g., monetary fine and wages). The individual or organization charged with discrimination reviews the report and is given an opportunity to appeal the recommended resolution. Prior to the appeal stage, the investigation process does not necessarily require the participation or cooperation of the accused. However, both the complainant and the accused must agree to have it go forward to a hearing officer. If the complaint has been determined to be valid and the alleged violator refuses to participate or comply with the recommendations, a referral is made to an appropriate city department or organization with enforcement powers. Programs with investigative powers intervene after an act of discrimination has occurred. Intervention generally occurs on a case-by-case basis. HRCs in this model expend some resources and staff time in prevention and education programs. For example, the San Francisco HRC expends about 20 percent of its resources on prevention and education in such areas as outreach and workshops to inform citizens, businesses, and landlords on civil rights laws.
The third type of program is the "legal enforcement and resolution" model. Nationally, this model is uncommon with only two HRCs having powers to prosecute, New York and Seattle (Interview 6). Not only do these agencies have the power to legally investigate discrimination complaints, they also possess the ability to prosecute and impose civil penalties such as back pay, rent refunds, training, and reinstatement of employment or damages for pain and suffering.

Both New York and Seattle provide an array of outreach and educational programs outside of investigation and legal enforcement. The New York's HRC also has a Community Relations Bureau that includes a crisis intervention component.

Although most of the HRCs believe that the source of conflict is generally other factors than race, they provide programs to prevent discrimination through educating members in the community or intervene after it has occurred through report or conflict. Most of the HRCs have no formalized structure to respond in a proactive manner to the social policies that impact the populations they serve although most attempt to advocate for public policy reform. One interviewee explained that "policy is reactive to social conditions" (e.g., civil rights movement). The Seattle HRC, however, has a policy analysis division which examines the potential impact of new and proposed legislation on the populations it serves. The agency responds by advocating for or against a policy based on how it will affect protected groups.

Funding

The main source of HRC funding comes from the city and county, with some federal funds. Federal funds are tied to enforcing antidiscrimination legislation in housing (HUD), employment (EEOP) and hate crimes. The amount of funding granted to an agency appears to be related to the type of programs the HRC provides. HRCs with legal authority to investigate complaints have larger budgets than programs
which provide only prevention and intervention services. HRCs that investigate and prosecute generally have larger budgets than the other two types of program models. Geographical or demographic considerations do not seem to be related to an agency's funding. For example, the densely populated New York City HRC has an extensive budget of approximately seven million dollars per year, while the similarly populated Los Angeles County, with a greater geographical dispersion, receives approximately one million dollars per year from the County. It also does not appear that the number of reported discrimination and hate crimes is a consideration for budget allocation. Los Angeles County has experienced a continued growth in hate crimes throughout the last decade (Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations, 1997). To increase their budget, Los Angeles County relies on fund-raising activities from private agencies and corporations. Agencies may also take on projects that are considered important but of low priority to their overall mission in an effort to increase their funding. For example, Los Angeles County contracted with the INS to produce a manual on the management of day labor at hiring sites. Most HRCs were dissatisfied with the amount of their allocated budget. One city HRC described their budget as "pathetic" when compared to the money allocated to the city fire and police departments (Interview 5). One HRC was not only scaled back in funding, but lost their departmental status when the city experienced a recession. One individual conveyed that current budget allocations have made it difficult and sometimes impossible to carry out the agency's mission (Interview 3), while another voiced concern about the inability to focus on programs believed to be of importance. For example, one HRC wanted to move beyond investigative functions and increase resources in prevention programs (Interview 17). The majority of explanations given for low budgets were attributed to past or present politics, for example, a long-standing former mayor who only tolerated the agency and had no interest in its significance and had failed to understand the implications
of the city’s socio-demographics (Interview 16). Funding was also explained as an outcome of the agency’s organizational structure. Loyalties may be balanced more towards elected politicians who appoint commissioners than the agency and its mission. For example, since mayors or other political officials control the budget and appoint commissioners, there may be a reduced incentive for commissioners to advocate for a budget increase (Interview 3). One executive director was clearly satisfied with the funding and support received by the agency. The executive director conveyed strong support from a relatively new mayor and city administration plus significant increases in funding to carry out mandates and achieve goals (Interview 8). The mayor was described as sharing the agency’s mission and vision and as one who viewed the agency as an integral part of city government.

Evaluation of Agency Effectiveness

How an agency evaluates its effectiveness and the types of tangible outcomes that are used to measure success is tied to its mission, mandates and programs. The direct effects of prevention activities on discrimination are difficult to measure, thus most of the HRCs focused on outcomes such as the number of multicultural festivals, community presentations, workshops, and media events (e.g., television broadcasts) held during a given year. Reporting the number of accomplished activities does not directly address whether the agency has achieved its mission to reduce or eliminate hate crimes, discrimination and bias, and improve interpersonal relations or the quality of people’s lives. One agency counts the number of calls that come in from the community after a presentation or media event as an indicator of successful education and outreach efforts. Surveys are used by one HRC to evaluate client satisfaction of prevention (e.g., workshops) and intervention programs. For example, one HRC surveys both parties of a discrimination dispute about their experiences with the investigation and resolution process.
The effects of intervention programs are somewhat less elusive and provide more tangible measures of effectiveness than prevention programs. Measures can include a reduction in hate crimes and complaints of discrimination, the number of complaints processed and brought to resolution, and community organization efforts. As a tangible indicator of effectiveness, one agency calculated the amount of time it takes for a case to move from a complaint to some type of resolution. Investment in computerized programs to track complaints of discrimination appears to be a new trend. One HRC representative argued that the "conventional methods" of disparity studies comparing minority and non-minorities is unreliable because businesses and public organizations do not necessarily keep accurate records in housing and employment (Interview 8). Instead, the tangible outcome used to evaluate effectiveness is whether the agency has carried out its mandates and met its goals, which can be determined by an agency's record of accomplishments such as a decrease in complaints and the enforcement of affirmative action contracts with public and private businesses.

APA ISSUES AND PARTICIPATION IN THE HRC

Asian Pacific Americans And Race Relations

The way APA concerns are addressed by HRCs is heavily influenced by a public perception that APAs are not generally a target of hate crimes. Relatively low rates of reported APA hate crimes to HRCs support this view, especially when compared to Blacks, Jews, and non-White Hispanics. For example, in Los Angeles County where one of the nation's largest APA population resides, three hate crimes against APAs were reported in the 1997 annual report, while two were reported in Chicago involving Middle Easterners and none in Austin, Texas (Chicago Report, Los Angeles County Report, 1997, Interviews 2, 6, 7 & 10). When cases of violence are reported in the media, they are often
presented as an isolated event such as the beating death of Vincent Chin in Detroit in 1988 during massive lay-offs in the automotive industry. Although Vincent Chin was Chinese, racism appeared to take a back seat to explanations of auto industry competition with Japan. Similarly, when a Filipino American postal worker was the only fatality of the perpetrator who committed the violent attack on the Jewish children’s day camp during the summer of 1999 in Los Angeles, relatively minimal media attention was focused on him or his family.

Discounting acts of violence may further support a perception that APAs do not experience hate crimes. How hate crimes are defined by HRCs has significant implications for agency response and policy. The legal definition of a hate crime varies slightly from state to state but generally is defined as any criminal or attempted act which is motivated by the actual or perceived victim’s race, ethnicity, religion, sexual orientation, gender, or disability status (Hate Crime in Los Angeles County, 1997). Racial epithets are not necessarily considered a hate crime unless there is a threat of violence and not otherwise protected by free speech laws (City of Chicago Commission on Human Relations, 1997). Graffiti is a hate crime only when it is directed at a specific group. Vandalism, on the other hand, is considered to be a hate crime directed at houses of worship or institutions, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. One of the primary determinants of a hate crime is the motivating factor behind the act. Motivation can be established by admission from the perpetrator, verbal or written threats, symbols (e.g., Nazi swastika) or a pattern of incidents. Without evidence that the aggression or attack was motivated by racism, a hate crime cannot be determined. For example, during 1999 one large urban area experienced approximately twenty arson carport fires destroying structures and automobiles within a period of a few months. All of the victims were APAs. Although reports of the carport fires were covered in the media, no mention was made to APAs as targets or victims. This information was instead reported to the
County Board of Supervisors and subsequently referred to the County Fire Department Chief who headed an arson investigation. No investigation of possible racism was initiated. It was explained during an interview with an administrator at the local HRC that no actual evidence that a hate crime targeted at APAs had occurred (Interviewee 3). There was a lack of evidence that the perpetrator who was not apprehended had a bias, hatred or prejudice towards APAs. No symbols or verbal and written threats existed that were directed towards APAs. In other words, racism as a motivation could not be established. The acts did not fit the classification of vandalism because they were not directed towards any specific organization or house of worship. One interviewed individual at the local HRC stated that some city officials believed that although all victims of the fires were APAs, no evidence to the contrary existed that the fires were not random acts of arson (Interviewee 3). Thus, incidences such as these will not make their way into the annual hate crime report, and APAs will again show a relatively low rate of hate crimes. This situation is reminiscent of what happened during WWII when returning Japanese Americans were reintegrated into the community. The HRCs chose to promote resettlement quietly to avoid public controversy. Similarly, the movement of immigrant Vietnamese into California was also done quietly to avoid public controversy. This (social response of quietly resolving) fits well with Asian Pacific American’s under-reporting of hate crimes and image as a model minority.

Most HRCs acknowledged that the low rates of APA discrimination and hate crime reports may be a consequence of under-reporting. The most common explanation given for under-reporting was Asian cultural values and beliefs. For example, the traditional APA cultural practice of keeping personal problems and difficulties within the family and not publicly airing them to avoid shame was cited by three of the HRCs (Interviewees 6, 8 & 9). Other explanations were language barriers and, for Southeast Asians, fear of any government institution or
official. Cultural explanations make an assumption that all APAs adhere to traditional cultural values and beliefs and also imply that the only APA groups who under-report are immigrants. Conversely, one APA interviewee believes that the under-reporting of incidences is partly an outcome of inadequate publicity and community outreach and the political marginalization of APAs (Interview 4).

Although not all of the HRCs have the power of enforcement, all of the agencies conveyed the importance of protecting immigrants and other groups (e.g., ethnic/racial minorities, disabled, gays and lesbians, and women) from discrimination in housing and employment. However, when giving case examples of APA discrimination and/or tension, interviewees almost always described incidences involving Asian immigrants. Urban areas have undergone significant demographic changes since the 1965 immigration law. The Asian Pacific American population has grown from small numbers of primarily Chinese and Japanese to a more dispersed and diverse population. HRC interviewees tended to agree that as the APA population increases, so does tension and conflict as groups begin to compete for resources in housing and employment. Race is viewed as a secondary factor in the rising tensions and conflicts. For example, in one large urban area, a “destabilization” of neighborhoods has occurred as immigrants buy or rent housing (Interviewee 4). One HRC staff member stated that “while one or two Asian families residing in a neighborhood does not pose a problem, more families begin to set off conflicts.” It was also stated that White ethnics resist the influx of “outsiders” (i.e., Asian Pacific Americans). This perception of conflict and violence tied to APA population growth and the concomitant competition over resources was supported by the description by an HRC official regarding the violence in Texas between White and Vietnamese fisherman during the late 1970’s. “In and of themselves” Vietnamese were not seen as a problem until their numbers grew and they began to be perceived as a serious economic threat to White shrimpers (Interview 6).
mounting tension and subsequent violence culminated when White shrimpers contacted the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) to assist them in removing Vietnamese from the Gulf Waters. The KKK responded by intimidating Vietnamese families and individuals, burning shrimp boats, firing shots at them, and threatening to kill them. The KKK obtained a boat mounted with a cannon and threatened to shoot at any Vietnamese fishing boat that came into the Gulf waters. The response was to file a lawsuit against the KKK and pass legislation dismantling and prohibiting KKK paramilitary training camps throughout the state.

Much of the conflict involving APAs has taken on a decidedly anti-immigration tone (Interviews 4, 8, 9, 13 & 14). Anti-immigration sentiment has made its way into formal legislation such as California’s English-only initiatives, the end of bilingual education in the Los Angeles school districts (Interview 8), and welfare reform policies (Interview 14). HRCs are generally not structured to significantly effect these policies. One interviewee stated that policy is reactive to social conditions, that “policy is in front” and HRCs “do not take a leadership role here” (Interview 3). Moreover, social policies do not meet HRC definitions of discrimination, hate crimes or violence, but definitely reflect a climate of intolerance and exclusion towards Asian Pacific Americans and other immigrant groups.

Multiracial conflict between APAs and other minority groups has gained national attention. One APA commissioner stated Asian Pacific Americans are viewed as a model minority except when it comes to their involvement in interracial conflict (Interview 11). The most notable cases have been between Blacks and Korean merchants. Most Whites are “perplexed by it all,” and their response has been to avoid any involvement (Interview 5). Both Asian and non-Asians described the source of conflict as primarily about competition over resources with race as a secondary factor. How conflict is defined has a significant impact for response. One interviewee described the conflict between Blacks and
Koreans as part of a historical continuum (Interview 5). In the Black community there has always been a merchant class of "outsiders." Prior to the Koreans it was Jewish and Chinese. Blacks have always complained that they have been cheated, over-charged, and seldom hired. Resources are taken from the community without any investment back into the Black community. Faces and race may change, but these perceptions remain the same. On the other hand, the Black community does not realize the problems faced by small business owners. For example, small businesses do not have the same access to low-cost bulk and discount purchasing as the large supermarket corporations who are able to pass on savings to their customers. Furthermore, both groups seem to lack an understanding of each others' cultural values, beliefs, and behaviors. He states that much was learned after the riots. Koreans have taken a more active role in the community where they own their businesses and have hired Blacks. "The number of incidences have come down and both groups have become sensitized" to one another (Interview 4). However, he notes that underlying tensions remain and that Blacks continue to experience a threat of displacement as more Asians continue to move into the community. Although the conflict was primarily defined as one involving competition over resources, the resolution strategy was primarily one of improving relationships by opening dialogue and mediation and educating the two groups about one another. This method of response appears to be typical of HRCs with mandates and programs that are principally focused on human relationships through education.

APA involvement in multiracial conflict extends beyond the Korean and Black incidences. To further complicate the multiracial nature of conflict, intra-group conflict among APA ethnic groups and with other protected groups has emerged. Youth gang violence between APAs, Blacks and non-White Hispanics has been on the rise during the last two decades. Chinese, Filipino, and Southeast Asian gangs not only have had aggressive and violent confrontations with other minority gangs,
but with one another. Although youth gang membership is based on race, in the APA community confrontations are generally defined as delinquent criminal behavior and not hate crimes. Two HRC interviewees partly attribute youth gang violence to a structure of race relations tied to an emphasis on ethnic and racial differences that create divisive polarities (Interview 3 & 4).

Cultural celebrations are described as “culturally cumbersome” and should not be used as a predominant strategy to improve race relations (Interviewer 3). For example, instead of improving race relations, cultural celebrations have generally led to violence between Black and Brown youth in the high and middle schools and housing projects. An alternative strategy would be to focus on “common experiences” such as history and their place in society. Two HRCs have moved to prevention programs which de-emphasize differences and instead emphasize common issues and experiences that transcend race. Most recently, one of the local HRCs supported the removal of cultural celebrations from several of the city’s high schools.

To further complicate the multiracial nature of conflict, there is a growing concern regarding complaints of conflict between APAs and other protected groups. In New York, conflicts between Pakistani and Bangladeshi taxi cab drivers and other protected groups (e.g., women and the disabled) have been reported. It is not clear if the conflict is based on religious anti-Muslim or anti-Sikh sentiment or racism, or if it is a case of sexism and discrimination against disabled people (Interview 4). The older paradigm of Black and White conflict does little to advance our understanding (Interview 3).

There seems to exist a perception that non-immigrant APAs are not in need of as much protection as immigrants and other protected groups. As one HRC administrator stated, “Chinese Americans are successful at being given political and economic access” (Interviewee 8). With the exception of two interviewees, issues of discrimination among
non-immigrant APAs did not emerge. However, outside of the ethnic enclaves the glass ceiling effect in employment, the under-representation of APA's in institutions of higher learning, the attempts at some universities to place an admission cap on selected Asian Pacific American groups, the glaring absence of APA representation in the media, and the under-representation of appointed and elected APA officials in municipal, state and federal levels of government were generally ignored. APAs are not immune to similar biases and discrimination in housing that immigrants experience. Two APA interviewees described cases of discrimination and bias in purchasing or renting homes in traditionally White suburban neighborhoods (Interview 4 & 14).

Perceptions of Asian Pacific Americans as having “made it” contribute to the minimal attention focused on institutional racism and discrimination. Several of the interviewed HRCs seem to support a contention that non-immigrant APAs are doing quite well without them. Almost all of the HRCs gave at least one model minority explanation that demonstrated stereotypes about APAs. One top-ranking HRC administrator stated that Asian Pacific Americans are largely successful and have done very well in education and economics and that their “children do very well in school” (Interviewee 6). Reflecting a stereotype of APAs choosing to keep to themselves, this same administrator stated that with the exception of the local Chamber of Commerce, there was a lack of interest on the part of Asian Pacific Americans to participate in mainstream organizations or the local governments.

The issue is a lack of inclusion in government, institutions and communities in which Asian Pacific Americans reside. Unlike the more blatant behavioral acts of racial discrimination and hate crimes, institutional racism is subtle. Concerned largely with enforcement, conflict resolution and/or prevention and education, HRCs are not structured to address these more subtle forms of discrimination. Glass ceilings are contained within an institutional infrastructure that does not spill out of
those boundaries into street violence and hate crimes (Interview 3). Institutional discrimination and racism is not easy to detect and even more difficult to prove.

**APA Participation and Role in the HRC**

The role and participation of APAs within HRCs was somewhat mixed. While one HRC had a special Commission on Asian American Affairs, other agencies had no substantive or institutionalized approach to specifically include APAs. The exceptions were the responses to conflict between African Americans and Koreans and issues concerned with all immigrants. Asian immigrants are generally not differentiated from other protected immigrant groups. Overall, it appears as if Asian Pacific Americans have minimal participation within the formal structure of human relation commissions. Several APA and non-APA commission members acknowledged that Asian Pacific Americans as a group have no role in their agency (Interviews 2, 4, 6 & 7).

APAs have been able to participate at the commission level, but there are still problems. One HRC reported that there were no Asian Pacific Americans on the commission, but the problem may be more extensive because the available information is incomplete. (One administrator did not know the ethnicity or race of commission members and would “get back” with that information.) At three HRCs dealing with recent tension between Blacks and Koreans, Koreans were appointed to two commissions, while the third HRC did not appoint a Korean. The HRC with no Asian Pacific American commissioners explained that Asian Pacific Americans in that city did not file discrimination complaints and have not indicated an interest in becoming involved with the organization. Considering that there are numerous ethnic groups that comprise the category of Asian Pacific Islander, none are represented on the commission. (This is not a problem unique to APAs, but is also a problem for the ethnically diverse Latino population.)
APAs have been present among the HRC executive directors. In general, the composition of this key position is somewhat diversified. At the time of the study, there were two White women, one male and one female Asian Pacific American, and two male and one female African Americans. Glaringly missing are Hispanics. The Asian Pacific American executive directors are located in areas with one of the highest concentrations of Asian Pacific Americans in this country. All of the interviewed HRCs were asked who was the first Asian Pacific American to serve as an executive director at their HRC. Two of the agencies reported former Asian Pacific American executive directors. Seattle reported one Asian Pacific American male almost thirty years ago, and San Francisco cited two former Asian Pacific American Directors during the last two decades. Asian Pacific Americans comprise a significant population size in both of these cities. Three HRC administrators did not know if there had been a past executive director of Asian ancestry. When considering that HRCs have been in existence for fifty years or more, the appointment of Asian Pacific Americans as executive directors appears to be relatively recent.

As stated earlier, the composition of the HRC staffs are influenced by a number of factors, including the civil service hiring process. The available information indicates that one HRC had no Asian Pacific Americans on their staff. Those HRCs that could report on the ethnicity of staff persons revealed a cross representation of Asian, Latinos, Jews, and African Americans. In these HRCs the number of staff in a particular racial/ethnic category may be related to the ethnicity of the executive director. For example, at one HRC where the executive director was Asian Pacific American, about 38 percent of the staff were Asian Pacific American while about 2 percent were African American. At another HRC where the executive director was African American about 33 percent of the staff were African American, while about 1 percent were Asian Pacific American. Both HRCs served a remarkably similar area.
with similar demographic distributions of ethnic/racial minorities.

City politics have an important influence on the role of APAs. Politics can enhance and support the role of APAs, or ignore them, or create a negative hostile environment. Mayors have considerable power and authority in influencing an agency’s mission, organizational structure, funding, direction and policies and can play a significant role in the appointment of commission members. According to one commission member, “electoral politics is where race relations get played out” (Interview 4). Mayors have the power and authority to direct more initiatives to community outreach and address hate crimes through conferences and public hearings to gather testimony about incidences of discrimination (Interview 18). Current outreach efforts to the APA community generally include flyers and literature distributed at various community events, media and publicity, and appearances by commission members at cultural festivals. Mayors can also appoint Asian Pacific Americans to fairly high level senior and advisory positions as part of the administration’s “inner circle.” This inclusion of Asian Pacific Americans provides access to key policy-makers. The lack of APAs in government severely limits access to the key decision makers, who without this access have minimal influence on the mission, mandates, programs, and policies of the HRC (Interview 18). This commission member further noted that the commission is supposed to be the “eyes and the ears” of the community, informing the mayor of the racial climate in the city. However, the commission does not serve this function in the current administration. Commission members at three HRCs described past and current mayors as people who don’t care, as only tolerating the HRC, as unaware of race relations, and as ignorant of the impact of rapidly changing demographics on race relations (Interviews 3, 4 & 5).

In addition to city politics, characteristics and perceptions of the APA community also appear to shape the APA role within HRCs. Interviews with those in HRCs where Asian Pacific Americans have little
or no role revealed that the APA population in their catchment area was very small or that no complaints based on race or national origin are filed (Interviews 2, 6, 7, 9, 11 & 17), implying that population size relative to other groups and the number of complaints filed are equated with an APA role.

The myth of APAs as a model minority was evident during the interviews as reflected in explanations for the lack of APA presence in the HRC. One APA interviewee stated that overall, Asian Pacific Americans have benefited more than any other group from civil rights legislation (Interview 8). Others pointed to the political and economic success achieved by some APA groups. It was noted by several HRCs that other minority groups “still had a way to go,” such as Arabs, East Africans, Eastern Europeans, Ethiopians, and Latinos whose populations are rapidly increasing in large urban areas. Discrimination against immigrants as a group was described as problematic by the majority of HRCs. “The new focus” appears to be “on new immigrant groups” (Interview 8). Low rates of complaints were interpreted as an indicator that overall APAs do not have as great a need for HRC services as other groups.

One interpretation of low APA participation in HRCs is that it is due to choice. One interviewee noted that there was a general lack of interest for the APA community to become involved (Interview 6). At this particular HRC, an Asian Pacific American has never been appointed or hired as executive director, commissioner, or staff member. In addition, Asian Pacific Americans were described as being more interested in their own organizations and economic organizations within the community, such as the Chamber of Commerce. Two agencies noted that Asian Pacific Americans are more cohesive than other groups. However, interviews from the APA community dispute the claim of cohesiveness and advocate for stronger coalitions between APA ethnic groups (Interviews 13 & 14).
The perception of APAs as model minorities who are doing quite well affects the perception of HRCs. One interviewee from the APA community stated that HRCs have not yet recognized Asian Pacific Americans in their efforts (Interview 13). With the exception of one, all of the HRCs stated that Asian Pacific Americans were an important part of the HRC missions and programs. However, in the actual organizational structure and day-to-day activities of HRCs, APAs appear to have minimal participation and possess little power.

One APA commission member stated that APAs have been and are in the position to assume the role of an “objective party” in conflicts involving race (Interview 3). APAs occupy the position that Edna Bonachich refers to as the “middleman minority” (Interview 3). For example, Judge Lance Ito who presided in the O.J. Simpson trial was not necessarily acceptable, but not unacceptable to African Americans or Whites. The commission member notes that being an “objective party” in conflicts is a delicate and complicated role. APAs must manage a public and ethnic identity, and remain conscious of different audiences. One implication of the “middleman” role is that APAs are in a position to assist in establishing relations and coalitions among disparate populations.

HRC VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Almost all of the HRCs and APA community members shared a similar vision about race relations of going beyond looking at ethnic/minorities as separate groups with separate issues and concerns. The increase of multiracial conflict and discrimination between ethnic/racial populations with other protected groups and the inclusion of other new groups (e.g., women, disabled, elderly, gays and lesbians, transgender people, veterans) require HRCs to view race relations differently. One executive director calls for a move from a “tribal orientation” to a structure that is inclusive of everyone (Interview 11).
One ethnic minority HRC administrator stated that there needs to be a move away from the ethnocentric politics of race — race relations are no longer based on a Black/White paradigm nor on a minority versus White paradigm (Interview 5). To focus on just one group not only becomes ethnocentric, but further divides groups as one becomes more powerful than another. A common and consistent theme is to focus on similarities and what the different groups have in common and share. A message of common interests seeks to unify groups. This administrator delivers the message that division has outlived its usefulness. In presentations he "downplays ethnicity, blends lines" and delivers a "gentle presentation." Common interests gain the cooperation and participation of the community. The executive director refers to this as "interest politics" instead of racial politics. He defines multiculturalism as "recognizing each culture" within a context of interest politics. He further notes that Whites have been staying away from the tension among minority groups. He states that "most Whites are perplexed by it all." To present a unified group to address issues and concerns, the White community needs to be brought in as part of the dialogue. This executive director delivers the message that division has outlived its usefulness.

One APA executive director stated that HRCs are currently tied to a structure that creates polarities. The executive director argues that racial and ethnic categories should not be a predominant strategy used by HRCs to address problems of racism and discrimination. Moreover, ethnic and racial categories are political and foster stereotypes. An alternative view is to deconstruct categories. If inclusion is the goal, then hypothetically everyone must be included. Categories are social constructs and as such create ambiguity about who does or doesn't belong. The executive director states that "we are lacking a theoretical model" on how to include all groups." He argues that the current strategy is to reduce conflict between the polarized groups — right now everyone wants to "make nice." Instead of celebrating cultural diversity
or managing conflict, the sources of conflict need to be directly addressed, worked through, and resolved.

It is a fine line between respecting each group individually, while trying to find common interests and politics. Common interests that transcend race include economic issues, equity for all races, crack houses, education, gang infestation, prostitution, and community needs. The vision of common agendas that seek to unify diverse groups has already begun to be integrated into programs. For example, field workers involved in prevention and intervention work seek out issues that are shared by the majority of members in a particular community in an effort to unite people in a common cause that is not race focused. One HRC has implemented an outreach campaign named “We All Belong” to symbolize its vision of multicultural inclusion.

The new vision ties discrimination and conflict to existing social factors that create economic and structural barriers. One APA executive director stated a coalition of economic equity made of all oppressed groups is needed. The HRC can tap into community coalitions and coalitions can tap into other subgroups. To form a unified front to combat these problems, problems are re-conceptualized from issues of race to social factors that affect all members within a community. The implication is that splintered competing groups cannot garner the power needed to address social issues unless they join together.

Both Asian Pacific American community leaders and APA HRC members support the new vision. However, in order to participate in this united front, APAs must have a voice and significant role in HRCs and city government. With equal participation, APAs can unite with others to influence HRC mission, mandates, programs, organizational structure, and policies.
References


Part III

National Race Policies
Introduction

Over the last decade affirmative action has emerged as the defining wedge issue on race, and Asian Pacific Americans (APAs) occupy a unique position in this heated political debate. APAs are materially and ideologically on both sides of the political divide, with some adamantly supporting and others vehemently opposing the policy. Understanding the APA position is important for several reasons. Their socioeconomic diversity poses troubling questions regarding the underlying purpose and coverage of race-based programs. Just as the other chapters in this book demonstrate, APAs do not fit easily into the prevailing black-white conceptualization of race, specifically in this case into remedial policies predicated largely on the black experience. APAs remain significantly disadvantaged in some arenas, thus have a plausible claim for inclusion in group-based programs, but they are not disadvantaged in other arenas.

The socioeconomic status of APAs points to complex hierarchy rather than a simple dichotomous order. The simplicity of a black-white paradigm lies in the absolute and interlocking of the group ordering across disparate arenas, from education to work to capital accumulation. The inequality is so pervasive, glaring and systematic that it is self-evident. In a simple bipolar structure, policies to correct racial inequality are simpler to design and implement, although still controversial with the disputes revolving around the specific causes and solutions. The status of APAs moves us away from this duality to a more nuanced paradigm with APAs occupying a middle position between blacks and whites. Even this ordinal depiction fails to capture the complexity. The material
standing of APAs varies significantly from one dimension to another so that the juxtaposition is not fixed. This inconsistency undermines the validity of the prevailing notion about racism. Rectifying the logical flaw is a necessary step to reconceptualizing race.

The presence of APAs has also complicated the political debate. In a few geographic locations, APAs are sufficiently large enough to affect ballot outcomes; consequently, they are courted by proponents and opponents for votes. (For examples, see the chapter by Saito and Park in this book.) The importance of APAs, however, extends well beyond narrow electoral politics. The ideological position held by APAs is important symbolically. The affirmative action debate is about the extent of society's obligation to address racial inequality and about the mechanisms that ought to be used. As a minority group with a long history of racial victimization, but also one that has overcome many (albeit not all) racial barriers, the position taken by APAs is powerful fodder for political polemics. Coming to grips with the APA political position, however, is not easy due to the heterogeneity of the population.

This chapter examines the unique position of APAs, starting in Part I with an overview of the evolution of affirmative action, an important and divisive policy emerging from the civil rights movement. Affirmative action is the contested boundary defining how aggressive government ought to be to redress racial inequality. Unlike the strong public and judicial support for anti-discrimination laws, support for race-based strategies to attenuate group disparity is ambiguous and conditional. The heated debate revolves around programs governing the internal operation of the public sector: government hiring and contracting, and admission to state-supported schools. The next section, Part II, examines the material positions of APAs in the three major arenas: education, employment, and business. The statistical evidence reveals a mixed picture of high achievement and under representation. The variation in socioeconomic status translates to differences in the
nature of APA participation in the major affirmative action programs, which is discussed in Part III. The available information shows that APAs bear the cost and reap the benefits. Because of this spread, APAs have taken varying political positions within the affirmative action debate in pursuit of both self-interest and broader principles. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the challenges posed by APAs for affirmative action.

PART I: THE EVOLUTION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Affirmative action must be understood as a part of a political movement by blacks and their allies to fight racism and promote socioeconomic justice. The decades leading up to this policy were ones of historical changes. Starting with the integration of the military during World War II, the civil rights movement went on to transform other parts of society, with much of the gains coming in the 1960s. State supported segregation in public schools ended with the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education ruling. President Kennedy used executive power in 1961 to require federal contractors to end any discriminatory employment practices and to establish the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit discrimination by privately owned facilities open to the public, by federally-funded programs, and by both private and public employers. The 1965 Voting Rights Act added force behind the drive to protect the rights of minorities to participate in elections.

Presidents played key roles in setting the pace. Despite campaign promises and inspiring public pronouncements, President Kennedy moved slowly and cautiously, shying away from fully utilizing his discretionary powers and delaying politically risky legislation. Lyndon B. Johnson’s view evolved over his career, initially siding with segregationists as a Congressman, then accepting the necessity of
addressing civil rights issues as Senate Majority Leader, and later pressing for legislation as Vice President. As President, he pushed his “Great Society” agenda to attack racial inequality. President Nixon proved enigmatic for initially supporting and then opposing key elements in the civil rights agenda, and his contradictory actions may be best understood as calculated political actions to weaken enemies and garner support.

The enactment of these laws was facilitated by a robust and growing economy, which minimized inter-group conflicts over resources. Paying for the cost of social change from an expanding economic pie enabled this nation to avoid the difficulty of reallocating in a zero-sum game. Even with a favorable economy, the civil rights movement faced obstacles. Some white males who were vested in the old racial order, fought to preserve the status quo, thus preserving their power and privileges. Opposition, however, was not just limited to overt racists. Most Americans found racial discrimination and prejudice objectionable, but were reluctant to accept the demands of the civil rights movement. The majority felt that the civil rights movement was “moving too fast.”

Despite only conditional support from whites, or because of it, the demand for change escalated as the social movement behind the civil rights movement evolved. The initial struggles focused on integrating schools and public facilities, and voter registration drives in the South. Later, the efforts moved north. Despite measurable economic gains, particularly by better-educated minorities, black expectations rose faster than actual progress and fueled frustration. A growing impatience over slow progress, persistent and pervasive poverty, and the lack of economic opportunity gave rise to devastating urban unrest between 1964 to 1968. Black protest shifted the demands from political rights and integration to economic rights, and the cutting edge of the movement moved from established nonviolent organizations to more militant ones espousing black nationalism and group rights.
Affirmative action evolved as a pragmatic and politically motivated strategy to combat racial (and later gender) inequality. During the early stage of the civil rights movement, the dominant strategy centered on ending blatant racism. When the term “affirmative action” was introduced into policy in President Kennedy’s 1961 Executive Order 10952, the proposed remedy was strictly anti-discrimination in nature, promoting hiring and terms of employment “without regard to race, creed, color or national origin.” President Johnson’s 1965 Executive Order 11246 expanded the notion, requiring federal contractors to develop plans to increase the number of underrepresented minority workers. This expansion transformed the goal from equal opportunity to equal results, that is, to ensure “not just equality as a right and a theory, but equality as a fact and as a result.” Even after the Democrats lost the White House, affirmative action continued to gain teeth. The 1970 “Philadelphia Plan” devised during the Nixon administration required federal contractors to establish hiring timetables and goals. Underutilization was defined as a lack of parity, when a firm employed a labor force that did not mirror the racial and gender composition of the larger labor force. Some private firms and universities also adopted this parity approach, but its application was most pronounced in the public sector, in government hiring and procurement and admission to state colleges and universities.

The adoption of affirmative action, as a policy, pushed the envelope of what the government ought to do to address racial inequality. Anti-discrimination laws were designed to protect people against individual acts of discrimination, and their enforcement was predicated on responding after the fact. Unfortunately, this approach failed to address systemic and institutionalized factors that disadvantaged minorities as a group. In other words, racial inequality was maintained and reproduced through forces and structures beyond individual acts of discrimination. For many blacks and their supporters, attacking this
problem required a radically different strategy operating at the group level. Programs, such as those associated with the "War on Poverty," targeted disadvantaged populations by channeling resources to impoverished neighborhoods, which were highly correlated with race. Affirmative action took an explicit approach by embracing race-conscious tactics, including the minority groups protected by voting rights and anti-discrimination laws.

Most affirmative action programs were not strictly a quota system, but the policy had certainly emerged as a race-based program. It required a redistribution of opportunities, although this often occurred at the margins. Such a reallocation was justified because the existing system of racial privileges was inherently unfair to the oppressed. Nonetheless, affirmative action required some segments to forego some opportunities, not a simple process even if the privileges were unwarranted. This shifting of opportunities, with real and perceived winners and losers, proved to be an extremely controversial policy, raising opposition from white males and also from former supporters of the civil rights movement.7

Opponents of affirmative action seized on the policy's race-based nature to challenge its constitutionality, arguing that granting special status to any racial group violates the "due process of law" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and anti-discrimination clause of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Starting in 1970, affirmative action programs came under attack in the courts.8 The first major setback came in 1978 in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. In this case, the Supreme Court decided that the medical school at the University of California at Davis, through its affirmative action program, violated Title VI of the 1965 Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment when it denied admission to Allan Bakke. The Court, however, left open the door for the use of race as one flexible factor in the admissions process, with Justice Powell arguing that the state has a legitimate interest in
promoting diversity in the student body. In the 1980s, the Court upheld the voluntary use of affirmative action programs, but it also ruled against preferential protection for minorities in layoffs and imposed a greater burden of proof to justify affirmative action. Further restrictions came in the early 1990s in cases involving contract set-aside programs for minorities. Although the Supreme Court earlier had sanctioned the use of race-conscious contracting programs to remedy past societal discrimination, the Court started imposing the burden of "strict scrutiny" first on local and state governments and later on the federal government. By moving from intermediate to strict scrutiny, the Court imposed a higher standard before affirmative action can be justified. The government must demonstrate that past governmental action contributed to the specific inequality in question, that there is a compelling government interest, and that the program is narrowly tailored to solve only the problem in question. In the 1996 Hopwood v. Texas, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit placed similar limits on admissions programs in higher education, restricting the use of race only when it is necessary to remedy past discrimination by the school itself. Moreover, the court stated that promoting diversity is no longer a compelling state interest, thus making it more difficult to correct any racial imbalance in higher education. While the courts have not outlawed all forms of affirmative action, its application has been severely restricted.

Affirmative action also came under attack from the executive branch. Presidential power proved to be a double-edged sword. Its use had been instrumental in establishing several civil rights policies, programs and agencies, but this approach exposed such actions to changing political winds. This was evident when President Reagan ushered in a neo-conservative era based on an ideology of smaller government, devolution, and supply-side economics. Through selective appointments, Republican administrations placed individuals opposed to affirmative action in the Civil Rights Division in the Department of
Justice and the Department of Education, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. These appointees in turn weakened affirmative action (and the enforcement of anti-discrimination employment and housing laws). A common theme was to move civil rights away from race-conscious policies to "color-blind" ones. The new mantra was that the government should never use race (or gender) for any public programs, even ones to remedy past discrimination. As anti-affirmative action efforts at the federal level waned with the Democrats recapturing the White House in 1992, the debate shifted to other arenas. In California, for example, Republican Governor Pete Wilson and his appointees on the Board of Regents of the University of California pushed through two resolutions in 1995 directing the university to end the use of race, religion, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origins in its admission process, contracting and employment.

Opponents of affirmative action have made direct appeal to the voting public through referendums, some successful and others not. In 1996, the voters in California passed Proposition 209, the "California Civil Rights Initiative," whose practical implication is to prohibit the state and local jurisdictions from using most affirmative action programs.\(^{12}\) One year later, the voters in the City of Houston defeated Proposition A, which would have ended affirmative action.\(^{13}\) In 1998, voters in Washington State passed Initiative 200, forcing the state and its local jurisdictions to stop using affirmative action.\(^{14}\) Similar initiative and legislative efforts are being pursued in other states, including Colorado, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and Texas.\(^{15}\) Some backers, such as those in Florida, have attempted to soften the impact of abandoning affirmative action with class-based programs designed to assist individuals from disadvantaged neighborhoods and schools, but those are not perfect substitutes.\(^{16}\)

Despite the victories by opponents of race-conscious policies, the
public has no decisive position. A reason for the mixed results on initiatives is that voters are neither totally for nor totally against affirmative action. Race-based policies create a conundrum over how far this nation ought to go to address racial inequality. Most people accept the fact that racial discrimination has not been eliminated, and many believe that something should be done. At the same time, a growing number find that affirmative action goes too far by forcing white men to bear a burden to remedy a societal problem not of their making. In other words, there is support for anti-discrimination policies, but resistance to giving unjustified preferential treatment. This does not mean that the government should not take an active role in eliminating racial inequality. A large majority support "increase recruitment" and a "sincere effort to hire" fully qualified blacks. There is then a nuance in the support and opposition to affirmative action, and how people vote depends on how the debate is worded. This can be seen in a survey of Houston voters prior to the 1997 election. A large majority would support a proposition stating "The city of Houston shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment and public contracting." On the other hand, less than a majority would support a proposition stating "Shall the Charter of the City of Houston be amended to end the use of affirmative action for women and minorities in the operation of City of Houston employment and contracting, including ending the current program and any similar programs in the future?" In the end, a majority of the voters opposed Proposition A, which stated "Shall the Charter of the City of Houston be amended to end the use of affirmative action?" If Houston's Proposition A had been worded differently, the outcome could have been different.

The debate over affirmative action has cooled, due in part to a robust economy that has eliminated fears of a zero-sum game, but the future of this policy is very much in the air. Race-based programs to correct racial
inequality are not illegal, but the courts have severely limited their application. Political support has waned but not vanished. President Clinton has declared that affirmative action should be "mended, not ended," but this task does not appear to be a priority. The discussion on affirmative action in the report from the Advisory Board to the President's Initiative on Race is largely descriptive and noncommittal. What we have currently is not a coherent policy, and perhaps there never was such a creature.

Part II: The Socioeconomic Status of Asian Pacific Americans

To understand how APAs are situated within affirmative action programs, it is important to first establish the overall material position of APAs in three arenas: education, the labor market, and business. Material position refers to measurable outcomes that define the relative standing of APAs in the racial hierarchy discussed earlier. This section provides a broad assessment, saving the discussion on the status of APAs within the public sector to the next section, Part III. The data indicate that APAs fare better than other minority groups, and in some areas better than whites. This is not the same, however, as an absence of problems. In education, APAs are above parity relative to whites by traditional measures but suffer from restrictive quotas. In employment, APAs are near parity but encounter barriers to selected occupations, particularly to management positions. APA businesses are below parity, experiencing difficulties competing in size and return. It is this dramatic variation in relative standing of APAs across the three arenas that adds to the complexity of the racial hierarchy.

The one area where APAs have experienced a high level of achievement is in education. This phenomenon starts early, as seen in the top panel of Table 1, which reports the racial/ethnic distribution of Californian schools ranked by performance on standardized tests. The data clearly show that African Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately overrepresented
in poorly performing elementary schools, and disproportionately underrepresented in highly ranked schools. The opposite is true for APAs. While APAs

### TABLE 1. RACIAL/ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS, 1998

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>%APA</th>
<th>%Black</th>
<th>%White</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary Schools</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>67.8</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-90%</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-75%</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-50%</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-25%</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom 10%</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| High Schools |      |        |        |          |
| Top 10%      | 17.8 | 2.8    | 67.8   | 9.0      |
| 75-90%       | 9.7  | 3.5    | 67.4   | 15.3     |
| 50-75%       | 9.0  | 5.4    | 57.4   | 22.6     |
| 25-50%       | 8.6  | 9.2    | 40.0   | 36.8     |
| 10-25%       | 8.5  | 10.4   | 17.2   | 58.9     |
| Bottom 10%   | 3.6  | 14.4   | 20.1   | 57.1     |

Source: Compiled by author from data from California Department of Education

comprise 8 percent of all elementary students, they comprise 17 percent of those in schools in the top 10 percent but only 4 percent in schools in the bottom 10 percent. A similar pattern is apparent at the high-school level. African Americans and Hispanics are concentrated in the worst schools, while APAs and whites are disproportionately enrolled in the best schools.

There are also racial differences in high-school dropout and completion rates as documented in Table 2. Dropout rates were estimated from school enrollment status for those without high-school degrees and between the ages 16 to 19. African American and Hispanic
youths are disproportionately more likely not to dropout relative to whites, while APAs are disproportionately more likely to be enrolled, although the white-APA difference is small. A large number of recent immigrants contributes to the high rate for Hispanics. To minimize this bias, a second set of estimates is made by excluding those who immigrated after the age of thirteen. Even among this restricted population, the dropout rate for Hispanics is the highest among the four racial groups. Of course, some of the dropouts may eventually earn a high school degree or GED. An alternative measure of high school dropout is the percent of young adults (20 to 24) without a high school degree. The statistics for this measure also show a parallel racial hierarchy, with blacks and Hispanics faring far worse than whites and APAs. The pattern also holds after excluding those who immigrated after the age of thirteen.

Along with a high rate of completing high school, APAs are better qualified to compete for entry into institutions of higher learning. This can be seen in the SAT scores, which are widely used by colleges and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2. DROP-OUT STATISTICS BY RACE/ETHNICITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%APA %Black %White %Hispanic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in School, 16-19 6% 15% 10% 26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/o HS Degree, 20-24 7% 18% 8% 37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excluding Teenage Immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not in School, 16-19 5% 15% 10% 21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W/o HS Degree, 20-24 7% 18% 8% 30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author from 1997, 1998 and 1999 CPS
universities to evaluate applicants. APAs do not perform as well as whites in the verbal section (1998 average score of 498 out of 800 versus 526), but they more than make up the difference on math (562 versus 528). One of the reasons for the lower APA verbal score is that only 28 percent of the APA test-takers speak English as their sole language, compared to 94 percent of white test-takers. In other words, a disproportionate number of APAs do not have English as a first language. One can argue that SAT scores are not perfect predictors of performance as undergraduates and that the test is culturally biased, but colleges and universities do use the results in admissions. To the extent that these scores are weighted, APAs are competitive by this criterion. The relative competitiveness of APAs can also be seen in the 1996 data from the California Postsecondary Education Commission, which calculates the proportion of high-school graduates fulfilling the minimum criteria for admission to the University of California. The APA rate for 1996 (30 percent) is several times higher than that for African Americans (3 percent) and Hispanics (4 percent). More surprisingly, the APA rate is more than twice as high as the rate for white students (13 percent).

Several factors account for the educational achievements of APAs. Culture values and parental beliefs in the centrality of education for success in this country provide a power push for children to succeed. APA achievement is also the product of lower residential segregation of APAs than other minorities, which is discussed in the chapter by Hum and Zonta in this book. The College Board reports that 37 percent of APA students taking the college entrance examine are in suburbs, which is equal to whites and higher than blacks (22 percent) and Hispanics (25 percent). This translates into APAs being more likely to reside in better school districts and neighborhoods with the better schools. (At the same time, APAs are more likely to be in large cities than whites, 37 percent versus 14 percent.) This spatial correlation may be influenced by self-selection, where the quality of education becomes relatively more
important for APAs in deciding residential location. This can be seen in the disproportionate number of APAs moving to two of the best school districts in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, Cerritos and San Marino.

The accomplishments of APAs at the high school level carry over to the college and university level. The rate of school enrollment for college-age students (between 20 and 24 years old) varies considerably by race: 36 percent for whites, 30 percent for blacks, 22 percent for Hispanics, and 55 percent for APAs. (If the population excludes immigrants who entered the country after the age of 13, then the enrollment rate for Hispanics is slightly higher, 25 percent.) APAs are not only attending colleges and universities at a disproportionately higher rate, but they also have a strong presence in the elite universities. This can be seen in Table 3, which lists the distribution of the undergraduate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>APAs</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stanford</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yale</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berkeley</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCLA</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michigan</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author from university web pages.
student body by ethnicity. The reported percentage for each ethnic group is based on “domestic” students, which does not include foreign students of that ethnicity. Among the top private universities listed, APAs comprise 17 percent to 28 percent of the student population. The range for the top public universities is wider, from 10 percent to 39 percent, with the higher percentage in schools located in states with large concentrations of APAs. By any reasonable measures, APAs have had remarkable success in accessing higher education.

Despite the educational achievements of APA students, there are problems. There are still significant segments of APA youths who are struggling because they have a limited command of the English language. This partly accounts for lower APA scores on the verbal parts of standardized tests relative to whites. The push for academic success comes with an emotional cost. The parental pressure to succeed creates tremendous anxiety among APA youths and contributes to intergenerational conflicts. Moreover, access to the elite institutions of higher education is not an unqualified success. Since the 1980s, many prestigious colleges and universities have been accused of reacting to the “overrepresentation” of APAs by establishing ceilings, a maximum quota, on APA admission. Audits of some elite schools discovered that the admissions rate for APA applicants were lower than that for white applicants, and among those admitted, APAs had stronger academic qualifications than other groups. One statistical study found that with similar qualifications, APAs had a lower probability of being admitted. A lower admissions rate, by itself, is not prima facie evidence of discrimination. In some cases, admission processes used non-racial criteria beyond those based on standard academic performance, and these had a disproportionate impact on some groups. For example, private universities gave extra preferences to sons and daughters of alumni, who happened to be predominantly white. One could argue that this policy merely reproduced the racial inequality of previous generations, but the universities
countered that they have legitimate and non-racial reasons for these preferences. In other cases, the evidence pointed to a biased admission process and prejudicial admission officers. Many schools that had such a potential problem have corrected both intended and unattended biases, but APA suspicion has not entirely disappeared. We will return to the quota issue in the next section of this chapter when the discussion focuses on public education.

In the labor market, APAs have an advantage because of high educational attainment, but do not always receive the same remuneration or occupational status as whites. Table 4 reports the educational attainment of those in the prime-working age category, 25 to 64 years old. Among the four reported racial groups, APAs have the highest proportion with four or more years of higher education. The relative difference is even greater for the category that includes advanced degrees (master's, professional degrees, and doctorates). The odds of an APA holding an advanced degree are more than one-and-half times greater than for whites, and four to five times greater than for African Americans and Hispanics. These higher APA rates of educational attainment are the product of two factors. The first is the phenomenon discussed above, that APAs who are educated in the United States (both native-born and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education Level</th>
<th>NH White</th>
<th>Blacks</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>APA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less Than HS</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor's</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced Degree</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author from 1997-1999 March Current Population survey
immigrants who come here as children or students) tend to complete more years of education. The second factor is that immigration laws since 1965 have favored those with higher education, particularly those in the professional, scientific, medical, and engineering fields. Moreover, the highly-educated immigrant who initially entered through occupational preferences became a sponsor for highly-educated relatives for slots reserved for family reunification, thus adding to the supply of highly-educated immigrants.\textsuperscript{34}

Despite the high level of education, APAs have not been fully able to translate their credentials into commensurate earnings and occupational status. Table 5 contains basic statistics for full-time (35 or more hours per week) and year-round (50 or more weeks per year) workers between the ages 25 and 64. Roughly three-quarters of the labor force for each racial group work full-time and year-round (77 percent for whites, 76 percent for blacks, 74 percent for Hispanics, and 77 percent for APAs).\textsuperscript{35} Despite the higher education attainment reported earlier, APAs lag behind whites in remuneration. In terms of annual earnings, the median for APAs is slightly lower than for white males ($33,200 versus $32,000). Another measure indicates that APAs are doing marginally better, 23 percent of whites are among the top one-fifth of all earners compared to 24 percent for APAs. However, this is surprisingly close given the considerably higher levels of education for APAs. Another way of viewing the statistics is to consider what is required to win a place in the top tier: 61 percent of whites in this earnings group have at least a bachelor's degree, while 80 percent of APAs do. Much of the difference is among those with advanced degrees, 26 percent for whites and 40 percent for APAs.

The disparity in earnings is associated with the problems faced by APA immigrants, and highly-educated male immigrants in particular.\textsuperscript{36} Among males with at least a bachelor's degree, recent APA immigrants earn about 22 percent less than U.S.-born whites, after accounting for
differences in age and educational credentials. Assimilation as proxied by long-term residency in this country helps, but even established APA immigrants earn 7 percent less than U.S.-born whites. U.S.-born APA males, on the other hand, earn roughly the same amount as U.S.-born white males. Among females (that is, within gender analysis), the earnings show a different inter-group pattern. Recent APA immigrants earn 10 percent less than U.S.-born whites, and established APA immigrants reach parity with U.S.-born whites. Interestingly, U.S.-born APA females earn 7 percent more than U.S.-born white females. On the

TABLE 5. EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES BY RACE/ETHNICITY
FULL-TIME, YEAR-ROUND WORKERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>APA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Median Earnings</td>
<td>$33,200</td>
<td>$25,400</td>
<td>$22,000</td>
<td>$32,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Top 20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Management</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Professions</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


other hand, it is important to note that this "advantage" is far from closing the gender gap, for white females earn 27 percent less than white males. U.S.-born APA females close some of that gap, but their earnings are much closer to that of U.S.-born white females than to U.S.-born white males. In other words, the gender gap remains a dominant factor.

Some of the labor-market disadvantages experienced by APA male and female workers can be attributed to a "glass ceiling," a barrier preventing many from moving into higher management positions. Although qualified and competent for higher management positions, many APAs are stereotyped as non-assertive, inarticulate, and too technical. The glass ceiling is certainly a major concern within the APA
community. A majority of the respondents to a survey of APAs by *Asian Week* agreed with the statement "There exists a 'glass ceiling' such that many Asian Americans are unfairly prevented from reaching upper management positions in many companies."38

The lower probability of being a manager is centered around the highly-educated immigrant population.39 Among males with at least a bachelor's degree, recent APA immigrants have only half the odds of being in management compared with U.S.-born whites, after accounting for difference in age and credentials. Assimilation has no effect because established APA immigrants face the same low odds. The analysis shows that U.S.-born APA males have lower odds of moving into management than U.S.-born whites, but the estimate is not statistically significant because of the small sample size. Among highly-educated females, recent APA immigrants have only about half the chance as U.S.-born whites to being in management, controlling for other factors. Assimilation closes much, but not the entire gap. The odds for established APA immigrants approach that of U.S.-born whites, with the remaining difference being statistically insignificant. There is essentially no difference between U.S.-born whites and U.S.-born APA females. While APA females may be able to close the racial gap within their own gender, they still face the glass ceiling encountered by U.S.-born white females.

By limiting access to managerial position, the glass ceiling has a trickle down effect on other occupations. An analysis of highly educated workers of both genders shows that U.S.-born APAs, established immigrants, and recent immigrants have the same odds of being a professional as U.S.-born whites. APA males, regardless of sub-group, have higher odds of being in this occupational layer, indicating that overrepresentation in the professions absorbs the underrepresentation in management. In other words, there appears to be a glass ceiling that keeps them from moving from the professions into management. For females, this
The phenomenon is not present, a finding that points to the additional complexity imposed by a gender-related glass ceiling.

The lack of parity is most apparent for APAs in the business world. While APAs, and immigrants in particular, have a reputation of being entrepreneurs, the self-employment rate (including family members working for no pay) for APAs is no higher than that for whites, and this is true even when comparing APA immigrants with white immigrants. Table 6 provides two sets of self-employment rates for the economically active population between the ages of 25 and 64. The first estimate is based on whether the person reported his or her main class of employment as self-employed. According to this measure, APAs and whites have the same rate. The second set of estimates includes both the self-employed and those working for others, but also receiving some income from self-employment. The latter captures people who operate a business on the side. While the second estimate for whites is slightly higher than for APAs, for practical purpose, the levels of self-employment are identical. On the other hand, the economic returns to self-employment are not identical. The data for those working year-round indicate that median total earnings for APAs is lower than that for whites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>APA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-employment (1)</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employment (2)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Earnings</td>
<td>$32,300</td>
<td>$24,900</td>
<td>$21,800</td>
<td>$30,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With at least a BS degree</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

whites. The economic disparity is even greater since self-employed APAs have more years of schooling than whites.

Data from the most recent survey of the characteristics of business owners (1992) show a similar picture. By two measures, APAs are doing well. Among minorities, APAs accounted for 31 percent of all firms and received 48 percent of all revenues. While APAs were faring better than blacks and Hispanics, APAs were not overrepresented among all owners. APAs owned 3.5 percent of all businesses and received 2.9 percent of all revenues, which are slightly lower than the APA share of the total population (4 percent in 1998). The picture is even less rosy when compared with white owners. Average (mean) revenue for APA firms was only 64 percent of that for white firms. The average APA firm had fewer employees and paid lower wages per worker than white firms. Only 14 percent of white owners worked 60 or more hours a week, but 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7. BUSINESS CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE/ETHNICITY, 1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All minorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Males</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by author from Bureau of the Census data on business owners
percent of APA owners did. APAs had smaller markets, with 42 percent serving a neighborhood market compared to only 26 percent for whites. Moreover, 31 percent of APA firms serve a minority-dominated clientele, about four times the level for whites. These facts, along with those presented above, show that APAs in business still lag far behind whites.

The above analysis of the socioeconomic status of APAs demonstrates the complex position of APAs in this nation’s racial structure. The unique material position of APAs poses three challenges to a bipolar racial model. The first is that the relative standing of APAs varies across socioeconomic dimensions. The achievements (vis-à-vis whites and other minorities) in one arena are not replicated in other arenas. This can be seen in the extreme variation in the simplistic APA-white parity indices for education, employment and business. The second challenge is that the nature of the disadvantages faced by APAs is not absolute (lower achievements than whites), but relative to what they could achieve if given the same opportunities as whites. For example, APAs are close to parity with whites in the labor market, but would fare even better if they could fully translate educational credentials into employment outcomes. The final challenge is that many of the barriers faced by APAs are not race-based, or at least not in the way racism has been commonly understood. These obstacles are associated with the immigrant experience, where cultural differences and slow acculturation prevent full incorporation. For some, this observation explains away the inequality; however, the explanation does not answer whether the criteria are economically appropriate or based on unwarranted prejudices. Some evidence points to a racializing of the foreign-born, thus blurring the line between racial processes and immigrant processes. Race, after all, is in part a social construction, and this nation has a long history of racializing APA immigrants.

Clearly, APAs cannot be simply forced into a dichotomous
paradigm by defining them as equivalent to other disadvantage minorities or as identical to the advantaged white population. Moreover, the relative standing of APAs varies across arenas, precluding the possibility of collapsing outcomes into a single, consistent measure of racial inequality. These facts force us to reconsider race relations as a multi-group and multi-dimensional hierarchy. The complexity introduced by the material position of APAs presents both a theoretical and a policy challenge.

PART III: THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION – ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN NEXUS

This section examines the link between APAs and affirmative action programs in three areas at the center of the political debate: public schools, government employment, and government contracting. Unfortunately, there is a paucity of systematic, consistent and detailed data across all three sectors; nonetheless, the available information provides intriguing insights. The variation in material position discussed in Part II maps into a similar variation within race-based programs. The diversity in socioeconomic outcomes discussed above is accompanied by a parallel diversity in the nexus between APAs and affirmative action. They both benefit from and bear the cost of the policy. In the field of education, where APAs have been successful, the issue is whether APAs should forego a disproportionate share of privileges in publicly supported schools. In the labor market, where APAs have had conditional success, the issue is which occupational niche is appropriate for APA participation. Finally, in the world of business, where APAs trail whites, APAs are more likely to be unconditionally included in affirmative action.

Given the high levels of academic achievement, it is not surprising that APAs have been largely excluded from affirmative action in public
education.\textsuperscript{42} Of course, there have been exceptions, most notably when the University of California had included Filipinos. It was felt that Filipinos constituted a highly disadvantaged population, uniquely different from the other two major APA groups at that time (Japanese and Chinese), but Filipinos were dropped from the program in the mid-1980’s. Although there have been other efforts to include high-poverty APA ethnic groups, it is difficult to make a case because a relatively higher number of students from these groups goes onto colleges and universities compared to blacks and Hispanics. Not being included as a target population, however, is not the same as having no relationship to affirmative action.

The prevailing relationship between APAs and race-based admissions programs is both controversial and troubling. A part of that relationship is indirect and equivalent to that for whites. The number of admission slots available to those not included in affirmative action (whites and APAs) is tied inversely to the degree that special admission procedures are successful in increasing admissions from targeted populations. Clearly, the policy and program alter the racial distribution, but in practice, the changes are at the margin and small in relative size. Moreover, in situations where past discrimination and institutionalized racism unfairly disadvantages the targeted groups, the reallocation achieves a greater social goal of promoting racial equality. Ideally, the opportunities foregone by whites and APAs are the unearned privileges, that is, the opportunities that would not have been available to these two groups in the absence of systemic and institutional racism. For those opposed to affirmative action, this shifting of admission slots smacks of unconstitutional reverse discrimination. To increase the moral legitimacy of this objection, some conservatives have argued that racial preferences hurt, not only whites, but also APAs. This appeal, however, has not won over the majority of APAs. According to one survey, a majority of APAs are willing to accept “giving preferences to underrepresented minorities in college admissions and scholarships.”\textsuperscript{43}
The situation is more explosive when restrictive quotas enters the picture, that is, when APAs suffer a double burden, one from any reallocation generated by affirmative action and the other from an enrollment cap to limit “overrepresentation.” It is important to note that latter practice, to the degree it exists, reallocates some admission slots from APAs to whites. Unlike affirmative action, restrictive quotas do not correct any past discrimination or institutional racism directed at whites. The one plausible argument is promoting diversity that mirrors the population, but it is doubtful that diversity in the abstract and devoid of the other race-related issues is sufficient to impose restrictive quotas.

As discussed earlier, imposing caps on APA admissions has been an issue in institutes of higher learning, and much of the controversy of the 1980s centered around the practices at the two flagship campuses of the University of California, Los Angeles and Berkeley. Both campuses had lower admission rates for APA applicants than for other major groups, precipitating protest from APA activists and parents. When asked about access to the University of California, an overwhelming majority believed APA applicants should be admitted at a rate commensurate with their achievements. While private universities used a policy of providing “legacy” preference to children of alumni (who happen to be predominantly white) to explain and justify lower admission rates for APA applicants relative to white applicants, the public universities had no such rationale. The concerns were sufficiently strong that the federal government launched an investigation, and the conflict was eventually resolved explicitly at Berkeley and tacitly at UCLA. The controversy in the public universities has subsided, but what remains unresolved is the problematic link between restrictive quotas and affirmative action. That issue reemerged in a different arena, in the public schools of San Francisco.

In the City by the Bay, the link between race-based efforts to correct past discrimination and glaring racial inequality was explicitly tied
to restrictive quotas." Although the caps did not explicitly single out any one group, Chinese students eventually were affected by its implementation. Like in other urban school districts, blacks were highly segregated into low performing schools within the San Francisco Unified School District. The local NAACP won a lawsuit in 1971 to desegregate the district and a consent decree in 1983 to strengthen the efforts, with the state providing millions of dollars to implement an integration plan. To produce a more balanced enrollment, the decree required each school to have students from at least four of the nine named groups (American Indian, black, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, Korean, Spanish-surnamed, other white and other non-white). Furthermore, the agreement established caps on the number for any one group, a maximum of 45 percent on most schools and 40 percent on magnet schools, and these restrictions proved to be lightning rods.

At the heart of the eventual controversy is Lowell High School, the oldest high school west of the Mississippi, the most selective school within the district and one of the most prestigious high schools in the nation. Its alumni include two Nobel Prize winners, a co-founder of Hewlett Packard, a former governor, a U.S. Supreme Court Justice, and a former president of Yale University. Since the 1960s, Lowell operated as a system-wide academic school with competitive admission. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Lowell won state and national honors for its academic excellence. Lowell itself was the target of a 1971 discrimination suit against SFUSD for operating a city-wide academic high school that had a disproportionate low number of minorities, but the district won the right to maintain such a program. Lowell, however, was subject to the 1983 consent decree. Despite the desegregation effort, non-APA minorities continued to be underrepresented. During the mid-1990s, blacks comprised about 18 percent of the students in the district but only 5 percent of Lowell's students, and the comparable statistics for Latinos are 20 percent district wide and only 10 percent for Lowell."Whites were above
parity (16 percent of Lowell while only 13 percent of the district) but not affected by the 40-percent ceiling. Only one group was affected by the enrollment limit. In the mid-1990s, Chinese comprised slightly over 40 percent of Lowell's student body. To keep within the maximum, the admission criterion for Chinese was raised above other groups. Both the restriction and the higher admission standards were not well received by many Chinese parents, eventually leading to a lawsuit against the district to end what was termed discriminatory quotas. In 1999, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, forcing the district to abandon the cap for Lowell and to develop “race-neutral” criteria to maintain diversity.

While the immediate outcome of the lawsuit is discernible, the motivation for the actions taken by the complainants and the long-term implications are much more difficult to pinpoint. Conservatives, such as Governor Pete Wilson and UC Regent Ward Connerly who were major supporters of Proposition 209, seized on the efforts by the Chinese against the restrictive quotas. They used those efforts to attack affirmative action, accusing the policy as the source of the “perverse” cap on Chinese enrollment and on a system of merit. Some supporters of the suit, however, took exception to this interpretation, stating that they are against discrimination against Chinese, but are for affirmative action. On the other hand, other supporters stated that they are against the use of race under any condition. The reaction from the left was harsh, with some activists chastising the Chinese for allowing themselves to be used by conservatives. In the end, the left argued, the ruling would eventually come back to hurt APAs because it weakens society's ability to redress racism. These varying interpretations point to a division within the Chinese public itself as evident in a 1998 CAVEC (Chinese American Voter Education Committee) survey of Chinese surname voters in San Francisco. When asked about their opinions on admission quotas for Lowell High School, 45 percent of the immigrant respondents thought it was a “bad idea,” 32 percent thought it was a “good idea,” while 23
percent expressed no opinion. The opposition is not surprising, but there is a surprising level of support from one-third of those interviewed. The long-term implication of the Lowell case is not known, but this controversy underscores the difficulty in decoupling APA concerns about restrictive quotas from affirmative action.

The issues in the area of employment are far less controversial. Two types of affirmative-action programs are relevant: direct government hiring and indirect hiring by firms with government contracts. The indirect hiring is not the focus of this chapter, but the effects are worth noting. Firms with federal contractors are under an obligation to develop and implement recruitment and hiring plans when minorities are underrepresented in their labor force, and this obligation also applies to many firms with state and local contracts. Existing econometric analysis, which controls for observable firm characteristics, finds that this requirement has a statistically measurable impact. African Americans have benefited, with their share of employment increasing by a tenth more in the federal contracts. Interestingly, the governmental requirement has the same impact on APAs, with federal contracting increasing their share by a tenth. While the magnitude of the impacts is small, the findings indicate that affirmative action does open up employment opportunities.

An analysis of direct hiring by the public sector reveals several potential problems for APAs. Table 8 reports the number of full-time workers based on EEOC (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) data for firms with at least 100 employees, and for state and local governments, and based on the data from the U.S. Office of Personnel Management for federal employment. The top panel shows that APAs are equally represented in both the federal government and the private sector, but are underrepresented in state and local government employment. It is unclear why the latter exists. It may be due to state and local governments being less committed to recruiting and hiring APAs. Moreover, there could be a spatial mismatch between where public sector
jobs are located and where APAs reside. Many state capitals are in cities with relatively few APAs.

Another problem is an unequal distribution of APAs across occupations within the public sector. Particularly troubling is the data indicating a glass ceiling in government employment. The underrepresentation is apparent whether the APA share of all employees or the APA share of employees in professional occupations is used as the benchmark. A parity index using the former provides a conservative estimate, while a

**TABLE 8. EMPLOYMENT BY RACE/ETHNICITY, 1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>APA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>All Occupations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Executive Branch</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Gov.</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officials/Manager</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Executive Branch</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Gov.</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Professional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Executive Branch</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>States</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Gov.</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

parity index using the latter partially accounts for the higher educational level of APAs. The ratio ranges from about .5 to .3 depending on which benchmark and which level of government. Moreover, state-specific data for combined state and local government employment indicate that the problem is present in regions with a significant presence of APAs: .4 to .6 for California, .5 to .9 for Florida, .3 to .8 for Illinois, .3 to .6 for Massachusetts, .2 to .6 for New Jersey, .4 to .8 for New York, .4 to .7 for Texas, and .5 to .6 for Washington. While a low index is not conclusive evidence of a glass ceiling, it does suggest that APAs are having difficulties moving into management.

Underrepresentation is not limited to management. There are other occupational niches, and one of the most glaring is protective services. The statistics in Table 9 show that APAs comprise only 1 percent of state and local employees in protective services, compared to 2.5 percent of the all state and local employees, a ratio of .4. The lower the index, the greater the underrepresentation. The ratio is even lower in the public sector, where APA professionals outnumber the APA managers by three-to-one. The ratio is particularly low for firefighters, but even for

| TABLE 9. EMPLOYMENT IN PROTECTIVE SERVICES BY RACE/ETHNICITY, FULL TIME STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYMENT, 1997 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
|                 | White | Black | Hispanic | APA  |
| All Occupations | 70.6% | 18.7% | 7.5%      | 2.5% |
| Protective Services | 72.7% | 17.7% | 8.0%      | 1.0% |
| Police | 72.7% | 16.1% | 9.0%      | 1.7% |
| Firefighters | 73.2% | 11.1% | 6.8%      | 0.8% |
| Corrections | 66.5% | 23.9% | 7.7%      | 1.2% |

police officers, APAs are below parity. The problem is present in the regions with a significant presence of APAs, as indicated by the parity ratio: .4 for California, .4 for Florida, .2 for Illinois, .4 for Massachusetts, .2 for New Jersey, .2 for New York, .3 for Texas, and .6 for Washington.

The underrepresentation in occupational niches has been addressed through selective action, often through court-imposed orders. This is illustrated by the effort to address the small number of Chinese in San Francisco's fire department. (In that city, the Chinese have comprised an overwhelming majority of the APA population.) During the mid-1960s when community leaders first raised the issue of underrepresentation, only 6 Chinese (and 1 black) were among approximately 1,600 firefighters, and that number remained essentially the same for a decade. Under a 1974 court order to address this problem, the department was expected to increase the number of APA firefighters to nearly 200.

The one area where APAs have been unambiguously included is in government contracting, particularly when federal funds are involved. This inclusion is based on the fact that APA firms are less likely to receive government contracts. The standard measure is the disparity index, which is a group's relative share of government contracts divided by that group's share of all businesses. For example, if group A has 10 percent of government contracts but comprises 20 percent of all businesses, then the disparity index is .50, indicating that this group is receiving only half of its "fair" share of government business. An analysis of public contracting in California reveals that APA firms are consistently underutilized by local governments. Even in San Francisco, where APAs are the largest minority group, the disparity index for APA firms is (.19). The problem is not unique to California. After reviewing a large number of disparity studies from throughout the nation, the Urban Institute finds that median value for APA-owned businesses is (.19), which is lower than that for women-owned businesses (.26), Hispanic-owned businesses
(.36), and black-owned businesses (.41). The low disparity index, along with the problems discussed earlier, has been the basis for including APA in government set-aside programs. This inclusion has continued after a review of federal contract set-aside, which is a part of President Clinton's "mend it, not end it" approach to affirmative action. The inclusion of APAs poses an interesting question of what is the appropriate or desirable goal.

APAs have taken advantage of this inclusion through participation in programs to promote minority (and women) contracting. At the national level, APA participation can be seen in the federal government's major effort to help minority firms, the 8(a) Program operated by the Small Business Administration. For the decade spanning the late 1980s to the late 1990s, APAs increased their participation in both absolute and relative terms, as shown in Table 10. By the end of the twentieth century, they made up nearly a quarter of all 8(a) firms. APAs are also participants at the state and local level. This can be seen in California's certification program for minority (and women) businesses, which is required to qualify for set-aside contracts. Both state and local agencies use the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>88-91 FY</th>
<th>92-95 FY</th>
<th>96-99 FY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APAs</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=</td>
<td>14,234</td>
<td>20,756</td>
<td>23,461</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unpublished data provided by SBA
certification to determine eligibility. APA firms accounted for 29 percent of the state's certified minority businesses. Although data are not readily available for other states, a review of the certification programs in the largest states show that APAs are among the listed groups eligible for enrollment. Inclusion is driven by the fact that states are required to follow federal guidelines on these matters as a condition for receiving federal funds.

Beyond the active participation of APA entrepreneurs in minority set-aside programs, there is strong support within the APA communities for these programs. This can be seen in a survey conducted in Houston prior to the Proposition A vote. When asked if city government should set aside contracts for minority businesses, only a small minority of non-Hispanic whites (37 percent) approved, but a large majority of blacks (71 percent) approved. The percentage for APA approval falls between these two extremes, 61 percent, which is similar to that for Hispanics, 63 percent. Not all APAs, however, support this type of affirmative action. Edward Chen was a plaintiff in a suit to overturn the results of the election, where a majority voted against the anti-affirmative action initiative.

Taken together, the information for the three areas shows that APAs have taken disparate positions on affirmative action. Not surprisingly, there are systematic and predictable differences across the three areas, but even within a given arena, there are conflicting opinions. These cross currents reveal that APAs are influenced by both self-interest and larger ideological beliefs. APAs face the same dilemma facing this nation as a whole on what ought to be done to redress racial inequality. As mentioned earlier, there are difficult tradeoffs, and most are willing to accept race-based solutions under certain conditions. There are additional complexities in the APA population.

The one event we can gauge where most APAs stand on affirmative action as an overarching policy is the vote on the single most
important initiative so far, California’s 1996 Proposition 209, the so-called “California Civil Rights Initiative”. The result from a statewide exit poll conducted by the *Los Angeles Times* shows considerable racial variation. The strongest support came from whites (63 percent for), and strong opposition came from blacks (74 percent against). What is surprising is that three-quarters of Hispanics (76 percent) also were against the proposition. The poll also found that a majority of APAs (61 percent) voted against the proposition; however, the estimate is based on a small number of responses. Two more specialized exit polls in neighborhoods with high concentrations of APAs also found that a majority, and in fact a large majority, of APAs voted against the proposition. In Southern California, 76 percent of APAs voted against 209, and this opposition crossed party lines (78 percent of APA Democrats and 73 percent of APA Republicans). In the San Francisco Bay Area, a similar percentage of APAs voted against 209 (80 percent), and again the opposition crossed party lines (86 percent of APA Democrats and 63 percent of APA Republicans).

Analyzing one election, however, is not sufficient to discern the dominant APA political position. The APA population is very heterogeneous, and competing factors come into play. The extreme economic and ethnic diversity of this population is very well documented. The APA population is also diverse in its politics, as indicated by party registration data. The emergence of naturalized immigrants as a majority of APA voters further complicates the picture. Many of these new voters are still in the process of formulating opinions on domestic issues such as affirmative action. Their attitudes are fluid as continued exposure to American society shapes and reshapes their opinions. The APA political position remains elusive and is up for grabs.
Part IV: Conclusion - What Next?

This nation is at a crucial juncture in addressing racial inequality, with affirmative action as the primary battleground. In a larger political and historical context, the heated and nasty debate marks a dramatic reversal in the search for a solution. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s transformed the state from one either supporting or turning a blind eye to racism to one attacking racial injustice, at least in its most blatant forms. Legislation was passed to protect voting rights, proscribe housing and employment discrimination, integrate schools and other public facilities, and fight inner-city poverty. One can cynically point out that the elected officials had to be pressured into enacting these laws, that programs were efforts to prevent escalating social unrest, and that implementation was half-hearted. Such a dismissive view, however, too easily denies the hard-earned victories, the progressive policies and programs. The accomplishments should not be judged by a failure to achieve utopia, but gains made in the face of resistance. At the close of the twentieth century, racial politics in America has taken a turn against race-based policies. Those opposed to the civil rights agenda have found an effective weapon by hijacking the principle of fairness to attack the most controversial policy, affirmative action. This counter insurgency has mobilized the mainstream by arguing that the policy is contrary to civil rights principles and constitutional protections. Of course, the idea that race-based laws and programs violate the rights of some (particularly white males) by giving “unfair” preferences to others (primarily minorities) is not new. That assertion has been at the heart of numerous court cases. What is different is an acceptance of this argument by many mainstream politicians and a significant share of the voting public. The battle, however, is far from over.

APAs occupy a unique position in the political debate because they occupy an ambiguous position within the racial structure. Their
presence complicates issues regarding the application of and fundamental justification for affirmative action. On the other hand, resolving these complications can help reformulate a sounder policy. APA concerns cannot be easily pushed aside or folded into a simple black and white framework. Their educational and economic successes preclude them from being classified simply as another disadvantaged minority equivalent to blacks. At the same time, the APA population cannot be simply lumped in with the dominant white population. The social construction of this population as a racial minority is rooted in a long history of anti-Asian racism and reproduced by contemporary anti-Asian prejudices. Some may want to ignore APAs by asserting that they are a small population. This was true for most of the century, but less so today. APAs now constitute about 4 percent of the population, and will constitute about 6 percent within a generation. While it is important to note that APAs cannot be dismissed numerically, it is at least as important to note that the impact of APAs on race-related policies has not rested on population size. Historically, this group profoundly shaped race relations through the laws enacted against them and the legislative and court victories won by them. Within the contemporary battle over affirmative action, APAs make two important contributions.

The first is in the realm of symbolic politics. There are those who point to APAs as a minority group that has experienced historical discrimination, but nonetheless have been able to overcome obstacles without governmental intervention. This “model minority myth” is used to shift the responsibility of closing the racial gap from the larger society to minorities. If one group can do it, so can the others. Some want APAs to go beyond being a passive model to being spokes­persons against affirmative action to fight reverse discrimination against APAs. This political strategy rests too much on appealing to self-interest and fails to recognize that many APAs accept the necessity to collectively address racial inequality. As the chapter by Taeku Lee
shows, the majority of APAs believes that blacks, and Hispanics to a lesser degree, suffer from discrimination. This translates into support for some race-based policies. In a 1995 national survey, a majority of APA respondents agreed with the following statement: "White Americans have benefited from past and present discrimination against African Americans, so they should be willing to make up for these wrongs." According to a 1996 survey sponsored by Asian Week, slightly more than half of the respondents supported affirmative action and a third opposed it. This shows that many APAs are driven by a broader sense of this country's obligation.

On the other hand, proponents of race-based programs believe that APAs can take an equally powerful stance. Liberals want APAs to be a role model in accepting the sacrifices needed to achieve racial justice. An example of this is the statement by several law professors who support affirmative action. They argue that "APAs can play an extraordinarily powerful role in the debate because they can declare their support for the programs even when they are not directly benefited by them... I am willing to share this burden to help us get beyond racism, to reach a fairer society. I am willing to go beyond my self-interest in order to strive for a community of justice." This call for noble and principled action has great moral appeal, but it minimizes APAs' legitimate self-interest in the affirmative-action debate. Indeed, within our society where the pursuit of self-interest is the norm, acknowledging the special needs of APAs can move the debate forward, if for no other reason than to challenge prevailing ideas.

There are three challenges. The first questions the notions of the primacy of race. APAs are a racial minority, but they are not automatically included in affirmative action programs. As we have seen, inclusion into any particular program (covering higher education, public employment, or government contracting) is predicated on whether APAs are demonstrably disadvantaged. This
practice shows that affirmative action as an institution is flexible and reasonable in situating APAs. The policy is not, as opponents suggest, blindly wedded to a simplistic application of race. Unfortunately, the treatment of APAs has been ad hoc rather than based on a well-articulated principle. Such a principle does not preclude a single race from being included in all affirmative action programs when the evidence justifies such a decision, but this result is the product of applying the principle rather than an a priori categorization. Even if the final outcome of starting with this principle may not differ much from what currently exists, the exercise is politically important because it provides the justification that many voters want before they support affirmative action.

The second challenge centers on the types of race-related problems that government should correct. Affirmative action was developed to counter the racism experienced by African Americans in the 1960s; however, the problems confronting other minorities are not of the same nature. This chapter has documented that the disadvantaged faced by APAs are different, with many of the problems rooted in the immigrant experience. Hispanics and Native Americans also face hardships that are generated by disparate historical and contemporary forces. While socioeconomic injustice is a necessary common denominator for governmental action, programs should be tailored to address the underlying race-specific causes.

The final challenge is to debate openly the sacrifices that must be made to achieve racial justice. Proponents of affirmative action are uncomfortable with such a discussion because it shifts the discussion away from the disadvantaged and potentially legitimizes the claim that whites must give up some opportunities. Yet, as we have seen, this point has been and will be an unavoidable element in the debate. An enlightened and socially productive debate requires that both sides engage the issues rather than having one side frame the issue through polemics. For better or worse, APAs are a part of the debate on the cost of affirmative action, as well as the broader debate on race-based policies.
Endnotes

1 I am grateful for the assistance provided by Issac Elneecave and Elena Sovhos. Taeku Lee graciously provided tabulations from several opinion polls.


6 This was a part of his famous 1965 speech at Howard University, where he argued for affirmative action: “You do not take a person who had been hobbled by chains, liberate him, bring him up to the starting gate of a race and then say, ‘You are free to compete with all the others,’ and still justly believe you have been completely fair. . . . It is not enough to open the gates of opportunity. All of our Citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates. . . . Men and women of all races are born with the same range of abilities. But ability is not just the product of birth. Ability is stretched or stunted by the family you live with, . . . the neighborhood . . . the school . . . and the poverty or richness of your surroundings. It is the product of a hundred unseen forces playing upon the infant, the child and the man.” (Stephanopoulos and Edley, Affirmative Action Review, p. 115).

Most of the early rulings reaffirmed the legality of anti-discriminatory laws in employment. The Supreme Court ruled that firms could not use employment tests that are not job related and have a disparate impact on protected groups, and that employers must have some legitimate nondiscriminatory business reason for rejecting minority applicants. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), McDonnell Douglas v. Green (1973), Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody (1975), and Washington v. Davis (1976).


The progressively greater restrictions are correlated with an ideological realignment of the Court. From 1969 to 1991, the Republican presidents appointed a new Chief Justice as well as nine additions to the Supreme Court.

The specific language of Proposition 209 prohibits the state and local government from supporting programs that "discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting." For a discussion on the development of Proposition 209, see Lydia Chavez, The Color Bind: California's Battle to End Affirmative Action (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998).


20 University of Houston Center for Public Policy and Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy, cited in Julie Mason, Houston Chronicle, 2 October 1997.


22 For this chapter, the term whites refers to the non-Hispanic (NH) white population. The broader white category includes a significant number of Hispanics who identify themselves as whites on race-questions. However, Hispanic whites occupy a socioeconomic position that is very different than that for non-Hispanic whites; consequently, statistics for all whites differ from those for just NH whites. For the purpose of this chapter, NH whites are used as a benchmark to determine the relative standing of minority groups. For convenience, the chapter uses the terms whites and NH whites interchangeably. This chapter does not include Native Americans because the sample size is too small in many of the data sets; nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that
this group is extremely disadvantaged.

23 Data are the 1998 results for the fourth and eleventh grades for the Stanford 9 test as reported by the California Department of Education's STAR data server at http://star.cde.ca.gov/. The test data are merged with data on the racial/ethnic composition for each school from the same source. The ranking of elementary schools is based on a combined score using results reading, math, language and spelling. The eleventh grade ranking is based on scores for reading, math, science and social science tests. We use the percent of the student body that scored at or above the 75th percentile. The composite score may not accurately represent the true performance level of California students; California elementary students may truly be performing at less than the national average or perhaps the benchmark level is improperly set. Nevertheless, the data does provide a useful way to rank the relative performance of elementary schools. The original 11th grade study used results from reading, math, science and social science tests.

24 The statistics for Tables 2, 3, and 4, come from a tabulation by the author of the March Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a national monthly survey of about 60,000 households, and is used to collect information on labor market conditions, particularly the unemployment rate. The March survey, which produces the Annual Demographic Profile, contains extensive information on current (contemporaneous) status along with work experiences and earnings for the previous year. Since 1989, the CPS has included APAs as a separate racial category. The surveys for 1997, 1998, and 1999 were pooled to derive a reasonable sample of APAs. The size of the sample varies according to the needs of a particular analysis. For example, the sample used to calculate wages for the foreign-born, prime-working-age population includes about 3,600 APAs. The actual number of unique individuals is slightly more than two-thirds of the sample size because the CPS retains a proportion of the March sample over a two-year period. Income data are adjusted to 1998 dollars, and the reported statistics on earnings and hourly wages are the weighted average for the three years (1996, 1997, and 1998). Statistics on the labor market status (e.g., labor force participation rates) are for the survey week.


26 SAT Chart 13: Within racial/ethnic groups, first language is related to SAT Verbal scores.


For a discussion of this issue and a summary of the literature on APA students, see Paul M. Ong and Linda C. Wing, "The Social Contract to Educate All Children," in Bill O. Hing and Ronald Lee (Eds.), Reframing the Immigration Debate (Los Angeles, CA: LEAP Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute and UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1996) 223-265.


It is difficult to document many acts of prejudices because they are not conducted openly; nonetheless, there is certainly indirect evidence. This includes stories passed along by those privy to these closed discussions where APAs are not present. The author has received information from white colleagues who were disturbed by discussions among white administrators about their concerns about and desire to minimize the overrepresentation of APAs.


This does not take into account those outside of the labor market because they have become discouraged workers. This is a particular problem among black males.

Multivariate methods are used to estimate the independent sources of the earnings
inequality. Linear regressions are used, with the log of total wages and salaries as the dependent variable. The independent (causal) factors include type of credential (bachelor’s, master’s, professional, and doctoral degrees), nativity (U.S.-born and foreign-born), age and race (APA and white). The sample is restricted to those between the ages of 24 and 64, working full-time (35 or more hours a week) and year-round (50 or more weeks a year), holding at least a bachelor’s degree, and classified as an employee (i.e., not self-employed). Moreover, immigrants are divided into recent and established immigrants (those in the country approximately less than 12 years and those in the country approximately 12 years or more). For the analysis, the earnings of U.S.-born white males is the ultimate benchmark. The impact of the independent variables is calculated using the exponential function on the estimated coefficients.


39 To estimate the effects of ethnicity and nativity, logit regressions with the same college/university educated sample are used in the analysis of the probability of being in management for APAs and whites working full-time and year-round and between the ages of 24 and 64.

40 Total earnings include wages and salaries, self-employment income, and farm income. Wages and salaries are included because many of the firms are incorporated with the owners paid a salary.


42 Even more interesting is the potential impact of alternative schemes to increase disadvantaged groups. For example, giving preference based on class rather than race (that is, giving greater weight to those from low-income families) would increase the admission rate for APAs but not for other racial minorities. This not only shows the inadequacy of class-based program to replace race-based programs in promoting admis-
sions for underrepresented minorities, but also reveals the unique position of the APA population, which has a disproportionate number of poor families despite a high average income for the total population. Cecilia A. Conrad, “Affirmative Action and Admission to the University of California,” in Paul M. Ong (Ed.), Impacts of Affirmative Action: Policies and Consequences in California (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1999) 171-196.

43 “APA Agenda: Asian Americans on the Issues,” Asian Week, 23-29 August 1996: 14-17. For that specific item, 54 percent of the respondent supported the statement, 34 percent opposed, and 12 percent had no opinion.


45 See the results form the Los Angeles Times Poll #318. Respondents were given this question: “As you may know, Asians make up about 10 percent of California’s population but they comprise about 28 percent of the students in the University of California system. Which of these statements comes closer to your view about that: If Asians are better qualified, more of them should be admitted to college than others’ or ‘Despite qualifications, the racial makeup in colleges should generally mirror the population as a whole.” 65 percent of APAs selected the first statement, compared to 42 percent of blacks, 37 percent of Latinos, and 58 percent whites.


Public High School West of the Mississippi,”

www.sfusd.k12.ca.us/schwww/sch697/about/history/page2.html

49 Enrollment data taken from the DataQuest web site maintained by the California Department of Education, http://data1.cde.ca.gov/dataquest/.


51 In 1996, SFUSD modified the admission process for Lowell: “The new admissions policy prescribes that 80 percent of the freshmen are to be admitted under one cut-off score computed strictly according to their composite score, which is based on their middle school GPA and CTBS percentile ranking. The remaining 20 percent of the freshmen are selected from a pool of ‘value-added’ applicants who are given extra points if they produce evidence that meets additional criteria, e.g., took honors courses in middle school, lived in public housing, were eligible for the federal lunch program, participated in extra-curricular activities, had parents who did not graduate from high school, etc.” www.sfusd.k12.ca.us/schwww/sch697/about/policy/admissions.html. This new process, however, did not directly address the issue of a cap on enrollment. The use of race has remained unresolved. Ryan Kim, “Foe Blasts School’s New Admission Plan,” San Francisco Chronicle, 25 November 1999: A1 and A9.


54 The literature indicates that APAs in the public sector earn less and hold lower positions than whites after controlling for personal characteristics. A summary can be found in M.V. Lee Badgett, “The Impact of Affirmative Action on Public-Sector Employment,” in Paul M. Ong (Ed.), Impacts of Affirmative Action: Policies and Consequences in California (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1999) 83-102. Her own analysis shows that in 1990 APAs in government, and male APAs in particular, are less likely to hold a managerial or professional job than whites; however, the gap is even
greater in the private sector.

The precise occupational definitions in Table 8 are not the same as the CPS-based definitions used in the analysis in the previous section of this chapter, which is based on the Current Population Survey. Nonetheless, the relative distributions are similar. For example, both the EEOC and CPS data show that APAs in the private sector are only half as likely to be in a management position as in a professional occupation.

Because APAs are better educated, one would expect a proportionately higher share of the management position, but the detail data are not available to estimate what the share should be. However, the multivariate analysis in the previous section indicates that APAs have reach parity with whites in the professional categories, after accounting for age, educational credentials, and nativity. In other words, the observed APA share of professional jobs is in line with what we expect after taking into account background characteristics. Given that management is also a high-status occupation, we would expect APA share of management position to be roughly equal to that in the professions. In other words, if APAs hold 7 percent of professional jobs, then we would expect APAs to hold 7 percent of management jobs given their higher education. The lower the index, the greater the under representation.


The extremely low parity index for APAs is due in part to the higher level of entrepreneurship of APAs compared to other minority groups. If the population is used as the numerator to construct a parity index, then the results would show that APAs fare better than other minorities, although still not as well as whites. This change in the rank order reveals the limitations of such simple measures.


The purpose and objective of the 8(a) program is to assist socially and economically...
disadvantaged individuals participate fully and successfully in the business mainstream of the American economy. This goal is accomplished through the expansion of businesses owned by program participants, which, in turn, generates societal benefits through the creation of jobs and wealth. Program participants receive multi-year business development assistance. Because of the selection rules and the underlying composition of disadvantaged firms, the participants in the 8(a) program are predominantly minority, and this is particularly true in the early years.

62 Tabulation by author of California Certification Information System (Calcert) 1999 database, California Department of Transportation.

63 Stephen L. Klineberg, Houston’s Ethnic Communities, Third Edition (Houston, TX: Rice University, 1996).


65 There is no equivalent exit poll on APAs for Houston’s Proposition A or Washington State’s Initiative 200, but there is some indirect information. An inspection of the votes by precinct in King County, which includes Seattle, reveals that most of the predominantly APA neighborhoods (by block groups) coincide with precincts where voters overwhelmingly (75 percent or more) voted against the initiative. www.seattletimes.com/news/local/charts/voted98/I200county.html, and www.seattletimes.com/news/local/charts/voted98/I200race.html


67 A part of the explanation might be that this group had been sensitized to the necessity to fight wedge issues sponsored by conservatives. In 1994, the state passed Proposition 187, an initiative designed to prevent undocumented aliens from public services but also had a strong anti-immigrant undercurrent. Los Angeles Times, 10 November 1994: B4.


Immigrants: The Demographic Background,” in Bill O. Hing and Ronald Lee (Eds.), Reframing the Immigration Debate (Los Angeles, CA: LEAP Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute and UCLA Asian American Studies Center, 1996) 35-57.


74 Post/Kaiser/Harvard Race Poll, 1995. Respondents were asked to choose which of the following two statement represents their opinion: “White Americans have benefited from past and present discrimination against African Americans, so they should be willing to make up for these wrongs” or “Most white Americans have not benefited from past and present discrimination against African Americans/Hispanic Americans/Asian Americans, so they have no responsibility to make up for these wrongs.” Forty-six percent of APA respondents selected the first statement when applied to Hispanics or APAs.

75 “APA Agenda: Asian Americans on the Issues,” Asian Week, 23-29 August 1996: 14-17. For questions on giving preferences to underrepresented minorities in employment and public contracts, 51 percent agree, 33 disagreed, and 16 percent had no opinion.

Asians and Race Relations in Britain

Shamit Saggar

Introduction

By European standards, Britain is frequently characterized as a country in which the social and political integration of ethnic minorities has advanced substantially. Starting from a limited base in the immediate post-war period, a substantial proportion of minorities emerged from the 1970s onwards as relatively active in the mainstream political process and able to harness tangible benefits in the employment, housing and educational markets. In large measure, Britain's transformation into a multiracial, multicultural society was driven by its particular immigration history. Significant numbers of labor migrants were recruited from both colonial and post-colonial sources during the 1950s in order to fill often-specific shortfalls in the effort to reconstruct after war. Additionally, others from similar countries of origin responded to this labor shortage and joined often spontaneous migration chains to build new and, hopefully, better lives for themselves and their offspring in what at that time continued to be described as the mother country. Finally, putting aside the large numbers involved in family reunification (a theme that spawned major political rows over immigration policy in the 1970s), a third component of this transformation was made up by politically displaced refugees. Three successive nationality crises in Kenya (1968), Uganda (1972) and Malawi (1976) resulted in major inflows of British nationals of South Asian ethnic origin.

This chapter is concerned with charting the nature and effects of this transformation in British society and with examining the part played by Asians in this process. The following section reviews both the historic context of post-war immigration as well as recent Census and other
indicators on the components of multiracial Britain. A key theme in the historic background has been the question of race and racialization, a perspective that suggests that the post-war newcomers were systematically perceived through the prism of racial difference and distance. Indeed, the idea that British politics and society in some way became racialized in the 1950s is to suggest that a quasi-formal racial code became the basis for public debates over immigration from Asia, Africa and the Caribbean. This argument, as this chapter will argue, has become increasingly redundant in recent years precisely because of diminished predictive capacity of race in tracking and explaining the social circumstances of ethnic minorities in Britain. The third part of the chapter turns to consider specific aspects of the Asian presence in Britain. Attention focuses on participation patterns in employment, education and mainstream politics, again raising questions (taken up in following section) over the nature of the public policy framework as a whole. The primary underlying theme of the fourth part of the chapter is to shed light on the extent to which the Asian experience within multiracial Britain follows patterns that adequately describe other significant minorities. The purpose of exploring this theme is not merely to track different trajectories in their own right; rather, it is to assess the intellectual and practical relevance of the British liberal race relations paradigm. This liberal framework, as we shall see, has a long-standing pedigree in British approaches to social policy more generally. However, it is important to bring out its genesis in U.S. thinking and practice in race relations, influential both at home and abroad throughout the twentieth century. The chapter closes with a discussion of the Asian experience within a society whose norms have been largely driven by the development of ethnic group-based political rights. Such an outcome, it is suggested, has left the British case appearing increasingly anachronistic when measured by continental European standards.
Asian Demographics and Related Patterns

Britain's Asian population significantly outnumbers any other single composite group among the ethnic minority population. Based on now-dated evidence from the 1991 General Census, Asians constitute a little less than 3 percent of the general population. More recent estimates based on Labor Force Survey data released just before the last general election in 1997 indicated that Asians as a combined group might have swollen by a further 12-15 percent during the 1990s; moreover, the overall number of Asians, based on these LFS trends, was likely to expand by an additional fifth by the time of the next census (2001). Therefore, at century's end, an Asian community hovering around the two million mark seems to be a credible estimate.

While this population size may only be modest in absolute and proportional terms, it is important to emphasize that it is relatively concentrated geographically. In broad terms, around three-quarters of its members are found in urban areas of Britain, while its Bangladeshi-origin component is essentially a London-based subgroup (over nine in ten are found in the capital city, the great bulk of whom is concentrated in London's East End). It is not hard to see immediately the implications that such urban concentration might have on the salience of certain public policy issues rather than others. Moreover, in Britain's traditional first-past-the-post electoral arrangements, there are some very clear benefits that accrue from geographic density in a limited number of parliamentary constituencies and local government wards.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Number (in thousands)</th>
<th>Percent of total population</th>
<th>Percent of nonwhite population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>54,889</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>51,874</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>3,015</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Caribbean</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black African</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black other</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black total</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladeshi</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asian total</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Asian</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Asian *</td>
<td>1,835</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* Calculation based on total of all South Asian, Chinese and other Asian groups
Source: 1991 General Census
The composition of the Asian community is rather more revealing, however. As Table 1 above shows, Indians are by far the largest individual group, and very probably over a million in number in actual terms. As a group, Indians will, of course, comprise many different religious, linguistic, regional and even caste sub-groups, though in the British case Hindus from Gujerat and Hindus and Sikhs from Punjab are the largest and best-known components of the Indian-origin population. Ethnic Pakistanis’ numbers are something over half the Indian size, while ethnic Bangladeshis amount to just over a tenth of the aggregate number (or a third of the size of the Pakistani group and a fifth of the Indian group). With a considerably younger age profile than the white population, the growth that is likely to take place among Asians will be considerable. Labor Force Survey findings from the mid-1990s reveal that more than two-thirds of Asians are below 35 years of age, as compared with less than one-half of their white counterparts. The former group then is heavily represented in the major child-bearing and rearing age cohorts with obvious knock-on effects in terms of growth patterns (taking no account for external sources through further primary or secondary migration, however restrictively regulated by policy). It is also worth adding that growth rates for Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups have tended to be larger than Indians, partially reflecting aspects of socioeconomic class and educational backgrounds, but also the possibility of cultural differences at work. Asian Indians, therefore, hold an important numerical grip for the time being, though the implication that this might be reflected in areas such as electoral strategy may turn out to be mistaken. Proportionately smaller, yet more tightly packed, these Asian groups might easily be capable of greater political leverage.
Policy Problems and Frameworks: Patterns of Change and Continuity

British integration policy has broadly been geared to addressing direct and indirect discrimination in different aspects of British society. It is a framework that largely has its origins in the 1960s, an era in which British governments began to develop fresh ideas and approaches to the longer term consequences of earlier immigration and settlement policies. The nature and characteristics of the British approach is a topic that has been widely debated, and we shall return to consider certain elements of the model and its impact upon Asians in Britain in a later part of this chapter. For the time being, however, it is worth shedding some light on the form that Asian participation in public life has taken.

In very general terms, the British policy thinking and practice has operated under the assumption that forms of under-representation would normally characterize the participation of significant ethnic minorities such as Asians and blacks. Racial prejudice, it was thought, was the cause behind such under-representation and that this factor could and indeed should be countered through a combination of enforced social reforms (tentative anti-discrimination laws), and educational leadership (typically seen in early stabs at introducing cross-cultural awareness into the school curriculum as well as into professional hiring and training programs). For instance, the arena of electoral politics provided a good early illustration of the kinds of problems that social policy and wider reform efforts were aimed at addressing. In national parliamentary elections, the first ethnic minority, mainstream party candidate (a black doctor) emerged only as recently as the 1970 General Election. The first Asians in similar situations did not appear until the mid-1970s and no minority, black or Asian, was successful even at the level of winning a party nomination in a nationally winnable seat until 1983. It was not until as late as 1987 that the first batch of ethnic minorities was finally elected to Westminster
under the colors of one of the major parties (four were returned including a single Asian). Later in 1992 an Asian Conservative MP was successfully returned by a west London constituency comprising a sizable number of Asian voters, though this breakthrough was something of a false dawn due to his emphatic defeat five years later. Finally, by 1997 the total Asian presence in the House of Commons stood at just five MPs (all of whom represented the Labor Party). In the world of local elections the picture was slightly more promising, but certainly not substantially different. Writing in the mid-1990s, one respected commentator was able to paint a rather upbeat picture of Asian electoral progress at sub-national level:

The broad picture is that Asian communities have been more successful in producing councillors than their black counterparts. The Asian community has achieved a position close to parity in 40 local authorities [in which the Asian population exceeded 10 percent]. The most remarkable fact is that in these 40 authorities the proportion of Labor councillors is 93.4 percent and that of the Conservatives 4.5 percent and Liberal Democrats 2.1 percent. The extent of this party-based imbalance is a fact that needs to be driven home in popular coverage of race-and-representation themes.

Under-representation thus referred to a situation in which aggregate data pointed to either shortcomings in the supply of suitable participants or, more disturbingly, to worries over prejudice and discrimination in the recruitment and selection activities of political parties. Outside politics, in areas such as employment and education, the under-representation formula instead concerned job hopefuls and employers or students and teachers, respectively.

With this background in mind, it worth devoting some space in this chapter to examining the reality of Asian participation in British
society. Three fairly specific areas are reviewed—employment, education and electoral politics—to try to gauge two interrelated questions. First, to what extent is it reasonable to point to under-representation generalizations? The question has meaning because it has been suspected for a long time that the Asian group is likely to contain important variations within its very broadly set parameters. Second, what signs, if any, are there to suggest that Asian participation, or at least the participation of segments of the Asian-origin population, is driven by ethnic commonness as opposed to other secular factors such as social class? This question stands out mainly because a great deal has been claimed about the notion of Asianness, a loose descriptive term that is frequently cited as if to highlight the salutary importance of ethnicity and ethnic kinship in shaping the position of an ethnic group. As the following discussion observes, such an argument has been somewhat over-emphasized in the three fields that are examined.

**Labor Market Change and Consolidation**

The structure of the British labor market has changed dramatically over the past two decades and Asian participation in different forms of employment has also evolved to keep pace with these changes, while in some areas there are considerable signs of falling behind in labor market participation patterns. It is worth beginning, however, with a brief overview of the types of manual and non-manual work in which Asians are involved, taking account of the underlying class structure in Britain. Table 2 below tells the story. It is immediately clear that Asian employment is slightly skewed towards participation at the lower end of the status scale. This is particularly pronounced among Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin Asians. Equally, these two groups contain large numbers in the middle-ranking, skilled manual employment category, partly reflecting the kind of labor migration patterns of which they were originally a part. Meanwhile, the start of a distinctive Indian pattern can be discerned with
heavy concentration, comparable to whites, in the three categories at the upper end of the scale. Interestingly, a similar picture is also true of black Caribbeans (except in professional jobs) on the basis of 1991 Census figures, thereby dispelling the belief that few among this group could or had reached into a stable middle-class employment. The most noteworthy figure relates to the one-in-ten rate of Indian professional employment uncovered almost a decade ago, a finding that has presumably increased even farther in the intervening period.13

| Table 2. Socioeconomic employment status of selected ethnic groups, 1991 |
|-----------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| Occupation                  | White | Indian | Pakistani | Bangladeshi | Black Caribbean |
| Unskilled                   | 6    | 3     | 5         | 4           | 7              |
| Semi-skilled manual         | 15   | 21    | 24        | 32          | 19             |
| Skilled manual              | 21   | 16    | 25        | 26          | 22             |
| Skilled non-manual          | 24   | 23    | 18        | 20          | 24             |
| Managerial                  | 29   | 28    | 22        | 13          | 26             |
| Professional                | 5    | 9     | 6         | 5           | 2              |

Source: 1991 General Census

Census data, therefore, paints a picture of partial upward socioeconomic mobility among all members of the at-large Asian community.14 This is true only to an extent, however, because there are clear signs of Asian Indians beginning to stretch away from the pack. Not surprisingly, this has led to talk of a new Indian middle-class by which it is hard to ignore this group's very high rate of participation in professional employment. Aspects of this Indian-led pattern are likely to be reflected in areas such as political identity and behavior (including
voting preference). Additionally, forms of new middle-class identity are unlikely to be built on employment patterns alone, and we would expect some similar outcomes in areas such as housing (tenure type, mean equity value, neighborhood character, etc.) as well as education (selective entry, fee-paying, attainment levels, etc).

An interesting question concerns the origins and trajectory of Asian middle-class groups. For one thing, it has been suggested that straight comparison of the main Asian groups may risk masking the possibility that these groups' class structures were highly dissimilar at the point of entry as immigrants into Britain. Certainly, Asian Indians were over-represented among the East African refugees of the 1960s and 1970s. East African Asians displayed a marked different employment and class background to their sub-continental counterparts. The former was mainly drawn from white-collar, public sector employment and also from independent business backgrounds. As such, most were already familiar with two key elements of British society following migration: the use of the English language as the lingua franca of the new home society, and urban residential experience in common with new settlement patterns after arrival. In contrast, Asian immigrants from South Asia directly had tended to settle in Britain at a much earlier period and had been drawn from mainly rural, agrarian backgrounds. Few held the linguistic background of their later East African counterparts and many were recruited directly into semi-skilled and routine manual work in manufacturing, transportation, the health services and textiles. The wide disparities uncovered within superficially similar ethnic groups are a factor that needs to be treated with caution. In short, the burgeoning Indian middle-class in modern Britain may owe their upward socioeconomic mobility less to their ethnic origins than to a series of fairly specific factors such as language and previous employment that have in turn made important, though indirect, contributions to their social class status.

Finally, a word or two must be added on the question of
unemployment (conspicuously not scanned in the employment-based social status profile of the previous table) and average earnings (an indicator of position within social status scales). Labor Force Survey data from the mid-1990s revealed even greater reason to believe that a large schism had opened up between Asian Indians on one hand and all the other significant ethnic minority groups (including Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) on the other. Male unemployment among whites stood at 9.9 percent, a figure not too dissimilar to that for Indian males (13 percent). Meanwhile, comparable rates for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis put together had reached a staggering 27 percent (within reach of the upper end rate seen among black males of 30 percent). This is fairly reliable reason to think that segmented labor markets are at work among different Asian ethnic groups. Furthermore, LFS data showed that average hourly earnings of Indian men stood only modestly below those of their white counterparts (the former amounted to 91 percent of the latter). The ratio of Pakistani and Bangladeshi males earnings to those of whites, meanwhile, was a paltry 68 percent, substantially below that of black males and ethnic minorities as a whole (88 and 89 percent respectively).

**Educational Participation and Performance**

The pattern of excess among selected Asian groups in relation to other Asian communities is substantially reinforced in the area of educational take-up and mean attainment rates. Table 3 below notes that the one of the root ingredients of attainment involve the capacity—or perhaps opportunity—to participate in post-compulsory education beyond 16 years of age. The data relate to the mid-1990s period and demonstrate that, once again, it is exceedingly hard to lump together the profiles of all three main Asian groups. Furthermore, the data reveal that, in the case of educational participation, non-Indian Asians continue to outstrip the rates found among ethnic minorities at large, though it is striking that by 18 years of age considerable fall-off has occurred among Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis as well. This further drives home the earlier observation about Indian exceptionalism. This is important because it signals a rough age-driven indicator for potential recruitment into higher education and with it the main avenue into future possibilities for professional training and employment.

Interestingly, all minority groups exhibit participation rates considerably in excess of the white benchmark, probably suggesting that young members of these ethnic groups and their parents increasingly view education as a primary means for securing social mobility. At age 16, this generalization appears to apply to all minorities, Asian and black, but by age 18, this has become much more of an Asian-only phenomenon. Furthermore, in the case of other Asian groups, staying on in schools, colleges and universities has become something of an article of faith.

**Table 3. Participation in Post-Compulsory Full-Time Education, 1994**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aged 16</th>
<th>Aged 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani/Bangladeshi</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian **</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
* England and Wales only
** comprises Chinese, Japanese, Korean and SE Asian

Source: Youth Cohort Study, Department for Education and Employment, Spring 1994

In the area of attainment, once again Asian Indians scored highest when measuring the proportions succeeding in gaining five GCSE passes between
grades A-C. Figures for the mid-1990s showed that 45 percent of this group reached this threshold, the same as among whites. Interestingly, the other Asian group (which includes Chinese) also matched this rate of success. However, a significantly lower rate of achievement was recorded among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (just 25 percent). Local surveys in 1997 of the picture in London relating to those holding degree-level qualifications showed a marked disparity between Pakistanis and Bangladeshis: 46 percent of the former (in London) held degrees against just 25 percent of the latter. This implies that the standard method of collapsing together the performance of these two groups (in order usually to deliver sufficient sample group numbers) is probably likely to remit misleading results. The same survey also revealed that both Chinese and South Asians generally were substantially more likely to be studying for academic qualifications than other ethnic groups. Black and white students, meanwhile, were considerably over-represented on vocational course enrollments.

In the early years of research on, and policy development of, ethnic minority educational participation it was generally assumed that lower levels of attainment were limited to black Afro-Caribbean groups. Certainly pockets of low achievement could be pointed to among Asians in comparison with whites at large, but these were generally thought to be isolated examples. However, more recent data has consistently pointed to marked variations in performance within the Asian population, and there has been little point in denying the very considerable records of over achievement by Indians in particular. These differences, of course, cannot be seen in isolation and it is likely that social class and attainment patterns are closely entwined with one another.

Questions of educational outcomes, however important and fought over, only relate to one prominent aspect of debates over education policy. Another key dimension stems from the nature and content of the educational curriculum, in turn raising often-febrile arguments over the values and principles underpinning formal educational programs. This is an area in which only limited research has been carried out on the nature of ethnic group
attitudes. One particular survey, now rather dated, indicated that distinctions could be made between different ethnic minority groups attitudes toward multicultural educational principles and even lesson content. However, in pointing tentatively to some degree of reservation among Indian parents, it was not clear whether this tension was driven by their ethnic identity or rather by aspects of their social class. In any case, it masks the bigger division between minority parents on one hand and white parents on the other, many of whom exhibit attitudinal support for multicultural education, conditional on its targeting towards ethnic minority children or at the very least towards areas of high minority concentrations. Further research is still needed to unlock the extent to which group perceptions of multicultural education are informed by frameworks that question, and possibly deny, its legitimacy in mainstream schooling.

**Electoral Behavior: Prospects for Voter Dealignment**

If we now turn our attention to the third and final aspect of the discussion of Asian participation in contemporary Britain, it is clear that the arena of mainstream politics, centered on electoral choice, is one in which several important debates exist over the extent of Asian influence and leverage. Electoral politics holds the potential of rapid and observable change in the eyes of those eager to highlight the centrality of Asian participation. Critics have sometimes noted that such a preoccupation risks overplaying the actual impact that results from Asian electoral participation and, more troublesome, serves to overlook the dividends that might result from pressure group activity or protest politics. These considerations aside, it is possible to identify the emergence of a core debate among analysts and commentators over the worth of mainstream Asian political participation. One side of this argument has tended to emphasize the idea that Asians specifically—and ethnic minorities more generally—have the potential to act collectively in order to maximize their returns from the political system. A core element of this claim has rested on voter numbers and their strategic use in a concentrated and targeted
manner.\textsuperscript{26} For this school of thought, the ethnicity of Asians counts politically because it is the vital glue that binds together their political outlooks and behavior in what otherwise remains a political cold climate. Against this it is possible to identify a counter-school that sees little prospect in Asians using collective action to boost potential political rewards principally because, it is argued, the absence of convincing evidence to demonstrate high and enduring levels of ethnic-based political consciousness among this group.\textsuperscript{27} The fact that they may share many, though not all, aspects of their ethnic background with one another, is not grounds for believing that Asians will adopt a similar position in terms of political participation. For one thing, it is doubtful whether they share a common issue agenda with one another, with little evidence to support the idea that a pattern exists within Asians' understanding of their political interests. For another, wide and not-easily-accountable variations exist in the actual rates of electoral involvement among different Asian groups, implying that generalizations about the wielding of electoral muscle are fraught with misdiagnosis.\textsuperscript{28}

In order to flesh out this debate, let us consider three central elements of Asian electoral participation: the question of rates of involvement based on electoral registration and turnout; the extent to which the evidence points to a distinctive set of issues or interests that Asians share with one another; and finally, the ever-thorny puzzle over Asians party alignment. The third theme has arguably presented one of the greatest challenges for political analysts. The prime reason for this controversy has been the overwhelming allegiance of British ethnic minorities to Britain's traditional left-of-country political party, the Labor Party. At one level this has not only meant the rightist parties such as the Conservatives have missed out on an minority electoral dividend, but, moreover, have accepted that Labor's massive lead has been largely the product of the internal class composition of the Asian and black electorate. The difficulty has arisen from evidence that has shown that little or no propensity among the much smaller proportion of middle-class minorities to break with their traditional Labor mooring. Other considerations, notably the
influence of group ethnicity upon political cohesion, are thus thought to be critical to understanding minority voting behavior generally and Asian participation in particular.

However, to start with the question of political involvement, evidence from the 1997 General Election indicates that, at the level of basic voter registration, all three main Asian groups that were studied exhibited impressive rates of participation. This participation is related to the second core element, that of turnout rates. Table 4 below summarizes the position in 1997 on both fronts and shows Asian groups in comparison with one another and also in relation to their white and black counterparts.

### Table 4 - Electoral Registration and Turnout by Ethnic Group, 1997 *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group (%)</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Indian</th>
<th>Pakistani</th>
<th>Bangladeshi</th>
<th>Black African</th>
<th>Black Caribbean</th>
<th>Misc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is your name on the electoral register?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>97.0</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>90.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N</td>
<td>2,480</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total %</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Did you manage to vote in the General Election? ** |       |        |           |             |               |                 |       |
| Yes              | 80.8  | 85.4   | 84.9      | 80.4        | 74.2          | 73.4            | 71.8  |
| No               | 19.2  | 14.6   | 15.1      | 19.6        | 25.8          | 26.6            | 28.2  |
| Total N          | 2,406 | 274    | 106       | 56          | 62            | 94              | 85    |
| Total %          | 100.0 | 100.0  | 100.0     | 100.0       | 100.0         | 100.0           | 100.0 |

Notes:

* Excludes Scotland
** Excludes Don’t knows

Source: British Election Study 1997 - merged file (weighted data)
The degree of variance among Asians is also of significance. The above evidence shows that an Asian pattern-of-sorts exists (registration and turnout rates that equal or exceed those of other minority groups). In addition, a regular Indian pattern is discernible. In all cases, Indians are shown to be the most participatory group with rates that appear to bring them somewhat closer to their white counterparts than other Asians: registration rates matched those of whites, while reported turnout in fact outstripped rates among white electors.

The upshot of this evidence is fairly clear. It would appear that a large segment of the Asian population is characterized by a form of political participation that is not immediately evident among other ethnic minorities. Secondly, this evidence suggests variations in Asian and minority political participation. In particular, the distribution of the Indian vote comes to mind and will be examined below. Thirdly, the evidence here tends to encourage the view that an underlying social class effect might be influencing patterns of Indian participation. The evidence on levels of participation, in other words, promotes as many questions as answers.

A second element of the discussion relates to the relative distinctiveness of Asian political interests and attitudes. In this respect it has been argued that in order that Asians can act collectively within the political arena, it is first necessary to show that they share sufficient similarities in their political outlook and even in their political thinking. The evidence is far from conclusive, however. Data from Gallup analyzed from as long ago as the 1987 General Election showed the startling fact that just 1 percent of Asian respondents ranked race as one of the two most important issues facing them (from a list of 10 issues). Significantly, although this figure appears minuscule, it is entirely in line with that found among black voters (none) and whites (just 1 percent). Furthermore, survey data collected by National Opinion Poll in 1991 reported a revealing picture among whites, Asians and blacks in terms of the treatment all respondents perceived each group received from public
institutions. Interestingly, the proportions believing that the (public) schools provided worse treatment for whites and Asians differed very little (13 against 15 percent); the comparable figure for blacks was a colossal 38 percent. Likewise, at the hands of the courts, the notion that Asians and whites as groups received a raw deal attracted the support of 19 and 24 percent of respondents respectively, as against 57 percent in relation to blacks. In the area of policing the figures were 45, 48 and 75 percent, while in employment opportunities the findings were 42, 39 and 67 percent respectively. This particular survey appeared to paint a picture that, at the very least, distinguished Asians from their black counterparts in multiracial Britain. These data conspicuously failed to point to any degree of Asian-only distinctiveness as measured not by Asian attitudes and behavior but, rather, in terms of the views held by members of society as a whole.

Finally, more recent evidence from the 1997 General Election highlighted only modest grounds for a picture of Asian distinctiveness. One interesting variant on this theme has been to examine ethnic group attitudes toward political issues that do not normally tie in with debates over race or ethnicity. The case of attitudes in relation to public spending as a means of tackling poverty is a good case in point since it may simultaneously represent something of an indirect link with the perceived political interests of discrete ethnic minority groups. Some 91 percent of whites probably or definitely agreed with the proposition that government spending ought to be raised to tackle poverty; however, this was also true of very high proportions of Indians and Pakistanis (89 and 86 percent respectively), with rather fewer Bangladeshis taking this position (72 percent). The complication is further reinforced by the supporters among those of black African origin (95 percent) and black Caribbean background (91 percent). Again, this does not point to any sign of Asian attitudinal distinctiveness. It is always possible that researchers are looking in the wrong places for the sort of evidence that could possibly support the
hypothesis of Asian distinctiveness. Certainly, in fields such as cultural policy, opinions over the role of religion in politics and the role of women in public life have indicated that some groups of Asians hold different attitudes from those of other groups. However, this limitation is the rub in the thesis because such generalizations often do not apply to Asians as a bloc. The potential for Asians to develop collective positions and a strategy for political action is consequently diminished.

This effective roadblock is especially puzzling given that there is plentiful evidence for Asian (and ethnic minority) distinctiveness as measured by voting preference. Numerous studies have pointed to remarkably consistent partisanship across Asian voters of all different social classes, and the task, not surprisingly, has been to try to account for this stable pattern. Among Asian voters this need has been especially pressing given the growth in this group’s middle-class numbers without any noticeable departure in its traditional patterns of party choice. According to Heath et al. the deadlock, identified some years ago, points at least partly to the role of ethnicity as a separate political socialization agent and stimulant to attitude formation and political behavior:

The political behavior of [Asians and blacks] is not to be explained by their class situation. They are much more inclined to the Labor Party than white voters in similar class situations. Perception of the group interests or processes of group identification are more plausible explanations.

A final area to consider is the matter of the partisan loyalties of Asian voters and the prospects, if any, for change. Voting studies going back over many years have shown that British ethnic minority voters have backed the Labor Party in quite staggering numbers: typically four in five minority voters have voted for Labor in a typical general or local election. This pattern has applied historically as much to Asians as other minority groups. However, it has been Asian voters, more so than their black counterparts, who have been singled out by proponents of embourgeoisement-centered
theories of voting behavior. These arguments have been built on the idea that changing social and economic relationships, chiefly rising social mobility, would drive similar changes in political outlook and behavior. In particular, evidence from the late 1980s and early 1990s showing clear signs of an emergent Asian—largely Indian—middle-class have been seized upon by this school as the raw material for future rightward drift in Asian political attitudes and beliefs.  

Two features of existing Asian voting patterns stand out. First, the overwhelming bias to Labor is self-evidently out of line with the varying (and usually weak) fortunes of Labor among white voters in this period. Second, this bias appears to be relatively insulated from short-term trends. For instance, the rout suffered by Labor in 1983 was not reflected among Asian voters. Minorities remained remarkably loyal to Labor in what then was a terribly cold climate. The upshot of this is that the Labor Party is probably enjoying saturation levels of Asian electoral support and has been doing so for many past elections. Table 5 below tells the story of Labor's quite staggering grip on Asian and black voters as compared with their white counterparts, and also summarizes a picture of continuity in the most recent election.

**TABLE 5. ETHNIC MINORITY VOTING PREFERENCES, 1983-97**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre parties</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:  
* Excludes those not intending to vote and undecideds  

There is a long-standing interest among researchers, politicians, journalists and others in Asian voter alignment. The research points to three broad lessons for this varied audience. First, it is reasonably clear that a model ethnic minority beachhead does exist for Labor’s rivals — principally the Conservatives — among the numerically large Indian electorate. This group contained around 18 percent who backed the Conservatives in 1997, an otherwise disastrous year for the Tories — around five times the rate found among black voters as a whole. The opportunity-cost of this development remains an open question from the perspective of Tory strategy, putting aside the question of how far, if at all, it is the product of conscious effort. Second, it is likely that Asian elites can and do have an influential role to play in advancing any potential for dealignment with the Labor Party. However, this is compromised first by the short-term success of Labor in winning (or retaining) a great deal of elite loyalty, and secondly, by the tendency to overstate the basic leverage capacity of elite activity. Certainly, this has been a continuing feature of Tory strategy, which has been lead, and often limited, by over-reliance on elite initiatives. Third, the cultural thesis, by which a supposed overlap between ethnic group values and party values was emphasized in campaigning, is probably a red herring in explaining, let alone predicting, the possibility for Asian dealignment. For one thing, this school of thought pays virtually no interest in the rather more illuminating evidence for class-based factors in possible dealignment, an approach that recent research has devoted a lot of attention towards. Additionally, the argument over Tory cultural campaign themes in 1997 was eclipsed by Labor’s success in mobilizing basic bourgeois themes for its own partisan benefit.
Race Relations and Asian Public Policy Agendas: Fits, Misfits and Recalibration Politics

At the start of this chapter mention was made of the nature of Britain's modern immigration debate that began in the 1950s as well as the ways in which governments started the ball rolling in tackling the scourge of discrimination and promoting integration policy. This, in other words, was the central historic legacy of the mid-Twentieth Century through which developments by the start of the next century have to be seen. And yet, it is reasonably plain that this legacy has provided an analytical and policy lens that at best allows only partial understanding of the position of Asians in contemporary Britain. For one thing, to speak of the great race-and-immigration question in modern British politics is to miss the point that such a debate has largely ceased to exist. There have been many factors behind this transformation but, as the essay highlighted, the continuing political instability that all parties experienced at the hands of the immigration issue was finally put to rest in the early 1980s. The 1981 British Nationality Act ensured that on-going rows over unknown numbers of immigrant dependents were ended quite conclusively. The upshot was that immigration effectively dropped off the edge of the political agenda and British immigration policy has been characterized thereafter by an era of firm but fair controls. Additionally, it cannot be forgotten that, with family reunification largely completed for the first waves of immigrants, by the 1980s and 1990s the issue has become progressively less salient for the minorities themselves. Lastly, Britain has been increasingly preoccupied with the impact of European integration upon its immigration regime and this has meant that a new pan-European dimension has eclipsed older narrow concerns with Asian sources.

If immigration as a political issue is no longer recognizable in modern Britain, what then of the path taken by political efforts to secure
integration and curb discrimination? In this area there has been no comparable decline in salience for these concerns among minorities. However, the growing class diversity found among South Asians described previously has meant those old assumptions about the value and purpose of integration policy can no longer be taken for granted. In one area, education, limited evidence already exists to show that there is a growing polarization of opinion within the Asian communities towards the role of multiculturalism in the curriculum. These variations are possibly masks for class-driven interests, and it is likely that more widespread examples in areas such as housing and health will emerge in the near future. Attitudinal evidence from 1997 suggests that, while all groups of Asians believe that the incidence of prejudice and discrimination is fairly widespread, some clearly assign very different meaning to this reality than others. Indeed, the centrality of race as a long-term source of division appears to be doubtful when it comes to drawing generalizations about Asians as whole in Britain. Furthermore, while recognizing the extent of racial discrimination, some groups of Asians are undoubtedly more eager and willing than others to embrace direct, racially-based forms of social policy in response. To be sure, South Asians of Indian ethnic origin stand in sharp contrast to their Pakistani and Bangladeshi counterparts on questions as fundamental as government approaches to equal opportunities. That said and to be fair, all minorities, and all groups of Asians, are clearly united with the white counterparts in their emphatic opposition to doctrines of racial preference.37

Race Relations and Asians: Future Prospects

Race relations in Britain are a field of endeavor that have been closely modeled on the U.S. experience in the middle part of the twentieth century. Starting from a low base, British political, policy and other elites...
were successful in devising a policy framework for immigrant integration during the 1960s that ran parallel to the major influxes from South Asia and the Caribbean. Much has been written about this framework and its attendant strengths and weaknesses. This context is important in order to understand how far public policy responses have gone in the intervening years to appropriately tackle the problems facing British Asians. In this concluding section of the chapter, we shall discuss the role and fit of public policy and also consider the question of race as the central unit of analysis and interpretation facing the policy community. In addition, it is imperative to ask whether a single race relations framework can any longer encompass the position of such increasingly diverse ethnic groups, to say nothing of the diversity of experience among Asians themselves. Three central lessons can be drawn at this stage.

First, there is the matter of sheer population numbers and their patterns of expansion and potential reconfiguration. Substantially-dated Census returns from the early 1990s place the total Asian population, from south, east and south-east Asian sources, at a little under two million or 3.5 percent of the greater UK population. These numbers constitute almost two-thirds of all ethnic minorities, with South Asians alone making up one-in-two of all minorities. However, it is clear that some striking patterns of integration, socioeconomic mobility and participation characterize the experience of some Asians as opposed to others. At the risk of slight over-generalization, it is now permissible to speak of Indians as following a rather distinctive path from other South Asians. Certainly this perspective commands weight in areas such as employment and education, though, significantly rather less so in the area of party political choice. In general, it is likely that these are the beginnings of class differentiation taking hold from within the Asian communities, thus rendering the notion of collective Asian interests as ever more improbable, as well as, implausible. That is not to say that there is no further steam in
the idea of Asian politics as a major feature of the political landscape. Rather, it is likely that Asians will take a more selective approach to the relevance of their ethnic origins in matters of attitudes and behavior. Public policy-makers might therefore conclude that a form of a la carte Asian ethnicity is at play at that; more seriously, this framework represents the best hope in preparing for cross-Asian responses in some areas alongside more targeted efforts in others.

Secondly, policy-makers have already begun to make necessary allowance for the capacity for self-help and self-determination. This is not a trivial thing to speak of, not least because of the continuing criticisms of paternalism that have been leveled by many grassroots activists against liberal-inspired public policy programs. In this respect, policy-makers have been sensitive to the charge that possibly not all policy measures ought to be driven by the need to root out discrimination in the delivery of public services. The area of health care is a good case in point. While a wealth of evidence exists to show that Asians do not necessarily receive a full or even reasonable share of publicly funded health care services, it is also striking that many of these groups' demands have been focused on their particular health needs. Issues of ethnic genetics and epimediology have played a part in this agenda. At the same time there has been a growing chorus calling for the focus and parameters of established health and social services to be recalibrated to better meet the needs of some Asian groups who traditionally are reluctant to search for external forms of assistance. Plainly there is the possibility that certain traditional values contribute to this reluctance. However, it is far from clear as to how far public services can be redrawn in order to cope with assumptions about ethnic groups who, in reality, may not operate at a group level (or least not operate effectively). The challenge for public policy is to anticipate this possibility while avoiding a position of relying on assumptions that will often fail or disappoint or both.

Finally, we must consider what role, if any, is to be played by
Asian politics in shaping the political landscape of public policy. Casting an eye upon racial politics in Britain at the end of the 1990s, it would appear that Asian participation in political life has developed, from a slow start, to relative maturity and strength. Electoral data confirms that in 1997 the registration and turnout rate of this large and varied group ranked alongside or even exceeded their white (and black) counterparts. Five Asians were elected in that year's general election, all but one representing seats in which large numbers of Asian voters were concentrated. In local government, estimates from the mid-1990s revealed a fairly astonishing rate of improvement: that over 100 Asians had been elected outside London, achieving a position very close to parity. A similar picture emerged in several inner London boroughs. Lastly, due to the strong electoral alignment between Asians and the Labor Party, many independent commentators had begun by the late 1980s speculating, perhaps naively, about the potential benefits that might accrue from this relationship. A generation previously, Asians had been few in number in electoral politics, rarely successful as candidates, often confined to the terrain of single-issue homeland politics, and generally undervalued by mainstream parties.

Three central factors underlie the story of political maturation. First, Britain's electoral arrangements have placed weight on electoral strength derived from sheer numbers of voters. For Asians, this has been an opportunity in the sense that the combined size of the three largest Asian groups—Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis—had reached 1.5 million (according to the General Census and thus clearly a gross understatement of the true size by the late 1990s). One Asian media outlet in 1997 boasted of the possibility of some 36 Asian marginals, where Asian voter numbers were greater than defending majorities, possibly of some 36 Asian districts, where Asian voters outnumber defending majorities. While they may have talked up the actual figure, a number of candidates saw the importance of this potential voting bloc.
Second, the constellation of issues and interests that comprise mainstream parties' interest in Asian affairs has gradually shifted away from immigrant matters and toward the aspirations of British-born younger Asians (now a majority within the community). The upshot of this has been that interest has gravitated to mainstream educational, employment and related policies in which it is increasingly conceded there is a legitimate Asian dimension. For instance, distinctive, though complementary, arrangements aimed at boosting recruitment in areas such as policing, civil service employment and higher education are now commonplace.

Lastly, the face of Asian political involvement has not been divorced from the group's participation in British economic life. In this regard, recent Labor Force Survey evidence has show wide divergence in the patterns of some groups of Asians as compared with others. However, in education, employment and business start-ups decisive headway has been achieved among Indian Asians, in particular. As part of a wider picture of advancement, such economic progress has been described by many as heralding a new era of weakening partisanship with the Labor Party. One of the most conspicuous barkless dogs, therefore, has been the singular failure of Labor's opponents to build a sizable following among Asians. Evidence from the 1997 contest indicated that the problem has not stemmed from lack of effort (there has been plenty), but rather from a failure to exploit a growing social class division in the political outlook of middle-class Asians compared with their more numerous working-class peers. The secret of Asian politics may thus lie in first understanding traditional British class politics.
Endnotes


2 While readers are probably familiar with the broad immigration context of British race relations, it may be that there is less awareness of possible obstacles created by nomenclature and political custom. That is, the term 'Asian' is widely ascribed in Britain to what is in fact South Asian-origin groups (the largest of whom are Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans). Therefore, the term is used rather casually in public debate as a form of practical shorthand to encompass immigration waves that were largely connected to Britain's imperial legacy in British India and, to a lesser degree, in colonial East Africa. The term has little meaning in relation to East or South-East Asian groups (typically the focus of North American understanding of the term Asian, though, interestingly, Chinese and Japanese communities are clearly elements of the ethnic mosaic found across Britain). Even less purpose is accorded to the term in describing much smaller groups from central or western Asian sources. The chapter will follow this British convention, but will additionally aid the comprehension of readers by adapting it slightly through the incorporation of the term South Asian (and its variants). Where a departure from this convention is required (for instance, in order to allude to East Asians), this will be clearly highlighted and explained.


6 An early and thoughtful attempt to reflect on British integration strategies alongside U.S. experience in this field can be found in N. Glazer and K. Young (Eds.), Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy: Achieving Equality in the United States and Britain (London: Heinemann, 1983).


8 The single Asian MP was joined by a second following the by-election in November 1991 in Langbargh. Although Ashok Kumar lost his seat in the subsequent general election, his success in 1991 broke an important barrier because of the miniscule number of ethnic minorities in his constituency. After a spell outside Westminster, Kumar was elected again in 1997 in a largely similar seat containing very few minority voters.

9 Out of a total of 659 MPs (or a bit over one per cent of the House of Commons). The
overall size of the Commons has tended to vary from parliament to parliament as a consequence of constituency boundaries reviews though changes are often marginal. Following the 1997 election, five of the nine ethnic minority MPs were of South Asian ethnic origin.

16 At the time of writing (October 1999) another Asian, Shilesh Vara, has been selected to fight as the official Conservative candidate in a Labour marginal (Northamptonshire South). Given the slim Labour majority in this seat, his chances of becoming the second Asian Tory MP appear to be fairly attractive.


16 A similar point might also be made in relation to aspects of the work of W.J. Wilson in the United States.


Although there is sometimes worrying confusion between group numbers on one hand and registered voters on the other, to say nothing of the need to qualify observations on the basis of differential turnout rates.


39 S. Saggar, "Civic Values, Participation and British South Asians," paper presented at a conference on *An Asian Agenda for Public Policy* the King George VI & Queen Elizabeth Foundation at St Catharine's, Cumberland Lodge, Windsor, April 1997.


44 Kumar, mentioned previously, was successfully elected to the north east constituency of Middlesborough South and Cleveland East (containing less than 2 percent who were ethnic minorities).


Asians and Race Relations in Australia

Christine Inglis

More than either the United States or the United Kingdom, Australia’s demography identifies it as a nation of immigrants. The continuing significance of immigration to Australia is indicated by the almost one quarter of its population who, in 1996, were born overseas. When the children of these immigrants are included, more than 40 percent of the population are of recent immigrant stock, a level equaled in few other nations. Although the vast majority of the contemporary Asian population has arrived in Australia since the 1970s and their numbers doubled between 1986 and 1996, they cannot be viewed simply as the latest wave of new immigrants. Asians have always been an important component in Australia’s population and in the national psyche. This chapter begins by highlighting their central role in the nineteenth century development of the Australian national identity. A century later, substantial Asian immigration to Australia coincides with another watershed, as changes in Australia, Asia and beyond raises question about the nature of Australian identity and institutions. Without this historical background, it is difficult to appreciate the personal or institutional features of Australian race relations as they impinge on various groups of Asian origin. The main areas of contemporary inter-group relations addressed in this chapter concern the economic participation of Asian groups and issues of discrimination and racism, intermarriage, citizenship and identity. The chapter then concludes with some reflections on how policy responses and options shifted from assimilation to multiculturalism.
Consolidation of Australian Identity

From the earliest days of British settlement in 1788, immigration has been central to the growth and economic development of Australia. After the end of convict transportation, alternative overseas sources of labor were sought. Despite plans to introduce contract-laborers from Asia, few arrived before the discovery of gold in the 1850s, making the Australian colonies a far more attractive destination to voluntary immigrants, including those from China. Like many other miners, the Chinese were predominantly single, male fortune hunters who viewed their stay in the Australian colonies as a temporary sojourn. Estimates of the numbers involved are imprecise, but at certain points the Chinese were recorded as being 10 percent of the population of the rich Victorian gold fields. Whereas prior to the gold rushes, the Chinese were viewed as a potentially valuable source of migrant labor by farmers, their presence on the gold fields soon generated hostility and even physical violence from other miners who felt their interests threatened by the Chinese presence. A range of administrative and legal measures directed against the Chinese or Asiatics were introduced to restrict entry to the colonies and access to the gold fields (Price 1974). The “New Gold Mountain” (the Chinese name for Australia) was kind to only a few Chinese, many of whom could not afford to return home.

After the gold rushes, these Chinese turned to employment in agriculture. In the cities, they played important roles in the agri-food industry, ranging from truck farmers to retailers and importers and financiers of bananas and other agricultural produce. Another niche was furniture making where they roused the ire of the trade union movement which, perceiving them as a threatening source of cheap labor, campaigned for further restrictive legislation. There were few Chinese women in Australia, so the Chinese who established families in Australia usually married European or Aboriginal women. The
economic hostility to the Chinese took on moral overtones with their depiction in the popular press as opium-smoking degenerate destroyers of white women (Yu 1995).

In contrast to the Chinese, other groups of Asian immigrants attracted less hostility. They did not compete with the European population, being fewer in number and their economic niches often located in remote areas. By 1891, the Asian numbered 46,600 or 1.5 percent of the total population, and 4.6 percent of the foreign-born population, 80 percent of whom were born in the United Kingdom. The 36,000 Chinese were the second largest foreign-born group after the British. When the six British colonies federated in 1901 to form the new nation of Australia, the numbers in the Asian population had changed little, but the growth in the Australian-born population meant they were now only 1.2 percent of the total population. Although the Chinese comprised 5.4 percent of the foreign-born population, unlike many other sojourners, they had not left during the economic depression of the 1890s. Within the Asian population there were, however, substantial changes. While the 29,900 Chinese were still the largest group, there had been an increase in the population born in British India to 7,600. Many Indians were Muslims from the Northwest Frontier who had been brought to Australia to look after the camel trains, which provided the main means of transport in the desert interior. The Japanese population had also increased eight-fold from 420 to 3,593. This growth followed the 1898 establishment of a Japanese consulate in northern Queensland and Japanese involvement in the sugar cane plantations and the pearling industry (Meaney 1999). The other major “Asian” group identified in the census was the 1,500 Syrian born. The majority of the Syrians were Maronite Christians, who occupied a niche as travelling traders. Unlike other Asian groups, their more permanent pattern of settlement was signaled by the presence of families.

The emerging working-class nationalism, closely linked to the trade union movement, emphasized assimilation as necessary for the
maintenance of the then highest standard of living internationally. Asia was, in this scenario, a threat to Australian survival and Asians were viewed as inherently inassimilable, unwanted cheap labor. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Australian colonies built the "Great White Walls" (Price 1974) designed to protect the settler communities from Asian incursions. Similar legislation was also enacted in both western Canada and the USA. What was distinctive in the Australian case was the difficulties of the colonies in coordinating the six sets of separate legislation which constituted the walls. This difficulty was an important impetus towards the federation of the colonies into a nation.

Upon federation in 1901, one of the first acts of the new Commonwealth parliament was to introduce the Immigration Restriction Act, which provided the legal basis for the White Australia Policy to ensure, as one prominent magazine puts it, "Australia for the White Man." The egalitarian workers' paradise was one where full citizenship rights were henceforth restricted to Europeans with access to naturalization denied to foreign-born non-Europeans. The obvious economic benefits to Europeans were hidden behind rhetoric depicting Asians as essentially incapable of attaining the cultural attributes necessary for full and proper participation in Australian society. International diplomatic pressures and economic considerations, nevertheless, played a major part in molding the precise form and operation of the Policy. Despite the intention of closing the door to non-European immigration, exemptions allowed temporary entrance to new Asian arrivals (Willard 1923; Yarwood 1964; Palfreeman 1967; London 1970; Price 1974). Chinese businesses were able to import Chinese staffs, and Japanese came to work in the pearling industry. As an ally in World War I, Japan successfully sought special treatment for its citizens while the British Indian colonial administration monitored the experiences of Indians.
Despite these opportunities for limited entry, the Asian population declined in numbers. The growth of locally born Asians did not compensate for the death and departures of the older men. The Japanese were very much a transitory group of employees, compared with the Chinese, Indians, and Syrians. The nadir for the Chinese community was 1947 when the 9,144 Chinese and 2,950 part-Chinese comprised less than 0.2 percent of the total population. The next most significant Asian groups were the Indians, 2,480 as well as 418 part-Indians, and the Syrians, who numbered 1,675 with a further 223 part-Syrians. In contrast to foreign-born Asians, the Australian-born of Asian ancestry were Australian citizens but, nevertheless, experienced a diverse set of discriminatory behavior affecting employment, schooling and other areas of social life.

Despite their small numbers, during the first half of the twentieth century, the Asians were an important element of Australian diversity. In 1933, Chinese was the third most common language, after English and Italian, while China was the third most important non-British or Australian birthplace, after Italy and Germany. With assimilation dominating policies and attitudes toward immigrants (as well as Aborigines), the locally born Asians actively sought to acculturate. Few of the younger Chinese were literate in Chinese. Many adopted Christianity and were entering middle-class professions and occupations. However, full social assimilation was largely beyond their reach, although the economic discrimination against them had declined. Even if the more bizarre stereotypes and images of mysterious and enigmatic orientals or “celestials” had lost their currency, the main contact which most families had with the Asian population was that with the Chinese truck farmers selling their produce from door to door.
Mass Migration, Australia’s Changing Relationship with Asia and Multiculturalism

The Second World War was an important watershed in Australia’s international relations. It confirmed many of the popular concerns about Australia’s vulnerability to threats from Asian powers seeking to acquire Australia’s riches. The need to build the population from a base of only 7 million became an important priority for future security and for the restructuring and growth of the economy towards industrial self-reliance. Mass immigration to increase the population by 1 percent annually was the ambitious strategy adopted to achieve these objectives. Australians were assured that this migration would not change Australian society since the emphasis would be on attracting British immigrants. When this proved impossible, the search for immigrants extended from East European refugees to include immigrants from northern Europe and then the Mediterranean countries and, by the late 1960s, also Middle Eastern countries such as Turkey and Lebanon.

At the same time, Asian decolonization was changing Australia’s geo-political environment. A foreign policy based on defense was complemented by a more active engagement in regional political and economic developments. As important was Australia’s participation in the Colombo Plan, which brought substantial numbers of Asian students to study in Australia. Many of these students remained in, or subsequently returned to, Australia to live. There were also gradual changes in the White Australia Policy, allowing the entry of the non-European spouses of Australian citizens, the highly skilled, and part Europeans, including Anglo-Indians, and Ceylonese Burghers. Barriers to the naturalization of non-European immigrants were also removed. These continued modifications to the White Australia Policy were driven by a desire to avoid foreign diplomatic criticism (London 1970; Meaney 1999).
In 1973, soon after it was elected as the national government, the Australian Labor Party, which previously strongly supported White Australia, announced its replacement by a new non-discriminatory immigration policy which did not exclude on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion. Instead, the government developed a selection system to accommodate those admitted for refugee or humanitarian reasons, those coming on the basis of family reunion and, finally, those with specific economic resources or skills. The relative weighting attached to each of these components have changed from time to time in response to international, domestic, and socio-political considerations. Recently, the distinction between permanent and temporary immigrants has blurred as policies now allow longer temporary entry periods for the highly skilled managers and professional workers who are part of the changing labor force associated with globalization (Inglis 1999b).²

Existing Asian communities had little influence on these changes in immigration policy which have, however, resulted in substantial increases in the Asian population. From the 1950s, there was a slow but steady growth in the numbers of Asian immigrants, especially from Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Singapore. After the formal ending of the White Australia Policy in 1973, the first major Asian groups to arrive were refugees from East Timor, followed by Indo-Chinese, after the end of the war in Vietnam. Subsequently, it was Asian groups who took most advantage of further changes in immigration policies which favored family reunions and which were initiated in response to pressure from European immigrant groups. However, economic developments in Europe meant few Europeans were interested in emigrating to Australia, even to join their relatives. By the middle of the 1980s, it was evident that those members of the new Asian middle-class were most interested in and able to take advantage of the opportunities for immigration by highly skilled and wealthy business entrepreneurs. Well-educated, often in English in institutions with qualifications recognized in Australia, they became a significant part of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; the Former USSR</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East Asia</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China excl. HK &amp; Taiwan</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macau</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldives</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S &amp; Central Amer &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa excl. North Africa</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total All Countries</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
flow of immigrants. As Table 1 shows, in the 12 years from 1985/86 to 1997/98, 40 percent of all immigrants entering Australia came from Southeast (19.3 percent), East (13.4 percent) and South (6.6 percent) Asia. Vietnam, Hong Kong, the Philippines, China, India and Malaysia have been especially important source countries (Inglis 1999a, p.87).

The numbers of Asians increased significantly since the 1960s, when the majority of immigrants were still from the United Kingdom and Europe. With the exception of many refugees, they are very different in class background as compared to the earlier nineteenth century Asian immigrants and the more recent European arrivals. The majority is now from middle-class backgrounds. In 1997-98, 58.1 percent of all immigrants who had been employed prior to arrival had worked in professional and highly skilled occupations. In these groups, over half of the managers and administrators were Asian-born and nearly 40 percent of the professionals were Asian-born (Inglis 1999b, pp.48-9). The motivation for many of these Asian immigrants to immigrate to Australia is more complex than simple economic gain. After recent major recessions, Australia no longer appears as the New Gold Mountain for Asians. Instead, other aspects of the “good life” attract these middle-class immigrants. For some, it is related to political uncertainties and the lack of freedom in their homelands. For others, it is the lure associated with the Australian physical environment such as the weather and the lower levels of pollution and overcrowding. The presence of relatives and educational opportunities for children are other important incentives for many middle-class immigrants.

This growth in Asian immigration coincides with the waning of assimilation as the guiding goal for immigrants. This policy change in the 1970s resulted from a recognition of the failure of assimilation to take place and a need for policies designed to address the disadvantages experienced by large numbers of non-English-speaking background (NESB) immigrants. Under assimilation, the onus was on the immigrant
to adapt to the existing society and its institutions, thereby removing any responsibility from the receiving society to make special policy provisions for addressing immigrant disadvantages. Despite the brief adoption of a policy of integration in the 1960s which envisaged the coexistence of public assimilation with private cultural maintenance, a wide cross-section of the community, including teachers, health workers and others working with NESB immigrants as well as European community groups, demanded a more interventionist policy in addressing disadvantages and cultural diversity. This demand grew during the 1970s. The outcome of these demands was the adoption of multiculturalism as the guiding principle for future policies addressing inter-ethnic relations.

In Australia, multiculturalism has significantly different connotations than in the United States. Not only is it the official government policy, rather than simply a policy of “resistance,” it also explicitly addresses the cultural and the economic dimensions of difference which, as Wieviorka noted (Wieviorka 1998), is a major departure from the United States’ disjuncture between the economic and the cultural policies, evident in the debate between proponents of affirmative action and those of multiculturalism. From its origins in the early 1970s under the Labor government to its institutionalization in 1978 under the conservative Fraser government, multiculturalism has been an evolving policy which varies in the emphasis given to cultural maintenance or addressing disadvantage (to the extent that the two objectives can be separated). Its scope has also extended, from a policy to address the needs of NESB immigrants, to include their children and, since 1989, to be a policy benefiting all Australians through the promotion of diversity and the reduction of social disadvantage. Under multiculturalism, social cohesion and harmony arise from an acceptance of a non-socially divisive diversity, in contrast to assimilation, where these outcomes are seen as resulting from a homogeneous population. Certainly, after two decades, the attempted blending of the two dimensions of social justice and
cultural maintenance has been remarkably successful in ensuring the incorporation of diverse groups into a previously homogenous society in an equitable and surprisingly non-contentious manner.

The growth in Asian immigration coincides also with increases in Australian involvement in the Asian region. In 1997, after the onset of the Asian economic crisis, 50 percent of Australia’s export market was still with Asia, which remains the major source of tourists and fee-paying international students for the highly lucrative tourism and educational industries. Australia’s political and economic reorientation away from Europe and towards Asia coincides with government-initiated domestic-economic restructuring intending to allow the Australian economy to adapt better to the effects of globalization. The macro- and micro-economic changes began in the 1980s with the intention of replacing reliance on agriculture, mining, and a highly protected manufacturing industry with a shift to a service-oriented, knowledge-based economy employing a highly-skilled workforce. A departure from the historical commitment to egalitarianism through state intervention has been another especially significant change occurring over the same period. Since 1996, the conservative Liberal-National Party government has placed even greater emphasis on dismantling existing economic institutions, including those of the welfare state.

For many Australians, including British and European immigrants, economic and political transformations have been disconcerting, especially since, for nearly two decades until the mid 1990s, they were associated with levels of unemployment (up to 12 and 13 percent) unknown since the 1930s Depression. Economic restructuring has involved the collapse of many industries and jobs, while principles of economic rationality and “user pays” have had particularly negative effects on the poor and rural populations. Traditional government strategies, of reducing immigration in periods of recession, have been unable to prevent considerable opposition to immigration. Economic
opponents have combined with environmental groups to argue that Australia's fragile eco-system cannot support a large population. Some of these groups have individuals who are concerned with extending physical conservation to "social and cultural conservation." They argue that multicultural policies threaten Australian society, especially when these policies involve non-British groups, particularly Asian groups. The most recent in a series of (anti-) "Asian Immigration Debates," which began in 1984 and recurred in 1988, was linked to the election of two "Independent" candidates in the 1996 Federal election. One of these Members of Parliament, Pauline Hanson, subsequently went on to found her own One Nation party, which won 10 seats in the 1998 Queensland state elections. This success for the party's extremely populist program did not continue in the 1998 federal elections nor in the 1999 NSW state elections. The emergence of One Nation and the earlier debates highlight how the contemporary increase in Asian immigration has again become a major political issue, because it coincides with an economic, political and social change, which vocal groups in the population correlate, not altogether inaccurately, with a realignment in the Anglo-Celtic institutions underpinning the foundation of Australian national identity. What distinguishes the present hostility from that of the last century is that now it serves not to unify the nation but, rather, to highlight major divisions within the society between the urban and rural, young and old, the more highly educated and those less skilled, the more cosmopolitan and internationally oriented and those with a narrow view of Australian society. The next section considers how the Asians, whose immigration has become so contentious, actually experience life in Australia.

**Asians in Contemporary Australia**

By 1996, almost 5 percent of the Australian population
more than since the height of the nineteenth century gold rushes, had been born in Asia (2.6 percent in South East Asia, 1.4 percent in North East Asia and 0.8 percent in Southern Asia). The major Asian birthplaces were Vietnam, China, the Philippines, India, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Singapore (see Table 2). In only a decade, there had been a doubling of the Asian-born population. In 1986, the 413,158 Asian-born people made up only 2.65 percent while 2 percent of the population, including those born in Australia, actually described themselves as belonging to one of the four major Asian ancestry groups represented in Australia, including Chinese (1.1 percent), Vietnamese (0.4 percent), Indian (0.3 percent) and Filipino (0.2 percent). The doubling of the Asian population, between 1986 and 1996, was not spread evenly across Australia. The majority were concentrated in New South Wales, and, in particular, Sydney, where they comprised 6.3 percent of the population, compared with 5.4 percent in Victoria and 5.0 percent in Western Australia. The latter’s proximity to South East Asia attracted many settlers from there and South Asia. The concentration of the Asian born in Sydney reflects, not only the role of social networks, but also how Sydney’s aspiration to global city status ensures that it is perceived as the center, with the strongest economy and the best opportunity of providing employment for newly arrived immigrants.

Within Australian cities, ethnic concentrations have never acquired the reputation of being closed and exclusive quarters, as sometimes occurs in North American or European cities. Ethnic concentrations in excess of 5 percent are sufficient to cause comments while concentrations in excess of 10 percent are extremely rare. Using these criteria as a guideline, there are few substantial Asian concentrations in Australian cities. In 1996, the only Asian-born groups, which accounted for more than 5 percent in any area, were either from China or Vietnam. The Chinese comprised 5 percent or more of the population in five Sydney local government areas, with the largest concentration being 8.5
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number (000)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>13,227,776</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>291,388</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>378,112</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,072,562</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; the Former USSR</td>
<td>2,217,009</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>192,642</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>44,175</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>76,255</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>92,949</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>29,490</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>151,053</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South East Asia</td>
<td>456,460</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China excl. HK &amp; Taiwan</td>
<td>111,009</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>68,430</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East Asia</td>
<td>254,186</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>77,551</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>46,984</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Asia</td>
<td>145,498</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>75,022</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S. &amp; Central Amer. &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>75,539</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>55,755</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa excl. N. Africa</td>
<td>107,417</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>762,757</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>17,892,418</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1996 Census Tables B05 & B06
percent in an area with an extremely ethnically diverse population. Much greater concentration was evident among the Vietnamese, who constituted more than 5 percent of the population in 13 different suburbs and local government areas. The largest concentrations were 24.6 percent and 16.1 percent in adjacent Brisbane suburbs where the refugees first settled on their arrival in Brisbane. Not all concentrations of Asian groups are in economically disadvantaged areas. In contrast with earlier groups of non-English speaking immigrants, wealthier, more highly educated Asians from countries such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Singapore now live in middle-class suburbs.

The presence of Asian immigrants in wealthier areas of the cities is indicative of the economic resources possessed by significant segments of the Asian population. This was already evident in the 1986 census data showing that certain Asian ancestry and birthplace groups were actually faring extremely well on various economic measures (Inglis and Wu 1992). In particular, Indian men and women were especially likely to be employed in professional and managerial positions, with incomes well above the average for other groups of immigrants. Among the Chinese, there were major variations related to their birthplace (Inglis and Wu 1992; Jones 1992). Success was far less evident among the Indo-Chinese and other Asian refugee groups, who experienced high levels of unemployment, low incomes and were also typically concentrated in less skilled positions (Inglis and Wu 1992).

This pattern, old overall success coupled with internal diversity, was still evident a decade later in 1996. As Table 3 shows, employed immigrants from many Asian countries were substantially overrepresented in prestigious managerial and professional occupations. This pattern was repeated, though to a lesser extent, in the occupations of women and those who had arrived within the previous five years. Those born in Indochinese countries were least likely to be employed in these occupations, in which their participation was similar to that of immigrants
from southern European countries such as Italy, Greece and the former Yugoslavia. Consistent with these occupational patterns are variations in the income of Asians, which shows that those from Indochina report the lowest incomes while those from India, Sri Lanka and Malaysia have incomes exceeding those of the British and Australian-born (Jayasuriya and Kee 1999, 62). The picture of relative economic disadvantage of the Vietnamese and Cambodians is continued in their elevated levels of unemployment (Jayasuriya and Kee 1999, 66). Commenting on the economic experiences of Australian-Asians, two recent authors have concluded that “compared with earlier migrants and despite their diversity, Asian migrants are reasonably well integrated as members of Australian society” (Jayasuriya and Kee 1999, 69).

**Table 3. Percentage of Managers, Professionals and Para-Professionals in the Workforce by Selected Birthplaces, Australia 1996**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>53.9</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South African</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>45.5</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N &amp; W Europe</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1996 Census
The variations in occupation, income, and employment status among the Asians highlight the complexity of their labor market experiences. The inevitable question is whether this diversity can be explained by variations in their human resources or by the existence of discrimination in the labor market. Appropriate educational qualifications are necessary for many high status jobs in the growth sectors of the modern economy. As a longitudinal survey of recent migrant arrivals shows, many Asians do have tertiary qualifications although there are wide variations, ranging from Malaysians, 60.1 percent of whom have tertiary qualifications, to Vietnamese, only 2.4 percent of whom have tertiary degrees (Shu 1996). But educational levels alone cannot ensure economic success, since knowledge of English and the recognition of credentials obtained overseas are critical to occupational outcomes in Australia. While the vast majority of immigrants from India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Sri Lanka have native speaker levels of competency, this applies somewhat less to those born in Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and, less still, to those from China, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Except for those born in the Philippines, competency in English is highest amongst those from former British Commonwealth countries, whose educational qualifications are more likely to be recognized in Australia than qualifications from other countries. Similarly, it is these groups of Asian immigrants who have been particularly successful in gaining employment in professional and managerial occupations (see Table 3).

The recognition of qualifications gained overseas is an important determinant of the job outcomes of immigrants. For those Asian immigrants who have had their tertiary training and education in Australia, the recognition of their qualifications is not an issue. Nor is it an issue for immigrants trained in many British Commonwealth countries such as Singapore or Hong Kong, whose degrees and qualifications are recognized after little or no additional examination. Other immigrants, including many of those from Asian countries, experience considerable difficulties in gaining recognition for their qualifications, often requiring considerable retraining and testing to meet the demands of professional accreditation bodies. Whether these demands are appropriate, in view of
existing Australian levels of training and qualifications, or are an attempt by regulatory bodies to discriminate against those with overseas training, is often a cause of considerable debate among skilled workers, such as doctors who cannot practice without Australian registration. Discrimination against the overseas trained can also extend to their experience in seeking employment and promotion. A longitudinal study, of immigrants who arrived between June and December 1991, concluded that the achievement of appropriate employment remains a major problem for immigrants in the early years of settlement. However, there was considerable variation among arrivals with the skilled immigrants having lower rates of unemployment than skilled workers despite the continuing problems of skill-recognition. The study also identified the importance of country of birth. Not only did those from English speaking countries, such as the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and the United States, do well in the job market but so did those from countries with high levels of competency in English and British educational traditions (e.g. Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Sri Lanka). Both groups fared significantly better in terms of employment, occupational status and income than those from China, Germany, Lebanon, the former USSR, Taiwan and Vietnam (Iredale and Nivison-Smith 1995, 97).

From the perspective of Asian immigrants, these findings, which point to the existence of significant differences between Asian groups based on the appropriateness of their human resources and capital, reinforce the variations evident in the 1986 and 1996 census data reported above. A similar conclusion, concerning the occupational outcomes for immigrant professionals, also emerged from an analysis of 1991 census data. It emphasized the importance of English skills and Australian training, regardless of country of birth. Although the authors cautioned that for professionals who arrived in the late 1980s and 1990s during the most serious recession since the 1930s, the potential for regaining their professional level of employment was less rosy (Birrell and Hawthorne
For the growing numbers of Australian-born or reared young people of Asian background, the Birrell and Hawthorne study concludes that there did not appear to be employer bias directed at Australian trained persons born outside Western Europe. This is obviously an encouraging indicator of a lack of discrimination (Birrell and Hawthorne 1997, 77). It is also important for the many achieving high levels of success at school and university. While the term model minority has not been adopted in Australia to describe the educational success of Asian students, their increasing numbers among the high achievers in the annual high school examinations, to determine entry to universities, frequently draws comments in newspaper reports pondering on a particular Asian valuation of education. While children of earlier groups of NESB immigrants, especially those of Greek background, have followed a similar route into the universities, the success of those of Asian background often attracts critical comment. This comment, which is the obverse of the media speculation about the existence of some particular Asian cultural valuation of education, involves an association of their examination success with a focus on study at the expense of participation in other areas of school life. This critique is especially common in boys' schools where team sports, such as football, cricket and basketball, are still viewed as an important part of the curriculum which cannot be replicated by participation in activities such as debating, music or art. Disinterest in sport, which plays an important part in life for many Australians, all too easily leads to comments concerning the "un-Australian" nature of individuals or groups.

The economic experiences of recent Asian immigrants and the educational successes of their children can be interpreted as evidence for a relatively positive integration into Australian society. However, the hostile comments often directed towards successful Asian students is a reminder that discrimination and prejudice towards Asians may be a
major part of their daily experiences. During the first of the so-called Asian Immigration debates in 1984, much of the commentary noted not that this was a continuation, or re-emergence, of the older patterns of anti-Asian hostility from the nineteenth century, or even of the hostility felt towards Japanese in the aftermath of World War II. Instead, the point was made that it was a pattern of hostility also experienced by earlier waves of post-World War II immigrants, beginning with the East European refugees and then more recent Italian, Greek, Turkish and Lebanese arrivals. What this analysis overlooked was the resonance with earlier anti-Asian sentiments, which gave additional force, especially among Anglo-Celtic sections of the population, to anti-Asian practices and attitudes.

In 1989, a major national survey was undertaken on behalf of the government to determine the response to its multicultural policies. As part of this survey, respondents were asked to rank the "acceptability" of particular ethnic groups. Although a majority of the population were tolerant towards immigrants from all ethnic backgrounds, 32 percent expressed negative feelings towards Vietnamese, slightly lower negativity towards Muslims and Lebanese, and much lower levels of negativity towards the earlier immigrant groups such as Greeks, Italians and the British (Ip, Kawakami et al. 1992, 23). A more detailed analysis of the survey data reveals that attitudes towards immigrants are very closely related to respondents' views about multiculturalism. Those opposed to multiculturalism, who were more likely to be born in Australia or the United Kingdom than either Europe or Asia, were less likely to support migrants from regions other than the United Kingdom and were particularly opposed to more immigrants from Asia (Goot 1993, 249). The anti-multiculturalists were also more likely to consider immigrants better off than others in terms of receipt of government payments, access to university opportunities, job opportunities, renting accommodation, as well as income and wages (Goot 1993, 250). As Goot concludes, in a
climate where questioning of Asian immigration can be seen as racist, distancing oneself from multiculturalism can be another way of doing the same thing, but in code (Goot 1993 252). The existence of generally negative views towards Asians in Australia is supported by a survey, undertaken in Brisbane and Sydney in the early 1990s, in which a number of respondents acknowledged that Australians, in general, were hostile to immigrants, as well as being racist (Ip, Kawakami et al. 1992, 56, 73).

The actual interpretation of such attitudinal data can be complex, especially with regard to how such attitudes translate into actual behavior. Some indication of this translation into actual behavior comes from a survey of 1,220 Asian immigrants from China, Hong Kong, Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan, who arrived in Australia in the five years prior to 1995 and settled in Sydney, Melbourne, Adelaide, Brisbane or Perth. The interviews took place shortly before the emergence of the Pauline Hanson One Nation party. What is interesting, in retrospect, is that just over one-third of the respondents (37.5 percent) reported experiencing actual discrimination. Four main types of discrimination were particularly notable: verbal abuse (reported by 33 percent), feelings of discrimination (26 percent), inequitable treatment in employment and in the workplace (16.2 percent), and condescending attitudes by service providers (12.7 percent). Importantly, personal attacks and violence, unfriendly behavior, and housing related issues were encountered by only a very small percentage of the respondents. There was considerable variation in the reporting of discrimination with the highest levels being reported by those from the Philippines (45.8 percent) and Taiwan (43 percent) and the lowest by those from Vietnam (29.4 percent) and China (34.5 percent). There was a close relationship between English ability and the reporting of discrimination, with those most competent in English also being more likely to report discrimination. One explanation for this may be that these are the individuals who are best able to discern the subtle
nuances of verbal discrimination. They may also be individuals who find themselves in employment or social situations below their expectations which create frustration and unhappiness. This, in turn, sensitizes them to discrimination (Ip et al. 1995). One surprising aspect of these findings was the low level of discrimination reported by Vietnamese respondents since, as a group, the Vietnamese are widely viewed as amongst the most disadvantaged ethnic groups in Australia. A partial explanation for the limited reportage of discrimination may lie in their limited English fluency but it may also reflect a certain desensitization among the Vietnamese community to instances of discrimination or to their more limited encounters with non-Vietnamese.

After the March 1996 electoral success of Pauline Hanson and the founding of her One Nation party, there was an increase in expressions of anti-Asian attitudes in graffiti, on talk-back radio programs, and in public places where Asians often became the butt of hostile and stereotypical abuse. The failure of the Prime Minister to criticize or seek to silence Hanson’s often bizarre and inaccurate statements concerning Asians, Aborigines and other “non-Australians” was widely viewed as inflaming relations between Asians, Aborigines and “true” Australians. While the Prime Minister’s excuse was Hanson’s right to freedom of speech, the effect of his silence was to remove previously existing social and moral constraints against such discriminatory and prejudiced activities, since it was widely assumed that the Prime Minister himself shared many of her prejudices and views. Indeed, it was not until October 1996 that the Prime Minister led a joint resolution in Parliament condemning such behavior and endorsing racial tolerance. What seems to have finally convinced the Prime Minister to take this step, at the urging of his Cabinet Ministers and many prominent Australians, was concerned about the effect which the anti-Asian sentiments were having on Asian countries and leaders. His attention to these effects was related to the
Australian economy's extensive reliance on Asian trading partners, tourists, and international students. With the decline of the One Nation party, expressions of anti-Asian sentiment have declined as have what, at the height of One Nation's popularity, were still the relatively rare fights and physical attacks directed against Asians or Asian property.

The complexity of Australian race relations is evident in the way anti-Asian hostility coexists with more positive signs of acceptance and social incorporation of Asians into Australian society. One example is the high level of Australian citizenship among Asian residents. The barriers to acquiring Australian citizenship are limited since only two years permanent residence is required. There are no Australian barriers to retaining dual nationality and the extensive formal tests of English and knowledge of the local society and institutions required in the United States are absent. Figures show that, with the exception of Malaysians and Chinese, there is a growth in eligible residents taking up Australian citizenship (Bureau of Immigration Multiculturalism and Population Research 1995). Still, it is clear that the decision to become a citizen is frequently a decision to facilitate entry to Australia or permanent employment in the government public service. For many, it does not immediately translate into a sense of belonging to Australia or Australian society despite the changes associated with the development of multiculturalism. This was evident in the survey of recent Asian immigrants undertaken in the early 1990s and referred to above. While the majority of the recent arrivals had either taken Australian citizenship or planned to do so as soon as they were eligible, less than 5 percent described their identity simply as Australian. Furthermore, some two-thirds said that they still considered themselves as "migrants," yet many of these replies came from individuals who were actually Australian citizens. This tendency was especially marked among recent Vietnamese arrivals, where 41.2 percent still considered themselves as "migrants". While there were variations among the Asian groups in the reasons given for the continu-
ation of a ‘migrant’ identity, the most commonly stated reasons, apart from being overseas born and not a citizen, were English language problems, the perpetual nature of immigrant status, and difficulties adjusting to the Australian life style (Inglis et al. 1998, 378). Clearly the development of policies of multiculturalism in Australia has not progressed to a point where citizenship is an immediate key to a sense of psychological belonging in Australia even if, as among the majority of the Vietnamese and Philippines, there is the intention to remain living in Australia rather than return to their birthplaces.

Another, less ambiguous, indicator of a more positive aspect of ethnic relations in Australia is the extent of intermarriage between Asian and non-Asian Australians. From the 1950s, many of the Colombo Plan students who came to study in Australia married non-Asians as did the descendants of earlier Asian settlers. This trend continues in recent years despite the growth in Asian populations, creating greater opportunities for Asians to find a marriage partner within their own communities (Penny and Khoo 1996). In the nineteenth century, European women who married Chinese men were frequently reported to have become outcasts from the European community. The same patterns are rarely recreated in contemporary Australia, where intermarriages involving Asian partners may, for the non-Asian family, be an extension of other exogamous marriages involving spouses from diverse backgrounds. In contrast to earlier periods, public curiosity or hostility is rarely displayed towards couples where one of the partners is from an Asian background. There is a class dimension involved in intermarriages, with intermarried couples tending to be better educated and more likely to have both spouses in the work force and less likely to be unemployed than when compared with in-married couples (Penny and Khoo 1996, p.55). A major exception to this pattern involves the Filipinos, who are the Asian-born group most likely to have Australian-born spouses (Penny and Khoo 1996,32). Filipinas frequently marry Australian-born or resident men.
whom they have met only through correspondences or on short visits to the Philippines. After marriage, the women often find themselves living in isolated rural area of Australia with men often less educated than themselves and many years their senior. Lack of employment opportunities for the women frequently combine with their husbands' desire for a homemaker to ensure that they do not enter the workforce.

Contributing to the more positive contemporary assessment of intermarriage by the non-Asian population is the growing familiarity of the non-Asian-Australians with Asian society and individuals from Asian backgrounds. Survey findings show that younger, more educated Australians have a much more cosmopolitan view of the world and are less likely to adopt the nativistic view that people cannot be "truly Australians," unless they were born, or resided for most of their lives, in Australia and belong to a Christian religion (Jones 1999, 23). However, growing familiarity with Asia is not restricted to middle-class groups. The anti-Asian hostility of the last decade has been tempered by the contacts that non-Asian Australians have acquired with Asia. Many young Australians and their parents traveled extensively in Asia and, at home, they encounter many forms of Asian cultures. Chinese and other Asian cuisines are widely eaten at home as well as in restaurants. The popularity of Asian leisure and cultural activities, ranging from bonsai to martial arts, continues, while traditional Asian medical practices are gaining widespread acceptance. An important effect of these developments is that, for many Australians, the fear of an exotic Asia evident in the nineteenth century has been replaced by a much greater familiarity with the region and its diverse cultural practices. Giving support and legitimacy to these developments are changes in school languages and social studies curriculum designed to create an "Asian literate" population. A major motive for these curriculum changes is the perception that such knowledge is important as a basis for developing Australia's economic and political relations with the region. One result of
these various developments in education and daily life is that stereotypes based on ideas about traditional Asian societies are increasingly displaced by awareness of the changes which have taken place in Asian countries in recent decades. The result is that the Asian "other" (whether located in Australia or Asia) is ceasing to be viewed as exotic or, indeed, inscrutable and, hence, cause for fear.

The Changing Role of Policy

Australian governments have traditionally played a dominant role in fostering and controlling immigration and settlement in a manner unequalled in the United States or Canada. The abandonment of the White Australia Policy, for primarily international rather than domestic reasons, has been associated with the renewed growth of Australia's Asian population. As the predominant immigrant group, their incorporation into Australian society has been directly affected by policies developed to cater, not to Asians, but to immigrants from non-English speaking backgrounds. Two specific policy areas deserve special consideration, that relating to economic settlement and incorporation and that concerning discrimination and racism. Under the umbrella of multiculturalism are a suite of policies, ranging from free English language classes to programs catering to specific linguistic and ethnic groups on the basis of identified needs. Access to the latter programs depends very much on the extent to which ethnic community organizations and social welfare workers are able to demonstrate the need for assistance. Larger ethnic groups with more concentrated populations and resources are always better placed to access support, regardless of whether they are Asian or European. Certain Asian communities, such as Indo-Chinese refugee groups, are active participants in multicultural welfare programs. Other predominantly middle-class groups, such as those from Malaysia or Taiwan, are primarily involved in programs relating to support for
By the late 1980s programs were developed to facilitate the re-entry of skilled workers into the Australian labor force. The initiatives ranged from specialist English language training, to the provision of re-training and bridging courses for special occupations and the provision of financial allowances for those undertaking these courses. At the same time, the National Office of Overseas Skills Recognition was set up to facilitate the assessment of the equivalence of overseas to local qualifications (National Multicultural Advisory Council 1995, chapter 5; Birrell and Hawthorne 1997, 20-21; Iredale 1997, chapters 6-7). Although the limitations of these initiatives were frequently noted, they constituted an unprecedented effort to re-incorporate skilled immigrants into the workforce. In his comparative study of the United States, United Kingdom and Australia, Reitz identified these policies as being a significant factor contributing to the high level of success of immigrants in the Australian labor market (Reitz 1997). Reitz, however, warns that changes towards a more individualized institutional system and cuts in social welfare spending have the potential to undermine many of the immigrants achievements of equity (Reitz 1997, 225).

By the 1990s, the developments of which Reitz warned were occurring in Australia. Growing criticisms of multiculturalism and its alleged financial costs to the community while privileging ethnic groups at the expense of “Australian,” although still resisted by governments, nevertheless coincided with quite specific policies designed to limit government welfare and community payments. These moves to limit government social welfare spending accelerated after the 1996 election of the conservative Howard government which was concerned with replacing state involvement in service delivery by leaving delivery to the market. Among the steps affecting recent immigrants were restrictions on access to various social welfare and unemployment benefits for the first two years after arrival in Australia. Another change was the requirement
that, except for refugees and humanitarian entrants, all immigrants without adequate levels of English would need to pay for access to English language courses. While not targeting a specific group of recent immigrants, the large numbers of Asian arrivals meant they were particularly affected by these punitive policies which, critics point out, have the potential to create an ethnic underclass. While this may be a somewhat alarmist assessment, it stands as a reminder that the retreat from active government policies is occurring not, as in the 1950s and 1960s, in a time of affluence, but rather in a time of considerable economic uncertainty and change. This is a time when the resources required for successful economic incorporation are more complex than a strong back and a pair of willing hands.

Although not initially part of multicultural policies, since the 1980s and the first of the Asian immigration debates which specifically targeted Asian groups in Australia, the issue of policies to address discriminatory practices and racism have gained increasing public attention. However, it was not until 1991 that the first National Report into Racist Violence was prepared. This examined the experiences of indigenous Australians and those of non-English speaking backgrounds. The preface to that report notes that

The evidence presented to the Inquiry indicates that multiculturalism is working well in Australia. In spite of our racial, ethnic and cultural diversity, our society's experience of racist violence, intimidation and harassment is nowhere near the level experienced in many other countries (Moss 1993, .x).

However, it then notes that the situation for indigenous Australians was far worse than for those of non-English speaking background. In the case of those of non-English speaking background, the most prevalent form of racist violence was the existence of a threatening environment, which referred not to the existence of physical force
but "verbal and non-verbal intimidation, harassment and incitement to racial hatred." Those most common targets of such activities were identified as those who are visibly different. Clearly Asians were a major target of such violence and the subsequent first State of the Nation Report on non-English Speaking Background People undertaken by the Federal Race Discrimination Commissioner in 1993 included a status report on Asian Australians where the diverse experiences of communities were noted:

Communities which were well-resourced in any of the following areas—fluency in English, locally recognized qualifications, financial arrangements or strong community support—were able to settle successfully in spite of some discrimination. However, communities lacking these resources were at risk, even a relatively large community such as the Vietnamese (Moss 1993, 264).

In the light of the subsequent reductions in government funding for programs contributing to the acquisition of fluency in English, providing support for the up-grading and recognition of overseas qualifications, as well as community development and financial assistance, the ability of community organizations to assist new arrivals has been substantially reduced.

With regard to racism, the 1993 State of the Nation Report noted that racism was raised only in community discussion by young people of non-English speaking background. It went on to note that there was insufficient evidence to say categorically that racism was seriously affecting the young people, although there was a clear need for monitoring the situation (Moss 1993, 264-5). By 1996, after the commencement of the Hanson debate, the State of the Nation Report gave a very different picture of the situation and the emergence of public hatred targeted at Asian Australians, many of whom, the Commissioner noted, experienced racism on a daily basis (Federal Race Discrimination Commissioner 1996, xi).
The law provides only partial protection. Since 1975, Australia has a Racial Discrimination Act, designed to make racial discrimination unlawful in all areas of public life and to give rights to equality before the law to people of all races, color, national and ethnic origins. In 1995, the scope of the law was expanded to include offensive or abusive public acts of racial hatred. While the existence of such legislation may be an important deterrent, the complexity of the procedures involved ensures that only a small proportion of the cases ever come within the jurisdiction of the Act (Federal Race Discrimination Commissioner 1996, 21).

What became evident in 1996 was the need on the one hand for a clear signal from the government that racial vilification was unacceptable and not to be tolerated. The longer the Prime Minister failed to join other community leaders in speaking out against the Hanson populist statements and agenda, the more anti-Asian sections of the community gained confidence and support for the correctness of their views. It was also evident that there was a need to undertake a major education campaign to counter the many wild and scurrilous statements made in the name of freedom of expression. Although government funds were available for this purpose, they were not expended for many months and, ultimately, were allocated to an advertising agency to undertake a feasibility study of what should be done.

Further compounding concerns about the inertia in implementing national policies to address racism, were moves by the government to emasculate the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, the national tribunal with prime responsibility in the area. The decline of the One Nation Party, in large part because of its own internecine feuding and subsequent loss of electoral support rather than because of any concerted policy to more effectively address racism within Australia, while welcomed, is a matter of concern. This is because it leaves open the possibility that, should circumstances see the emergence of another populist debate, racist violence could again become prominent.
An inevitable effect of the Hanson debate is that many Asian-Australians now have an increased sense of insecurity about their place in Australia. This insecurity includes long-established families, whose Australian-born children were finding that their hitherto unquestioned Australian identity was being called into question as they were treated as recent immigrants.

Significantly, the most recent report of the National Multicultural Advisory Council, entitled *Australian Multiculturalism for a New Century: Towards Inclusiveness*, only indirectly addresses issues of racism and discrimination involving immigrant and indigenous groups. It does this in its calls for political leadership and political parties to demonstrate consensus and support for the future development of multiculturalism (National Multicultural Advisory Council 1999, 82). At the same time, it argues for the need to communicate more effectively the aims of multiculturalism to its critics. The general thrust of the report is to refocus multiculturalism, more specifically, to highlight its links with the evolving value of Australian democracy and citizenship, including a balancing of the rights and obligations of all citizens. This aim is evident in the primacy given to civic duty ahead of cultural respect, social equity and productive diversity. At the same time, there is a specific reference to the need to acknowledge the contribution of those from Great Britain and Ireland and to achieve reconciliation between indigenous people and all other Australians (National Multicultural Advisory Council 1999, 83).

Whether such well-intentioned sentiments will be effective in achieving inclusiveness without the allocation of substantial public resources is a moot point in current policy debates. The economic and social diversity within the Asian population in Australia means that individuals and groups often have different needs in achieving social equity. What does unite them, however, is that, to the extent that they are viewed by other Australians as a homogeneous group which symbolically represents the undesirable face of Australian society at the end of the twentieth century, their full incorporation into that society remains
problematic. However, it is dangerous to see the current relations between Asians and others as simply a replay of the negativity and hostility Asians faced in the nineteenth century. Today's hostility can be viewed as a desperate effort rather than as the clarion call to the development of a new national identity. Notwithstanding such an interpretation, there is a widespread perception that the current Prime Minister, John Howard, is himself sympathetic to many of the views associated with the Hansonites. This includes a view of Australian society as a new Britannia, characterized by values such as “mateship,” which were at the core of the discourse surrounding Federation in 1901. Such a worldview now has little resonance with many Australians, including the large percentage from non-British origins for whom the shift in policy from assimilation to multiculturalism has created a much valued extension of options and choices as to the form of their incorporation into Australian society. Despite a highly regrettable retreat from many of the state institutional supports for multiculturalism, there now exists a generation reared under the policy and a growing awareness of its international value for addressing the challenges of globalization, even among a significant segment of the Anglo-Celtic majority. This coalescence of support for multiculturalism can only be beneficial for the future development of race relations involving Asians in Australia.
Endnotes

1 Space will not allow a broader review of race relations between indigenous and non-indigenous Australians which are part of a different paradigm reinforced by distinct administrative, institutional and social agendas which separate them from the pattern of relations involving minority immigrant groups.

2 Reflecting the historical concerns about cheap labour Australian governments have always been extremely reluctant to provide entry for unskilled or semiskilled labour.

3 Since the 1989 National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, multicultural policies have specifically included the indigenous, Aboriginal population within their scope. Policy makers are well aware of the highly sensitive nature of this inclusiveness given that Aboriginal groups assert their distinctive position as the original inhabitants of Australia who have experienced more extensive and damaging disadvantage and discrimination than any of the recent immigrant groups.

4 The popular labelling of such highly vitriolic public discussions, which became linked with extensive racist behavior as “Debates,” may be viewed as an attempt to deny their social significance and/or to ignore their highly emotive and anti-rational dimension.

5 Unpublished data from the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.

6 Both studies identified professionals from the Philippines as being an exception to the general finding that English competency is related to success in regaining former employment status. Whether this can be accounted for by employers’ concerns about Filipino educational standards, or whether it reflects an employment strategy among Filipinos which involves professionals being more ready to take lower level jobs rather than risk unemployment than are those from other countries, is unclear. Birrell, B. and L. Hawthorne (1997). Immigrants and the Professions in Australia. Melbourne: Centre for Urban and Population Research, Monash University.

7 Pauline Hanson, and another independent, Graeme Campbell, were unusual in winning their seats in Federal parliament after their respective political parties, the Liberal and Labor parties withdrew their party endorsement because of concerns about their racist attitudes and views.

8 Frequent reports of physical as well as psychological abuse experienced by these women have become a major concern to welfare and government authorities with Australian embassies developing special procedures to alert applicants for fiancee visas of potential difficulties in marriages contracted after only a brief acquaintance.

9 The growth in the Asian population was largely the unintended result of changing emphases in government immigration policies as they favoured initially family reunions and then skilled workers and those with substantial capital. However, subsequent policies by government to accept refugees from specific Asian countries such as Vietnam (as well as Latin America and Eastern Europe) and to attract students and tourists from...
Asian countries were consciously adopted in response to foreign and economic policy considerations. Domestically, policies to target specifically “Asian” matters have not, however, reappeared.

16 The Prime Minister took personal responsibility for constructing a highly contentious preamble to the Australian constitution, which reflected such sentiments but which was rejected in the September 1999 referendum.
References


Part IV

New Possibilities
Focusing primarily on Los Angeles, New York City, and Houston, this chapter examines contemporary grassroots efforts to establish multiracial coalitions among Asian Pacific Americans, Latinos, African Americans, and whites in communities across the United States. By studying a range of collaborative efforts, we examine race relations and politics in America’s increasingly multiracial cities. These grassroots efforts provide a rich source of information and offer “lessons” on what may or may not work, facilitating policy formation and raising theoretical issues aimed at initiating and supporting cooperative relations among diverse racial groups and efforts to address urban problems.

Within the last two decades, the populations of New York City, Los Angeles, and Houston have undergone a remarkable shift. Driven by the massive growth in immigration from Asia, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean, these cities have made the transition from white majority to “majority-minority” cities. At the same time, the influx of Asian Pacific Americans and Latinos has injected American cities with multiracial diversity and has complicated the dominant black/white approach to urban race relations.

Asian Pacific Americans share neighborhoods, schools, local governments, and commercial districts with a range of minority groups. For example, the majority of residents in Los Angeles’ Koreatown are Latinos, and New York City’s Chinatown is rapidly expanding into the Latino and African American Lower East Side. These multiracial conditions are replicated with local variations throughout the U.S. in major metropolitan communities such as: Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, and in small cities such as Garden City, Kansas, and Wausau, Wisconsin. Clearly, the increasingly diverse and complex demographics
of the U.S. demand that we examine and address the relations emerging from these changing racial dynamics.

Media attention and scholarly research have focused primarily on conflicts—such as Black-Korean struggles in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles (Min 1996). Receiving less attention, however, is the long history of efforts to establish cooperative efforts, such as Filipino and Mexican workers in California who created the United Farm Workers Union in 1965; Mexican American Edward Roybal who utilized an alliance of Latinos, African Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and whites to win a Los Angeles City Council seat in 1949; and the contemporary efforts of the organization Committee Against Anti-Asian Violence (CAAAV) in mobilizing Asian communities to build multiracial alliances to counter racist violence and police brutality in New York City.

Also, by selectively highlighting the educational and economic “success stories” of some Asian Pacific Americans, media accounts have depicted the entire group as a high achieving “model minority.” The image suggests that they have overcome obstacles faced by other minorities, and this perception has hindered the development of alliances with other groups (Lee 1996). What the image overlooks are the serious issues affecting the Asian Pacific American community—such as extremely high levels of poverty, low levels of education, hate crimes, and employment discrimination—that can form the basis for alliances among minorities.

Contemporary grassroots efforts strive toward equitable policies and resource distribution within the current political framework at the local level—a departure from the social movements of the 1960s that attempted transformative social change on a national scale (Fainstein and Fainstein 1991; Omi and Winant 1994). Neighborhood groups are part of a long history of progressive efforts aimed at improving neighborhood conditions involving such issues as housing, transportation, education, crime, drugs, health care, day care, and jobs. While a focus on local com-
Community issues can be viewed as a conservative retreat from national concerns, as Robert Fisher and Peter Romanofsky (1981 xi) explain, "neighborhood organizing can also be a progressive response by city dwellers who want to control the institutions that affect their lives..." driven by the desire for "political and economic democracy." Furthermore, while our case studies of collaborative efforts occur at the local level, the conditions they address are framed by national circumstances and trends.

The New Urban Race Relations

Major economic and political trends which frame contemporary grassroots collaborations include increasing globalization of the economy and increasing competition for capital, renewed national discussion on race relations and inequality, and shifting racial policies at all levels of the government. A reversal of economic fortunes in the U.S.—from the rapidly expanding post-WWII economy and growing incomes at all levels, to the rise in international competition in the 1970s, demand for greater corporate profits, and the increasing gap between the poor and the rich—brought equally significant changes in the political climate and social policies. In the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. government began to address practices and policies by private entities and the state itself that supported racial discrimination in such critical areas as home mortgages, voting rights, and access to public education. These legislative efforts marked a turning point in U.S. racial policies and generated positive changes, as demonstrated by the increasing numbers of minorities elected to public office and an overhaul of U.S. immigration policies (Davidson and Grofman 1994; Hing 1993; Omi and Winant 1994).

Since the 1970s, however, fiscal conservatism gained momentum and firmly established itself in the 1990s in major urban areas across the country, and the liberal economic policies of the New Deal and social reform of the Civil Rights Movement came under attack (Plotkin and
Scheuerman 1994). Major components of this transition include less state regulation of corporations in support of “free market” policies; attack on labor unions to meet the corporate demands for a more flexible work force; and continued massive public subsidies and tax cuts for corporations in exchange for uncertain benefits such as job growth, which Time has dubbed “corporate welfare” (Barlett and Steele 1998). In contrast to “corporation friendly” policies, “big government” is portrayed as wasteful and inefficient, resulting in cutbacks in social services and a withdrawal from government support for civil rights (Ong, Bonacich, and Cheng 1994). Major forms of discrimination embedded in society have remained untouched by government reform efforts with limited government resources allocated to enforce civil rights legislation (Massey and Denton 1993). Efforts to address discrimination have been curtailed, such as when California’s voters passed Proposition 209 in 1996, ending government affirmative action programs, or attacked, such as in Houston, Texas, where a similar proposition was voted down.

These policies have had a disproportionate impact on urban ethnic communities that are more closely linked to government funding in critical areas such as housing, education, transportation, and health services. Even with an upturn in the economy in the late 1990s, the general trend in policies remains the same, as indicated by the welfare-to-work programs, which were implemented without in-depth evaluation of the long-range implications. The era of limited government and resources forms the context and conditions which frame urban problems and interracial relations as minorities experience and bear the costs of economic restructuring. These developments are too large and sweeping for single groups to address alone, underscoring the need for responses whose effectiveness hinges on multiracial collaboration.
Revisiting Coalition Politics

In many cities, Asian Pacific Americans are potentially an important part of multiracial collaborations; however, their incredible heterogeneity poses new challenges to coalition politics. While Asian Pacific Americans have always been characterized by the diversity of their population, since the 1965 Immigration Act, renewed and new immigration has significantly increased the complexity of the population in terms of ethnicity, class, generation in the U.S., political ideology, and country of origin (Hing 1993; Park 1998).

The heterogeneity of Asian Pacific Americans calls into question one of the most enduring assumptions since the Civil Rights Movement, that is, that the political incorporation of racial minorities is inextricably linked with their participation in liberal coalitions (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Sonenshein 1993). This assumption has been fundamental and pervasive to studies of race and power in contemporary American cities for compelling reasons. For much of America's urban history, conservative coalitions have actively and uniformly sought to exclude all racial minorities from the political process. Faced with hostility and the recalcitrance of conservative coalitions, racial minorities found a measure of political unity among themselves and worked with allies among white liberals whose political commitment included individual and procedural rights and distributive and representative justice (see Boussard 1993 and Taylor 1994).

The recent immigrants bring new multiracial complexities and challenges to the urban political process and pose daunting challenges for liberals in maintaining their traditional claim on racial minority incorporation. At the same time, racial politics gradually moved from the simplicity of white over black discrimination to the more nuanced and complex dynamics of "post-Civil Rights" politics (Omi and Winant 1994; Marable 1995). Since the 1970s, the very same political changes that the
Civil Rights Movement unleashed has opened the way for rearticulating racial politics such that charges of "reverse discrimination" now permeate American political discourse. As liberals find themselves struggling with new challenges, some conservatives have reached out for minority votes and support (Omatsu 1994; Park 1998). Whether these attempts reflect their anxiety in the face of demographic change or genuine commitment to racial inclusion, conservatives are increasingly reluctant to politically write off racial minorities, especially in large cities and diverse states where racial minority voters can shift the electoral balance. These emerging trends signal the new realities that bring into question the traditional liberal assumptions of race, power, and coalition building.

These events and our case studies suggest that participation in community politics is promoted by strong local organizations which facilitate resource development, community mobilization, leadership training, political lobbying, and serve as a basis for communication and negotiation among groups. A major concern is negotiating and establishing common issues, while recognizing that differences exist but will be put aside temporarily as the groups work toward common goals. Clearly, this is not always possible. In Los Angeles, for example, extreme conflict between Korean shopkeepers and African American customers and residents prompted the Los Angeles County Human Relations Commission to initiate the Black Korean Alliance in 1986. While achieving some success in the mediation of conflict, the Los Angeles Civil Unrest of 1992 underscored the magnitude of the problems in urban centers and the limitations of efforts such as the Alliance, which was dissolved in 1992 (Chang 1993; Min 1996). Elections in multiracial communities, such as Monterey Park in Los Angeles County, demonstrate that Asian Pacific Americans, Latinos, and whites would cross-over and vote for candidates of other racial origins. At the same time, however, when offered a choice of strong candidates, and able to cast multiple votes in elections with a number of seats up for election, voters in Monterey Park demonstrated that race
continued to be the major factor as voters overwhelmingly cast their ballots in the largest number for candidates of the same race and ethnicity (Fong 1994; Horton 1995).

The fact that the Black Korean Alliance disbanded, or that coalitions fail to elect their candidates, does not necessarily signify that all meaningful work toward mediating conflict and creating alliances cannot succeed. On the contrary, the individual relationships and networks that are nurtured and supported by such struggles often live beyond their initial contact. Such attempts should be seen as part of larger, long-term efforts to address community concerns. The fact that individuals and groups are able to begin the process of dialogue and negotiation, develop an agenda to pursue jointly, and at least temporarily, work together lays the groundwork for future collaborations.

The next section offers four case studies of multiracial relations, examining the successful Houston mayoral campaign of African American Lee Brown that utilized a multiracial grassroots strategy; New York City Council redistricting and elections in Chinatown that involved discussions of Asian Pacific American/white and Asian Pacific American/Latino alliances and that met with mixed results; an effective multiracial effort to address high school violence in the San Gabriel Valley of Los Angeles County; and a notable international and multiracial effort to support union jobs in Los Angeles involving Latino workers, a Korean corporation, and Korean labor unions. These case studies illustrate the importance of forging common goals that transcend narrow, parochial interests, the role of building and sustaining relations among individuals and organizations that can form the basis for communication and collaborative efforts, and the critical role that organizations play as vehicles for leadership training, resource building, community mobilization, and a basis for communication and negotiation among groups.
Case Studies

A. The Lee Brown Campaign in Houston

In 1997, as Los Angeles and New York elected conservative Republicans into the City Hall to replace liberal African American mayors and as affirmative action programs were under a nationwide attack, Houston's racial politics were undergoing a defining moment. In a city with a well-earned reputation for political conservatism and white-dominance, the mayoral race pitted Robert Mosbacher, a conservative Anglo and a member of the city's famed oil elite, against Lee P. Brown, a liberal African American and the city's former Chief of Police (American Political Network 1997). Sharpening the racial overtone of the mayoral race was the bitter campaign surrounding Proposition A—inspired by California's Proposition 209—that called for the elimination of affirmative action in the city's hiring and contracting policies. The two candidates stood on opposite sides of Proposition A, with Mosbacher supporting and Brown opposing the controversial measure (Sallee 1997). In a hotly contested and closely watched race, the nation was stunned when Houston voters elected their first African American mayor and decided to uphold the city's affirmative action policy. In his victory speech, Brown vowed to lead a "new" multiracial Houston, based on politics of inclusion and economic justice (Benjaminson 1997; Bernstein 1997c). Sharing the spotlight with the mayor was a contingent of Asian Pacific Americans, most of whom were members of Asian-Americans for Lee Brown. According to the newly-elected mayor, for the first time in Houston's mayoral politics Asian Pacific Americans played a visible and a defining role in the city's mayoral campaign.

This case study examines the relationship between Asian Pacific Americans and Lee Brown's campaign. First, the case study focuses on why Brown viewed Asian Pacific American support—along with the support of Latinos—as such an important element to his overall campaign.
Second, the case study goes behind the scenes to examine the politics within the Asian Pacific American community that ultimately resulted in the community’s visible support of the mayor.

Since the 1970s, African American politicians have mounted a steady effort to win the mayor’s seat in Houston. Motivating their effort was the profound sense of their exclusion from Houston’s political and economic structure (Rodriguez 1998a). As documented in Joe Feagin’s influential Free Enterprise City (1988), the pro-business elite that dominated the politics of the city consistently viewed the African American community with a combination of hostility and neglect. As the Civil Rights Movement spread throughout the nation and brought unprecedented inclusion of African Americans in other major U.S. cities, Houston remained largely unaffected. As Houston’s economy boomed during the 1970s, the African American community—without much political voice—bore the brunt of massive urban renewal programs that left much of their community uprooted and destroyed (Feagin 1988). While the political will of the community was strong, African Americans, with only 35 percent of the votes, could not find a candidate that could “cross-over” and win the majority of the votes (Rodriguez 1998a; Feagin 1988).

From the mid-1970s, Houston—much like many of the major cities in the U.S.—underwent a profound demographic change that would alter the politics of the city (see Table 1). Even as white residents were leaving Houston en masse in the aftermath of the oil crash, Houston become one of the major centers of immigration (Rodriguez 1995). Houston’s established Mexican American community saw a renewed and massive migration from Mexico. They were quickly joined by other immigrants from Central America who made the Latino community in Houston one of the largest in the nation. During the same time, Asians and Pacific Islanders came to Houston in massive numbers, the largest flow made up of Vietnamese refugees fleeing their war-torn country.
Other Asian immigrants flocked to Houston in search of economic opportunities (Rodriguez 1995). By 1990, Houston had the eighth largest Asian Pacific American population in the country (Shinagawa 1996). For both Latinos and Asians, their entry into Houston has not been smooth. Latinos have had to struggle with chronic occupational and residential segregation and have had a profoundly strained relationship with the city's Police Department (Rodriguez 1995). For some groups of Asian Pacific Americans, their demographic growth and economic visibility have been met with backlash, including incidents of anti-Asian violence. Nonetheless, as Houston was preparing for the 1997 election, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Pacific Americans accounted for 60 percent of the city's population (Bernstein 1997a, 1997b).

**TABLE 1. POPULATION OF HOUSTON 1998 (estimated)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>558,783</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Pacific American</td>
<td>165,633</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>599,581</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>736,657</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>27,402</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,088,056</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by Philip Law, UCLA Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies, from Current Population Survey.

Given the historical experiences and contemporary realities, Lee Brown sought to build his campaign on the theme of "diversity" as a way to resist being labeled a narrow "black candidate" and as a way to acknowledge the growing racial complexity in Houston (Bernstein 1997a). From the beginning of his campaign, Brown placed reaching out
to Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans at the top of his political agenda. In this effort, Brown resisted both working through established Latino and Asian Pacific American elected leaders and appealing narrowly to well-organized business interests. Instead, he addressed the social service needs of the Asian Pacific American and the Latino communities and underscored their political exclusion from the city’s political process (see Rodriguez 1998b). A close observer of the race comments:

The major difference between Mosbacher and Brown was obvious when it came to Latinos and Asians. Mosbacher worked to win the support of elected leaders and the business groups. I guess he went after the big names and the money. By getting their support, he could also claim that he had the support of these communities. Brown went the other way. He actually talked about programs and issues that would impact these communities. Programs for social service agencies to meet the needs of the youth and the elderly was a main platform and a major winner for Asians and Latinos who felt they were shortchanged when it came to city’s social services. Brown was also explicit about his plans for bringing Asians and Latinos into the political process. Using the theme of “neighborhood oriented government,” he urged us to participate: not just through our leaders or with our money but with our votes and involvement (Author’s interview 1998).

Another observer comments, “reaching out to Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans made Brown really stand out from previous African American candidates. When Sylvester Turner ran in 1991, Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans were completely invisible in his campaign. By reaching out to these two groups—as well as lobbying for white liberals—Brown was also sending a message to all of the Houston’s voters: namely that he is not just a black candidate.” (Author’s interview 1998)
As the election heated up during the summer of 1997, Brown was dealt a powerful blow when two of the major Asian Pacific American and Latino political figures threw their political support behind Mosbacher. First, Martha Wong, the sole Asian Pacific American member of the City Council and an established member of the Republican Party, declared her support for Mosbacher, citing both his support for pro-business policies and his opposition to Proposition A. In making her support public, she argued that Asian Pacific Americans, as a predominantly entrepreneurial group, would stand to directly benefit from pro-business policies and that affirmative action had hurt Asian Pacific Americans access to public employment in Houston (see Mason 1998a, 1998b). In addition, Gracie Saenz, a Latina Councilwomen and a Democrat, declared her support for Mosbacher. Echoing a similar theme, Saenz cited Mosbacher’s “extensive experience in business,” his commitment to traditional family values, and his goal of expanding international trade with Latin America (Bernstein 1997b; Bernstein and Benjamison 1997).

Reflecting back on these two developments, a Chinese American professor at the University of Houston comments:

If Brown did not establish his relationship to Asian Pacific Americans and Latinos from the beginning, he would have faced tremendous difficulties when these highly visible politicians turned against him. I mean, these were seen as leading spokespersons of these communities. However, by this time, Brown had built his own network of supporters—mostly with social service organizations and community organizations. This allowed him to shrug off what would have been a potentially devastating turn of events (Author’s interview 1998).

While Saenz’s support for Mosbacher was countered with declared support for Brown from various established Latino politicians and the influ-
ential Tejano Democrats, members of the Asian Pacific American community found themselves scrambling to organize and declare their support for Brown (Bernstein 1997b). To provide a public platform for declaring their support, Asian-Americans for Lee Brown was created in October, 1997. Made up of a cross-section of Asian Pacific American community activists, social service organizations, and business groups, Asian-Americans for Lee Brown directly opposed Martha Wong (Asian-Americans for Lee Brown 1997). A Korean American community activist comments:

The creation of Asian-Americans for Lee Brown was a major turning point for the Asian Pacific American community in Houston. On the one hand, the community showed that there is considerable political diversity within the Asian Pacific American community—that we are not just all conservative or that our politics is simply based on the interest of small businesses. On the other hand, Asian Pacific Americans showed that we have matured politically. Even though Martha Wong was, by far, the most influential politician in our community, we showed that our politics can take us beyond just one person. Just as important, we showed that we would not use a single issue to test a candidate. While Martha tried to use the affirmative action issue to pit us against African Americans, those of us who supported Brown felt that his platform, overall, was much better for us (Author's interview 1998).

During the runoff campaign, Brown relied heavily on the endorsement from Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans to rally support from these two communities and to send an unequivocal message that his political appeal was not just limited to the African American community (Benjaminson 1997). In the end, Brown won the runoff by 16,000 votes out of 300,000 total cast, securing 95 percent of the African American
vote, 26 percent of the White vote, and running even in both Latino and Asian Pacific American communities (Bernstein 1997c). Addressing the diversity of Brown's support, Alan Bernstein of The Houston Chronicle reported that Brown won this election with an "ethnic medley with black chorus" (Bernstein 1997d).

B. Redistricting in New York City

In 1989, prompted by lawsuits charging racial discrimination and violation of the U.S. Constitution, the New York City Charter was amended to increase the number of city council districts from 35 to 51, a change intended to improve the political representation of minorities. Working from 1990 to 1991, a Districting Commission held a series of public hearings and crafted new council districts.

In the 1991 city council elections following redistricting, Asian Pacific American candidates failed in their attempt to become the representative of the Chinatown district, which contained the city's largest concentration of Asian Pacific Americans. In contrast, the number of African Americans and Latinos on the council increased dramatically from 26 to 41 percent (from 9 to 21), raising the question of why the districting process apparently worked for those two groups, but failed for Asian Pacific Americans.

Asian Pacific Americans agreed that Chinatown should be kept intact within a district and criticized past redistricting efforts which fragmented the community and diluted their electoral strength (Chong 1990; Fung 1990; Lam, N. 1990). Developing criteria to define Chinatown, studies presented to the Districting Commission focused on population, housing, schools, social services, employment, industry, organizations, and commercial enterprises. The "core of Chinatown" was contained in 8 contiguous census tracts (6, 8, 16, 18, 25, 27, 29, 41), and Asian Pacific Americans constituted over 70 percent of the area's population (New York Chinatown History Project 1990; Fung 1991; Koo 1990a).
Chinatown, located in Lower Manhattan, occupies prime real estate, a few blocks north of City Hall, with Wall Street and the World Trade Center a short distance to the south. The increasingly popular residential and entertainment districts, Soho and Tribeca, lay to the west, inhabited primarily by whites, while the Lower East Side borders on the east with large numbers of Latinos and some African Americans.

Before the release of the 1990 Census data, community members estimated that Chinatown contained from 100,000 to 150,000 inhabitants based on the number of housing units and average occupancy, a population sufficient to create an Asian Pacific American majority district. However, the release of the official census data revealed the impossibility of that solution. With a city population of 7,322,564, each of the 51 districts would require a population of approximately 143,579 (as compared to 212,000 with 35 districts) and the census counted only 62,895 in the eight tracts containing Chinatown, falling far short of the district requirement. The Census undercount of Chinatown's population and the decision to increase the number of districts to 51, rather than to the minimum of 60 recommended by community groups (Fung 1991), perhaps had minimal individual effects, yet they added to the overall political barriers faced by Asian Pacific Americans.

Community activists agreed on the general boundaries of Chinatown and the goal of keeping it intact within one council district. The fundamental issue which divided community activists centered on the decision over what areas should be added to Chinatown to meet the minimum population requirement. Two competing plans emerged in the debate over the relationship between race and political representation, offering contrasting alternatives for Chinatown and its relation to the predominately Puerto Rican neighborhood to the north and east and the white areas to the west and south.

Members of Asian Americans For Equality (AAFE), a social service provider, led the effort for a district based on descriptive repre-
sentation (Pitkin 1967) and the historic opportunity to elect an Asian Pacific American. They characterized redistricting and the upcoming election jointly as a pivotal moment when the history of political exclusion nationally and locally—at that time, an Asian Pacific American had never been elected to the city council or citywide office—could be reversed. As city council candidate and AAFE member Margaret Chin (1990) explained in a presentation to the Districting Commission, “It is the opportunity for real representation for communities that have too long been under represented.” With this in mind, AAFE (Koo 1990b, 4) proposed that the core of Chinatown should be joined with areas to the west, stating that “Asian candidates have done better than white candidates in the area west of the core, where one would assume white candidates with a liberal agenda would traditionally be at their best.” They ruled out the areas to the east of Chinatown because their data analysis showed that Asian Pacific American candidates did poorly in local elections.

A variety of community activists and organizations—such as the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund (AALDEF), Community Service Society, and the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund (PRLDEF)—focused on the needs and interests of the low-income and working-class residents as compared to the middle-class district proposed by AAFE. Recognizing that no single ethnic or racial group in the area was large enough to constitute 50 percent or more of a district, residents formed an organization, Lower East Siders for a Multi-Racial District, which proposed a plan that would create a majority Latino, Asian Pacific American, and African American district (Chan 1991). The plan proposed a district with a “minority-majority” population, incorporated the bulk of their communities, and considered population growth trends. Elaine Chan (1991)—a member of the Multi-Racial District organization and coordinator for the Lower East Side Joint Planning Council, a housing advocacy group—stressed the long history of multiracial activism in the area and how that defined and reinforced a
tightly knit political community. She argued that "Asians, Latinos, and African Americans have had a historic working relationship on issues of common concern: housing, health care, immigration, day care, bilingual education, affordable commercial space, job training, and general quality of life issues." Chan also refuted the assumption that Latinos would not vote for Asian Pacific Americans, noting that Latinos supported two Asian Pacific American candidates in the 1987 judicial race (Ohnuma 1991).

Alan Gartner (1993, 67), Districting Commission Executive Director, maintained that the commission members believed that the majority of the Asian Pacific American community favored separating Asian Pacific Americans and Latinos so that the two groups would not compete against one another. By joining Chinatown with areas to the west, Gartner (1993, 67-68) explained, "Ultimately, the Districting Commission opted to craft a district designed to offer the only opportunity in the city to the Asian-American community to elect a candidate of its choice." However, according to Judith Reed (1992, 777), General Counsel to the Districting Commission, others affiliated with the commission believed that public testimony clearly favored a multiracial district, contradicting Gartner's interpretation of events. The history of combining minority populations in the U.S. is mixed, with groups both voting as a bloc and against one another (Ancheta and Imahara 1993; Guinier 1991; Saito 1998).

The districting plans joined Chinatown with areas to the west and created District 1 in which Asian Pacific Americans were the largest group at 39.2 percent, slightly ahead of whites at 37.2 percent, as shown in Table 2. However, in terms of registered voters, whites clearly dominated the district with 61.5 percent as compared to 14.2 for Asian Pacific Americans. Lower voter registration rates for Asian Pacific Americans and Latinos may have offered a relative advantage for Chinatown if it were linked to the Lower East Side where Latinos also show a dropoff in registered voters as compared to population as shown in Table 2.
### Table 2. New York City Council District 1 and 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>District Population</th>
<th>Voting Age Population</th>
<th>Registered Voters (estimated)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DISTRICT 1 (Population: 137,930)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Pacific American</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DISTRICT 2 (Population: 151,883)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Pacific American</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>59.3</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>71.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: New York Districting Commission (July 26, 1991) letter to the Department of Justice. Percentages are rounded.

From the perspective of many Asian Pacific Americans, District 1 was inextricably linked with Asian Americans For Equality (AAFE) and its council candidate, Margaret Chin. AAFE has provided a range of community services, such as building and renovating affordable housing, providing information and training to small business owners, and enforcing tenant rights. Despite its indisputable progressive and community roots, critics of AAFE charged that it had become a developer intent on following its own agenda, and unilaterally putting forth its redistricting plan reinforced that image (Jacobs 1997). AAFE's support in 1982
for Chinatown garment subcontractors against workers and charges that it used a subcontractor that paid below minimum wages reinforced the view that the organization had strayed from its original mission (Lagnado 1991). Kathryn Freed, Chin's main opponent and eventual winner, was an attorney with a history of working for tenants' rights and affordable housing. Freed adopted the platform of the Asian American Union for Political Action—whose members included supporters of the multiracial district—and its emphasis on jobs and housing and received the organization's endorsement.

While racial minorities have forged alliances with white liberals to gain political incorporation, the driving force of such coalitions—the convergence of interests—did not frame District 1 events. Chin was unable to gain crucial West Side support, and major Democratic clubs and representatives backed Freed. The influential Soho Alliance argued that "Problems on the West Side—overdevelopment, the waterfront, the West Side Highway, loft laws, historic districts...have little in common with Chinatown community's woes, such as the need for affordable housing, jobs and education programs" (Hester 1991, p. 10). The rapid growth of Chinatown received little campaign attention, although the preservation of Little Italy—currently surrounded by an expanding Chinatown—continues as a major dividing issue.

While Asian Pacific American descriptive representation was not served in District 1, Freed's efforts to gain Asian Pacific American backing and her support of working class issues transcended narrowly defined racial politics and demonstrated the importance of building a larger, more inclusive base and platform which included Chinatown concerns. In addition, Chinatown was kept intact and not fragmented among different districts, a major goal supported by AAFE and the multiracial district advocates. Chin's loss demonstrated the need to rebuild and reinforce political relations. While white voters had supported Asian Pacific American candidates in previous local elections, Chin's campaign had
apparently not laid the groundwork necessary to gain the endorsement of key community leaders and failed to generate compelling issues to win the support of a majority of voters. However, Freed's election was not a complete victory for backers of the multiracial district since a major concern that drove their plans was the preservation and reinforcement of the political community generated from the history of alliances in the Chinatown/Lower East Side region. Those two areas were divided into Districts 1 and 2, fragmenting the community. Adding to the complexity of political representation, Puerto Rican Antonio Pagan was elected in District 2, serving descriptive representation. Pagan championed community safety, Puerto Rican empowerment, and his work promoting affordable housing, while his detractors argued that his efforts were intended to support the interests of real estate developers (Ferguson 1993; Morales 1991). The struggle over nationalist concerns versus multiracial alliances is also a key issue in the next case study on high school violence.

C. THE MULTI-CULTURAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION AND THE ALHAMBRA SCHOOL DISTRICT

The issue of high school violence in the San Gabriel Valley of Los Angeles County offers an illustration of how community members address the political, economic, and cultural implications of rapid growth among Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans. Located fifteen minutes by freeway east of downtown Los Angeles, the region is undergoing dramatic demographic changes due to international and domestic migration. Primarily white in the 1950s, the region now has Latinos as the largest group. Asian immigration, led by ethnic Chinese but also including significant numbers of Vietnamese, Koreans, and other groups, has led to a large and rapidly growing Asian Pacific American presence, adding to the native-born Japanese American and Chinese American population which began entering the region in the 1950s and 1960s. Latinos are the most
powerful politically at the regional level, holding all higher elected offices in 1998. The San Gabriel Valley is the center of the largest Chinese ethnic economy in the nation in terms of the number of ethnically owned businesses.

The Alhambra School District draws the bulk of its students from a cluster of cities—Alhambra, Monterey Park, Rosemead, and San Gabriel—which, according to the 1990 Census, collectively was 1.2 percent African American, 41.4 percent Asian Pacific American, 36.6 percent Latino, 20.1 percent white. Ranging in size from 37,000 to 82,000, the four cities are characterized more by mixed rather than segregated neighborhoods. Reflecting the relative youth of Asian Pacific Americans and their higher school-age population as compared to whites, the 9,700 high school students in the district are 51 percent Asian Pacific American, 38 percent Latino, 1 percent African American, and about 10 percent white (Alhambra School District 1990). This complex economic and political mix frames race relations in the region.

By the early 1990s, racial violence in local high schools, growing conflict among parents along racial lines as they struggled to resolve student issues, and the unresponsiveness of the Alhambra School Board prompted concerned residents to reconcile their differences and join together to force the school board to act. The local chapter of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the Chinese American Parents and Teachers Association of Southern California (Chinese American PTA), which was based in the San Gabriel Valley, established the Multi-Cultural Community Association to end the fragmentation of parents’ efforts along racial lines and persuade the school board to implement policies to alleviate racial conflict.

In the mid-1980s, a fight involving Asian Pacific Americans, Latinos, and whites resulted in a non-fatal stabbing of a Chinese student. In 1991, two more fights involving Latinos, whites, and Asian Pacific Americans were reported. When parents expressed their concerns before
the school board, some white members of the board dismissed the fights with explanations of "youthful hormones" and "boys will be boys." The five-member board was comprised of one Mexican American, one Chinese American, and three whites, although support for issues did not necessarily follow racial lines in the long and complex deliberations that followed. Latino parents were also very concerned about the tracking of Latino students into non-college preparatory classes and the dismally low percentage of Latino, as compared to Asian Pacific American, students who completed courses required for college eligibility (Calderon 1995).

The members of the Chinese American PTA did not agree with the board members' explanation of the student problems. In a letter to the board they stated that "...racial conflicts led to the stabbing of a Chinese student at Alhambra High School" and in 1991 at San Gabriel High School, "Two Chinese students were victims of an unprovoked beating by a group of Latino students on campus" (CAPTASC 1991). After the 1991 fight, 225 Asian Pacific American students signed a letter describing some of the forms of harassment faced by Chinese students at San Gabriel High School—which was 42 percent Asian Pacific American, 44 percent Latino, with the remainder primarily white (Alhambra School District 1990)—and sent it to the Board of Education.

The Chinese American PTA was established in 1979. The group's history was explained during a discussion involving white, Latino, and Asian Pacific American residents who had gathered during the coalition building process around the issue of school violence. A member explained that Chinese American parents created the organization because the school-based PTAs did not meet the unique needs of the Chinese immigrant parents who included many who did not speak English and were unfamiliar with even the most basic practices of U.S. schools, such as report cards. The school district's refusal to use translators at the PTA meetings demonstrated an unwillingness to recognize the concerns of the new immigrants and created a need for an organization
which could deal with crucial education issues and involve parents in matters dealing with the safety and well-being of their children. Asian Pacific American parent groups have also been created in other Southern California communities with large immigrant populations, such as a Chinese group in Arcadia, Korean and Chinese groups in Cerritos, and a Korean group in Fullerton (Seo 1996).

At the same time that the Chinese PTA was lobbying the Alhambra School Board, members of LULAC were also attending school board meetings, requesting that the school district address conflict in the schools. Tension between the Asian Pacific American and Latino parents was exacerbated by the school board’s reluctance to deal with conflict on the school campuses and the attempts of some board members to shift responsibility from the schools to the parents and to pit Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans against one another. According to Jose Calderon (1995), one of the founders of the multiracial coalition that emerged from the struggle, the initially antagonistic relationship between Latinos and Asian Pacific Americans was primarily due to the misconceptions each group had about the other. Latinos wrongly assumed that the Chinese PTA could use the large amounts of capital controlled by Asian Pacific American entrepreneurs in the region, giving them much greater access to local politicians and attorneys. Although there was a strong Latino middle-class population, it was composed primarily of salaried professionals who believed that they did not have access to the same level of resources as Asian Pacific Americans. On the other hand, Asian Pacific Americans incorrectly believed that since most of the local politicians were Latino, Latinos had greater political influence over members of the school board.

Calderon, representing LULAC, and Marina Tse, a Chinese immigrant woman and the president of the Chinese PTA, worked with a number of other individuals to try to overcome the “narrow nationalist” aims of each group and combine the two to form one organization
(Calderon 1995). Rather than combatants on opposite sides of a “racial” issue, Calderon and Tse stressed that as parents with children in the same schools, they should be united by the larger goal of seeking quality education in the school system where complex problems based on economic and demographic restructuring, class differences, cultural misunderstanding, and race were grossly oversimplified as racial conflict.

Calderon and LULAC had a long history of coalition building, demonstrated by LULAC’s numerous meetings with the West San Gabriel Valley Asian Pacific Democratic Club and Calderon’s involvement in multiracial politics in Monterey Park. His credibility among Latinos, Asian Pacific Americans, and whites as a person who was genuinely concerned about the issues of all groups was crucial as members of the different organizations worked to look beyond the immediate issue concerning campus violence to the larger issues involving quality of education and conflict management. The Los Angeles Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund and the Asian Pacific American Legal Center also contributed legal aid for the students involved in the fights and mediation to help settle disputes among the parents. These individuals and organizations worked over a number of months and formed the Multi-Ethnic Task Force, later called the Multi-Cultural Community Association, and were successful in changing the school district’s policy of handling conflict after the fact through containment and punishment, to instituting prevention programs which addressed the roots of the conflict.

D. ORGANIZING BEYOND RACE AND NATION: THE LOS ANGELES HILTON CASE

While the above three case studies have examined multiracial coalitions in traditional political settings, this case study examines a coalition building effort in an economic setting. On October 28, 1994, the employees of the Los Angeles Hilton and Towers—one of the largest hotels in Downtown Los Angeles catering to mainstream conventioneers
and tourists—received a notification from the Hilton Hotel International
that they would lose their union contracts on New Year’s Day, 1995. The
owner of the building, Hanjin International, failed to come to terms with
Hilton Hotel Corporation over renewing the terms of the two-year old
management contract and decided to manage the Los Angeles Hilton
itself (Silverstein 1994; Los Angeles Hilton and Towers 1994). As the
first order of business, Hanjin International decided to cut labor costs by
terminating the union contract between Hilton and the 575 mostly
Latino employees who were represented by Hotel Employees and
Restaurant Employees Union (HERE) Local 11, one of the most visible
and activist labor unions in the city. Coming only two-and-a-half years
after the devastating Los Angeles Civil Unrest, this event had all of the
trappings of yet another volatile racial conflict, this time pitting a large
and powerful Korean corporation against a small but activist Latino labor
union. Given the potential for a bitter and divisive fight, the incident
received almost immediate media coverage and the city braced for another racially charged incident (Silverstein 1994; Kang 1994; Garcia-
Irigoyen 1994).

Hanjin International’s venture into Los Angeles’ real estate mar-
ket came at the tail end of a decade-long Asian buying spree of high-pro-
file properties. The Japanese began the trend during the mid-1980s with
high profile purchases, including the Rockefeller Center in New York
and the Beverly Hills Hotel in Los Angeles. Even though the commer-
cial real estate market was taking a steep downturn during this time,
Asian investors, flush with cash from their booming economies, acquired
numerous buildings throughout the country. As a late comer, Korean
companies joined others from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Indonesia and
bought some of the major buildings in Los Angeles (Cho 1992).

In purchasing the Los Angeles Hilton, Hanjin Group—the fifth
largest Korean conglomerate of which Hanjin International is a wholly
owned subsidiary—sought to add American real estate to its massive
multinational business interests that included shipping, construction, energy, and, its crown jewel, the Korean Air Lines. Hanjin Group's purchase also reflected its own sense of economic vulnerability in South Korea. With growing democratic changes and the ensuing labor militancy of South Korean workers, Hanjin Group was no longer protected by the pro-growth policies of the South Korean government that had previously banned independent labor unions (Kim 1997). Indeed, their purchase of Los Angeles Hilton coincided with one of the largest labor struggles in South Korean history when workers from Hanjin Shipping Company successfully formed an independent labor union in 1992. The Los Angeles Hilton and Towers seemed far removed from the politics of South Korean labor relations. Despite their high hopes, Hanjin Group saw its investment in Hilton drop precipitously as the Los Angeles tourist industry became devastated in the aftermath of the civil unrest of 1992. With its investment shrinking by the day, Hanjin Group, through Hanjin International, decided to take over the management of the hotel and cut costs by eliminating the unionized workers.

Most of the Latino workers in Hilton were represented by Local 11, led by Maria Elena Dorazo, who has a well-earned reputation for innovative and principled organizing in the city (Cho 1992). Fearing that the event could become a racially-charged incident in a city that saw too many racially divisive conflicts, she called on Roy Hong, the Executive Director of Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates (KIWA) and a former consultant for Local 11, to help with the case. She had called on KIWA a couple of years earlier when Local 11 and KIWA successfully worked together to iron out a new contract for the workers at the nearby Koreana Hotel (Cho 1992). With KIWA's involvement, Local 11 hoped to defuse the racial dimension of the Hilton campaign as well as utilize KIWA's two sets of ties—its connections to the Korean American community and to the labor movement in South Korea—that could directly bear on the success of the Hilton campaign. KIWA immediately signed on as a full and open partner in the organizing campaign.
Almost immediately, the coalition between the Latino Local 11 and the Korean American KIWA brought increased visibility to the campaign. To a city that was wracked with racial division, the coalition between the two organizations won political support from mainstream political institutions. In particular, the Los Angeles City Council, at the urging of four of its most progressive members—Rita Walters, Jackie Goldberg, Mike Hernandez and Mark Ridley-Thomas—used the Hilton campaign as a forum to discuss the city’s race relations and to protest the loss of unionized jobs (Los Angeles City Council 1997). After celebrating this important example of multiracial coalition in a divided city, the City Council urged Hanjin International to renew the labor contract with the workers. The public and visible support of the City Council brought added attention from others, including the media (Kang 1994; Garcia-Irigoyen 1994). In this way, one very real resource for the campaign was the coalition itself: by crossing the racial line, the campaign won important political support and visibility.

In addition, KIWA used the Korean American ethnic media to rally support from the Korean American community. In particular, KIWA exploited the conglomerate nature of Hanjin Group as it went after the most visible and vulnerable part of the Hanjin Group’s presence in Los Angeles—the Korean Air Lines that is dependent on the Korean American traveling public. In campaign flyers and in Korea Times editorials, KIWA implored Korean Americans to boycott Korean Air Lines to punish Hanjin Group for its bad corporate citizenship and signed on numerous social service and religious organizations, including the Korean Methodist Church and the Korean American Interagency Council (an umbrella organization of Korean American social service agencies), to commit to a boycott (Kang 1994; Local 11 1994a, 1994b). Indeed, one of the major actions that the campaign undertook was at the Thomas Bradley International Terminal at the Los Angeles Airport where members of KIWA and the supporters of Local 11 distributed a
flyer that was addressed to the customers of Korean Air Line, asking the question "what will happen to 500 Hilton workers when the new year comes?" (Local 11 1994d). Coming at the height of the travel season, the campaign effectively put tremendous economic pressure on Korean Air Lines, and, in turn, the Hanjin Group.

It is critical to note that the involvement of KIWA was essential in applying this economic pressure. By going after Korean Air Lines, the campaign had effectively mounted a "secondary boycott"—an activity that Local 11 as a labor union is strictly forbidden to engage in under the Section 8 (b)(4)(i) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). However, KIWA, as a nonprofit "worker’s advocate organization", was able to mount a secondary boycott of the Hanjin Group (Wong 1992).

As the campaign reached a fever pitch with direct action in Los Angeles, including picketing and civil disobedience, KIWA relied on its international ties with South Korean labor unions to pressure Hanjin International to settle (Sierra 1994; McDonnell 1994). In November 1997 KIWA hosted a fact-finding visit by Nam Sang Oh—a reporter from The Korea Labor News, based in Seoul, Korea. With close consultation with KIWA and Local 11, The Korea Labor News published numerous stories regarding the Hilton campaign in Korea (Author’s interview 1998). On the heels of this publicity, Committee for the Struggle to Reinstate Hanjin Dismissed Workers was formed in Korea under the leadership of Kyong Ho An, a veteran of Hanjin labor strikes. Citing both the class-based solidarity with Latino workers in Los Angeles and the long-term self-interest of preventing Hanjin Group from exporting unionized Korean jobs to unorganized workers abroad, the Committee threatened the Hanjin Group with sympathy strikes and actions in Korea (Author’s interview 1998). In this sudden transnational move, Hanjin Group faced the real prospect of its multi-million dollar problem in Los Angeles growing into a multi-billion dollar problem in its own backyard.
With mounting pressures from all sides, Hanjin International decided to settle with Local 11 on January 6, 1995. In the settlement, Hanjin agreed to renew the labor contract with Local 11 and to rehire all of the workers with their seniority firmly in place (Kang 1995; Los Angeles Times 1995). At a time when labor unions had been in full retreat nationwide, Local 11 won an important victory for its 575 workers against what had initially appeared to be impossible odds. Moreover, the Hilton campaign provides important lessons and possibilities for multiracial coalition building, including coalition building beyond the nation.

CONCLUSION: Lessons from the Case Studies

Our analysis suggests a number of lessons regarding multiracial coalitions and collaborations. First, racial coalitions emerge most strongly when groups are able to set aside short-term, group-specific benefits to address more fundamental issues that can bring progressive social change. In the Alhambra School District, Asian Pacific Americans and Latinos transformed the initial issue of school violence into a broader discussion of inclusive participation, conflict resolution, and tracking of minority students. Most importantly, Asian Pacific Americans and Latinos mobilized collectively to bring accountability to the school district and to improve the quality of education for all students. Likewise, in the Los Angeles Hilton case, Local 11 and KIWA worked together under the common vision of maintaining union jobs that pay a living wage and provide basic benefits. The fact that Local 11 and KIWA was able to recruit Korean labor unions to their campaign stands as a hopeful sign that coalition building on the part of labor can cross national boundaries in this era of transnational capital.

Second, in an ironic twist, successful multiracial coalition building must resist narrow race-based politics, while clearly recognizing the importance of race in society. In the Houston case, Lee Brown con-
sciously resisted the label of "the black candidate." Instead, from the very beginning of his candidacy, he consciously reached out to Asian Pacific Americans, Latinos, and liberal whites, consistently promising a more inclusive and responsive leadership. Members of the Asian Pacific American community had to also go beyond its narrow racial politics to support Lee Brown: a segment of the community broke ranks with City Councilwoman Martha Wong when she endorsed Robert Mosbacher. As a member of Asian-Americans for Lee Brown states, "it was more important for the community to be divided and be true to itself, than united just for the sake of unity" (Author’s interview 1998). The New York City Chinatown case illustrates that voters work within a constantly changing set of conditions and suggests that AAFFE—whose well-run campaign for establishing district boundaries was a success—may have counted too heavily on past electoral victories for their candidate, Margaret Chin, without sufficiently working to re-establish support in the heavily white community west of Chinatown for AAFFE’s redistricting plans and Chin’s city council race. While the Multi-Racial District group did not succeed in their efforts to create a Chinatown/Lower East Side district, Kathryn Freed worked to establish a multiracial base and adopted their platform in District 1.

Third, building alliances also underscores the importance of building and sustaining relations among individuals and organizations that can promote collaborative efforts. Jose Calderon’s history of supporting alliances among Asian Pacific Americans, Latinos, and whites in the San Gabriel Valley proved essential with the issue of school violence; and the previous efforts between KIWA and HERE, and Roy Hong and Maria Elena Durazo, paved the way for joint action on the Hilton labor issue. A history of working together, constructing networks, and building trust can help lay the foundation as new concerns emerge. Organizations play a key role in this process, forming an institutional base from which individuals can meet.
Fourth, ethnic specific organizations, rather than generating divisiveness in society (Schlesinger Jr. 1991) as the Alhambra School District case study demonstrated, serve as vehicles for community mobilization, leadership training, resource building, and an effective basis for communication and negotiation among various community groups. Funding for these groups is paramount, and such organizations as Asian Americans For Equality, Korean Immigrant Worker Advocates, Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, and the Chinese American Parents and Teachers Association of Southern California play crucial roles in fostering grassroots participation. Funding—including private foundations and from the various levels of government—can be problematic, however, if the allocation of funds is used to suppress critical views about government policy and/or social issues among community groups (Mollenkopf 1992). Local community groups—such as the Multicultural Community Association in the San Gabriel Valley and the Multi-Racial District group in New York City—often arise to face particular issues, and disband once their goals are met. However, even though community organizations come and go, the working relationships that such organizations nurture and support are meaningful because the same individuals often play key leadership roles in different organizations over time in a particular region, maintaining relationships between diverse segments of the community.

Finally, there are important structural impediments—such as the accuracy of the census and number of districts—to political participation and coalition building. Broader participation is necessary for Asian Pacific Americans, especially in the area of electoral politics. As a way of electing representatives, single member districts have been very effective for large populations of hypersegregated African Americans and whites, but in the case of New York City and much of the U.S., the more dispersed populations—including large numbers of non-citizens—of Asian Pacific Americans make such districts problematical. Suggestions for
alternative election systems need to be considered, such as cumulative voting, in which voters can cast as many votes as there are open seats and can strategically use those votes by spreading them among the candidates or using all of their votes on one candidate (Guinier 1994; Reed 1992).

The emerging theme of the new millennium is the complexity and heterogeneity of U.S. minorities in contrast to the broad overlap of class and racial positions of America's earlier history. This diversity is the challenge for coalitions as different class positions, unbalanced levels of resources and power, and dissimilar immediate material interests potentially impede coalition formation.

* * *

Edward J.W. Park would like to gratefully acknowledge Mary Ann Park (USC) and Noemi Garcia (Princeton University) for their research assistance. He also acknowledges the Southern California Studies Center (Director, Michael Dear) for supporting the Los Angeles Hilton case study.

Leland Saito would like to acknowledge the research assistance provided by Antonio T. Tiongson, Jr.

* * *
References


Chong, B. (1990, November 1). Written testimony delivered to the New York City Districting Commission. Appendix 3(2).


Lam, N. (1990, November 1). Written testimony delivered to the New York City Districting Commission. Appendix 3(2).


New York Chinatown History Project. (1990, November 1). Written testimony delivered to the New York City Districting Commission. Appendix 3(2).


In June 1997, President William J. Clinton introduced The President’s Initiative on Race (PIR). The purpose of the Initiative was to examine race relations in America by using the tools of constructive dialogue and study, and its one objective was to move our nation closer to the promise of building a more just society. His Advisory Board was comprised of individuals who had very different, but valuable, experiences with race in America. The seven-member Advisory Board was chaired by the distinguished historian John Hope Franklin, and it included former Governors Thomas Keane and William Winter, businessman Robert Thomas, organized labor representative Linda Chavez Thompson, the Reverend Susan Johnson-Cooke, and me.

When the President first announced the Initiative, hopes were high. Never before in the history of the nation had a President, during a time of relative peace and prosperity, placed at the center of attention the issue of race relations in America—from our past, through the present, and to the future. The scope of the effort was broadly defined, but a central theme was that every American should come to understand that improving race relations today, as we enter the twenty-first century, is of utmost importance for the generations of tomorrow. The Initiative was designed to examine current problems, understand our history, and focus on options for the future.

Under the leadership of the White House, the nation had the chance to affirm and expand upon the work that had begun in local communities all across the country. In many places, the fact of America’s diversity had already emerged, transforming programs and policies and
local culture. Cities such as Los Angeles had already experienced the best and the worst that could come from such change. The President understood that the rest of the nation would face somewhat similar changes, although perhaps less dramatic, and that this transformation would inevitably have an enormous impact on shaping our future.

It was the end of a century, the end of a millennium, and the beginning of a new era. From my vantage point, the President's commitment to raise the question of race relations was visionary, courageous, and an assertion of true leadership. He had the foresight to expand his genuine personal interest in this matter, recognizing and acting upon the fact that his Administration had the opportunity to take the first steps to address a complicated challenge that this nation could no longer avoid.

The Idea of Moving Beyond Black and White

In July 1997, at one of the Advisory Board's first meetings in Washington, DC, each Board member was asked to make a brief comment as to what needed to be done during the course of the year. I introduced the notion that the dialogue about race in America should move toward the inclusion of voices from those who were neither black nor white. I urged that we make room in the conversations for examining the experiences of Americans who are of mixed-race backgrounds. I also urged that the Advisory Board consider the work of poets, musicians, performing artists, and others who have deepened our understanding about one another by using means that help us transcend the realms of talk and dialogue.

Not so surprisingly, the proposition of moving beyond black and white proved to be both significant and contentious. It brought out all the resentment, anxiety, anger, and distrust that has plagued race relations for so long. Despite the civil rights movement, the passage of anti-
discrimination laws, the broad public education that has taken place since the 1960s, and the scores of advocacy efforts that have been started in the pursuit of racial justice, it was clear that the basic trust had still not been established, that wounds remained deep, and that a common language to discuss race in America had not yet been found.

Why should America be concerned and interested in race relations beyond the black and white divide? This question was asked over and over again throughout the year that the Advisory Board met, and the fundamental answer is that it is necessary for keeping democracy alive because it is time to stop running from the complexity of the vast heterogeneity of our population. And it is time for the complexity to be examined in our public discourse, with a full understanding that many divergent points of view will emerge and that many intense differences of opinion will be voiced.

The decision to move beyond black and white is a challenge to the dualistic approach that American society has become comfortable with when problems must be resolved in order to maintain our sense of stability and security. As a consequence, we often find ourselves in untenable public policy debates that repel, rather than inspire, innovative thinking to meet our needs. Rather than allow ourselves to clearly grasp the complexities of circumstances, there is a tendency to simplify to the point of absurdity. This simplification can be seen throughout society; the war on drugs serves as a good example. The “war” was declared at a time when the number of drug offenses in the legal system was in decline. Yet, inexplicably, panic-produced policies were adopted—policies that increased law enforcement resources, stiffened sentences, and reduced rehabilitation services and options for offenders—with the result that we now have prisons that are filled with first-time, nonviolent offenders who will remain in custody for decades, their families destroyed in the process. Yes, we as Americans have grown comfortable with dualities no matter what their cost. We find it troublesome to think in terms of
multiple dimensions when it comes to people, politics, public policy, and history. Thus, the suggestion that the dialogue on race move forward to include those who are neither black nor white seems to be asking too much—even as we are approaching the beginning of a new century.

Resentment about the broader inclusion of those who are neither black nor white arose because the legacy of slavery continues to manifest in the lives of African Americans today. Anxiety arose because the people of this nation know that the first public conversations about race in America should speak to the historic injustices of racial bigotry. Thus, the notion of building a more inclusive framework for race relations pushes people beyond familiar ground and into arenas in which there are few leaders, no preeminent organizations that embrace people of conscience, and no clear framework in which to discuss or develop policy initiatives.

There were numerous concerns by Board members who resisted the idea that the new century would demand a new framework for thinking about race. For example, there was concern that the unique hardships and sacrifices of African Americans would be diminished or ignored. In addition, there was concern about how public resources would be allocated if other minorities began to establish needs and make a strong case for those needs. And finally, there seemed to be disbelief about the contributions and sacrifices by non-African American minorities in shaping race relations and our nation's future. But it was apparent that the numerous concerns all reduced to one key issue: the discomfort with change. And this discomfort was brought about by the realization that such change will affect the life of each and every American.

The population of the nation is expected to experience a dramatic demographic shift over the next several decades. Non-Hispanic whites will comprise a bare majority of approximately 52 percent. African Americans, who comprise about 12 percent of the population today, will
grow to about 13 percent. It is also projected that immigration will continue to increase, bringing people of mostly Asian and Hispanic descent to our shores. The Asian Pacific American (APA) population is predicted to triple and the Hispanic population more than double. Moreover, the information age economy is already upon us, and it is clear that the advances we have realized in telecommunications and technology will re-shape human relations and race relations in dramatic ways. The implications of this data speak clearly to the complexities of the future.

The reaction to the suggestion that it is time to include voices never before heard in broad public discourse revealed regional differences as well as interracial suspicion. The West and Southwest regions have had some experience incorporating different cultural practices and languages into their societies. For those in other large urban centers, however, the idea of emerging perspectives that are neither black nor white was hardly an issue worth mentioning. Conversely, in the non-urban East and South, the suggestion to move beyond the black and white duality seemed radical. Indeed, it prompted accusations of racism against the members of the Advisory Board itself. Thus, the first foray into forward thinking created a flashpoint.

Given this context there nonetheless still remains the fundamental question of how to move toward a new race relations framework without having first settled questions about our past. The nation continues to struggle with the legacy of slavery in both measurable and immeasurable terms. The objective data available from government and private sources confirm that opportunities for racial minorities (particularly African Americans) continue to be limited. This is best evidenced by facts that confirm racial disparities in housing, employment and economic opportunity, public education, and health status. The following facts were brought to the attention of the Advisory Board during the course of the year:

- Housing segregation continues to be a problem, with blind testing
demonstrating that there continues to be discrimination by landlords who refuse to make housing available to non-whites.\footnote{6}

- The Council for Economic Advisors published findings based on U.S. Census Bureau data which revealed that median incomes for black and Hispanic families is almost half that for white and Asian Pacific American families. Despite higher median income than other racial minorities, the rate of poverty among APAs is 50 percent higher than among whites.\footnote{7} In a study focused on marginal sectors of the APA population of Los Angeles County, researchers found a high rate of poverty, with the highest rates among Southeast Asian refugees, followed by Pacific Islanders.\footnote{8}

- In June 1998, the federal government announced that a study of its procurement contracting in more than 70 industries helped to establish a benchmark for the utilization (versus capacity) of disadvantaged businesses. The data revealed that there were several industries in which minority-owned business enterprises were being underutilized. Accordingly, in its revision of policy on contracts for minorities, the White House urged the use of affirmative action programs to correct the underutilization rates.\footnote{9}

- The states of California and Washington now make it illegal to use affirmative action in connection with the use of public funds—whether for education, contracting, or employment. The passage of these laws has had a devastating impact on students seeking the opportunity to learn in public institutions.

- Working people are facing tremendous challenges, with the shift of employment opportunities moving from manufacturing jobs to the service industry and sales. This shift has hurt minority workers in
particular. A recent study by the AFL-CIO revealed that African American and Latino workers are concentrated in low-wage occupations. In 1997, 22 percent of African American workers and 20 percent of Latino workers were in the service industry—the second lowest paid occupation after farm work.\(^\text{10}\)

- The health status research reveals more of the story in that there has been an acknowledged problem collecting health data and accurate mortality information for APAs.\(^\text{11}\) Thus, a comparative examination of mortality rates indicating that APAs have the lowest death rates across all age bands between 1-65 years\(^\text{12}\) may not be as comforting as it seems, since there is reason to believe that the mortality rate calculations are based on flawed information. The available statistics have been limited to information from death certificates provided by coroners, funeral directors, and the census count—all arenas in which there is a strong suspicion of undercounting. This, combined with the lack of national health data for this group (due to their exclusion from major population health studies until only the last 20-30 years), suggests cautious optimism about the research published to date.\(^\text{13}\)

The findings above are but a small part of the picture that emerged during the course of a year in which race relations in America were examined. The broad observations and impressions of the Advisory Board are contained in the report forwarded to the President.\(^\text{14}\)

Working Relationships Between PIR Staff and Advisory Board Members

The infrastructure of the PIR was headed by Judith A. Winston, who had previously served as Acting Undersecretary and General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Education for the Clinton
Administration. Her main responsibility was to direct the talent of some two dozen staff members who were either detailed from other federal agencies to work with the PIR, or were hired specifically for the various tasks that were to be undertaken during the course of the year. For a variety of reasons, this proved to have its share of difficulties and obstacles that had to be met.

The staff included individuals with impressive academic and professional credentials related to virtually every aspect of the Advisory Board's inquiry. Several staff members had experience working on related policies and programs in various federal agencies. Some had advanced degrees in fields such as public policy, political science, sociology, and governmental affairs. Still others had exceptional skills in managing logistics for large public meetings or were brought to the Initiative to take advantage of their abilities to provide administrative guidance. Individuals were diverse in every respect—race, ethnicity, gender, talent, experience, and interest in the subject at hand. Although this broad range and depth of backgrounds and diversity represented a leadership challenge that would have been daunting for any executive, Ms. Winston succeeded in bringing the staff to a shared focus and to an understanding of the parameters of the Advisory Board's task within the first two months.

The Advisory Board decided to hold meetings throughout America, and, in retrospect, this may have been a mistake. The skills and talents of staff members were unwittingly diverted from substantive to logistical matters. Rather than taking full advantage of the opportunity to utilize the training and experience of the staff that had been recruited to the PIR, key individuals were forced to spend much of their time preparing for town hall and Advisory Board meetings throughout the nation. The amount of time invested in advance work (including outreach to local leadership, site reviews, and coordination of events related to the topics covered), not to mention review and preparation of
materials for Advisory Board members prior to the public meetings, was enormous. Given the short time-frame of one year, it would have made more sense to keep the Advisory Board meetings in Washington, DC, and allow the staff to concentrate its attentions to the analysis of some of the more difficult topics and substantive issues related to race relations.

The relationships between staff and the Advisory Board were almost always positive. Each Advisory Board member had a staff person assigned to work with directly, and the Executive Director made every effort to make herself available for any purpose related to advancing the work of the PIR. Prior to every session, materials were delivered to Advisory Board members in sufficient time to permit an opportunity to preview the writings and publications that would form the foundation of the subjects to be covered during the public discussions. Staff members made certain that any questions, concerns, or modifications that Advisory Board members had would be answered or incorporated.

Although the Advisory Board encountered a fair share of criticism during its tenure, Dr. Franklin was able to lead the group through some of the most trying circumstances, bringing to bear his wisdom and dignity to the efforts of the Advisory Board. He extended the opportunity to voice concerns to those who wished to be heard, but never lost sight of the purpose of the meetings. Without a doubt, the leadership of Dr. John Hope Franklin and Executive Director Judith Winston made it possible for the Advisory Board to continue its work during an otherwise difficult year.

What Should Be Done Next?

The dialogue stimulated by the PIR was only a beginning. One of the things that I learned as a member of the Advisory Board is that this is not a situation in which anyone is being called upon to make a judgment—either/or, right/wrong, worthy/unworthy. Nor are we to draw
a conclusion about race in America. The story is still being told. The conversation and its many related activities are an integral part of the intergenerational work that requires all of us to take a step into the future. This is a challenge that urges America to recognize its stature in the world community as other nations look to us for leadership. It is a challenge that reflects the multi-faceted dimensions of America’s experience with the concept of race. The conversation will move us toward answers about how America can provide leadership to ensure that society honors pluralism in a democracy, but this will be accomplished only if we confront the greatest obstacle to success—and that is indifference.

In my discussions across America, young people ask me why my generation is so focused on the message of injustice. They simply do not see the world in such terms and they are not moved to involvement when they hear speeches about it. In some ways I feel frustrated because on the one hand I fear that indifference will set in and the concept of "reasonable racism" will replace the overt bigotry of our past. Yet, on the other hand, what I also hear is that hope has not been extinguished, that this next generation has been taught to look for attributes in people that go beyond color. They have been inspired to learn about the histories of their families and how those stories relate to America’s story. They recognize where injustice and poor leadership have been asserted, and they see a society that is much improved over what their parents and grandparents lived through. And it is the message of today’s youth, in all its manifestations, that must be incorporated into the analysis by examining how these sentiments expressed can inform the decisions that we will make in the future.

Today’s leaders must find ways to continue the conversation by understanding what the next generation sees. Our future leaders are searching. Many already have impressive credentials that reflect a capacity to work in settings that are as diverse as the imagination allows. They have had the advantage of studying in programs that were created
out of the movements for self-definition, free speech, and civil rights and women's rights. They are the beneficiaries of the technological advances that allow the curious to explore all of the worlds that the Internet and cyberspace have to offer. But the opportunities to bring diverse young people together face-to-face, to learn, to discuss, and to work in the context of institutions that affect us all, are still limited. How their individual talents can inform and shape the whole is seldom explored. The fact that hard decisions are always part of living is not shared and examined with our youth. As a consequence, participation among high school and college students in political campaigns is down as compared to 30 years ago, and although volunteerism in community service activities and religious groups is up, indifference is too often the main theme for the majority. Realizing this fact is essential to answering the question, "What should be done next?"

There is a strong belief that bigotry and prejudice can be overcome with education. Access to quality public education in primary schools is essential and almost everyone agrees that our children deserve this, at the very least. For many, the pursuit of higher education is another path to hope. In today's economy, it is clear that a failure to grasp the information age concepts and skills means being left on the margins. In addition, there is the recognition that we need to utilize our technology and media to deepen insight into problems that may appear to be racial but in reality are far more complex. People are looking for the chance to come together in order for the messages and strategies to be developed. Creating opportunities to engage our communities in the important task of telling our stories, documenting our experiences, and analyzing what those experiences mean in the larger context must be a part of any strategy that is designed to strengthen the chances for creating a more just nation.
A Brief Response to the Critics

The wisdom of many cultures recognizes that the past informs the future. Thus, part of the work that lies ahead for America is the continuing effort to unearth the facts related to our past. Indeed, as that work is done, the opportunities to shape new options for the future will grow.

Though critics suggest that there is no value to continue the conversation about race in America, the circumstances we face in the next century suggest otherwise. The conversation must continue because there are many Americans who remain committed to the idea that this nation offers the promise of equality. It is the vehicle that offers the opportunity for all Americans to deepen their understanding of how their individual decisions and experiences affect our collective future. Some have had the chance to participate in conversations about race relations for generations; others are only beginning to find their way to the table. There are many more voices that must be heard to ensure the expansion of possibilities for positive participation in the domestic and international economy, for governance at all levels, and for planning and building the leadership in the next generation.

The conversation must continue in order to confront the contextual changes that are occurring all around us. Our connections to the rest of the world are growing through economic relationships, political negotiations, and international family relations. It was neither happenstance nor calculated decision-making that moved our society into this position; rather, it was the unavoidable consequence of our advancement in technology, the development of new markets, and the growth of our capacity in telecommunications. Yet, even with all of these advancements, what has been left unaddressed are the consequences of how people will respond once the successes of governments, businesses, and scientists are realized. The unfortunate fact that preliminary experi-
ences have not always been positive—conflicts based upon troubled race and ethnic relations in Europe, Asia, the African continent, and America—illustrate that the challenges we face are enormous.

Concluding Remarks

If we are to be realistic about the future, we must accept the idea that complexities await for which there is no single best answer or resolution—only infinite possibilities exist. Thus, if we seek to be inventive and intentional in forging the possibilities that will shape our society, we have no choice but to continue the conversation. The conversation, however, need not be limited to verbal exchange. It can occur in a myriad of creative outlets, through the arts, through language acquisition programs, through child health and immunization efforts, and through self-assessment and candidate development programs in the private sector.

The richest sources of information are likely to be found in those places that are undergoing the most rapid change. Our most valuable tools in the future may not be based on what has been previously tried and tested. Instead, they may emerge from the segment of our population that has forged relationships during a time in which “the politics of protest” has been joined by “the politics of possibilities.” In essence, the politics of possibilities allows people to see where the limitations lie, assess the alternatives in light of the limitations, set priorities, and work together to create new ways to meet needs.\(^\text{18}\)

Those who called the President’s Initiative on Race disingenuous, ineffective, and off-target are wrong. The PIR was not compelled by violence or crisis. It was not an initiative that would earn the politician who introduced it significant political capital. In fact, it was an effort that seemed designed to bring to light the conversations that were already taking place in local communities across the nation. While
critics offered examples of inadequate progress made since the work of the 1960s by the McCone Commission and the Kerner Commission, their criticism did not give adequate attention to all the pertinent factors, including those that I have raised.

My experiences are those of an immigrant family growing up in a time when America was forced to confront the moral degradation of racial segregation and discrimination in the middle of the twentieth century. The world and society that I was born into are far different from the world and society in which I now function. At the beginning of a new century, my voice follows and precedes generations who have sought, and new generations who will seek, ways to bring our nation closer to its highest aspirations. And I, along with many others who are neither black nor white, have a voice and contribution to add to those who recognize that we still have a long way to go.

* * *

Angela E. Oh served on the Advisory Board to the President’s Initiative on Race. She is currently a Commissioner on the Los Angeles City Human Relations Commission and a national lecturer on issues of race, diversity and the future of American society.

* * *
Endnotes

1The President’s Initiative on Race was introduced on June 13, 1997 during the commencement ceremony at the University of California, San Diego. In the course of his remarks, President Clinton noted that the focus of his Initiative on Race was to help educate Americans about the facts surrounding issues of race, to promote dialogue in all communities, to recruit and encourage leadership, and to recommend concrete solutions to bridge the racial divides. See “Remarks by the President at UCSD Commencement,” www.whitehouse.gov/Initiatives/OneAmerica.

2Recognition of the unique experiences of African Americans in this country was an explicit part of the President’s Initiative on Race.


6Testimony of Douglas Massey, University of Pennsylvania, at Advisory Board meeting on Race and Poverty held on February 11, 1998 in San Jose, California. Massey’s remarks were about the problem of housing segregation. His studies document the persistent problem of racial discrimination. For blacks, he said poverty is linked to segregated housing and that discrimination is the cause of much of the segregation. He urged active government intervention to eliminate such discrimination.


10 The information prepared by the AFL-CIO Labor Research Division was presented during a meeting of the Advisory Board held on June 18, 1998 in Washington, DC. A summary of findings was entitled, *The Continuance of Racial Disparity* (AFL-CIO, June 1998).


13 On June 7, 1999, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13125, directing all federal agencies to include Asian Pacific Americans in programs that address health and quality of life issues (including education, housing, labor, economic and community development). Many hope that the lack of information about Asian Pacific Americans will not persist in the future with the adoption of this new White House directive in place.

14 The Advisory Board's report to the President is entitled, "One America in the 21st Century—Forging a New Future." In addition, the Advisory Board also produced a book entitled *Pathways to the Future*. This book provides a tool for those who want to know about promising practices that were identified by the President's Race Initiative during its cross-country travels. The programs, organizations and resource materials listed in the book were selected because they offer innovative approaches to expanding opportunities for involvement and change. The publications can be viewed at www.whitehouse.gov/Initiatives/OneAmerica. The publications can be obtained from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328. ISBN 0-16-049944-5.

15 During a session held on March 23, 1998 at the University of Colorado in Denver, various Native American Indian tribes staged a protest, voicing concern about the absence of a native person on the Advisory Board. As the meeting started, Dr. Franklin was repeatedly interrupted as he tried to explain his family's background, the special efforts that were being made to reach out to Native American Indians during the year, and the different points of view from other tribes that had met with members of the Advisory Board. In the end, the protests were made part of the record and the Advisory Board was able to receive information about stereotyping of racial minorities.
"The concept of "reasonable racism" is one that speaks to the way in which we have become rational about our bigotry and prejudice. It says in essence, "My prejudice is rational (however regrettable), because all of the information I have about the other says I should hold this prejudice. It is not subtle, it is not embarrassed. It is simply a reasonable position for me to take, in light of what I know." For more on this concept, see Jody David Armour, Negrophobia and Reasonable Racism: The Hidden Costs of Being Black in America (Critical America) (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1997).

The writings of people like Abigail and Stephen Thernstrom have documented facts that support the point of view held by these young people. The improvements in quality of life, the institutional changes in our courts and political systems, and the disapprobation of overt discriminatory practices are, in fact, positive changes.

The politics of possibilities is a dynamic that is illustrated by what occurs in many immigrant populations. I first came upon this notion in a conversation with a veteran journalist who made the observation that in her day, the politics of protest served the civil rights movement well. Today, it is different and rarely are mass demonstrations viewed as effective or meaningful. Rather, it is the response of newcomers that is dramatically changing the dynamics of our country. These are people who are typically locked out of participation in society because of language barriers, differences in customs and social practices, and a sheer lack of informal networks that are often necessary to navigate the social, economic and political environs. As a consequence, immigrants will establish their own enclaves, create their own financial assistance programs through networks that are family-based, and in the first generation, invest time and effort in stabilizing the family so that the second generation can experience success.
Contributors
Contributors

Pauline Agbayani-Siewert has a joint appointment as an Assistant Professor with the Asian American Studies Center and the Department of Social Welfare at UCLA. She has focused much of her research on cross-cultural mental health practice and service delivery, with an emphasis on Asian and Filipino American populations and also does work on gender roles, program evaluation and community needs assessment. Her research includes secondary data analysis in studies of cross-cultural competence of mental health workers; Asian American gender roles and domestic violence; and minority mental health. Her list of publications includes “Identifying social support characteristics among African American and Filipino American parents with school-aged children,” the chapter “Filipino Americans,” in Asian Americans: A Survey of Ethnic Groups, and “Filipino American Culture and Family: Guidelines for the Practitioner.”

Yen Le Espiritu is Professor of Ethnic Studies and Sociology at the University of California, San Diego. She has a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California, Los Angeles. She has served on advisory committees for the Smithsonian Institution, the American College Testing, and the UC Office of the President’s Asian Language Task Force. Professor Espiritu has done research on race relations, ethnic identities, gender, and immigration. Originally from Vietnam, she is the author of numerous journal articles and three books: Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging Institutions and Identities (1992), Filipino American Lives (1994), and Asian American Women and Men: Labor, Laws, and Love (1997).

Tarry Hum is an Assistant Professor of Urban Studies at Queens College (New York) and an affiliated researcher with the Asian/Pacific/American Studies Program at New York University. She recently completed her

Christine Inglis is Director of the Multicultural Research Centre and Associate Dean (Research) in the Faculty of Education, University of Sydney where she is Associate Professor in the School of Social, Policy and Curriculum Studies and is also President of the International Sociological Association. She has a Ph.D. from the London School of Economics in Sociology and an M.A. from the Australian National University. She has undertaken research and policy evaluation in migration and ethnic relations in Australia with a particular focus on the Asia Pacific region. Current research interests include examining the impact of Asian immigration on Australian institutions and a comparison of the migration and settlement patterns of Chinese and British professionals. Recent publications include: "Middle Class Migration: New Considerations in Research and Policy" (1999) in The Future of Australian Multiculturalism edited by G. Hage and R. Couch; "Australia" and "Papua New Guinea" (1998) in L. Pan ed. The Encyclopedia of the

Robert George Lee is Associate Professor of American Civilization at Brown University. He previously served as Associate Director of the Brown University Center for the Study of Race and Ethnicity in America and has been chair of the Rhode Island State Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights. Professor Lee has written on a wide range of topics in Asian American history and literature. He is the editor of Dear Miye, Letters Home From Japan 1939-47 (Stanford University Press 1996) and the author of Orientals: Asian Americans in Popular Culture (Temple University Press, 1999).

Taeku Lee is Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Harvard’s John F Kennedy School of Government. A political scientist by training, he specializes in public opinion, racial politics, social movements, and social policy. His forthcoming book, Two Nations, Separate Grooves, examines the mobilization and activation of public beliefs on race during the Civil Rights Movement. Lee also writes on Asian Pacific American politics with a special focus on the racialization of Chinese Americans during the campaign finance controversy and the measurement and significance of anti-Asian attitudes. Lee holds degrees from the University of Michigan, Harvard University, and the University of Chicago. At Harvard, he is affiliated with the Malcolm Wiener Center for Social Policy, the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics, and Public Policy, Harvard’s Program in Health Policy, and its new Multi-disciplinary Program on Inequality and Social Policy. He is on leave during the 1999-2000 academic year as a Robert Wood Johnson Health Policy Scholar at Yale University.
Angela E. Oh is a trial attorney who is currently engaged in writing and public lectures on a wide spectrum of issues related to race, diversity, and American society. She serves as a Commissioner on the Los Angeles City Human Relations Commission and is a Trustee or Board Board Member for several organizations. Ms. Oh was a partner at the Los Angeles law firm of Beck, De Corso, Daly, Barrera & Oh until June 1997, when she was appointed by President Clinton to the President’s Initiative on Race. At the conclusion of her appointment, she turned her focus from the law in order to expand the depth of the race dialogue across the nation. From January to June 1999, she was a Lecturer, Visiting Scholar, and Lawyer-in-Residence at UCLA. Ms. Oh continues to address audiences at universities, government agencies, professional and private organizations, and business enterprises. Her speeches and writings reflect the opportunities and challenges of America’s diversity in the 21st century.

Michael Omi is associate professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. He received an A.B. in Sociology from the University of California, Berkeley and a Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Along with Howard Winant, he is the author of *Racial Formation in the United States* (2nd edition, 1994) and numerous articles on racial theory and politics. He has also written about right-wing political movements (“Shifting the Blame: Ideology and Politics in the Post-Civil Rights Era, *Critical Sociology* (Fall 1992); Asian Americans and race relations (“Situating Asian Americans in the Political Discourse on Affirmative Action,” *Representations*, Number 55 (Summer 1996), and the U.S. Census (“Racial Identity and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification,” *Law & Inequality*, Volume XV, Number 1 (Winter 1997). He is currently completing a study of the emerging practices of anti-racist organizations in the United States. In 1990, he was the recipient of Berkeley’s Distinguished Teaching Award.

Edward J.W. Park is the Director of Asian Pacific American Studies Program at the Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles. He received his Ph.D. in Ethnic Studies and a Master's degree in City Planning, both at the University of California at Berkeley. His research topics include Asian American politics, ethnic economy, and race relations. He currently serves on the Program Committee of the Korean American Museum and the Advisory Panel of the L.A. as Subject Project of the Getty Research Institute. His publications include "Competing Visions: Political Formation of Korean Americans in Los Angeles, 1992-1997" (Amerasia Journal, 1998); "Friends or Enemies?:

Shamit Saggar is a Senior Lecturer in Government at Queen Mary & Westfield College, University of London. He was awarded his Ph.D. at the University of Essex in 1989. He has held faculty posts at the Universities of Essex and Liverpool. He is currently on leave from QMW and holds a John Adam Fellowship at the Institute of United States Studies of the School of Advanced Studies, University of London, where he is working on an intellectual history of Anglo-American race relations. His main research and applied interests are British politics, ethnic minority political participation, comparative immigration policies, think-tanks and advocacy groups, urban regeneration, and regulation policy. His next book, Race and Representation, will be published by Macmillan Press in 2000. Dr Saggar’s previous books include: Race and Public Policy (Avebury, 1991), Race and Politics in Britain (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), The General Election 1997: Ethnic Minorities and Electoral Politics (CRE, 1998), and Race and British Electoral Politics (ed) (UCL Press, 1998).

Leland T. Saito is Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies and Urban Studies and Planning at the University of California, San Diego. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of California, Los Angeles. His research and publications focus on urban politics, economic development, and race relations among Asian Americans,
Latinos, and Whites in multiracial communities, particularly in Los Angeles, New York City, and San Diego. He has written numerous articles on these topics and a book, *Race and Politics: Asian Americans, Latinos, and Whites in a Los Angeles Suburb* (1998). He has served on advisory committees on race relations and urban economic development, including committees established by the Lieutenant Governor of California and the city of San Diego.

Karen Umemoto, Ph.D., is an assistant professor in the Department of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Hawai‘i at Manoa. She received her Master’s degree in Asian American Studies at the University of California at Los Angeles (1987) and her doctorate in Urban Studies from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (1998). Her general area of interest is planning and governance in a multicultural society with a focus on race relations and racial conflict. Her publications include “A Profile of Race-bias Hate Crimes in Los Angeles County” (with Mikami, 1999), “Blacks and Koreans in Los Angeles: The Case of LaTasha Harlins and Soon Ja Du” (1994) and “Life and Work in the Inner City” and “Diversity Within a Common Agenda” (with Ong, 1994). Her areas of research include hate crimes, gang violence and community building. She is currently a consultant for the National Institutes Against Hate Crimes, a program of the Museum of Tolerance in Los Angeles.

Michela Zonta is a doctoral student at the Department of Urban Planning, UCLA, and a researcher at the Lewis Center for Regional Policy Studies, UCLA. She was previously a researcher at the Istituto Superiore di Sociologia (Institute of Sociological Research) in Milan, Italy, where she published a number of reports on Italian metropolitan development and governance, including the final demographic and socio-economic report for the New Master Plan of the City of Turin, and
the analysis of Italian metropolitan areas for the Ministry of Urban Areas, in view of the administrative establishment of metropolitan areas in Italy. She holds a Master in Urban Planning from UCLA. Her research interests include residential segregation among ethnic and racial groups, the history of the built environment, federal housing policies, and Welfare Reform.
Leadership Education for Asian Pacifies, Inc. (LEAP) is a national, non-profit, nonpartisan, community-based organization based in Los Angeles, California. Founded in 1982, LEAP's mission is to achieve full participation and equality for Asian Pacific Americans through leadership, empowerment and policy. With a wealth of information on Asian Pacific Americans and a national reputation as a leading Asian Pacific American organization, LEAP continues to raise the visibility and leadership effectiveness of Asian Pacific Americans.

Through its Leadership Management Institute, LEAP has trained tens of thousands of people nationwide — university and high school students as well as individuals in the community, public, and private sectors — and remains the only Asian Pacific American organization offering extensive leadership and cultural diversity training programs and services. LEAP is also the founder of the Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute, the only national center devoted to analyzing policy issues impacting Asian Pacific Americans, and the Community Development Institute, a national effort to build the leadership capacity of Asian Pacific American communities.

Alvenia Rhea Albright, American Express
Ghulam Bombaywala, Fivestar Restaurants
Ming Chang, MEC International, LLC
J.T. (Ted) Childs, Jr, IBM
Rockwell Chin, NYC Commission on Human Rights
Muzaffar Chishti, UNITE!
Vishalba Desai, The Asia Society
Erwin Furukawa, Pacific Bell
Harry Gee, Law Office of Harry Gee
Patrick Hayashi, University of California
Clinton Helenhi, Community Activist
Kenton Ho, TRW
Kenneth Kasamatsu, California Bank & Trust
David L. Kim, Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc.
Janice Koyama, University of California, Los Angeles
Ngan Tai Le, Illinois Dept. of Human Services
William H. "Mo" Marumoto, Boyden, Inc.
Cao O, Asian American Federation of New York
Frank Quevedo, Southern California Edison
Prany Sanamkone, University of California, Irvine
Diana Sun, Capital One
William Tamayo, Attorney at Law
Tritia Toyota, KCBS-TV
Peter Wiersama, Asian Business Ventures
Sou Wong-Lee, Raytheon Systems Company
Helen Zia, Author & Community Activist

J.D. Hokoyama, President & Executive Director

STAFF
Linda Akutagawa, Director of External Relations
Christine Itano, Director of Training
Glenn Kawashiki, Vice President for Leadership
Gina Lew, Director of Development
Dean Minura, Information Technology Specialist
Grant Sunoo, Administrative Assistant
Melissa Szeto, Development Associate
Grace Toy, Director of Finance and Administration
Jill Tsutsui, Program Coordinator

CONSULTANTS
Fatima Bustos-Choy, Gaia Flow Consulting
Alan Kumamoto, Kumamoto Associates
John Y. Tateishi, Tateishi/Shinoda & Associates

LEAP
Leadership Education for Asian Pacifies, Inc.
327 East Second Street, Suite 226
Los Angeles, CA 90012-4210
Tel: 213-485-1422 Fax: 213-485-0030
Email: leap@leap.org Web: www.leap.org
The UCLA Asian American Studies Center, founded in 1969, is the largest and most comprehensive program of its kind in the nation, focusing on the historical, contemporary, and future status and experiences of Asian and Pacific Islander Americans. The Center has active multi-disciplinary core programs in basic, applied, and policy research, undergraduate and graduate teaching, publications, video documentation and new media technology, archival and library acquisitions, student leadership development, joint university-community research projects, and public educational activities. Annually, it offers over 70 classes, which enroll over 3,000 students in its BA and MA programs. The Center’s Press publishes Amerasia Journal, the leading interdisciplinary journal for the field of Asian American Studies, as well as other major reports, publications, CD-ROMs, videos in public policy, the arts and humanities, the professional disciplines, and the social sciences. The Center attracts scholars, writers, artists, decision-makers, and students from across the nation and world, who use its extensive library and archival holdings in Asian American Studies, and consult with the Center’s distinguished faculty and staff. It also maintains close working relationships with organizations, museums, media, and social services agencies in Southern California and throughout the country.

UCLA Asian American Studies Center, Faculty Advisory Committee, 2000

James Lubben, Chair, Social Welfare
Pauline Aghayani-Siewert, Social Welfare
Emil Berkanovic, Public Health
Mitchell Chang, Education
Lucie Cheng, Sociology
King-Kok Cheung, English
Clara Chu, Library and Information Studies
Cindy Fan, Geography
Gaurang Mittu Gulati, Latino
Nancy Harada, Medicine
Wei-Yin Hu, Economics
Yuji Ichioka, History
Marjorie Kagawa-Singer, Public Health
Jerry Kang, Law
Suegendi Kar, Public Health
Harry Kim, Emeritus, Social Welfare
Vinay Lal, History
Rachel Lee, English
Jinji Ling, English
David Wong Louie, English
Mitchell Maki, Social Welfare
Takashi Maishidani, Medicine
Valerie Matsusoto, History
Alice Moon, Social Welfare
Robert Nakamura, Film and Television
Kazuo Nihiura, Psychiatry
Paul Ong, Urban Planning
William Ouchi, Management
Geraldine Padilla, Nursing
Kyeyoung Park, Anthropology
Michael Salzman, History
Shu-Mei Shih, East Asian Studies
David Takeuchi, Psychiatry
James Tong, Political Science
Cindy Yee-Bradbury, Psychology
Henry Yu, History
Min Zhou, Sociology
Don Nakamishi, Director, Education

UCLA Asian American Studies Center Staff, 2000

Don T. Nakamishi, Director
Robert A. Nakamura, Associate Director/EthnoCommunications
Enrique de la Cruz, Assistant Director/Curriculum
Christine Wang, Center Management Coordinator
Cathy Castor, Center Office Manager
Marjorie Lee, Reading Room Coordinator
Judy Soo Hoo, RR Assistant Coordinator
Jennifer Kim, Assistant Director, Center for EthnoCommunications
Russell C. Leong, Publications/Amerasia Journal Editor
Glenn Omatsu, Amerasia Journal Associate Editor/Crosscurrents
Mary Uyematsu Kao, Publications Coordinator
Charles Ku, Publications Business Manager
Meg Malpaya Thornton, Student/Community Projects Coordinator
Sefa Aina, SCP Assistant/Coordinator
Yuji Ichioka, Associate Research and Adjunct Professor
Irene Soriano, Curriculum Assistant

UCLA Asian American Studies Center
3230 Campbell Hall
405 Hilgard Avenue
Los Angeles, California 90095-1546
web site: http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/aasc

TEL.: (310) 825-2974
FAX: (310) 206-9866
E-mail: dtn@ucla.edu
OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY THE LEAP ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE AND UCLA ASIAN AMERICAN STUDIES CENTER

THE STATE OF ASIAN PACIFIC AMERICAN SERIES

REFRAMING THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE
This study examines the socioeconomic impact of Asian immigrants and formulates new ways of viewing immigration in a constantly-evolving global environment. Specific emphasis is placed on the participation of immigrants in the nation's education system, entrepreneurial sector, and political process. 1996/322 pp/$17

ECONOMIC DIVERSITY, ISSUES & POLICIES
A report that documents the labor, immigration and education patterns that shaped the diverse Asian Pacific American population. The study also examines key sectors of the economy heavily impacted by Asian Pacific Americans and shows how APAs can transform major public policy debates over economic restructuring. 1994/305 pp/$15

POLICY ISSUES TO THE YEAR 2020
This report forecasts a near tripling of the Asian Pacific American population by the year 2020 and examines the profound implications of these demographic changes for national public policy. APA experts offer policy analysis and recommendations in a range of areas, including race relations and civil rights, education, health, labor, media, and the arts. 1993/318 pp/$15

OTHER TITLES

BEYOND ASIAN AMERICAN POVERTY:
COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICIES & STRATEGIES
This study examines the needs of low-income Asian Pacific communities in Los Angeles and offers community economic development strategies and recommendations in the
areas of housing, job training, workers’ rights, and small business development. 1993/171 pp/$12

COMMON GROUND:
PERSPECTIVES ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION... AND ITS IMPACT ON APAs
A compilation of essays written by prominent Asian Pacific American business, government, and community leaders that examines the issues and far-reaching implications of affirmative action. 1995/44 pp/$3

COMING SOON IN 2000

POLICY ISSUES TO THE YEAR 2020, 2ND EDITION
Based on new demographic data, this report contains updates of the original policy monographs, as well as new chapters addressing current policy issues impacting APAs, such as the campaign finance reform debate, the Hawaiian sovereignty movement, high technology business development, and racial stereotyping in the media.

THE LESSONS OF PARCEL C: REFLECTIONS ON COMMUNITY LAWYERING
The first volume of a new series exploring the intersections between legal research and public policy, this report documents Boston Chinatown’s organizing experience in its battle to wrangle Parcel C from institutional expansion and preserve it for community use.

For more information or to order, contact:
LEAP Asian Pacific American Public Policy Institute
c/o Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. (LEAP)
327 East Second Street, Suite 226
Los Angeles, CA 90012-4210
Tel: 213-485-1422
Fax: 213-485-0050
Email: leap@leap.org
To better serve the needs of our readers, your answers to the following questions are greatly appreciated.

How did you learn of this publication?
- Friend/Colleague
- Teacher/Professor
- Internet/Web
- Newspaper
- Magazine
- Event (please specify): ______
- Other (please specify): ______

What population(s) does your work most impact?
Check all that apply
- Asian Pacific American
- Cambodian
- Chinese
- Filipino
- Hmong
- Japanese
- Korean
- Laotian
- Pacific Islander
- South Asian
- Vietnamese
- Other: ______

Did you purchase this book for:
- Work/business (if yes, please answer questions below)
- Personal interest
- School
- Other (please specify): ______

Which of the following best describes your work?
Check all that apply:
- Business/Professional
- Civil rights/social justice
- Cultural preservation
- Economic development
- Education
- Government/Politics
- Health
- Leadership/Training
- Social services
- Other (please specify): ______

Please add me to LEAP's mailing list

Name ____________________________________________________________
Title ____________________________________________________________
Organization _____________________________________________________
Mailing Address ________________________________________________
City ____________________________________________________________
State __________________________________________________________
Zip ______________________________________________________________
Phone __________________________________________________________
Fax ______________________________________________________________
Email __________________________________________________________

Please return to LEAP: 327 E. Second St. Ste. 226, Los Angeles, CA 90012 4210